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SUMMARY 
This thesis is a study of British colonial policy in southern Africa in the 19th century. More 
specifically it looks at how British imperial policy, in the period 187 5 to 1881, played itself out 
in two British colonies in southern Africa, under the direction of a British imperial agent, 
William Owen Lanyon. It sets Lanyon in the context of the frontiers and attempts to link the 
histories of the people who lived there, the Africans, Boers and British settlers on the one hand, 
and the histories of colonial policy on the other. In doing so it also unravels the relationship 
between Lanyon and his superiors in London and those in southern Africa. 
In 1875 Owen Lanyon arrived in Griqualand West, where his brief was to help promote a 
confederation policy in southern Africa. Because of the discovery of diamonds some years 
earlier, Lanyon's administration had to take account of the rising mining industry and the 
aggressive new capitalist economy. He also had to deal with Griqua and Tlhaping resistance to 
colonialism. Lanyon was transferred to the Transvaal in 1879, where he was confronted by 
another community that was dissatisfied with British rule: the Transvaal Boers. Indeed, in 
Pretoria he was faced with an extremely difficult situation, which he handled very poorly. Boer 
resistance to imperial rule eventually came to a head when war broke out and Lanyon and his 
officials were among those besieged in Pretoria. In February 1881 imperial troops suffered defeat 
at the hands of Boer commandos at Majuba and Lan yon was recalled to Britain. 
In both colonies Lanyon was caught up in the struggle between the imperial power and the local 
people and, seen in a larger context, in the conflict for white control over the land and labour of 
Africans and that between the old pre-mineral South Africa and the new capitalist order. He 
made a crucial contribution to developments in the sub-continent and it is remarkable that his 
role in southern Africa has thus far been neglected. 
***************** 
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INTRODUCTION 
This thesis is a study of British colonial policy in the melting-pot of the frontiers of the southern 
African interior in the 1870s and early 1880s. It examines imperial policies of the time through 
the prism of an individual, a British imperial agent, William Owen Lanyon. His role in two 
remote colonial possessions is examined from the year 187 5, when he arrived in southern Africa 
to take up his appointment as administrator of Griqualand West, to 1881, when he was obliged 
to relinquish his position at the head of the administration in the Transvaal. He was then recalled 
to Britain and returned home in disgrace. The thesis investigates the interaction between Lanyon 
and the people of these two colonies - Africans, settlers, and Boers1 - as well as his own 
complicated relations with the imperial policy-makers in Britain and his superiors in southern 
Africa. His attitude to those over whom he ruled and theirs to him was one of mutual dislike, 
often contempt, throughout his more than five years' service. The reasons for this and its 
implications will also be examined. Paradoxically Lanyon believed implicitly in imperial control 
but as will be seen, translated it into colonial prerogative in his policy-making in both Kimberley 
and Pretoria. This had the effect of weakening imperial authority and ultimately led to his failure 
as imperial relations with the Boers in the Transvaal deteriorated into war. 
Put differently, was Owen Lanyon simply a puppet on an imperial string, an official whose 
actions were controlled by his imperial superiors? He had after all to work within parameters laid 
down by his superiors. This was particularly the case under Lord Camarvon, who was the 
secretary of state for the colonies when Lanyon began his term of office in Griqualand West in 
1875. Camarvon promoted a policy of confederation at the time and appointed 'puppets' to 
further this specific policy. Lanyon, in this sense, can perhaps be seen as one of these puppets, 
although Bartle Frere, Theophilus Shepstone and Gamet Wolseley (in 1875), certainly cannot 
be classified as Camarvon's puppets. When Sir Michael Hicks Beach took over from Camarvon 
in the Colonial Office, Lanyon' s role vis a vis the secretary of state changed. Hicks Beach upheld 
For an explanation of terms see below. In this thesis 'settlers' refers primarily to people of British origin 
but also includes immigrants from other countries, many of whom flocked to Kimberley when diamonds 
were discovered. The term Boer is used for people of Dutch origin. 
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the ideal of confederation in southern Africa but he was by no means as convinced about its 
merits as Camarvon. Hicks Beach did not appoint Lanyon as a puppet in the Transvaal, but rather 
as someone who had the credentials to be a good administrator. 
It will become clear that Lanyon was also an innovator, playing a crucial role in pointing the way 
to a thoroughly colonised southern Africa that was emerging at the time. It will be shown, in 
other words, that he was not merely carrying out imperial policy but was actively involved in 
relationships and struggles between imperial power, the settlers, the Africans and the Boers. It 
will also become clear that he was a key player in the developing conflict between the old pre-
mineral southern Africa and the new aggressive capitalist political economy that was beginning 
to take shape after the discovery of diamonds. The subcontinent was poised for change and 
Lanyon, it will be argued, made a more significant contribution to developments on southern 
Africa in the 1870s and 1880s than has thus far been acknowledged. 
As a British colonial agent, Lanyon received his directives from the Colonial Office in London, 
although these filtered down to him through successive high commissioners based in Cape Town 
and later, in Pietermaritzburg. Moreover, the British possessions in which Lanyon served as 
administrator were central to the development of Britain's strategies in South Africa during the 
years he was at their helm. So it is hardly surprising that more often than not the directives he 
received were fairly explicit. In this sense Lanyon's freedom of action was undoubtedly limited. 
But this was not the whole picture. He also had to implement these instructions in accordance 
with changing local conditions. He was in effect buffeted on all sides by pressures and restraints. 
In Griqualand West Lanyon was given more freedom to act than in the Transvaal, but his task 
was a difficult one. The forces of embryonic capitalism and the dynamics of production after the 
discovery of diamonds in 1867, made considerable demands on his abilities as a local imperial 
agent. Taking over from Richard Southey, he had to redefine the state's role in the new mining 
economy. He had to cope with a rebellious digger community, avaricious merchants and a 
dramatic drop in the price of diamonds which threatened to put his administration even further 
into the red. After his first year in Kimberley, Lanyon wrote plaintively to his father: 
No one who lives at home can form any conception of the difficulties and dangers which surround the 
driver of a coach like Griqualand. There is as great a difference betwixt an old colony and this, as there 
3 
is between driving a tramway car and taking a coach across a country where there are no roads or 
established routes. And the whole work falls on the driver.2 
This thesis will argue that, despite his growing unpopularity, he made good progress in 
Griqualand West and his years in the colony were perhaps the most significant of his southern 
African career. It will be shown that he played a definitive role in the making of African policy, 
regulating the labour force and expediting the growth of monopoly capitalism in the diamond-
mining industry. And in a military campaign in 1878 he commanded the imperial troops that 
quelled the resistance of the Griqua and Tlhaping to British rule. 
In March 1879, Lanyon was instructed to relocate to the Transvaal. This was hardly a move to 
be relished. There was an atmosphere of simmering unrest in virtually all sectors of the 
population, with Africans chafing under colonial overlordship. Britain's annexation of the South 
African Republic (ZAR) two years before had also woken a slumbering Afrikaner nationalism 
among the scattered Boer community. The Boers were resentful of British rule and it was not 
long before mutual distrust and a thinly veiled hatred developed between them and the new 
administrator. It will be shown that in the Transvaal, at least until April 1880 when there was a 
change in government in Britain, Lan yon' s freedom of action was indeed restricted. At this time, 
more than at any other, he can be described as a puppet on an imperial string. He was hamstrung 
by a lack of money, was subject to crippling legislative restrictions and had to wait for Colonial 
Office approval for constitutional reform. In addition he was subject for six months to the 
overbearing authority of Gamet Wolseley. It was only after Wolseley left, and Colley had 
succeeded him as high commissioner, that Lanyon was released from suffocating control. 
Thereafter he reported directly to the secretary of state rather than through Colley. 
However, the thesis will argue that it was Lanyon's comparative freedom, the loosening of the 
imperial string under Liberal Party rule, which proved fatal to his southern African career. Indeed 
it marked the end of his career in any civil capacity. Lan yon was granted far more latitude in the 
Transvaal from April 1880 and began to exercise it almost immediately. He implemented 
legislative reform and reaffirmed his presiding presence in the making of African policy by 
2 Transvaal Archives, National Archives of South Africa, Pretoria (hereafter TA), A596, vol 11, Lanyon -
Charles Lanyon, 23 October 1876. 
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formalising colonial control over the Pedi. With the Boers he was, however, far less successful. 
Complacency in his own ability and that of the imperial army which backed his autocratic rule 
proved to be a dangerous combination. This thesis will make an assessment not only of Lan yon' s 
contributions but also of the reasons for his failure and ultimate recall. It was then that imperial 
control was exerted in the fullest sense and Lanyon was unceremoniously removed from the 
southern African imperial stage. 
It is only necessary to mention in passing that some historians, at their most hegemonic in the 
1970s and 1980s were highly critical of purely political and national histories, including studies 
which made use of an uncontextualised biographical approach. They insisted that as capitalism 
and early industrialisation gathered momentum it was economic forces, rather than the role of 
the individual, that dictated the course of South African history. The claim was made that many 
of the studies of imperial policy in South Africa over-emphasised the importance of the formal 
imperial framework and the 'personal preoccupations' ofindividual policy-makers. 3 In doing so, 
these historians have been accused oflosing sight of the primacy of economic imperatives which 
underpinned such policies. But as Colin Webb puts it in an incisive counter-argument, while it 
is agreed that the values of individuals are shaped by the societies of which they are part, and that 
the 'underlying system of production' of these societies is undeniably important in defining 
societal values, its role should not be over-played. He pleads instead for a more personalised type 
of history in which 'individual will and intelligence' are carefully scrutinised.4 
Bearing this debate in mind, the importance of the dynamic forces engendered by the mineral 
revolution is neither denied nor neglected in this thesis. The imperial records are certainly still 
there, but I try to interrogate them in terms of the experiences of those who were not policy 
makers. While readily accepting that the political cannot be divorced from the economic and the 
social, this study of imperial policy focuses primarily on their interaction, albeit through the 
experiences and reflections of an individual imperial agent. As Christopher Saunders has put it 
in his discussion of the work done by social historians, who in the 1980s began to tum to studies 
3 
4 
A Atmore & S Marks, 'The imperial factor in South Africa in the nineteenth century: towards a 
reassessment, Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History, 3(1 ), 197 4, pp 120-129. 
C de B Webb, 'The origins of the war: problems of interpretation' in AH Duminy & CC Ballard, The 
Anglo-Zulu War: new perspectives (Pietermaritzburg, 1981 ), pp 8, 10-11. 
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of South Africa's more recent past, 
they allowed room for human agency and did not see state policies as only impositions from above - the 
mere diktat of capital- [and] were able to point to how whites had often been divided, and how Africans 
had helped determine the way they were ruled ... The best of such work always related individual lives to 
broader social processes, so opening new perspectives on the changing experience of the majority.5 
A similar social-history approach is adopted in this thesis. It looks at the society and economy 
of the communities living in Griqualand West and in the Transvaal and studies their 
interrelationship and interaction during Lanyon's two terms of office. It begins with an 
examination of the processes of social change within the societies living near the confluence of 
the Orange and Vaal Rivers in the 1870s - the very place where and time when southern African 
communities of every class and ethnic identity were plunged into the maelstrom of the mineral 
revolution. Here the Griqua and Tlhaping people came under Lanyon's sway and he also had to 
deal with the mining community. When he moved to the Transvaal it was the Pedi polity that he 
put under colonial control and he struggled, without success, against the resistance of the 
Transvaal Boers. In each case the reactions to and interactions of communities with British rule 
will be examined. 
Imperial history is coming back into vogue in South Africa. The proliferation of social histories 
of African societies and studies of the dynamics of proletarianisation which were in fashion in 
the 1980s, have given way in post-democratic South Africa to Afrocentric forays and theoretical 
studies on the making of identity. But there is also a perceptible drift back towards our imperial 
roots and the making of both colonial and modem South Africa in the work of Ross, Keegan, 
Dubow and Lambert on South Africanism.6 
It is not the intention of the thesis to offer a 'Life and Times' biography of Owen Lanyon. It is 
thus unnecessary to justify what might at first glance be seen as a biographical approach in this 
5 
6 
C Saunders, The making of the South African past: major historians on race and class (Cape Town & 
Johannesburg, 1988), pp 184-185. For examples of this type of history and these historians, Saunders 
points to the works in S Marks & R Rathbone (eds), Industrialisation and social change in South Africa: 
African class formation, culture and consciousness 1870-1930 (London, 1988). 
R Ross, Status and respectability in the Cape Colony, 1750-1870: a tragedy of manners (Cambridge, 
1999); J Lambert, 'South African British? Or dominion South Africans? The evolution of an identity in 
the 1910s and 1920s', South African Historical Journal, 43, 2000. 
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fresh examination of the 'imperial factor' m southern Africa. The last decade has seen 
historiographical interest swinging back to viewing individuals as important in their own right 
as agents of change. In South Africa this is reflected in a proliferation of studies on political and 
military figures who dominated the imperial and colonial stage in South Africa in the late 19th 
and early 20th centuries. These include works by Surridge on Kitchener, 7 Torrance on Selbome, 8 
Lavin on Curtis9 and McCracken on Porter. IO Social history has also produced a fairly robust 
'biographical' output in Guy's Colenso, Mendelsohn's Marks, Willan's Plaatje and Van 
Onselen's Maine, to mention but a few. 11 
This thesis therefore tries, hopefully in a refreshing way, to harmonise three discrete 
historiographies - one on the high politics of colonial policy-making, another on the experiences 
of African communities under colonial rule, and a third on the rise of Boer nationalism as a 
response to British imperialism. I try to situate Lanyon within these domains ofhistorical writing 
to show how important it is to connect colonial administration and African and Boer subjects in 
a more coherent, encompassing analysis. The study thus moves away from the conventional 
compartmentalisation of South African historiography which has segregated the past and in many 
ways under-represented second-tier administrators in their relationship with the whole gamut of 
colonial societies. 
It is also appropriate to explain the terminology used in this study. Because it focuses on the way 
in which imperial policy was played out in two successive administratorships in British South 
7 
8 
9 
IO 
11 
KT Surridge, Managing the South African War, 1899-1902: politicians v generals (Wodbridge, 1998). 
DE Torrance, The strange death of the liberal empire: Lord Se/borne in South Africa (Montreal, 1996). 
See also D Waley, A liberal life: Sydney, Earl Buxton, 1853-19 34, statesman, governor-general of South 
Africa (Hassocks, 1999). 
D Lavin, From empire to international commonwealth: a biography of Lionel Curtis (Oxford, 1995). 
JL McCracken, New light at the Cape of Good Hope: William Porter, the father of Cape liberalism 
(Belfast, 1993). 
J Guy, The heretic: a study of the life of John William Colenso, 1814-1883 (Johannesburg, 1983); R 
Mendelsohn, Sammy Marks: 'the uncrowned king of the Transvaal' (Cape Town, 1991); B Willan, Sol 
Plaatje: a biography (Johannesburg, 1984); C van Onselen, The seed is mine: the life of Kas Maine, a 
South African sharecropper, 1894-1985 (Cape Town, 1996). See also J Guy, The view across the river: 
Harriette Colenso and the Zulu struggle against imperialism (Oxford, 2002). 
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African states, a narrative and empirical methodology is followed. There is a difference of 
opinion in the literature about what to call the people of Dutch descent who had settled in the 
interior of southern Africa by the mid- l 91h century. Many of the more recently published works 
use the term Afrikaner12 while others continue to refer to Boer. 13 In my view the former is hardly 
appropriate until the last decade or so of the 1800s, and may well lead to confusion with Cape 
Afrikaners, to whom the term was indeed applicable earlier in the century. Accordingly, I have 
opted to use Boer, which is how they referred to themselves. 14 Although it can be agued that the 
Boers were also settlers, settlers refers to British settlers (and those from other parts of the 
world) while the term Boers has been used to refer to those of Dutch origin. Because of the time-
frame of this study the term republicans has been used more or less interchangeably with Boers. 
The terms black and white, which many modem-day historians, including Keegan and Marks and 
Atmore see as being 'ideologically determined' 15, are avoided except in isolated cases where they 
are more appropriate. African and colonist are used instead, but there are instances where the 
term white is used in the socio-political sense of a specific cultural construction. 16 
William Owen Lanyon is referred to throughout by the name he preferred himself: Owen 
Lanyon. Although his family addressed him in their letters as 'Willie' and he signed himself as 
such in his own letters to his father and sisters, Lanyon clearly disliked his first name. While in 
South Africa he signed all his other letters, both private and official, with the name W Owen 
Lanyon. When he was awarded the KCMG in 1880, he chose to be known as Sir Owen Lanyon. 
In a letter breaking the news of the award to his father, Sir Charles Lanyon, he confessed: 'I 
intend to drop the William for I hate the name, so as far as the outside world is concerned I shall 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
TJ Keegan, Colonial South Africa and the origins of the racial order (Cape Town, 1996) p ix, uses 
'Afrikaner' as does K Shillington, The colonisation of the southern Tswana 1870-1900 (Johannesburg, 
1985), p xvii. Interestingly, Keegan uses 'Boer' in an earlier work, even for a chapter which deals with 
the history of the Transvaal right up to 1908: TJ Keegan, Rural transformations in industrialising South 
Africa: the southern highveld to 1914 (Johannesburg, 1986), pp 20-50. 
See for example S Marks & A Atmore (eds), Ecomomy and society in pre-industrial South Africa, 'A note 
on orthography', and LM Thompson, A history of South Africa, pp xiii-xiv. 
PH Zietsman, Die taal is gans die volk (Pretoria, 1992), pp 4-9. 
Keegan, Colonial South Africa, p viii; Marks & Atmore, Economy and society, 'A note on orthography'. 
See Keegan, Colonial South Africa, pp viii-ix. 
8 
be known as Sir Owen Lanyon.' 17 
No study has as yet been made of the role of Lan yon in South Africa, but a great deal of material 
has been published on British colonial policy in southern Africa. Indeed, the debate on the nature 
and origins of British imperialism, as is proper in historical discourse, is an ongoing one. This 
will be reviewed in Chapter I in so far as it reflects the years 1875-1881, while Lanyon was in 
South Africa. In fact, the early 1870s are often seen as the beginning of 'new British 
imperialism', a period when there was a renewed urgency in relations between Britain and both 
her formal and informal empire in the subcontinent. 
Apart from the many publications and periodical articles18 on the nature and origins of 
imperialism, which deal with what Bernard Porter calls the 'treacherous field' which has now 
'been churned into a quagmire', 19 there are three publications which discuss the implementation 
of British colonial policy in southern Africa in the 1870s, that have proved particularly useful 
in this study, namely the works by Richard Cope,20 John Benyon21 and CF Goodfellow.22 In 
Ploughshare of war, Cope deals with the origins of the Anglo-Zulu war of 1879, providing a 
lucid and insightful study of imperial policy in South Africa in the 1870s. Of particular 
significance for the purposes of my own study, Cope focuses on the intricate relationships 
between the major role players, notably Shepstone, Cetshwayo, Camarvon, Frere, Wolseley, 
Hicks Beach and Colley, all of whom were involved in the unfolding drama of British policy in 
the Transvaal during Lanyon's term of office. In the words of another historian, this book is 
'essentially a study in the relationships between people from very different cultures and 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
TA, A596, vol 15, Lanyon- Charles Lanyon, 10 April 1880. 
One of the most important of these, used widely in Chapter I and Chapter II below, is the article by Marks 
& Atmore, 'The imperial factor', cited above. For those that deal more specifically with imperial policy 
in the 1870s see for example the works by Cope and Etherington and others, mentioned in the source list. 
B Porter, Review article: 'Imperialism and the scramble', Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History, 
9, 1980, p 76. 
RL Cope, Ploughshare of war: the origins of the Anglo-Zulu War of 1879 (Pietermaritzburg, 1999). 
J Benyon, Proconsul and paramountcy in South Africa: the high commission, British supremacy and the 
subcontinent 1806-1910 (Pietermaritzburg, 1980). 
CF Goodfellow, Great Britain and South African confederation 1870-1881 (Cape Town, 1966). 
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ideologies'23 and it is in this field of social history that I have also drawn much that was 
significant. 
Benyon's Proconsul and paramountcy in South Africa focuses on the line of control from 
Downing Street to the high commissioners in southern Africa. Although it gives important 
insight into the contributions in southern Africa of Barkly, Frere, Wolseley and Colley, it does 
not look closely at Lan yon' s role. Great Britain and South African confederation by Goodfellow, 
although published nearly 40 years ago and now somewhat dated, is perhaps the standard work 
on Camarvon's federation policy. However, the author has since been criticised for placing too 
much emphasis on the personal whims of Lord Camarvon, the secretary of state, in the 
formulation of British policy in the 1870s. Goodfellow's emphasis on the strategic value of the 
Cape in imperial motives, a view also espoused by Robinson and Gallagher,24 has also been 
questioned by specialists in the field.25 Although Goodfellow sees confederation as being 
'pursued by British governments in Southern Africa between 1870-1881 ', 26 my own view, which 
I shall defend in this study, is that Britain only actively pursued confederation for a shorter 
period. For all practical purposes the federation scheme and all ideas of annexing Zululand were 
abandoned in the wake of the overwhelming defeat of the British forces at the hands of the Zulu 
at Isandlwana in early 1879.27 
Another useful study for background information on British involvement in the period is an older 
work by an historian of the liberal school, CW de Kiewiet.28 First published in 1937, The 
23 
24 
25 
26 
27 
28 
J Lambert, review ofR Cope, Ploughshare of war: the origins of the Anglo-Zulu War, inKleio, 32, 2000, 
p 112. 
R Robinson & J Gallagher, Africa and the Victorians: the official mind of imperialism (London, 1969), 
p 59. 
See for example RL Cope, 'Local imperatives and imperial policy: the sources of Lord Carnarvon' s South 
African confederation policy', International Journal of African Historical Studies 20(4), 1987, pp 601, 
607-608. 
Goodfellow, Great Britain and South African confederation, p 204. 
British (imperial) Blue Books were all provided with C reference numbers and are hereafter identified in 
this way; C2260, p 110, no 16, Hicks Beach- Frere, 20 March 1879. 
CW de Kiewiet, The imperial factor in South Africa: a study in politics and economics (London, 1965). 
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imperial factor in South Africa does not have the broader vision that this topic has acquired over 
the following decades. Nor does it take a strong theoretical or ideological position on any 
particular facet of imperialism. Then too, some of the views De Kiewiet expresses, such as that 
on the significance of humanitarian motives in Victorian imperial policy, have since been 
rejected.29 However, some of his insights on imperialism are still relevant and they are written 
with such inimitable flair for expressing innuendoes and undercurrents, that the work cannot be 
ignored in any discussion of Britain in South Africa in the 19th century. 
More recent articles and works on British imperialism in the 19th century include a number of 
excellent new publications. Volumes 3 and 5 of the Oxford history of the British Empire30 , 
covering the 19th century and the historiography of the empire respectively are basic reading, as 
are the works by Cain and Hopkins31 and Hyam32 and articles by Andrew Porter.33 There is also 
a recent publication on the life ofWolseley34 and an edited version of Kimberley's journals for 
the years 1862-1902 which appeared in 1997. 35 
As far as Lanyon's role in Griqualand West (November 1875 to January 1879) is concerned, very 
little indeed has been written. JJ Oberholster' s doctoral thesis, Die anneksasie van Griekwaland-
Wes, 36 is more concerned with the way in which Britain contrived to annex the region in the early 
1870s than with its subsequent administration as a Crown Colony. Nevertheless it does provide 
29 
30 
31 
32 
33 
34 
35 
36 
See for example, Atmore & Marks, 'The imperial factor', p 132; Cope, 'Local imperatives and imperial 
policy', p 601. 
A Porter (ed), The Oxford history of the British Empire, vol 3: the nineteenth century and R Winks & A 
Low (eds), The Oxford history of the British Empire, vol 5: Historiography (Oxford, 1999). 
PJ Cain & AG Hopkins, British imperialism: innovation and expansion, 1688-1914 (London, 1993). 
R Hyam, Britain's imperial century: a study of empire and expansion (London 1993). 
A Porter, 'Religion and empire in the long nineteenth century, 1780-1914', Journal of Imperial and 
Commonwealth History, 1992 and "'Cultural imperialism" and Protestant missionary enterprise, 1780-
1914', Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History, 1997. 
H Kochanski, Sir Garnet Wolseley: Victorian hero (London, 1999). 
A Hawkins & J Powell (eds), The journal of John Wodehouse, first Earl of Kimberley for 1862-1902 
(Cambridge, 1997). 
JJ Oberholster, Die anneksasie van Griekwaland-Wes (Cape Town, Archives Yearbook for South African 
History [hereafter A YB], 1945). 
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some insight into Lan yon' s role in events prior to the incorporation of Griqualand West into the 
Cape Colony. A doctoral thesis by IB Sutton37 and an MA dissertation by M Broodryk38 deal 
with the rebellion in Griqualand Westin the period 1876-1879, throwingsomelightonLanyon's 
military campaigns. They do not, however, link Lan yon' s role as a militarist to his administrative 
duties in Kimberley or see his role as part of the imperial plan in southern Africa. There are also 
a number of excellent studies on the socio-economic history of the diamond mining industry, 
exploring issues such as labour recruitment, the compound system and the accumulation of 
diamond-mining capital. These are issues which were of great concern to Lanyon so these works 
have been gainfully used, but none of them pays more than passing mention to his particular role 
in Griqualand West.39 A less erudite book by Brian Roberts offers a local history of Kimberley 
which lives up to the promise in Harry Oppenheimer's foreword to be 'lively and absorbing', and 
provides interesting detail on day-to-day life in the new mining town.40 
British involvement in the Transvaal Colony ( 1877 to 1881) in the years after the annexation of 
the South African Republic, has received more attention from historians, although no 
comprehensive study has yet been made which assesses Lan yon' s particular role as administrator 
from March 1879 to April 1881, or which attempts to analyse the reasons why British policy in 
the colony failed. MC van Zyl's book on the protest movement mounted by the Transvaal 
republicans against British rule proved useful because it provides information on how the Boers 
felt about British domination and discusses their grievances with Lanyon's administration and 
their dislike of the man himself.41 Far less useful is the MA dissertation completed in 1951 by 
37 
38 
39 
40 
41 
IB Sutton, The 1878 rebellion in Griqualand West and the adjacent territories (PhD, SOAS, London, 
1975). 
M Broodryk, Die rebellie in Griekwaland-Wes, 1876-1879 (MA, Unisa, 1977). See also the published 
doctoral thesis by the same author, Die Kaapse noordgrensoorloe, 1868-1879 (Pretoria, A YB, 1992). 
See for example C Newbury, The diamond ring: business, politics and precious stones in South Africa, 
1867-1947 (Oxford, 1989); RV Turrell, Capital and labour on the Kimberley diamond fields 1871-1890 
(Cambridge, 1987); WH W orger, South Africa's city of diamonds: mine workers and monopoly capitalism 
in Kimberley, 1867-1895 (New Haven, 1987). 
B Roberts, Kimberley: turbulent city (Cape Town, 1976). 
MC vanZyl, Dieprotesbewegingvan die TransvaalseAfrikaners 1877-1880 (Pretoria, 1979). 
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JA Vorster.42 This is a superficial, descriptive account of the administrative process in the 
Transvaal as carried out first by Theophilus Shepstone and then by Owen Lanyon. Many of the 
other works on the period concentrate on the war itself, which is not really the issue here, or the 
annexation years prior to Lanyon's arrival. In this latter category CJ Uys's In the era of 
Shepstone provides very useful insight into Shepstone's role in the Transvaal and the legacy he 
left Lanyon.43 
My debt is, I hope, also apparent to the publications of a succession of social historians such as 
Keegan, Trapido, Legassick, Ross, Delius and Shillington.44 Their works have provided a rich 
background for this study by providing insight into the social dynamics of particular societies 
and the transformations in South African society as a whole in the crucial mid 19th century, a 
period of indistinct transition between pre-industrial and industrialising South Africa. They have 
been particularly useful because they place Africans within the ambit of the colonial state, 
Lanyon's domain. They examine the implications of industrialisation for African polities, 
African reaction to dispossession, their resistance and the changing nature of chiefly power in 
the face of colonial policy. These have all been important in my attempt to re-insert colonial 
policy-makers into the African experience of the 1870s and 1880s. 
As far as primary sources are concerned, here in South Africa there is a wealth of information 
on Owen Lanyon. Among the many useful sources in the Transvaal Archives at the National 
Archives in Pretoria, the most important was the Lanyon Collection (Accession 596). This is 
extensive, comprising seventeen bound volumes. Lan yon' s incoming and outgoing official and 
42 
43 
44 
JA Vorster, Die Engelse administrasie van Transvaal gedurende die eerste anneksasie-tydperk 1877-1881 
(MA, UP, 1951). 
CJ Uys, In the era of Shepstone: being a study of British expansion in South Africa 1842-18 77 (Lovedale, 
1933). For Shepstone's role in the Transvaal until 1879 Cope's Ploughshare of war was also very useful. 
For details of works consulted by these historians see list of sources. Among the most useful were Keegan, 
Colonial South Africa, and an earlier work by him, namely, TJ Keegan, Rural transformations in 
industrializing South Africa: the southern highveld to 1914 (Johannesburg, 1986); M Legassick, 'The 
frontier tradition in South African historiography' in Marks & Atmore, Economy and society, pp 44-79; 
Shillington, The colonisation of the southern Tswana; R Ross, Adam Kok's Griquas: a study of the 
development of stratification in South Africa (Cambridge, 1976); P Delius, The land belongs to us: the 
Pedi polity, the Boers and the British in nineteenth century Transvaal (Johannesburg, 1983) and S Trapido, 
'Reflections on land, office and wealth in the South African Republic, 1850-1900' in Marks & Atmore, 
Economy and society, pp 350-368. 
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private correspondence make up the major part of the collection. There are also three annexures 
which include publications, maps and several historical objects which were in his possession. 
Lanyon, very much in keeping with his character, was an avid and punctilious letter writer and 
mercifully his handwriting is clear and stylish. His letters to his father (volumes 11-16) are 
particularly useful, and cover the entire period during which he was in South Africa. They were 
written at fairly regular intervals, often every week, over a period of more than five years. 
Furthermore it is very clear that Charles Lanyon was his son's confidant. Lanyon wrote openly 
and frankly to him. Often these letters describe his emotions: his despair, his loneliness and his 
prejudices. He told his father about most of the major events in which he was involved, how he 
felt about them and why he reacted as he did. Needless to say these letters proved to be an 
invaluable source. 
Many other primary sources were consulted in various South African archives. Much of the 
official contact between Lanyon and the succession of British high commissioners was 
researched in the Government House collections at the Cape and Natal Archives. Lanyon's 
relations with the Free State government and President Brand's role in the Transvaal in 1880-
1881 were studied in the Free State Archives; details of his more than three years in Kimberley 
while Griqualand West was governed as a British crown colony, were also to be found in the 
McGregor Museum and the Kimberley Africana Library. Published South African sources that 
were useful included government gazettes and newspapers printed between 1875 and 1880 in 
both Kimberley and Pretoria. Copies of British parliamentary Blue Books were also consulted. 
Not surprisingly, many of the sources on Lan yon' s career in South Africa are located in England. 
At the Public Record Office in Kew, London, there are vast collections of official Colonial 
Office correspondence, including the original correspondence with officials in the Cape Colony, 
Griqualand West, Natal and the Transvaal for the relevant periods. In these 'original 
correspondence' collections the minutes (compiled by various Colonial Office members of staff) 
on important issues often provided background insight (and frequently, humour too!) on why 
certain decisions were taken. The invaluable printed British Confidential Prints (African series), 
the so-called imperial White Books, were also consulted in London. 
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Private collections were studied at a number of other British regional and university archives. 
This period of research proved to be a watershed in the planning of my thesis: it turned away 
from a biography ofLanyon towards the role ofLanyon as an imperial agent. The catalyst was 
the research into the substantial private collections of each of the three secretaries of state for the 
colonies under whom Lan yon served. Those of Camarvon ( 187 4-1878) are available at the Public 
Record Office in Kew and the British Library. The Hicks Beach (1878-1880) papers are at the 
Gloucestershire Record Office in Gloucester, and the papers ofKimberley (1880-1882), perhaps 
the most exciting 'find', are housed in the Bodleian Library at the University of Oxford. The 
latter collection has been available to researchers only since 1996. It was purchased from private 
hands in 1991 and the sorting and cataloguing of the papers was only completed five years 
later.45 The collection proved to be a veritable mine of new, undigested information on British 
colonial policy, providing some intriguing answers to previously unexplained British moves in 
1880-1881 and Lanyon's confrontation with the Transvaal republicans. 
Until now the only other historian to pause and reflect on Lanyon's contribution has been AM 
Davey, who sadly, has since died. In his MA dissertation on the Siege of Pretoria he looks 
briefly at Lanyon's last months in South Africa.46 Davey was subsequently, as an archivist, 
involved in the purchase of the Lanyon collection on behalf of the National Archives and was 
also responsible for sorting the papers and compiling a very useful inventory to the collection.47 
He was also the author, in the Dictionary of South African biography, of the entry on Owen 
Lanyon.48 When he heard of my research into Lanyon's role as an imperial agent in South 
Africa, he expressed interest in the project and wrote that in his view the Lanyon collection 
merited publication as an edited volume. After working with the papers in the 1950s, he wrote 
that he had formed an opinion of Lanyon as a solitary, unhappy man, full of 'outspoken 
prejudices'. He had been struck, as in fact I have been, by 'the contrast between Lanyon, the 
45 
46 
47 
48 
BM Theron, 'Searching for gems: the Kimberley papers at Oxford University', Kleio, vol 32, 2000, pp 
103-111. 
AM Davey, The siege of Pretoria 1880-1881(Parow,AYB,1, 1956). 
AM Davey, 'Inventory of the Lanyon collection (Accession no 596)', South African Archives Journal, 
2, 1960, pp 50-57. 
WJ de Kock (ed), Dictionary of South African biography, vol 1 (Cape Town, 1968), pp 465-466. 
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public figure, and the private man ... rather like a character in a minor Greek tragedy ... heading 
for disaster after 1880 and an aftermath of obscurity and early death' .49 
This thesis sets Lanyon in the context of frontiers with Africans and Boers and attempts to stitch 
together the copious histories of African societies on the one hand and the histories of colonial 
policy on the other. It also attempts to unravel some of the intricacies of the relationship between 
Owen Lanyon, the private and public man and colonial official in South Africa, and the British 
government. 
49 Private correspondence, Arthur Davey- Bridget Theron, 8 November 1996. 
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CHAPTER I 
OWEN LANYON AND THE SOUTHERN AFRICA OF 1875 
Owen Lanyon arrived in southern Africa at a particularly crucial time. In the 1870s there were 
vibrant new developments and a changing atmosphere in the interior. Lanyon, as will be seen, 
was to be caught up in, on one level, the relationships and struggle between the imperial power, 
the settlers, the Africans and the Boers and, on another level, the struggle for white control over 
the land and labour resources of the Africans and the new aggressive capitalist political economy. 
In a word, when Lanyon arrived, the continent was poised for change. 
Britain in South Africa: the situation when Lanyon stepped ashore 
The historiographical debate on the formative features of the frontier and in particular the racial 
element in this experience in southern Africa, is an ongoing one. Because an important part of 
this thesis is to study the implementation of imperial policy in the evolving frontier zones, the 
debate is outlined briefly to provide an indication of the general approach that has been adopted. 
In his Colonial South Africa and the origins of the racial order, published in 1996, Timothy 
Keegan follows the trend of many historians since the 1970s in debunking both the older settler-
nationalist and the liberal views on the nature and significance of frontier circumstances. 1 The 
settler view that racial conflict on the frontier was inevitable as the forces of European 
'civilisation' came face to face with African 'barbarism', is no longer seen as a true reflection 
of the situation in the interior. Under criticism too, is the so-called liberal view, which focused 
on the role of race on the frontiers, arguing that racism had been intensified there; the 
contribution of colonial agents, including missionaries and officials, and the interaction between 
whites and blacks were also closely examined. The earlier liberals claimed that the motives of 
For discussion of work by historians who have been categorised into so-called schools in South African 
historiography see Saunders, The making of the South African past, and Smith, The changing past. For an 
incisive summary of the various views on the role of the frontier in the formation of the racial order in 
South Africa, see Keegan's introduction in Colonial South Africa, pp 1-14. 
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imperial agents on the frontiers reflected a metropolitan benevolence to African societies and that 
they acted as the heroes in a process designed to break down the negrophobic Boer frontier 
mentality, transforming the diffuse frontier communities into an enlightened society. The fact 
that this 'benevolent' process often entailed conquest and suppression on the part of the European 
colonisers, and that the imperial power - albeit, in the 1840s and 1850s, often exercised 
informally - was frequently used in the interests of local settler accumulation, was largely 
ignored. 2 
This early liberal historical writing was overtaken in the late 1960s and 1970s by works which 
had a more Africanist perspective. Foremost among these, providing the best synthesis of the 
liberal view, is M Wilson and LM Thompson's two-volume Oxford history of South Africa, 
which appeared in 1969 and 1971.3 This represented a shift in thinking that occurred in the era 
of decolonisation in the rest of Africa, and the spotlight no longer falls on the role of white 
heroes. Instead the African reaction to white domination comes to the fore and African societies 
are examined in their own right. The Boer in the interior is portrayed as an unenterprising 
pastoralist, 'innocent of any dynamic economic impulses or influences, isolated from 
metropolitan culture and metropolitan capitalism' .4 The Oxford history was criticised by some 
for its empiricism, its moralism and its lack of emphasis on class. 5 Historians who argue that 
racial categories themselves are wrong and that class is the 'prism through which the country's 
2 
3 
4 
5 
For examples of early liberal works see WM Macmillan, Bantu, Boer and Briton: the making of the South 
African problem (London, 1929) and CW de Kiewiet, A history of South Africa, social and economic 
(Oxford, 1941). 
M Wilson & LM Thompson (eds), The Oxford history of South Africa, vol 1, South Africa to 1870 
(Oxford, 1969) and vol 2, South Africa 1870-1966 (Oxford, 1971). 
T Keegan, 'The making of the Orange Free State, 1846-54: sub-imperialism, primitive accumulation and 
state formation', Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History, 17(1 ), 1988, p 27. 
For a brief discussion of the merits and criticisms of the Oxford history see C Saunders, 'Leonard 
Thompson's historical writing on South Africa: an appreciation', South African Historical Journal, 30, 
May 1994, pp 6-9. A later work by Leonard Thompson, adjudged by most reviewers to still fit the 'liberal' 
rather than 'revisionist' mould is LM Thompson, A history of South Africa (New Haven, 1990). See for 
example reviews by H Bradford, A Davey, TRH Davenport and T Dedering in South African Historical 
Journal, 24, 1991. 
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past should be viewed' ,6 were the most vociferous.7 They felt that liberal writers place too much 
stress on the importance of the 181h century on the development of the racial order and neglect 
the dramatic impact of the mineral revolution in transforming the history of southern Africa. 
In clear contrast to this liberal interpretation of frontier society, Keegan explores the dynamic 
processes of racial stratification, primitive settler accumulation and dispossession in pre-
industrial Transorangia, a frontier of crucial concern in this thesis. He investigates the 
relationship between imperial expansionism and settler capitalism and shows that in the mid 19th 
century, some 20 years before the discovery of diamonds, there were already significant settler 
elites (both Boer and British), that had emerged in the interior and discusses the extent to which 
their cumulative activities were supported and legitimised by primitive state structures. 8 
Another pre-industrial frontier issue, one which is also of concern here and will be raised in more 
detail in the section that follows, is a consideration of the imperatives of British imperialism in 
the period from the 1840s until 1870. What, for example, underpinned the British response to the 
Boers in the interior following their emigration from the eastern frontier of the Cape Colony in 
the movement known as the Great Trek? The early liberals' answer to this question, that 
humanitarian concern influenced this reaction; that the indigenes needed protection from Boer 
rapacity,9 has been largely laid aside in more recent studies. It is maintained that by the 1870s 
the missionary influence had lost its impact and that imperial policy makers were more 
concerned with maintaining the economic and strategic interests of the empire at minimum 
expense to the British taxpayer. Co-operative treaties signed with the Basotho leader, 
Moshoeshoe, and the Griqua captains in the 1840s were well and good as long as imperial 
interests remained the major foci of power and stability north of the colonial boundaries. 
6 
7 
9 
C Saunders, The making of the South African past, p 196. 
See for example Marks, S, 'Liberalism, social realities and South African history', Journal of 
Commonwealth Political Studies, 5(3), 1972. 
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The radical social historians, spearheaded in so far as frontier relations are concerned, by Martin 
Legassick in his seminal work on the politics of the frontier10 studied the spread of colonial 
control in the interior and focused upon the incorporation of frontier societies into the capitalist 
system. The watershed date was the discovery of diamonds in 1867. The dramatic change in the 
economy and the beginning of the mineral revolution was the major catalyst; the pre-industrial 
frontier was less significant. Class, coercion and exploitation replaced the liberal ideas of 
interaction between races. For these historians, changes in frontier society had to be related 
specifically and primarily to the changing material base of society in the interior after 1870. 
Unlike many of the mainline radical theorists, who tended to promote what he calls 'capitalist 
triumphalism', Keegan attaches great importance to 19th century developments before the mineral 
age, but he is quick to agree that once minerals were discovered and advancing capitalism began 
to generate new economic and political imperatives in the frontier situation, the options open to 
indigenous and pre-capitalist societies began to narrow and the frontiers began to 'close' in the 
sense that natural and labour resources became progressively more controlled by the dictates of 
capitalists and by capitalist-inspired imperial expansion. 11 It is this social history approach to 19th 
century southern Africa, one that looks at the socio-economic interrelationship and interaction 
between the various people of the sub-continent, that is adopted in this thesis. Importance is 
attached to the formative nature of the frontier and the reactions of societies to colonial 
penetration both before the mineral age and at about the time Lanyon arrived in South Africa, 
as the mineral revolution began to pick up steam. It is agreed that the racial nature of the 
industrial order that had developed by the late 19th century in southern Africa did not originate, 
in the first instance, as some have claimed, entirely as a product of the mineral revolution. In 
other words, it was not exclusively the result of avaricious mining magnates searching for cheap 
labour; its roots went further back to the earlier part of the century, when the strength and resolve 
of the state in the interior was in fact more tenuous than older texts would have us believe. 12 
10 
11 
12 
M Legassick, 'The frontier tradition in South African historiography' in Marks & Atmore, Economy and 
society, pp 44-79. 
Keegan, Colonial South Africa, p 14. See also Benyon, Proconsul and paramountcy, pp 1-2. 
See for example CFJ Muller ( ed), Five hundred years: a history of South Africa (Pretoria, 1969) which 
lays the stress on the development of white political states in the interior and virtually ignores the existence 
of powerful African societies. 
20 
Settler and state superiority over indigenous societies in the interior for the greater part of the 19th 
century was certainly not a uniform reality. In fact the opposite was true, as will be shown. As 
Keegan puts it: 
At this time racial subjugation within the realm of the African farming peoples beyond the old established 
colony at the Cape was as yet fitful, unsustained and reluctantly pursued by the wielders of state power. 
The state was still a weak instrument, resistant to the forward proddings of settler capitalism, which was 
itself embryonic and without persuasive influence at the centres of power ... Nevertheless the forces at work 
in the first half of the nineteenth century prefigured the transformations that were set in motion by the 
mineral discoveries in South Africa in the last third of the century.13 
Expansion by British settlers and Boers from the Cape Colony to the north had been a relatively 
slow and sporadic process in the region beyond the Orange ( Gariep) River, an area loosely called 
Transorangia, until the late 1830s and1840s, when emigrant Boers began to arrive. Far earlier, 
during the 18th century, white trekboers had begun to move from the Cape into the sparsely 
populated Cape northern frontier, while others had migrated along the eastern seaboard. 14 Those 
on the arid northern frontier kept cattle, hunted, traded, raided and generally co-existed with 
Griqua communities of mixed descent, remnants of Khoisan peoples and indigenous southern 
Tswana groups, largely Tlhaping. 15 Over the years many of these people moved in an easterly 
direction along the more fertile regions beside the Orange River, and they will become the focus 
of this thesis in the discussion of developments that followed the discovery of diamonds at the 
confluence of the Vaal and the Harts Rivers in the late 1860s. It was here in the region known 
as Griqualand West, in the new mining town of Kimberley, that Owen Lanyon took up his 
appointment in 1875. 
To return to earlier times. As the 19th century wore on, whites began to move in increasing 
numbers from the Cape Colony to the southern highveld, the region between the Orange and the 
13 
14 
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Keegan, Colonial South Africa, p 14. 
One of the most comprehensive studies of the trekboer movement is PJ van der Merwe, Die noordwaartse 
beweging van die Boere voor die Groot Trek, 1770-1842 (Pretoria, State Library reprint, 1988). See also 
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M Legassick, 'The northern frontier to c 1840: the rise and decline of the Griqua people', in R Elphick & 
H Giliomee (eds), The shaping of South African society, 1652-1840 (Cape Town, 1989), pp 354-420; R 
Ross, Adam Kok's Griquas (Cambridge, 1976). The work by K Shillington, The colonisation of the 
southern Tswana, has been used extensively in this thesis to assess the reactions of the Tlhaping people 
to Lanyon's administratorship in Griqualand West from 1875-1879. 
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Vaal Rivers, and even further north, across the Vaal River, into the area that became known as 
the Transvaal. By this time most of the indigenous communities in the central interior had 
regrouped after the turmoil of the rrifecane which had erupted in the period c 1815-1830, and 
were part ofindependent chiefdoms which still retained access to land and had control over their 
labour. 16 As a result of developments during the mfecane period colonial influences were already 
being felt by Africans in the interior long before the Great Trek. Over time, varying degrees of 
interaction between indigenous communities and white settlers, including a polyglot ofivory and 
hide hunters, merchants and missionaries. Some African communities had been more accepting 
of missionary activities in their midst than others. 
The Great Trek, the migration of about 15 000 Boer pastoralists from the eastern Cape frontier 
to the interior - which, as has been shown, was by no means empty - in the 1830s and 1840s, 
has lately come under revision by historians. Although most continue to regard it as significant 
in the formation of colonial South Africa, it is no longer seen, as it was by Afrikaner nationalist 
historians, as an epic pioneering movement that 'gave the Afrikaner a unique identity', and 
opened up the interior to progress and civilisation. 17 Nor is the liberal view of the Trek as a flight 
from the British policies oflegal equality and other attempts at modernisation and enlightenment 
of this group of Calvinist eastern Cape frontier farmers, 18 widely accepted. It has been cogently 
argued that the emigrant Boers, who were led by men of substance in the eastern Cape, men who 
were very much in touch with the British settler economy and were not bent on extermination 
or subjugation of Africans in the interior, even had either been possible.19 More credence is given 
instead to the notion that they were drawn into the interior to seek opportunities to accumulate 
16 
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resources, notably land, and that by setting up simple state structures they hoped to legitimise 
their standing as a settler elite.20 The Trek was therefore not a flight from the colonial nexus; on 
the contrary it was a well-planned attempt to carry it, in its specifically Boer form, into the 
interior. The march of time, as will be shown, was to prove that the Boers were ill-equipped to 
fulfil their economic aspirations in the interior without the active assistance of the British.21 
It is also clear that in the frontier zones that came under formal settler control in the mid 19th 
century (whether British or Boer), which are of particular relevance to this thesis - the southern 
highveld north of the Orange River, Griqualand West and the Transvaal-the whites struggled 
to establish state structures. The settler and Boer societies in these regions, particularly in the 
Transvaal, were weak, and in all these regions whites were vastly outnumbered by Africans, 
many of whom were grouped in polities which had considerable military strength and viable 
economies.22 Among the more prominent societies were the Sotho, Tlhaping, Pedi, Venda, Swazi 
and - on the Transvaal's disputed southeastern border with Zululand - the powerful Zulu 
kingdom. Furthermore, in the case of the Pedi and the Venda, it has been conclusively shown that 
there was an 'African resurgence in the 1860s', a time when the emergent Boer state in the 
Transvaal was in almost total disarray. 23 The early white settler communities in the interior were 
also heavily dependent on local trade and alliances with the Africans. One of the best 
documented is that in the Soutpansberg, in the far northern Transvaal, where trekkers conducted 
a flourishing ivory trade with the assistance of Venda huntsmen as early as the beginning of 
the 1840s. 24 
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The trekkers in Transorangia settled in the plains of what later became the Orange Free State, a 
region occupied predominantly by the Basotho people under the canny leadership of 
Moshoeshoe. Opposition from Africans to white settlement was initially intermittent and 
ineffective, but soon competition for pasture, particularly in the fertile region between the 
Caledon and the Orange Rivers, became a thorny issue. The trekkers relied heavily on trade with 
Africans for supplies of grain and vegetables but were not above using their firearms when they 
met with resistance over land. Further to the west their relationship with the Griqua people was 
also an uneasy one. 
From about the 1840s, capital derived from the burgeoning eastern Cape wool export market and 
other forms of speculation in the Cape Colony, began to be invested in Transorangia and the 
internal trade network increased, goods being transported to and fro by oxwagons. Trekkers who 
remained in the region, rather than moving over the Vaal, soon became integrated into the 
expanding colonial economy which revolved around traders and speculators (many of them of 
1820 British settler origin) who settled on large farms around Bloemfontein. They were reliant 
on commercial links with the established colonial agents; loan, credit and exchange relations 
were backed by British capital based in Cape Town, Port Elizabeth and at the small coastal 
settlement of Port Natal.25 
In 1848 Britain had established formal control over the region between the Orange and the V aal 
by annexing it as the Orange River Sovereignty. The pressure that the local settler elite was able 
to bring to bear on the British governor, Sir Harry Smith, was the prime motivation behind the 
annexation. Land speculators and coastal merchants hoped that British administration would 
boost land values. Smith's move found little favour in London, however, and the Sovereignty 
was short-lived. British conventions with the Boers in 1852 and 1854 handed the Transvaal and 
Orange River Sovereignty over to them as independent republics. Two decades later, when Owen 
Lanyon arrived in southern Africa, Britain had become involved in the interior again and had 
annexed Basutoland and Griqualand West.26 
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The stark reality of the situation in the interior was that until the 1870s the pre-industrial Boer 
states, in particular, were very fragile entities, and as Thompson has pointed out, 'there were 
large areas within the boundaries they proclaimed where they had little influence' .27 In the mid 
fifties, in keeping with the prevailing spirit of free trade, Britain was still keeping her purse 
strings tight and was loath to take on any untoward military or financial responsibilities. With 
the advent of Gladstonian finance in the 1850s, 'the parsimony already characteristic of a 
property owners' parliament was reinforced by a powerful new dogma about the need to drive 
down the costs of government'.28 Local settler capital accumulation appeared to be enough to 
maintain the profile of British hegemony, and after all, Great Britain, unchallenged by European 
rivals, dominated the external trade of the region. As Keegan has remarked of the imperial 
presence in the interior at the time, and the British decision to sign the conventions, 
the Boer republic was in the last degree a vehicle of an informal, if often insecure, imperial hegemony in 
southern Africa, that outlasted the phase of formal imperial expansionism ... The creation of the republican 
state was made possible by the settler capitalism that was spreading into the further interior from the late 
1840s on the back of an advancing imperialism ... British commerce, British investment, British settlement 
and British imperial rule were advancing hand in hand. By 1854 British imperial rule was no longer 
necessary to sustain these forces, and could again recede.29 
As has been shown, the economy in the Orange Free State was reasonably stable, even before 
the mid 19th century. In both republics, but less so in the more remote Transvaal, some trading 
networks had been set up and a Boer elite was beginning to develop, drawn inexorably into the 
informal British empire. The forms of accumulation practised by these elites included land 
speculation, looting oflivestock and raiding neighbouring African communities for indentured 
labour. Studies by Trapido have shown the same tendency further north. In the earliest decades 
of white settlement states were weak and the markets limited, but later Boer society came to be 
based 'on a variety of combinations of hunting trading, office holding and land speculation'. As 
there was very little currency in circulation, officials were paid in land grants instead of cash. 
Commercial companies based in the British colonies of Natal and the Cape also acquired large 
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tracts of land and a number of land companies were granted hefty concessions.30 
But the Boers in both republics lacked political and bureaucratic skills and experience and for 
years, particularly north of the Vaal River, the governmental process was far from satisfactory. 
In neither republic could Africans vote; both prohibited Africans from possessing firearms - a 
law which proved impossible to implement, particularly once minerals were discovered and 
firearms were freely available in exchange for wages earned by migrant labourers31 - and 
required them to carry passes when moving about. When Lanyon arrived in the Transvaal in 
1879, the republican government had been replaced by a British one which proved to be almost 
as inept as its predecessor.32 
Mid-Victorian colonial policy: metropole and periphery 
The hectic academic debate on the determinants and nature of British imperialism continues 
unabated. Its intricacies are only directly relevant for this study as far as Britain's policies in 
South Africa from the 1870s until 1881 are concerned. More particularly, the concern here is the 
role played by Owen Lanyon in the implementation of these policies in South Africa and the 
possibility that he may, in some measure, have influenced their nature and course. As the 
imperial agent in South Africa he could provide the 'official minds' 33 back in London with 
invaluable advice about the situation in the colonies. The terms metro pole and periphery are used 
here to differentiate between determinants of imperialism of British origin, on the one hand, and 
those arising in the outlying parts of the empire, on the other. The peripheral regions were either 
formal British possessions, which had been annexed, or were regarded as falling informally 
under the British sphere of influence. To use another cliche, Lanyon was one of the colonial 
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agents, a man-on-the-spot; and enough has emerged from the debate on imperialism to establish 
that the motives behind British colonial policy were many and varied and certainly had origins 
in London, the metropolis as well as in the periphery. 
Seen on a broader canvas, in the mid century until about 1870, 19th -century British imperial 
motives were not geared specifically towards expansion. They had no need to be. Britain was 
riding the crest of the international wave and her post-industrial revolution policy of free trade 
emerged quite naturally from her unquestioned industrial and economic supremacy. Britain did 
not need an extensive colonial network 'to provide her with trade or emigration fields or security 
or glory. In free trade she had found a far better method of dominating the world without paying 
for it. '34 True, the bigger her empire, the more widely spread - and the more profitable - her 
foreign enterprise could be, but it was unnecessary to take formal control of colonies. Indeed it 
was just as profitable, less trouble, and far cheaper, to establish an informal British sphere of 
influence. It was perfectly safe to stop short of annexation because the British were too 
complacent to realise that their industrial supremacy could be challenged; mid 19th _century 
imperialism provided the mother country with all the advantages and few of the responsibilities 
of empire building. 
In 1871 Lord Carnarvon, who was not yet in the Colonial Office, warned Britons not to be 
unrealistic and overconfident about the economy. They should not, he cautioned, 'talk as if 
Providence had ordained that ... trade must come to us, because we live in a foggy little island 
set in a boisterous sea' .35 As the economic depression deepened in the mid 1870s and continued 
well into the next decade, these fears were indeed realised: profits dropped and unemployment 
rose. Foreign competition increased and the United States began to assume the role, ahead of 
Britain, of the world's leading industrial nation. 
After 1870 British imperialism began to change gear; different imperatives came into play in 
both the metropole and on the periphery. In Britain, the economy began to slow down and even 
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to show signs of faltering. The British found themselves challenged economically by the 
emergence of the new, self-confident, German Empire and by a United States of America, 
strengthened by the experience of the Civil War of the 1860s. These powers threatened Britain 
industrially and challenged her position as world leader.36 In response there was a growing 
realisation of the need to assert British paramountcy in the far-flung empire and to protect the 
British sphere of influence against the new rivals. By 1870, official minds were beginning to 
think increasingly of formal territorial expansion or the possibility of consolidating regional 
possessions. Simultaneously, peripheral crises were gathering. In southern Africa, the particular 
local circumstances - which will be explored later - meant that in its early stages, in the 1870s 
until about 1886, and certainly until it became clear that the mineral deposits (particularly the 
Witwatersrand gold), were hugely significant, imperial policy leaned more towards the 
consolidation of British paramountcy. 
Although Britain's international economic position clearly played a role in her changing attitude 
to her colonial empire, these imperatives soon became enmeshed with related strategic, political, 
social and even individual considerations at the metropole. And the significance of local 
imperatives certainly cannot be overlooked; in this thesis it will be argued that they played a 
crucial role. The debate on the relative importance of all these formative factors has been a lively 
one among historians. Isolating one aspect and claiming that this is predominant, can lead, it has 
been argued, to a static and monocausal interpretation of the complex relations between Britain 
and southern Africa.37 
Alternative interpretations of the determinants ofimperialism have since been offered by scholars 
who have placed the emphasis on the scramble for colonies in Africa and the competition which 
this aroused among European powers. This predominantly political view can be separated into 
two somewhat blurred categories: some imperial historians, such as Goodfellow, have focused 
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on the strategic value of Simonstown and the need to secure the vital sea route to India, arguing 
that it was this that played a significant role in motivating Britain's new thrust into the interior,38 
while others put more emphasis on crises and socio-economic changes that developed on the 
periphery and the contribution of local collaborating groups and agents.39 Indeed there are 
scholars who still consider that this latter approach, embodied in the Robinson and Gallagher 
thesis on the 'imperialism of free trade' that was initially put forward in an article in 1953 40 and 
then reiterated and refined in 1961 in their book Africa and the Victorians, is still one of the most 
relevant interpretations.41 In a recent review article, Dane Kennedy calls the Robinson and 
Gallagher explanation an 'exceptionally handy and heterogeneous tool kit of ideas ... about the 
dynamics of imperial expansion' .42 This is a view held in this thesis, although obviously 
economic determinants of imperial policy are crucial, given the fact that the focus of this study 
is the dawning of the mineral age in southern Africa. Increasingly, in the historiography there is 
a call to dismiss what has been labelled the 'spurious distinction between power and profit' in 
the debate about the 'motor' of imperialism.43 
Another view, one that is also emphasised in this thesis, is that individual policy makers in the 
Colonial Office and on the periphery had a significant role to play in the dynamics of 
imperialism. Benyon has pointed out that the contribution of the man-on-the-spot was often 
crucial at the point of interface between the metropole and the dependency,44 and it is clear that 
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there was, as Hyam puts it, 'a small but vital gap between what a really ambitious officer on the 
spot could do and what his metropolitan master dared to veto' .45 An example often cited in the 
literature is that of Lord Camarvon, who was secretary of state from 1874 to 1878; another is 
Bartle Frere, the high commissioner who was charged with the implementation of federation in 
southern Africa in the 1870s. Camarvon was imbued with remarkable and very personal passion 
about pushing through 'his' scheme, 46 and there are scholars who agree with Goodfellow that the 
role of 'individual will and intelligence' cannot simply be ignored. Colin Webb, for example, 
argued cogently that it was a gross oversimplification to suggest that because productive forces 
shaped societal values (which he agreed that they did), they also invariably impinged upon and 
overwrote all the decisions and purposes of individual office-bearers.47 
Many of these pre-1970 theories on the imperatives of imperial policy were challenged - and 
some, but not all - were discarded by the historians who gave primacy to the material, or 
economic imperatives of the changing relationship between Britain and South Africa in the 191h 
century. These ideas were persuasively argued, as has already been indicated, by Atmore and 
Marks in their important article published in 197 4. The authors settle, after extensive debate, for 
an almost exclusively economic explanation of the origins of British territorial expansionist 
colonial policy in the period after 1870. While agreeing that any appraisal of imperialism needs 
to be aware of the changing nature of the British economy at the metropole, the centre ofimperial 
power, they still give pride of economic place to local peripheral imperatives. In their view 
British imperial policy at this time was geared to the interests of those who were involved in the 
development of a capitalist economy after the discovery of diamonds. These interests demanded 
that to promote the new mining economy, government apparatuses should be upgraded to suit 
modem capitalist needs and white political dominance over the African majority should be 
entrenched. Furthermore it was absolutely essential that there be a ready supply of cheap labour. 
If either the African kingdoms or the Boer republics presented any obstacles to the successful 
attainment of these needs, such obstacles had to be neutralised. Clearly the investment of 
international capital in the diamond-mining industry immediately blurs the theoretical distinction 
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between imperatives of the metropole and those of the periphery. In order to formulate and 
implement imperial policy, a complex relationship soon developed between the Cape and 
imperial governments and between local and international capital.48 
This theoretical background, with its emphasis on the developing South African economy, is 
eminently suited to an analysis of Owen Lanyon's role as an imperial agent in South Africa. 
Although Lanyon only survived the first decade of this new imperialism before returning to 
Britain, he was closely involved in two key South African regions in the 1870s: Griqualand West 
and the Transvaal, both of which had been annexed by Britain.49 In the first instance, he was 
administrator in Griqualand West, and later in the Transvaal Colony. It fell to him to steer 
Griqualand West towards incorporation with the Cape Colony as part of Camarvon's 
confederation scheme. Lanyon was the imperial agent who had to juggle with the new dynamics 
of production on the diamond fields in accordance with the dictates of London and persistent 
local capitalist interests.so The crucial local imperatives that Atmore and Marks have identified 
were all part of his brief in Kimberley and subsequently also in Pretoria. Updating the 
administrative machinery, expediting the labour supply, quelling African aspirations and unrest 
and counteracting Boer insurgency, were foremost among his responsibilities.s1 Against what 
Atmore and Marks call African and Boer obstacles to the realisation of peripheral imperatives, 
Lanyon acted in his military capacity in 1878 to quell Griqua rebels and Tlhaping insurgents on 
behalf of Britain. Against the republicans in the Transvaal, he tried- admittedly without success 
-to secure imperial interests. Furthermore, as will become clear, while he was still in Kimberley, 
Lanyon acted as an imperial agent passing information to Downing Street. Prior to the 
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annexation of the Transvaal in April 1877 he received regular, confidential letters from an 
informer in Pretoria. Lanyon then relayed the news back to Camarvon on the situation in the 
South African Republic.52 The independent Boer republic was high on the Colonial Office's 
confederation hit list. Was it ripe for annexation? Lanyon provided some of the answers. 
Cain and Hopkins have recently provided a different dimension on what they see as the crucial 
influence of economic imperatives and have embodied it in their theory on the role of 
'gentlemanly capitalism'. 53 This view virtually ignores the importance of peripheral crises (which 
Atmore and Marks place firmly to the forefront) and instead puts great emphasis on the interests 
of high finance in the metropolis, in London.54 They claim that imperialism was 'at all times 
motivated and directed by the needs of British finance (in all its forms) and the service industries 
rather than the needs of industry or any non-economic consideration'. According to these 
authors, the aristocratic British gentleman capitalist was more than likely a banker, a stock broker 
or an investor ... to be directly connected with the processes of production was to forfeit any 
claim to gentility'.55 Finance and services, then, and not industry - again in contrast to the 
Atmore and Marks view - were the main engine of British political economy and profoundly 
influenced all governments, of whatever party, which had to bow to them as the ultimate locus 
of policy. But there have been some rumbling reservations. DK Fieldhouse is critical that the 
authors of this theory come dangerously close to claiming monocausality. He is not convinced 
that the ranks of gentlemanly capitalists were as closely knit as Cain and Hopkins suggest and 
he also points out that despite their insistence on the primary importance of the metropole, they 
have not been able to dismiss local circumstances entirely; instead they have merely downplayed 
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the importance of peripheral determinants of imperial policy. 56 
As influential as their article undoubtedly is, the Atmore and Marks 'reassessment' of the 
imperial factor has by no means halted the debate on the dynamics of imperial expansion. 
Although the intention in this thesis is to follow the social history tradition outlined by Tim 
Keegan, no review of the historiography of imperialism would be complete without some 
mention of the more recent postcolonial analyses. Works by Catherine Hall and Antionette 
Burton, for example, draw attention to the systems of colonialism and the relations between 
coloniser and colonised. They are concerned with the analysis of textual forms in which 
information about peripheral areas and colonial cultures has been expressed.57 New initiatives 
in understanding colonialism as a culture also include studies of the gender perspective and 
missionary activity.58 These studies add a new and intriguing dimension to the rich texture of 
imperial history. 
Having reviewed some of the imperatives that gave rise to the new drive for territorial expansion 
in the last quarter of the 19th century, it is appropriate to examine some of its characteristics. 
What was the nature of mid-Victorian imperialism, one might ask, what forms did it take, and 
what attitudes did imperial agents evince? Atmore and Marks, Darwin and Porter, among others, 
address this issue and come up with some particularly appropriate comments as far as the actions 
of the imperial agent Owen Lanyon, and his attitudes towards South Africa and South Africans 
in the period 1875-1881, are concerned. 
Imperialism has been defined as 'the sustained effort to assimilate a country or region to the 
political, economic or cultural system of another power', 59 and as the political and economic 
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dimensions have already been touched upon, it remains to address the cultural aspects. As 
imperialism gathered momentum in the 1870s a new attitude towards the empire took root among 
the British. It was the flowering of a very British variety of public sentiment, a particular type 
of national pride which favoured the more overt new imperialism. It embodied a new desire to 
spread the essence of a British way oflife, epitomised in the great metropolis, the so-called 'City' 
which 'dominated all facets of public policy', 60 to those in the undeveloped and uncivilised parts 
of the world. It was an attitude often assumed by colonial officials, and in its extreme form it 
came to be known as jingoism. It was tinged with ill-concealed paternalism and 'imperial high-
handedness, ... the tendency to assume an overbearing mien where English rights are judged in 
competition with other people's rights' .61 The people living in the less-developed regions of the 
empire, it was argued, would surely want civilised Britain to remove the blinkers from their eyes. 
Owen Lanyon, by his own admission, was 'jingoish' and many of his personal letters to his 
father clearly bear this out. 62 
Along with the characteristic sense of British superiority described above, came pre-conditioned 
racial and class attitudes that also found their way into the 19th -century South African situation. 63 
Atmore and Marks comment on 'the general and at times virulent anti-Afrikaner attitudes 
displayed by various British visitors, officials and settlers'. According to them 'it was not only 
the Coloured or African peoples who bore the brunt of British racialism ... many of the nastier 
remnants of this racialism ... were directed against Afrikaner communities, rather than against 
non-white peoples' .64 Richard Southey was apparently one such official65 and Owen Lanyon was 
another. In fact the description fits him like a glove. Letters to his family are filled with 
numerous examples of the most rank prejudice. Africans are 'uncivilised savages' who must be 
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dealt with promptly to 'keep them in their place', 66 but his poisoned pen is at its worst when he 
attacks the Boers of the Transvaal. They are labelled 'semi-civilised wind bags', 'inflated toads' 
and 'pusillanimous cusses who are either abject in their terror or bumptious in their swagger'. 
Above all, Lanyon berates their alleged cowardice, and remains convinced, mistakenly as proved 
in 1880, that they 'did not have it in them to fight'. 67 Studies which look at the attitudes of rulers 
and ruled are strong at present, and this study ofLanyon fits well into this mould. But first, closer 
acquaintance must be made with Owen Lanyon. 
Owen Lanyon: ambitious young imperial agent 
Frequent reference has already been made to Lanyon and before his role can be assessed it is 
necessary to know more about who he was, what sort of British background he had, and to gain 
a broad picture of his career before he arrived in South Africa. 
William Owen Lanyon was born in Belfast, Northern Ireland, on 21 July 1842.68 He was the third 
son of an eminent Anglo-Irish architect and civil engineer, Sir Charles Lanyon, and his wife 
Elizabeth Helen.69 The family grew to be a large one; Willie, as he was affectionately known, 
was one of four sons and three daughters. The infant son was given his mother's maiden name, 
Owen, as his second name. Although called 'Willie' within his family circle, he later chose to 
be known as Owen Lanyon, a decision which his family readily supported. 70 
It is obvious from Lanyon's surviving letters to his father, his sisters Flo, Nellie and Minnie and 
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his brothers Charles, John and Louis, that the family was a close one. 71 Charles Lanyon, clearly 
the respected patriarch of the family, was Willie's much-revered confidant and the private letters 
written to him are by far the most numerous in the Lanyon Collection now housed in the 
Transvaal Archives. They are caring, frank and full of information about his career as well as his 
day-to-day activities. Lanyon's letters to the other members of his family include a number to 
his eldest bother, Charles, whom he addressed as 'dear old boy', and to his three sisters. These 
other family letters are briefer and less revealing about Lanyon himself and his career in South 
Africa, but they are also warm and loving. Willie teases his sisters - his 'demons' and 'little 
devils' - particularly his youngest sister, whom he calls 'Baby', and warns them that they must 
behave themselves properly or run the risk of having to answer to him.72 While in South Africa 
he often told his family back in Ireland how much he longed to see them again and how he 
missed not being at home with them all.73 
Sir Charles Lanyon was an influential man74 of considerable means and the family home, called 
'The Abbey', was on an estate near Whiteabbey, county Antrim, in Northern Ireland.75 
Whiteabbey is a small town about twelve kilometres north of the city centre of Belfast. It is 
situated on the coast of Belfast Lough, an inlet off the Irish Sea. Willie was sent to receive his 
education in England, where he attended the Bromsgrove Grammar School in Worcestershire. 
His mother died in 1858, when he was only sixteen years old and two years later, having 
completed his basic education, it was decided that he should enter the army. In Victorian Britain 
a career in the army was considered socially correct for a well brought up, if not brilliant, young 
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man such as Owen Lan yon. 76 
Accordingly, with all the right credentials, the 18-year old Lanyon joined the British army in 
1860 as an ensign of the 6th Royal Warwickshire regiment, and spent several years serving in 
Jamaica. In 1866 he purchased a lieutenancy and was transferred to the 2nd West India regiment 
to which he was attached, on secondment, for the entire period he was in South Africa. 77 As a 
member of this regiment he was appointed aide-de-camp to the commanding officer of the West 
Indies in 1866. Apparently already proving himself an able clerical worker, he then served as 
private secretary and aide-de-camp to Sir JP Grant, the Governor of Jamaica from 1868 to mid 
1873.78 By this time Lanyon must have had aspirations to seek employment as a civil 
administrator - rather than a military officer - elsewhere in the colonies, because there is 
reference to a letter that he wrote to the secretary of state for the colonies, the Earl of Kimberley, 
'requesting to be considered a candidate for employment in the colonial service' when Grant left 
Jamaica. Grant's accompanying testimonial was couched in glowing terms. 'I cannot', he wrote, 
'speak too highly of Captain Lanyon's merits, and the great use he has been to me, in every way. 
His business habits are very good ... I have found his services invaluable and I can say with 
confidence that any department to which he may be attached will be fortunate.' 79 
Grant's recommendation did not bear fruit immediately. In late September 1873, Lanyon's 
regiment was sent to the British Gold Coast protectorate in West Africa. Some months earlier 
an Asante force had crossed the Prah River, crushed the resistance of the local Fante people and 
occupied the capital, Kumasi. The British government decided to remedy the situation by sending 
Gamet Joseph Wolseley (later Field-Marshal Lord Wolseley) to the Gold Coast as military 
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commander and civil administrator.80 His instructions were to settle the dust, restore Britain's 
dented pride, reinstate the loyal Fante and negotiate a new treaty with Asante.81 
Lanyon wrote to his father from Cape Coast Castle, where the 2nd West India regiment was 
awaiting Wolseley's arrival. Conditions there were far from pleasant. It had been pouring with 
rain for days, many of the men were sick and morale was low. The ambitious young Lanyon 
decided that hard work was one way to deal with the situation, even if it meant taking on extra 
responsibilities. In any case, he argued, 'I feel sure that the fact of my having done so will always 
tell in my favour'. He accepted the offer of an acting colonial secretaryship from the governor, 
Colonel Harley, 'on condition that it not be allowed to interfere with my military duties' and 
once Wolseley arrived, Lanyon was also chosen to act as his aide-de-camp.82 
Despite Prime Minister Gladstone's last minute caution that he was reluctant to sanction an 
armed attack in the Gold Coast region, Wolseley was never one to take the peaceful option when 
military glory beckoned. He could not resist adding another 'brisk colonial foray' to his recent 
successes in North America.83 Without waiting to train additional Fante volunteers, Wolseley 
launched the campaign on 14 October 1873. The Asante resistance soon crumbled. By January 
187 4 the expedition was over and the Gold Coast was subsequently proclaimed a British colony. 
Meanwhile, back in Britain the Liberal Party was defeated at the polls and a new secretary of 
state for the colonies moved into the Colonial Office in Downing Street. Among Lanyon's 
papers, copied out in his own handwriting, is an extract from a despatch that Wolseley wrote to 
the newly-appointed Earl of Camarvon in February 1874, just before he left the Gold Coast. 
While not appearing to be overly enthusiastic about Lanyon, Wolseley did commend his ability 
and his 'knowledge of colonial duties and regulations [that] were of great service to me'.84 Once 
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both Wolseley and Lanyon were back home in England, Wolseley was promoted to Major-
General and invested with the KCMG85 while his aide-de-camp was rewarded with promotion 
to the rank of Brigade-Major. 86 Five years later the two men were destined to meet again while 
serving in another British colony in Africa: the Transvaal. 
On 27 October 1874 Lanyon, who was temporarily in London, was summoned to an interview 
with RGW Herbert, the permanent under-secretary of state for the colonies. Lanyon wrote to his 
father the same day: 'It seems that they are anxious to get someone to go out to the Gold Coast 
on special service for a few months to do some special work ... and also to set the Govt. machine 
going ... Lord Carnarvon desired that the appointment should be offered to me ... Mr Herbert 
offered the appointment in such flattering terms ... that I at once said I would go.' 87 What 
probably influenced Lanyon's decision even more than the flattery- to which he was certainly 
not immune - was the juicy bait dangled before the ambitious young officer: Herbert had hinted 
broadly that on Lanyon's return from the Gold Coast, he need not fear 'obtaining a good billet'. 
Lan yon immediately made plans to sail to West Africa from Liverpool on 6 November 187 4. But 
first he would spend a few days at 'The Abbey': could Nellie please 'give his linen a good 
overhauling'?88 
In the Colonial Office, Herbert lost no time in setting the plans for the Gold Coast Colony in 
motion. In his letter to the War Office the next day he wrote that it was absolutely essential that 
Major Lanyon of the 2nd West India regiment and Dr S Rowe of the African Medical Service 
be given permission to 'proceed at once'. Both officers had 'a good knowledge of the Gold Coast 
and can be trusted to avoid errors and indiscretions in communicating with the natives'. 89 With 
the formalities out of the way, Carnarvon then wrote to the governor of the Gold Coast, Strahan, 
that help was at hand. Lanyon and Rowe would be sailing shortly. Lanyon was to be appointed 
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acting colonial secretary at a salary of £100 a month. His experience of conducting 'official 
business', wrote Carnarvon, would make him a valuable asset in that department. For the first 
time in this hurried spell of correspondence, Camarvon then divulged the nature of the 'important 
measures' for which the new men were so urgently required: their mission would be to help 
promote the 'proposed abolition of slave dealing and slavery' in the new British colony.90 
Nearly five months later, in March 1875, Lanyon was more than ready to return home. His work 
in West Africa completed, he was waiting for the steamer to take him back to Britain. The colony 
was a 'deadly place' and he could not wait to leave.91 His antipathy towards the colonies to 
which he was posted and the people who lived in them, was to be a recurring one. As Burroughs 
has written on the attitude of British administrators towards local communities in the colonies, 
many of these officials 'consciously pursued separateness and drew distinctions, whether racial, 
social or educational ... expatriate staff might keep leading inhabitants at arm's length and 
sometimes disparage local customs and proclivities' .92 This was certainly so in Lanyon's case. 
Later it will become apparent that he was to loathe everything about 'hideous and disgusting' 
Kimberley.93 He was also to hate the Transvaal and the Boer people, saying that the Transvaal 
'has ever been the grave of reputations and honesty' .94 Indeed, Lanyon seemed unable to form 
any favourable attachments to, or opinions of, anything immediately unfamiliar and non-British. 
By February 1880 - more than a year before he finally left South Africa - he couldn't get away 
quickly enough, because 'South Africa stinks in my nostrils' .95 And rather like a mirror image 
reflecting back at him, Owen Lanyon was disliked by almost all those he governed. By his own 
admission, 'I may say that I am an Ishmael against whom every man's hand is turned' .96 Even 
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as an ambitious, enthusiastic, wet-behind-the-ears 32-year old official, Lanyon began to sour, and 
be soured, by everyone around him. This was to be in the future, however. As far as the Colonial 
Office was concerned, Lanyon's brief term of office in the Gold Coast had been successful. In 
August 1875, back home in Britain, he received the CMG, in recognition of his services.97 
In 187 5 the new opportunity Lan yon had been hoping for materialised. In southern Africa a crisis 
had developed in the British Crown Colony of Griqualand West. Ever since the discovery of 
diamonds there in the late 1860s, the area had been something of a thorn in the side of the 
Colonial Office. It 'neatly (and fearsomely) brought together accumulating problems oflabour 
supply, defence and imperial expenditure' .98 Throughout southern Africa, and certainly in the 
diamondiferous Kimberley area, there was tension between Africans and settlers relating to land. 
To make the situation even more delicate, at the end of 1873, there was an incident of African 
unrest, the Langalibalele affair, in the Natal Colony. This was directly connected to the labour 
supply to the diamond fields. Chief Langalibalele's Hlubi people had acquired firearms as 
payment for their labour, and their failure to register these guns led to a nasty confrontation 
which soon echoed through the Colonial Office. In the wake of this somewhat embarrassing 
incident - as far as British policy makers were concerned - it became clear to Camarvon, who 
had taken office as secretary of state for the colonies in February 187 4, just as the crisis needed 
attention, that the issue of procuring a ready supply of the necessary African labour was fraught 
with difficulty. Not only were there problems associated with recruiting Africans; the 
independent Boer republic in the Transvaal was reported to be preventing the flow oflabour to 
the mines.99 
The troubled situation in Griqualand West, Lanyon's legacy from Richard Southey, who had 
been bundled out of the region in disgrace some months before Lanyon' s arrival, will receive 
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attention below.100 At this juncture it suffices to note that Southey's failure, and escalating 
tensions on the diamond fields were the background to Lanyon' s appointment. Barely two weeks 
after Camarvon had written an exasperated letter to Barkly saying that the situation could not be 
allowed to continue, 101 the War Office was asked to sanction Lan yon' s secondment without delay 
so that he could sail in the first week of September. 102 It was agreed that he could be released on 
condition that his military pay was stopped and the Colonial Office would take on the 
responsibility for his salary. 103 Camarvon was then able to write to Barkly to inform him of 
Lan yon' s appointment, reiterating that despite his comparative youth, the new administrator was 
'an officer of ability and experience'. 104 The details ofLanyon's departure for southern Africa 
were duly despatched to Barkly on 6 September 1875, the same day that he left England for the 
Cape of Good Hope. 105 
Lanyon wrote to his father six days later, heartily pleased that he was not bound for West Africa 
again. 106 He was accompanied by William Crossman, who was going to Griqualand West to 
investigate the financial situation. Crossman was 'a very nice fellow' and a congenial travelling 
companion. The weather was tranquil, the sea was calm and Lanyon's spirits were high. 'Thus 
far we have come on our way rejoicing; the sun has beamed upon us and the waves have danced 
smilingly round us, not with anger, but with joy that so fair a ship and so pleasing a freight 
should be speeding oe'rthe face of the waters.' The letter shows an enthusiasm andjoie de vivre 
which is extremely rare in Lanyon's correspondence. Once resident in Kimberley- and later in 
Pretoria - his letters show that he became disillusioned and morose. But at Madeira, heading 
towards the Cape of Good Hope, he was indeed filled with good hope and high expectations. It 
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was his third trip to Africa and he wrote: 'I find myself ... on my way to other lands ... The third 
time is certainly the charm, let us hope that the charm may not be delusive, and that bright 
anticipation may not be dimmed hereafter.' 107 There is a prophetic ring about this comment. His 
bright anticipation was certainly to tum to gloom by the time he returned home in 1881. 
Lanyon's next letter, written at sea about two weeks later, is more characteristic of his 
correspondence from South Africa. He was growing weary of the long voyage. The trip was 
'deadly dull' and the passengers were all 'stupid and vulgar'. Ever conscientious, he had whiled 
away the time reading his Blue Books on the situation in Griqualand West and had formed the 
opinion that few British colonies 'have had so eventful or so troublesome a career, as this my 
future charge'. He hoped he would be able to set it straight, because typical of a true-blue British 
imperial agent, he wanted honour, glory and prestige for Britain. Griqualand West had to be 
'stabilised and strengthened into a position of which the old mother country may not be ashamed 
to own that it is one of the family' .108 
The voyage from England to the Cape Colony appears to have taken two days short of a full 
month. Lanyon arrived in Cape Town on 4 October 1875.109 When he reported to Government 
House, the high commissioner's official residence, Lady Barkly explained that Sir Henry was 
still in Kimberley, where he was busy winding up the affairs of Southey's now defunct 
administration. On Camarvon's orders, Barkly had moved Richard Southey out and appointed 
JD Barry, the recorder, as provisional acting-administrator pending Lanyon's arrival. He also 
prorogued the legislative council and made all the necessary announcements concerning the new 
dispensation. 110 Barkly was expected back in Cape Town soon, and Lanyon was welcome to stay 
on in Government House. 
A letter from Barkly arrived within a few days, confirming that he would be back by about 17 
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October. He wanted to spend about a week briefing Lanyon on his duties before the new 
administrator left for Griqualand West. Lanyon meanwhile complained bitterly that it had been 
necessary to send all his heavy luggage around the coast to Natal. Off-loading it at Cape Town 
would have meant paying prohibitive duty on everything. Unlike the Cape, Natal still had 
representative government and was therefore not 'subject to the illiberal policy of self-made 
politicians': an irritable reference on Lanyon's part to the responsible government granted to the 
Cape in 1872. Plans were also laid ahead of time for Crossman and Lanyon to travel up to 
Kimberley in the wagon which would bring Barkly back to Cape Town. Lanyon obviously had 
little empathy for or concept of the rigours of the journey that lay ahead. He wrote rather 
ingenuous! y to his father: 'I expect we shall be about 15 days on the way [to Kimberley]. Fancy 
doing 720 miles in an 8-horse waggon something like one of Barley and Perkin's brewery carts 
with a huge hood over it; a sort of gipsy life.' 111 
Lanyon and Crossman arrived in Kimberley on 14 November. 112 In his correspondence Lanyon 
does not record his very first impressions of Kimberley, but about six weeks later he wrote: 'A 
more uninteresting country could not well be found. It is dead flat without water or trees and 
overhead a burning scorching sun ... The only outline against the horizon being huge heaps of 
soil which has been brought up from the mine.' 113 He was clearly delighted to have been warmly 
welcomed, and enclosed copies of the addresses he had received on the occasion, for Barkly's 
interest. 114 To his father, Lanyon admitted privately that the Southey government had been so 
unpopular that 'anyone coming would have been cordially welcomed, so I cannot flatter myself 
that it is personal. But I trust it may last, for one will have to tread on many corns morally'. His 
spirits high, Lanyon settled himself in Kimberley and began his administration of Griqualand 
West.115 
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CHAPTER II 
LANYON AND CROWN COLONY RULE 
IN GRIQUALAND WEST 
When Owen Lanyon arrived in early October 1875, British presence in southern Africa was 
already well established, but Griqualand West, where Lanyon was to be posted, was a newly 
developing region. The town of Kimberley had risen, phoenix-like, from the veld with the 
discovery of diamonds some eight years earlier and there was a cosmopolitan feel to the bustling 
little corrugated-iron village. People had come to it from all comers of southern Africa and 
beyond, and everyone was hoping to get rich quickly. It did not have a very stable society and 
was hardly the kind of place for a well-bred Irish-born British official to feel particularly 
comfortable; he stuck out like a sore thumb in the dusty mining town. To understand the brief 
that Lanyon had been given by the Colonial Office, and Lanyon's progress in what must have 
been a very foreign environment for the young imperial agent, it is necessary to understand how 
the nature of British colonial policy was evolving in southern Africa in the 1870s, and the 
attitude and opinions of the high commissioner, Sir Henry Barkly, who was Lanyon's immediate 
superior. Also ofimportance in understanding Lanyon's role is an examination of the legacy he 
had been left by Richard Southey, his predecessor. Southey had been singularly unsuccessful in 
the diamond fields and Lanyon had to take over from him in the wake of an armed revolt in the 
region. All these issues impacted upon Owen Lanyon's role in Griqualand West and form a vital 
background to the study of this, his first administratorship in southern Africa, from 187 5 to early 
1879. 
As will be shown, Lanyon's role in Griqualand West was in many ways the most crucial period 
in his southern African career. It was while on the diamond fields that he became an important 
architect of policies that secured the capitalist ownership of land. Furthermore, he devised and 
implemented measures that were the first of their kind in putting African labour resources under 
colonial control. These were to pave the way for white control over land and labour, hallmarks 
of the new aggressive capitalist political economy of the second half of the 19th century in 
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southern Africa. 
In Britain, the Liberal Party, under William Gladstone, whose imperial policy was reputedly 
dominated by his budget, had been in power since 1868. Gladstone 'promised and gave, cheap 
government and a modicum of reform where the body politic seemed to need it'. 1 In South Africa 
the imperial government was moving towards reducing its commitments, and was beginning to 
contemplate the withdrawal of imperial troops; it was also trying to pass as much responsibility 
and expense as possible to the colonies. In July 1870 a Whig secretary of state for the colonies, 
Lord Kimberley, took over in the Colonial Office and a new high commissioner for South Africa 
and governor of the Cape Colony, Sir Henry Barkly, arrived in late 1870. Kimberley, in line with 
the Liberal Party view, advocated political self-help in the colonies and in 1871 the Cape Colony 
was persuaded to take over the administration ofBasutoland, which the imperial government had 
annexed in 1868.2 Another step in the same direction was to encourage the Cape Colony in its 
aspirations towards responsible government. But Kimberley was soon obliged to change tack. 
In Britain there were rumblings of economic instability, and signs of growing international 
competition. At the periphery changes were also afoot. The discovery of diamonds foreshadowed 
the growth of a far more profitable capitalist economy in South Africa and to meet the demands 
of the new development, Britain was forced into more active involvement in the South African 
interior.3 
Kimberley had appointed Barkly expressly to further imperial Britain's policy of reducing her 
responsibilities in southern Africa, but the new pace of circumstances caught Kimberley off 
guard and left Barkly to handle a very tricky situation. With the new progress and prosperity of 
the early 1870s came an awakening of settler political confidence, and a powerful eastern Cape 
faction evolved in Port Elizabeth, forming a settler elite with considerable financial and political 
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clout. 4 These easterners, the so-called separatists, feared domination by the western Cape 
politicians and merchants and were thus against the move towards responsible government. The 
political tension between these two factions made Barkly's position very difficult. 
One of the foremost easterners, who led the move against responsible government, was John 
Paterson and another was Richard Southey, the Cape colonial secretary. It suited the interests of 
Paterson and other members of the growing settler elite in Port Elizabeth, to take early economic 
advantage of the new diamond discoveries. Indeed, in Southey, who was reputedly Barkly's 
guiding spirit,5 the easterners were able to push their own views. Stressing that the discovery was 
one of significant proportions, they urged that the fields and should certainly not be allowed to 
remain in the hands of the Tlhaping or be lost to the republicans. 6 There was also strong pressure 
from Port Elizabeth merchants who claimed that republican expansion was hampering their trade 
routes to and from the diamond fields and endangering the vital supply routes to the mines. 7 
After arbitration on the ownership of the fields and the Keate Award, Barkly, with Southey and 
the Cape lawyer David Arnot, was able to organise that the claims of the Tlhaping people and 
Brand's Free Staters to ownership of the diamond fields be superceded by those ofWaterboer's 
Griqua. Waterboer was then prepared to pass control of the diamond fields to Britain, but Barkly 
was in an awkward position because there was still no resolution of the responsible government 
feud in the Cape. As an interim measure, until such time as the new Cape ministry was up and 
running and, he hoped, would take over the diamond fields, Barkly annexed Griqualand West 
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for Britain in 1871, to be ruled temporarily as a crown colony. At the same time, the Cape 
legislative assembly passed a resolution tabled by Southey in favour of annexation of the 
diamond fields. 
The Cape Colony received responsible government in 1872, despite the opposition of the 
easterners. But then, to Barkly's dismay and embarrassment, the new ministry under John 
Molteno, the first prime minister, was not prepared to accept responsibility for the diamond 
fields. Soon thereafter, in 1873, Barkly appointed Richard Southey as lieutenant-governor of 
Griqualand West. Southey's appointment was significant. Like Barkly, he was a dyed-in-the 
wool imperialist and was fiercely anti-Dutch. In his view the republicans in the interior would 
not be accomplished enough to meet the challenges that were inherent in the development of a 
profitable diamond mining industry. As an easterner himself Southey was an acceptable choice 
as far as the eastern Cape settler elite was concerned - merchants and speculators based in Port 
Elizabeth were hoping that with his help their interests would be well served on the fields, where 
there were good business prospects in the offing. However, Southey's administration of 
Griqualand West was to fail. By the time he left the diamond fields in 187 5, to be succeeded by 
Owen Lanyon, British policy in South Africa was undergoing a remarkable change. 
Carnarvon and his confederation scheme 
In 187 4 the Liberal government in Britain was defeated. Benjamin Disraeli's Conservative Party 
then assumed control of the government in Britain and Camarvon headed up the Colonial Office 
as the new secretary of state for the colonies. Like most other members of the cabinet, Disraeli 
appears to have regarded colonial debates as something of a burden and he allowed Camarvon 
considerable latitude in decisions on colonial policy. 8 
The ambitious Camarvon was the author of the grandiose confederation scheme for southern 
Africa in the 1870s, although Disraeli obviously had to be consulted before major decisions were 
M Bentley, Politics without democracy 1815-1914 (Oxford, 1996), p xviii, argues that most senior British 
politicians viewed the empire as 'boring' and resented imperial intrusion in parliamentary affairs. 
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taken and as a courtesy Queen Victoria had to be informed of such plans.9 The confederation of 
Canada, undertaken in 1867, which had successfully reconciled both the British and the French 
to the empire and afforded them self-government, was used as a precedent in Camarvon's 
attempt to do the same with the British and Boer-ruled states. 
Camarvon's proposal was that the various colonies and republics in South Africa should unite 
to form a self-governing confederation under the British flag. He hoped that eventually this 
British control would stretch as far north as the Zambezi River. It was a plan that evolved slowly, 
finally taking shape in Camarvon's famous federation despatch of 4 May 1875, issued just over 
a year after he took control at the Colonial Office. The dogged pursuance of his plans and the 
reactions they evinced in South Africa form the backdrop to the role played by Owen Lanyon 
in Griqualand West. Indeed, it will be shown that Lanyon was an extremely influential person 
in pointing the way to the South Africa that was beginning to emerge after the discovery of 
minerals. He arrived in Kimberley at a time when confederation was beginning to be actively 
promoted in South Africa and the timing of his appointment makes it safe to assume that he was 
one of the first of Camarvon's pro-federation civil appointees, arriving in South Africa shortly 
after Gamet Wolseley's stay in Natal (April - September 1875), and some six months before 
Theophilus Shepstone began his mission to annex and administer the Transvaal on behalf of 
Britain. 
Confederation, according to Camarvon, would solve the 'tangled skein' of the diamond fields 
dispute because existing regional boundaries would no longer be an issue. 10 Furthermore, it 
would bring political unity to the small, disunited white population, bolstering white supremacy 
in the face of a large African population which was beginning to chafe against increasing settler 
pressure for land and labour. Britain's so-called humanitarian desire to protect African people, 
9 
10 
See for example Camarvon Papers, PRO 30/6/11, Camarvon - Disraeli, 20 September 1876, asking 
Disraeli's 'concurrence' on the plan to send Shepstone to the Transvaal with a 'secret despatch 
empowering him to take over the Transvaal government ... if circumstances on his arrival render this in 
any way possible' and Camarvon Papers, PRO 301613, Camarvon - Ponsonby, 20 September 1876, 
requesting that Ponsonby 'submit all this immediately to the Queen for HM' s approval'. 
Ibid, PR 0 3 016111, Camarvon - Disraeli, 14 December 18 7 5. Referring to the South African situation after 
the rejection of his confederation proposals Camarvon wrote: ' ... the skein is too tangled a one to be untied 
by mere telegrams'. His agent Froude would have to report back personally. 
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argued by some early liberal historians, can largely be dismissed; on close examination it 
becomes clear that the confederation policy was in fact markedly illiberal. 11 Then too, Camarvon 
argued, the growing demand for labour in the mid 1870s required by the developing economy 
could best be met by the adoption of a common policy. 12 If the supply oflabour was blocked by 
the republics, as it was reputed to be, or was slow in forthcoming from independent African 
states, then confederation would serve to remove these obstacles, and republics and African 
societies could be brought into line. Furthermore, confederation as Camarvon conceived it, 
would be instrumental in modernising and upgrading state machinery to meet the level required 
by the developing capitalist economy. In other words, isolated, inefficient, bankrupt states had 
to be swept up into the confederal scheme and made part of a more efficient whole. 
Camarvon's views on the benefits of confederation are probably a reflection of those expressed 
in a memorandum which he asked Edward Fairfield, a member of his staff in the Colonial Office, 
to compile in order to enlighten the members of the cabinet of the advantages of the scheme and 
explain why it appeared to be the best policy to follow in southern Africa. Fairfield raised three 
main issues. The first was the need to establish white supremacy. He pointed to the 'precarious 
position of civilisation' as far as African relations in both Natal and the Transvaal were 
concerned, the urgency to disarm the African people and the need to 'break down the power of 
the chiefs'. Secondly, small, inefficient governments needed upgrading. Their governance should 
be improved and replaced by sound administrative units which could attract capital and promote 
a viable capitalist economy. Thirdly, cheap labour had to be found to serve the needs of this 
emerging new economy. These pronouncements certainly put paid to all claims of humanitarian 
motives behind the confederal proposals. 13 
In line with Fairfield's thinking, one of Camarvon' s main arguments in favour of confederation 
was his insistence on the need for a' common native policy'. In his opening speech at the London 
11 
12 
13 
The last clause (clause 82) of the Draft Bill for federation, for example, states that for the purposes of the 
proposed Act 'the word "population" shall be deemed not to include African natives' and Africans were 
thus not entitled to vote, despite the fact that election to the proposed federal House of Assembly was to 
be proportionate to the population of each region. 
See for example Etherington, 'Labour supply and the genesis of South African confederation', pp 235-253. 
CP, African 84, Affairs; memorandum by Mr Fairfield, January 1876, pp 5-9. 
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conference that he had seen fit to organise on confederation, attended by representatives from 
some of the southern African states, Camarvon made a number of points on how confederation 
would affect Africans. He felt that the 'dangerous' form of wages, namely the firearms that were 
becoming readily available to wage-earning Africans on the diamond fields, should be controlled 
by a uniform policy. 14 He also made reference to the all-important African labour question, 
expressing the view that African workers should be 'fully utilised' and 'made a source of 
strength and of future prosperity' in the new confederation. 15 Furthermore he stressed that he saw 
African communities in South Africa as 'a serious and common danger to the whole European 
population'. Attempts should thus be made to limit chiefly power and foster white supremacy. 
By 'common native policy' the secretary of state presumably meant cooperation between the 
various white-controlled states to 'diminish the potential risk' posed by strong African polities. 16 
Confederation was, to put it bluntly, to be a white defence organisation. Furthermore, the 'Draft 
Bill for Union under one government of such of the South African Colonies and States as may 
agree thereto' which Carnarvon compiled and sent to Barkly after the 1876 conference, is clearly 
illiberal as far as the franchise for blacks is concerned. 17 Indeed, soon afterwards, FW Chesson 
of the Aborigines Protection Society submitted a statement, signed by a number of concerned 
members, to the Colonial Office, expressing grave misgivings at the apparent lack of concern for 
the rights of Africans in Carnarvon's confederation proposals of December 1876.18 
The second memorandum, also printed for cabinet use, was compiled by JB Glanville, the editor 
of a British periodical called The Empire. In contrast to Fairfield's document, Glanville's 
memorandum is an analysis of the difficulties in implementing confederation in southern Africa, 
and as a contemporary analysis of possible problems, Goodfellow is of the opinion that it was 
14 
15 
16 
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For details of Owen Lanyon's concurrence on the inadvisability of allowing Africans to buy 'warlike 
stores' see TA, A596, vol 4(b), Minute (draft) Lanyon - Frere, 19 September 1878. 
CP, African 102, Conference on affairs; Lord Carnarvon 's speech and minutes, Carnarvon's opening 
address, 3 August 1876. 
CP, African 102, Conference on affairs; Lord Carnarvon's speech and minutes, 3August1876, pp 1-3. 
CP, African 11, Draft despatch to Sir H Barkly on Union Bill, December 1876, pp 1-17. 
CP, African 138, Aborigines Protection Society- Carnarvon, 20 July 1877, pp 20-21. 
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unsurpassed. 19 Camarvon was interested enough in Glanville's ideas to ask him to call at the 
Colonial Office to discuss his opinions. Glanville, himself a South African, felt that the reaction 
in South Africa to Camarvon's suggestions of May 1875 had generally been positive. But he 
pointed out that as a result of the unpalatable diamond field dispute, the 'Dutch-speaking States' 
felt 'repugnance' towards British rule. They resented British intervention in their domestic affairs 
and the offensive attitude of British officials in South Africa. Here he probably had in mind both 
Barkly who was well known to be anti-republican, and Southey who was allegedly vindictive 
and notoriously discourteous to the Boers. 20 This, Glanville felt, put confederation at risk because 
both republics, and the Orange Free State in particular, were vitally important to federal success. 
'As long as Mr. Brand lives', he wrote, 'no proposal for Confederation will be received in the 
Free State to which he does not give his approval ... Were President Brand gained, all would be 
gained.' In essence, he was confident that if Brand could be won over, the Transvaal would 
follow, particularly if the latter was assured of a harbour at Delagoa Bay. Glanville foresaw no 
complications from Natal and Griqualand West: they would both be anxious to comply, but he 
was concerned, accurately, as it proved, that the Cape Colony would be reluctant to cooperate. 
According to Glanville there was no real support for federation in that colony and with their 
newly acquired responsible government status they would have little to gain from compliance. 
As he put it, 'to the Cabinet at Cape Town an invitation to promote Confederation is an invitation 
to provide for its own extinction' .21 
On the basis of advice from a number of quarters, 22 Camarvon then formulated his blueprint, his 
19 
20 
21 
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Goodfellow, Great Britain and South African confederation, p 76. In Cope, 'Strategic and socio-economic 
explanations', pp 14-20, a convincing argument is put forward, taking Goodfellow to task for ignoring the 
significance of Fairfield's memorandum. 
See Chapter I on the generally superior, and often racist attitude of British imperial agents in South Africa 
and Atmore & Marks, 'The imperial factor in South Africa, p 114. On Southey's unpopularity see the 
extracts from The Diamond Field, 20 June 1874, quoted in Oberholster, Die anneksasie van Griekwaland-
Wes, p 218; De Kiewiet, The imperial factor in South Africa, p 19. See also the discussion below of 
Southey's legacy to Owen Lanyon in Griqualand West. 
CP, African 81, Affairs; proposed conference of delegates; correspondence, enclosure 1 in no 2, TB 
Glanville, 'Some remarks on the practical difficulties in the way of a Confederation of the South African 
Colonies and States, undated (received 9 July 1875), pp 2-5. 
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'broad and dignified ambition for South Africa' .23 In this chapter it is significant to see how it 
impacted upon the situation on the diamond fields, where Owen Lanyon was to take over the 
administration from 187 5 to late 1878. The Colonial Office was determined that its responsibility 
for administering Griqualand West could only be an interim arrangement. Certainly Carnarvon, 
writing to Barkly in August 1875, saw what he called the Cape government's 'agreement' to the 
annexation of Griqualand West24 as exerting some binding force on it to accept responsibility for 
the region in the not too distant future. In mid 1875 the irrepressible Carnarvon foresaw few of 
the problems that lay ahead, and those he might have anticipated he brushed nonchalantly aside; 
for the present Griqualand West was his prime concern. He wrote to Barkly: 
As you are aware, the annexation [of Griqualand West] was sanctioned upon the passing of the resolutions 
by the Cape parliament asserting that it was desirable and needful ... for the interest of the Cape that the 
territory should be annexed; ... I have little doubt that the Members of the present Parliament will ... accept 
the Resolutions of 1871 as morally binding upon themselves ... No advance whatever has been made 
towards the fulfilment of the understanding on which Her Majesty's late government appear to have 
sanctioned the acceptance of Griqua-Land West as British territory ... The Resolutions which were adopted 
in July and August, 1871, ... constituted an undertaking on the fulfilment of which ... the Imperial 
Government were entitled to rely ... namely that the Cape Government ... should undertake the 
responsibility of the administration of the territory, even to the extent of making good the cost, if any, 
which might result from a deficiency of the local revenues.25 
'I anticipate no serious results', he had informed Disraeli the previous year. All that was needed 
was a 'firm tone' and he was confident that everything could be brought into line.26 
Such was the situation when Owen Lanyon, later to become notorious for his 'firm tone' in 
government, arrived in Griqualand West to try to steer the diamond fields back to some measure 
of solvency and, hopefully, deliver it into the none-too-welcoming hands of the Cape Colony. 
It is very clear from the timing of Carnarvon' s subsequent letters that Owen Lan yon was the man 
he had in mind to carry out the changes outlined in his despatch to Barkly, and the secretary of 
state promptly made the necessary arrangements.27 Lanyon's brief was made clear: he was to cut 
23 
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De Kiewiet, The imperial factor in South Africa, p 51. 
The Cape legislative assembly had done no more than pass the resolution which Southey had tabled in July 
1871 in favour of annexation of the diamond fields. The reality of the situation was that this did not 
constitute a commitment to assume full responsibility for Griqualand West as part of the Cape Colony. 
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back the English tax-payers' enforced obligation on the diamond fields by encouraging the Cape 
legislature to take the diamond fields under its wing. With Barkly's assistance, he was to take 
Griqualand West off the imperial government's hands, and this was to be the first step in the 
realisation of Carnarvon's confederal scheme. 
Richard Southey's legacy to Lanyon 
When Owen Lanyon arrived in Kimberley, where he was to be based for more than three years, 
the situation he inherited from his predecessor was very unsettled. In January 1873 Richard 
Southey had been appointed lieutenant-governor of Griqualand West. 28 His term of office in 
Kimberley appears to have been characterised by a remarkable lack of finesse. To be fair, he had 
to cope with an extremely volatile and difficult situation. As has been seen, in the 1870s 
Griqualand West was a pariah colony - a political mistake - unwanted by the imperial 
government, hated by the republics and kept at arm's length by the Cape Colony. 29 The discovery 
of diamonds had brought the region relative prosperity but also a host of problems. The 
population of the diamond fields had increased by leaps and bounds30 and when Southey was 
appointed there was little formal agriculture to provide even the most basic sustenance for the 
new community; everything had to be transported to the area. There was a melee of white diggers 
and African people who flocked to the diamond fields to search for gems. Other indigenes were 
in search of wage labour in the hope of earning enough to provide for their families and to 
purchase guns and ammunition in order to resist widespread and insidious settler land 
encroachment. 
Southey's revenue, given the fact that import dues were largely absorbed by the Cape Colony,31 
was based almost entirely, either directly or indirectly, on what proved to be an unreliable 
28 
29 
30 
31 
For an outline of the constitution under which Southey had to administer the crown colony see Turrell, 
Capital and labour on the Kimberley diamond fields, pp 32-33. 
Oberholster, Die anneksasie van Griekwaland-Wes, p 243. 
For approximate population figures in Griqualand West during Lanyon's administration, see below. 
TA, A596, vol I I, Lanyon-Charles Lanyon, 14October1875. On his arrival in Cape Town, Lanyon was 
scandalised to learn of this 'iniquitous' policy. He informed his father that he intended to 'obviate this in 
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commodity. 32 Soon after Britain's annexation of Griqualand West there were violent fluctuations 
in the price of diamonds, due largely to the sudden increase in the supply of the gems. To make 
matters worse an international financial crisis loomed in 1873, forcing diamond prices down. 
Diamonds also proved difficult to mine, with claims collapsing and extensive flooding causing 
long, frustrating and costly delays. The early days of carefree individual profiteering soon gave 
way to debilitating socio-economic problems such as the lack of hygienic living conditions, 
crime, altercations over claim ownership and the relentless inroads of speculators and mining 
companies. 
Before Southey's arrival there had been angry disputes over who had access to the land and 
mineral rights. The British-engineered arbitration court-which granted the land to Waterboer's 
Griqua - and the subsequent annexation of Griqualand West, had overruled the territorial rights 
of the Tlhaping people and the Boer republics, and had made the area (once Waterboer had been 
prevailed upon to relinquish Griqua rights), from the British point of view, crown land. Another 
complication was that certain land claims on the border between Griqualand West and the 
Orange Free State dated back to the British control of the Orange River Sovereignty in the period 
from 1848 to 1854 and Barkly had seen fit to ratify those land holdings extant on 27 October 
1871.33 The diggers, for their part, maintained that they were fully entitled to prospect for 
diamonds if they found a likely looking spot, but since 1867 when the first gems were 
discovered, colonial speculators from the Cape had not been slow in accumulating as many 
claims to vast tracts ofland as they possibly could. By virtue of their ownership these proprietors 
said that the ground, and therefore the mineral rights, was theirs. It all made for a chaotic 
situation by the time the various claims were examined in 1872-1873. Southey, as the senior 
British official in the colony was the sole authority to issue land titles and he was adamant that 
the Cape 'land-jobbers' with their grandiose schemes would not call the shots on the diamond 
fields. In the view ofboth Shillington and Turrell, Southey, who had strong ties with the wealthy 
settler agriculturists in the eastern Cape, hoped to capitalise the farming land for the benefit of 
eastern Cape farmers, thereby 'broadening the economic base of the new colony and reducing 
32 
33 
WH Worger, South Africa's city of diamonds: mine workers and monopoly capitalism in Kimberley, 1867-
1895 (New Haven, 1987), pp 27-28. 
CP, African 215, 'Report on the Land Question in Griqualand West,by Lieut-Colonel Charles Warren, 
R.E., C.M.G.', June 1880; Shillington, The colonisation of the southern Tswana, p 70. 
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its dependence upon the fortunes of the nascent mining industry'. 34 
Southey was also hard pressed to address an incipient labour shortage, curb gem thefts and illicit 
diamond buying and cope with growing dissatisfaction from all quarters. He was by nature a 
rigid, unapproachable autocrat; and with a highly unpopular staff, a small budget - which he 
managed very poorly - and an ineffectual and corrupt police force, he made little headway in 
bringing order to the restless, undisciplined digger community. The situation became so fraught 
that Southey's mine inspectors, charged with the responsibility of collecting licences from the 
diggers, could only carry out their duties if they were heavily armed.35 
The supercilious lieutenant-governor alienated himself from everyone, but his particular enemies 
were the white diggers. They were clamouring for class legislation to prevent Africans from 
buying and working claims. They also argued that official control over all African labourers 
would regulate and therefore reduce the cost of black labour. But Southey refused to introduce 
such controls. In keeping with his 'staunchly colour-blind' brand of liberalism - admittedly a 
remarkable outlook for an easterner and member of the eastern Cape settler elite- he continued 
to allow African diggers to hold claims.36 This liberalism and his claim, which is open to some 
debate, to be the protector of 'native interests', did not, however, stretch to recognition of the 
territorial rights of the Tlhaping people. As Shillington has shown, these rights were largely 
ignored in favour of a scheme to create 'a community of colonists based upon progressive white 
farming' in the well-watered regions of Griqualand West adjacent to the diamond fields. 37 
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Southey failed in several key areas. His attempt to regulate the extraction of exorbitant rentals 
by merchant proprietors is a case in point.38 Then too, in an effort to defend the rights of 
individual claim owners against absentee speculators who were threatening to consolidate all the 
smaller claims, Southey issued an ordinance to limit the number of claims that could be held by 
one person to 10.39 He also realised that a diamond industry based on small-holding, rather than 
larger-scale production, was in the interests of the local Kimberley merchants in particular- with 
whom he had great sympathy- because they depended for their profits on a large, economically 
active population rather than efficiency of production.40 But a regulation to prevent company 
production could not survive for long on the Kimberley diamond fields. Even in its infancy the 
diamond mining industry was showing clear signs of moving towards company production and 
eventual monopoly capitalism. Turrell maintains that Southey's inability to regulate monopoly 
rents and to place effective restrictions on claim combination in fact placed a serious brake on 
the development of productive forces on the diamond fields. 41 As will be shown, when Lanyon 
took over the reins from Southey, with due instructions from the Colonial Office, there was to 
be a gradual change from small to larger-scale company production. 
If Southey was poor at interpersonal relations he was simply abysmal at financial management 
and Griqualand West was pushed to the brink of collapse by early 1875. As mentioned above, 
Colonel William Crossman, a member of the Colonial Office staff, was sent out to Griqualand 
West on the same vessel as Lanyon.42 He was instructed 'to inquire into and report upon the 
financial condition ... of the Province of Griqualand West ... with a view to great retrenchment 
in expenditure'. Furthermore he had special powers to investigate how 'the Crown Lands and all 
revenue arising therefrom have been administered and the probable extent and value of the lands 
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not already disposed of' .43 It seems that Camarvon envisaged a complete re-organisation of the 
allocation of claims to diggers, one of the main sources of unrest on the diamond fields. In his 
provisional report written to Camarvon from Kimberley in the first week ofF ebruary 187 6, some 
three months after his arrival at the diamond fields, Crossman wrote that he was shocked at 
Southey's 'disgraceful' incompetence and his 'reckless way in dealing with everything'. Land 
disputes had gobbled up funds for surveys, policing- despite being ineffective- had cost a great 
deal and the management of works and public buildings had been grossly extravagant. Personal 
tax which had stood at £3 per head in 1872 had soared to £10 by 1875.44 Annual estimates of 
income and expenditure had only been prepared long after the stipulated deadlines and had 
arrived in London far too late to be useful.45 Furthermore, Crossman alleged that the 1873 
accounts had been falsified and some of the entries had only been made in the books as late as 
187 5. In his lengthy provisional report he provided masses of detailed evidence of the scandalous 
state of affairs, and added 15 enclosures to drive home his point. It was damning evidence 
indeed, as far as both Richard Southey and his unscrupulous colonial secretary, John Blades 
Currey, were concerned, although in the full report Crossman compiled three months later he was 
careful to exonerate Southey from any shady dealings.46 The only light at the end of the gloomy 
financial tunnel, said Crossman, was that at the time of writing 'Major Lanyon has already done 
away with several superfluous offices ... [in order to] reduce to some extent the expense of 
administration.' Among the enclosures Crossman included a minute compiled by the ever-
punctilious Lanyon, headed: 'Reductions in expenditure already effected' .47 
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Barely six months after Southey's arrival the white diggers had begun to hold public meetings 
where they expressed their relentless hatred for the lieutenant-governor and his hapless 
administration and aired their mounting grievances. 48 This antagonism reached such proportions 
by March 1875 that the diggers staged an uprising, the Black Flag Revolt. At the core of the 
outbreak was the conflict which was to become almost synonymous with the late 19th _century 
mineral revolution in South Africa - that between capital and labour. In Kimberley the dispute 
began with individual claim owners trying to survive the pressure from company promoters who 
wanted to take control of the entire diamond mining enterprise. Southey's ambivalent stance and 
ineffectual action satisfied no one. None of the interest groups was united - except against 
Richard Southey and his administration.49 In flagrant contravention of a proclamation Southey 
had issued, the diggers formed a Committee of Public Safety and armed themselves and 
introduced military drill. 50 Southey took fright and requested that troops be sent to assist his puny 
police force. 51 By the time a British force arrived in May 187 5 the Black Flag Revolt had blown 
over and the costly relocation of troops was chalked up against the lieutenant-governor's steadily 
declining reputation. 
Southey's legacy to Lan yon also had important implications for the new appointee's furtherance 
ofCamarvon's federal scheme. Britain's annexation ofGriqualand West in 1871 had alienated 
the two independent Boer republics, the Orange Free State and the South African Republic, both 
of which had made claims to ownership of parts of the diamondiferous land. The Orange Free 
State, unlike its northerly neighbour, had lodged a very convincing claim to some of the richest 
regions. At about the same time as Owen Lanyon was being considered as a candidate to be sent 
to Kimberley to pull Griqualand West out of the parlous situation into which it had slumped, the 
able Free State leader, JH Brand, was fighting a bulldog-like rearguard action against Camarvon. 
Brand insisted that all he wanted was simple justice for the Free State. Some of the 
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diamondiferous land undeniably belonged to the republic and Brand wanted justice. 52 
Southey, aided and abetted by Barkly, had exacerbated these troubled Boer-British relations by 
his superior bullying attitude towards the republics and arrogant references to their status as 
'petty republics' bent on expansion. 53 On assumption of office in Griqualand West, Southey had 
been given the go-ahead to deal personally with Brand rather than conducting affairs through 
Barkly, 54 and he had lost no time in exercising this prerogative. Before long he was complaining 
bitterly to both Barkly and Camarvon that farmers in the Free State were hampering the flow of 
labour to the diamond mines55 and that the Transvaal was causing unrest by encroaching on the 
Keate Award territory on its western boundary.56 While there is evidence that both these 
complaints, particularly the latter, were certainly justified, an improvement in relations with the 
Boers was high on Camarvon's list of priorities. Indeed, one of Lanyon's more important 
instructions, heavily underscored in his brief from Camarvon in 1875, was to try to repair the 
well-nigh irreparable damage done by Southey in this regard.57 Rapprochement with the Boer 
republics, had become an important pillar - recommended to Camarvon, as has been seen, by 
Glanville58 - of Camarvon' s confederation scheme. 59 Indeed, Camarvon' s rank expansionism is 
clear in a letter to Ponsonby, Queen Victoria's private secretary, in which he admitted that 
improved relations with the Boers was the preamble 'to that which has been for a long time my 
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object, the acquisition, in some form or another, of the Dutch republics' .60 
Apart from his failure to keep the peace and his inept administration, Southey's dismissal and 
his replacement by Lanyon was prompted by his attitude to the republics. Certainly, Carnarvon 
openly admitted to having little or no regard for Southey. 61 There is some support for the opinion 
that the Black Flag Revolt was the crucial catalyst,62 but the Colonial Office records appear to 
indicate that Camarvon was more concerned about the financial crisis in Griqualand West. 
Obviously the two issues are closely linked, as providing troops - unnecessarily as it turned out 
- to put down the digger unrest had certainly been an untoward expense which had to be met by 
the imperial government. Carnarvon' s correspondence shows that he was certainly very mindful 
of the 'disgraceful' mismanagement offunds,63 and even the 'cold-blooded', stoical Barkly, not 
usually given to overreaction, admitted that the financial state of the region 'exceeds my worst 
expectations'. 64 
By mid 1875 it was clear that the situation was spiralling out of control.65 Richard Southey had 
in fact fallen so far from grace that Camarvon felt that all these 'recent occurrences' had rendered 
him a 'less desirable representative of Griqualand West than he would otherwise have been'. His 
presence would no longer be required as a delegate at the London conference Carnarvon was 
busy planning.66 Finally, in August 1875, the secretary of state snapped. He wrote a long letter 
to Barkly saying that enough was enough. The situation could not go on unchecked: 
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at once, with an unsparing hand, every unnecessary expense and to place the administration on a far more 
economical and, at the same time, as I hope, on a more effective footing ... The first step ... will be the 
substitution ofa less highly paid officer for the present Lieutenant-Governor ... I should on many grounds 
think it desirable for him now to make way for another officer ... Mr Currey ... has assumed an attitude ... 
which I am compelled stron~ly to disapprove of, and I am of the opinion that he also should retire from 
the service of the Province. 
Although it was decided that Owen Lanyon should be Southey's replacement, in order to save 
money, his status and duties were to be different. He was appointed as administrator and was also 
expected to take on the duties of colonial secretary. His annual salary was to be £1 700 with no 
additional allowance,68 which was considerably less than Southey had earned as lieutenant-
governor. The administrator's staff would include a treasurer, a recorder, an attorney general, a 
head of police and several magistrates. In Carnarvon's view Lanyon's 'very considerable 
experience of colonial affairs' and his 'zeal and ability' made him 'exceptionally well qualified 
for the important and responsible duties of this post' .69 
Southey departed for the Cape Colony, where rather surprisingly, in the light of his lacklustre 
performance in Griqualand West, he was elected to the Cape legislature as the member for 
Grahamstown. Be that as it may, he had left a legacy upon which, from mid November 1875 
onwards, Owen Lanyon had either to build or to tear down and start afresh. 
New brooms sweep clean 
Lanyon arrived in Cape Town on 4 October 1875 and stayed there for a few weeks rather than 
heading straight off to Griqualand West.70 While in the mother city he learned whatever 
information he could about the diamond fields, including the fact that the cost ofliving there was 
extremely high and that his annual salary of £1 700 would not go very far at all.71 After 
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discussions with Barkly, Lanyon and William Crossman set off for Kimberley, arriving there on 
14 November 1875.72 Three days later, on 17 November, he was officially inaugurated as 
administrator and took the necessary oaths of office, 73 and the following day he wrote to his 
father that he was at his desk, full of zeal, ready to begin. 74 Lanyon was under no illusions that 
his task would be easy, but at the same time he was reasonably 'hopeful for the future', being 
under the optimistic impression that the region had 'many sources of wealth independent of the 
diamonds'. 75 
The new administrator was clearly an ardent imperialist, which is probably one of the more 
important reasons why Camarvon selected him for the post. Characteristically, Lanyon saw his 
mission as one of civilising the undeveloped region and 'backward' local society, and educating 
the settlers in the loftier, more enlightened, ways of the home country. 'I pray that its [Griqualand 
West's] infantile troubles may be all over', he wrote to his father, 'so that the work of education 
may be set in motion, whereby it may be stabilised and strengthened into a position of which the 
old mother country may not be ashamed to own that it is one of the family' .76 There was another 
reason why Lanyon was so anxious to succeed: he felt a deep sense of personal gratitude to 
Camarvon for having faith in his ability to pull things together in Griqualand West. 'Every 
endeavour', wrote Lanyon when a daunting amount of paperwork was piling up on his desk, 'has 
been, is and ever will be, to show that I am not ungrateful for his kindness'. 77 Camarvon, for his 
part, sent Lan yon a number of congratulatory messages, usually via Barkly or Frere, to encourage 
his young protege in his endeavours and to thank him for comments and suggestions about local 
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conditions. 78 
By all accounts, the Kimberley of the mid 1870s was not a very comfortable or congenial 
posting. When Lanyon arrived in the second week of November 1875 it was approaching mid 
. 
summer and the town was dry, hot, dusty and treeless. 79 By May, the weather had turned and it 
was bitterly cold. 80 Even William Crossman, who also had pressing matters on his mind to divert 
his attention from his surroundings, admitted that the place had little to recommend it. 81 The cost 
ofliving was sky-high compared to the other colonies, with a small loaf costing 1/6 and a fresh 
egg a full 7 Yid, while to hire a cook to prepare his food was going to cost Lanyon £9 a month 
in wages. 'I am almost a pauper', he complained.82 
Lanyon had been told that Southey's house in Kimberley was to be made available to him and 
he assumed that as Mrs Southey had resided there with her husband, it would be reasonably 
livable for a bachelor. 83 But when he arrived he found that there were some bothersome details 
to be ironed out in connection with the use of the house, because Southey had apparently borne 
some of the construction costs and wanted to be recompensed if the imperial government was 
to make the house available to Lanyon. Nearly five months later the matter had still not been 
resolved because the Colonial Office felt that Southey was asking too much. 84 Lanyon meanwhile 
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had been obliged to provide his own residence. 85 He moved into a small rented home, a 
corrugated-iron cottage, for the use of which he had to pay £25 a month. It comprised a few 
cramped rooms with few of the comforts that an Irishman of respectable birth might expect. 86 
For the first few weeks in his new office Lanyon had to make up the backlog of work and was 
simply' overwhelmed with deputations, visitors and enquiring officials'. The piles of paperwork, 
on which he could scarcely make an impression, were 'dreadfully disheartening'87 and he had 
to knuckle down to draft a number of urgent new bills.88 Nor were the public offices very 
comfortable, comprising three wooden-walled rooms with an iron roof, two other moderate··· sized 
ones and 'four or five small corrugated iron cabins'. 89 His first Christmas, some six weeks after 
arrival was lonely under a 'burning, scorching sun' and he wrote longingly of having 'electric 
wings' to join his family back home in Ireland.90 
Although the 1871 census figures put the white digger population at 20 000, Crossman estimated 
that in 187 5 when he and Lan yon arrived in Griqualand West there were about 6 000 whites and 
15 000 to 18 000 Africans in the vicinity of the diamond fields. 91 In mid June 1877 Lanyon 
reported to Frere that he had just completed a census and the total population stood at 45 277, 
of whom 12 374 were of European descent.92 
The local settlers, it would seem, were not very friendly and Lanyon had little in common with 
them. Despite the fact that they had given him a warm welcome on arrival, Lanyon soon 
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complained in his letters home that many of the residents were unscrupulous money-grabbers, 
rough miners out for easy money; in short, men who were going to be difficult to keep under firm 
control.93 And firm control was the hallmark of Lanyon's administrative style; Cecil Rhodes 
accused him of conducting his administration 'on the lines of a second-rate regiment' .94 Lanyon 
also made clear his attitude towards the local Africans: as a group he saw them as 'uncivilised 
savages' whose purpose was to work on the mines rather than as independent diggers. In a letter 
home he explained: 
Everyone here is such a Bohemian, staying only as long as it pays him to stay, that of course the less he 
has to pay towards the civil establishment the better he is pleased, so it is always a difficult matter to say 
which is the best way of getting at his pocket without the danger of his resenting it and in this place where 
there are about 15 000 whites and any amount of uncivilised savages from the interior who work on the 
mines, it is only by moral suasion that one can rule. A force of 34 unreliable police is not of much use for 
yth. 1 b . . 1 95 an mg e se ut mumc1pa purposes. 
Later he conceded that among the diggers, who were 'rough' and' a heterogenous lot', there were 
also 'some good fellows', but he found that he could only really associate with the more 
prominent men and those who were in government service.96 This approach to his subjects was 
hardly likely to endear him to the population of Kimberley at large, particularly as it had just 
seen the back of the intractable Southey. As was to be the pattern of his interpersonal relations 
with the people over whom he held sway in both his South African posts, feelings between them 
soon grew to mutual dislike, disrespect and even distrust. 
The constitution of Griqualand West made provision for an eight member legislative council of 
whom four were elected, while the other four were appointed officials. A nominal franchise 
qualification was in place (£20 per annum in wages) and strictly speaking Africans, if they made 
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claim to be British subjects, could register to vote. In practice very few did and Crossman 
probably spoke for the majority of the settlers in the region when he wrote in his report to the 
secretary of state, that he considered it 
absurd to give all these black men the right of voting for members of the Legislative Council. ... The great 
mass of the labouring coloured population ... come from the interior with every element of barbarism and 
no touch of civilisation amongst them, in fact they must be treated as children incapable of governing 
themselves. 97 
Of the elected members of the legislative council, only two were representatives of Kimberley's 
large digger community (the other two members represented the districts of Hay and Klipdrift, 
where the number of electors was comparatively far lower), a situation which in itself was highly 
unsatisfactory as far as the Kimberley diggers were concerned. Added to this, the four elected 
members were frequently outvoted because the administrator had a casting vote and the power 
of the veto over any proposed legislation. The whole system, with its built-in executive majority, 
was highly unworkable, and clashes between the appointed and elected members were the order 
of the day. Roberts alleges that the constitutional government in Griqualand West under Lanyon 
frequently broke down.98 Indeed, under the circumstances on the diamond fields, a system which 
could be manipulated by an autocratic ruler like Lanyon was probably the worst possible 
dispensation and was almost guaranteed to make the administrator highly unpopular. 
Southey had been gone for several months when Lanyon arrived, so Lanyon assumed his post 
after what he called an 'inter-regnum'. While Lan yon had been on the high seas Barkly had been 
up to Kimberley to appoint the recorder, JD Barry, to manage matters in a temporary capacity 
and generally keep an eye on things until Lanyon arrived.99 Barkly admitted to Carnarvon that 
while he was in Kimberley he had also been tempted to dissolve the existing legislative council 
but had decided against it, leaving the matter instead to Lanyon's discretion. Carnarvon had 
given Lanyon 'as free a hand as possible in the administration of the internal affairs of the 
Province' and Barkly, in accordance with Carnarvon's wishes, undertook to give Lanyon every 
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assistance but not to intervene unduly in any changes the administrator might wish to make. I0° 
At the beginning of December, a few weeks after assuming office, Lan yon decided that in light 
of recent troubles in the region it would be wise to dissolve the legislative council. Apparently 
his step was a popular one, because the following night when he attended the theatre, Lanyon, 
to his great satisfaction, was 'greeted with cheers'. IOI He then proceeded to make arrangements 
for a re-registration of voters and to plan a new election. 
Despite his military background and his expansionist tendencies that slotted so well into 
Camarvon' s imperialist plans for southern Africa, Io2 Lan yon saw himself first and foremost as 
a punctilious and conscientious administrator who managed to come out on his annual budget 
and was sometimes even able to show a surplus, despite all odds. He endeavoured to keep a very 
tight, personal rein on all aspects of the work that was entrusted to him and was loathe to 
delegate any of his duties. And yet he complained frequently to his family back home of the huge 
pressure of work and the vast correspondence he had to handle. To be sure, it appears that he was 
extremely short-staffed in Griqualand Westl03 and he did make several appeals for 'more help 
from home' because he was working, according to him, in excess of 12 hours a day. I04 Once he 
had relocated to the Transvaal, where the staff position was slightly better and he had a private 
secretary to do some of the more laborious correspondence, he was relieved of some of the 
routine work. I05 But then too, in the Transvaal Colony, the tension and the stakes were 
heightened and Lanyon, as will be shown, did not respond well to tension. Rather than forcing 
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him into cautious mode, it was inclined to goad him into wanton irresponsibility and 
aggression. 106 He would have regarded it as a great compliment that most of his critics saw him 
as an autocratic and unbending official who was reluctant to accept advice from others. 107 
Above all Lan yon kept a beady eye on financial matters. Perhaps because improving the financial 
status of Griqualand West and showing a surplus was a means of quantifying his success, he 
placed great store on keeping very tight control of expenditure. Furthermore, Carnarvon had 
made it perfectly clear to Lanyon that the Cape Colony- and more particularly the Cape premier, 
Molteno -was stalling about accepting Griqualand West under Cape rule. Unless its financial 
status improved, Molteno was unlikely to agree to take on the additional responsibility. Added 
to this, one of the main reasons for Southey's dismissal had been his ineffective, indeed chaotic, 
financial management, and Lan yon was acutely aware of this because his travelling companion, 
William Crossman, had been sent out to report on the financial shambles in Griqualand West and 
provide possible solutions. 108 No doubt, on the long journey the two men had exchanged some 
thoughts on the matter. Whatever his motivation, Lan yon' s starting point in Griqualand West was 
to address the issue of finances. 
His initial assessment of the economy of the region was that with diamond mining as the main 
source of revenue, Griqualand West was on a 'good footing' and he felt that with careful 
supervision he would be able to 'restore the finances to a sound state' 109 and keep annual 
expenses within Griqualand West's budget of £70 000. 110 He could not have foreseen, of course, 
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that the fluctuating price of diamonds was to play a major role in the prosperity or otherwise of 
the colony, or that in March 1876, just four months after he took over, there was to be a major 
collapse of the diamond price by as much as 40 per cent. 111 Blissfully unaware of what awaited 
him, he indicated that he was impressed with the information that in the previous two years no 
less than fifty pounds weight of diamonds had been sent out via the postal service, adding that 
no doubt countless more had left by other less conventional and even illicit means.112 He 
embarked on a strenuous programme to make a number of significant savings. 
One of the first instructions Lanyon had received from Camarvon was that he should 
immediately see to it that the local police force be increased in size and effectiveness and that 
police expenditure be trimmed where possible. These measures were, in Camarvon's view, 
'absolutely essential' in the light of recent digger disturbances in Griqualand West and the 
expensive despatch of imperial troops to help Southey quell the trouble. 113 Crossman agreed that 
'rowdies of every class, whether British or foreigners must be kept down by a strong police' 114, 
and Lanyon, who did not need coaxing to take strong action, made the necessary arrangements 
without delay. 115 
The police force was initially enlarged from 44 to 85 members, including 70 constables and a 
mounted force of 15. 116 Lanyon was almost apologetic that this would involve an additional 
expense to the state of between £6 000 and £7 000 per annum, but pointed out that not only 
would the police now be used to enforce the new control measures he was anticipating, but 
would ensure 'a more efficient collection of the revenue', and thereby go a long way to paying 
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their own way. 117 A special 'native' police force was also established to detect crime among 
African workers on the mines and to serve as prison guards. 118 Gaols, which according to 
Crossman's provisional report, were in a 'disgraceful' state, 119 were upgraded and a new prison 
was planned in Kimberley when funds became available. 120 A saving was made, on the advice 
of a Dr Dyer, by cutting down the diet of prisoners, 121 and it was anticipated that convict labour 
would also bring in additional state revenue. Furthermore, the High Court and other public 
offices, which had previously been in Barkly in the Cape, were moved to Kimberley for reasons 
of greater efficiency and further savings, 122 and the number of civil service staff was reduced. 
Lanyon proudly pointed out to Crossman: 'The fact that so great a saving has already been 
effected- about one-eighth of the revenue- in the space of eleven weeks, speaks for itself.' And 
to emphasise his point he appended a detailed 'Summary of Alterations and Changes' with the 
savings that would accrue for each item. Lanyon was not lacking in self-confidence; he even 
indicated that the savings made had been conservatively estimated and that given time, he was 
sure he could do even better. 'But only time will prove this.' 123 
By early May 1876, after six months of hard work, in addition to the improvements discussed 
above, Lanyon also had reforms in the sanitary regulations, the hospital administration and the 
postal service to his credit. 124 More importantly- certainly in his own mind- he could look back 
with satisfaction on the progress he had made as far as the financial affairs of the colony were 
concerned. Crossman had in the meanwhile returned to Britain and wrote to say that Lanyon's 
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reputation at the Colonial Office was good and there were 'no further fears' expressed about the 
situation in Griqualand West. Feeling well pleased, he wrote home to say that 
Last month's returns have made some show of what has been done and what I am doing. It was the best 
month's revenue we have ever had since this has been a colony. And at the same time the expenditure has 
been reduced, so ends must meet before long. And our debt is being steadily reduced. When I arrived it 
was £26 000; last month it was only £14 000 ... Though of course much of this is due to cutting down 
expenditure and proper checks on the collection of revenue. 125 
Then too, as the months went by, not only did the more efficient law enforcement measures mean 
that the labour supply was stabilised and the incidence of crime lowered, 126 it also meant, to 
Lanyon's glee, that there was good government income from compulsory registration fees and 
fines imposed by the courts. Worger makes the point that within a year of taking office Lanyon 
had, by virtue of his new energetic enforcement of black labour regulations, 'doubled the state 
income from labour registration fees'. 127 
At the beginning of 1877, Lanyon heard that Sir Henry Barkly, whom he had found friendly and 
helpful, was to be replaced as high commissioner in South Africa and governor of the Cape 
Colony by Sir Bartle Frere. In a letter to his father Lanyon wondered whether this heralded 
Griqualand West's immediate annexation by the Cape, which by implication would leave him 
without a job. 128 A hint of pique had by this time crept into his correspondence, probably 
prompted by his growing unpopularity in Kimberley and the fact that he had become involved 
in an embarrassing libel case. 129 He wrote rather petulantly that if this were the case, then he 
would be only too happy to leave the diamond fields, 'for I am most anxious to render up my 
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charge' .130 He comforted himself by telling his father that he was preparing the revenue and 
expenditure returns for 187 6, his first full year of office, and he felt well satisfied: 
The a/cs for the past year have been somewhat roughly made up, but tolerably accurately to be gauged 
from, and my heart is rejoiced to find that my labour has not been in vain, for I can show a surplus of 
revenue over expenditure of about £3 000 ... This is the first time there has been a surplus and I may 
egotistically say that it is the result of economy and vigilance. But I do not think I could again go throuf/} 
such another 14 months of toil and anxiety. Months in which I hardly knew where to tum for money. 31 
The 1876 returns were duly completed and transmitted to the Colonial Office, where they were 
favourably received. Herbert and Malcolm both minuted that the results reflected good work by 
Lanyon in Griqualand West, 132 and Camarvon himself sent a letter of congratulation. 133 A year 
later, at the beginning of 1878, Lanyon's first letter of the year was to tell his father that 'to my 
delight the balance is well on the right side'. Satisfactory financial progress was still being made, 
and there was a surplus of revenue over expenditure of £12 456 for the year ending December 
1877.134 Lanyon did not see out another complete financial year in Griqualand West, so these 
records were the last from Kimberley that he had the satisfaction oflaying before his superiors. 
Hicks Beach was duly impressed with Lan yon' s progress and sent him a congratulatory letter. 135 
Lanyon's success in general administrative matters and in balancing Griqualand West's books 
are, however, overshadowed by his important innovations in policy making for the developing 
mining industry. His handling of the land issue, the implementation of a new location policy and 
the enforcement of strict control over African labour, are all evidence of his significant 
contribution, not only on a local level, but also in a wider context, to southern Africa's economic 
transformation in and after the 1870s, and will be evaluated in tum, below. 
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The land issue and the rise of mining capitalism 
On Lanyon' s arrival in Griqualand West the burgeoning diamond mining industry meant that he 
had to make a number of local policy decisions that were of major importance. Entrepreneurs 
were calling for a resolution of the land issue, the suspension of the limit on claim holding and 
decisions on the recruitment, accommodation, control and residential settlement of African 
labour for the mines. Competing titles to land in Griqualand West had of course been a very 
complicated and controversial issue from the earliest days of diamond mining. No one knew 
where they stood; and several land commissions and a land court in 1876 had merely served to 
cloud the issue even more. 136 Despite the fact that he saw himself as the protector of African 
rights, Southey had ignored Tlhaping claims to the land near the diamond fields. Instead, he had 
lofty ideas of his own - which were never realised - of building an irrigation scheme in the 
regions adjacent to the mines and of selling off smaller lots and capitalising the agricultural 
land. 137 To prevent the intrusion of foreign capital he devised his specific policy on management 
of the mines. His legislation to limit holdings to ten claims was laid down in the 1874 Mining 
Ordinance, 138 and this virtually clamped down on the development of mining capitalism. It meant 
that local companies could grow, being on the spot to engineer partnerships, but foreign-based 
companies, which were not interested in investing in such small entities, were kept out. It also 
meant that merchant capital thrived in Kimberley and profits were safe in the pockets of local 
settler elites rather than overseas share-holders.139 
It was clear that a new approach to both the land issue and the management of the mines was an 
urgent priority. When Lanyon arrived, the land court ofNovember 1875 to March 1876 that had 
been set up to test the Bloemhof arbitration was still sitting, and its findings, when released, 
showed that contrary to the decisions reached at Bloemhof in 1871, the Tlhaping did indeed have 
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territorial rights north of the Vaal River. 140 In October 1876 Charles Warren was appointed by 
the Colonial Office to sort out the troublesome Orange Free State-Griqualand West border 
question, which Brand was pursuing so conscientiously, so that in the future, in Warren's words, 
'disagreement or controversy' could be laid to rest. 141 The correspondence between the Colonial 
Office, Barl<ly and Brand on this matter had been ongoing for years and Camarvon felt that some 
finality had to be reached. 142 Brand was clearly not going to be fobbed off with an apology from 
the Colonial Office, even if Carnarvon had been prepared to apologise for Britain's blunder, 
which he was not. 143 
In the knowledge that much of Griqualand West's farming land would probably be allocated to 
Free State Boers, Lanyon took stock of the situation and then had his surveyor general, FHS 
Orpen, 144 work on a new land initiative he had hatched - a system both to make farms available 
for whites and to develop locations for African residential settlement on the agricultural land that 
was still available. 145 He hoped that this would satisfy the settlers' demands for land and at the 
same time the policy of 'localising the natives' would help to solve the shortage oflabour and 
draw the local Africans into the developing economy. He proposed that small rural locations be 
established in the surrounding countryside for African settlement. These carefully scattered 
residential areas had ideally to be too small for subsistence and would, he hoped, serve as labour 
reserves for the surrounding farmers and if need be, for the developing mines. 146 With his 
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instructions clearly outlined, Orpen's survey duly allocated about one tenth of the available land 
for 'native locations' while the rest became available for sale to white farmers. 147 Each location 
was to be under the supervision of a local magistrate, a measure which also served to curtail the 
power of the southern Tswana chiefs. 148 
Shillington makes the point that similar to the original concept oflocations in the eastern Cape, 
Lanyon's policy was based upon the belief that Africans would acquiesce in colonial control if 
allowed to remain on the land where they had lived149 - even if they did not 'own' it in formal 
Western terms - or were given alternative territory. Once they had been settled in designated 
areas they would be far more malleable. With the erstwhile power of the chiefs safely in the 
hands of colonial officials, the inhabitants of the locations could be conveniently 'watched, 
controlled and taxed', and indeed be held in check in case they decided to move to other farming 
land which had, in the interim, been sold off to white farmers. 150 
Despite Britain's official humanitarian scruples about special laws for Africans, the measure was 
approved by the Colonial Office. Indeed, when the relevant correspondence on 'Locations 
allotted to the Natives in the neighbourhood of the Hart[s] River' was passed around for 
comment in the halls of Downing Street151 before being sanctioned by the secretary of state, WR 
Malcolm minuted that 'care must be taken to keep the natives constantly under the direct control 
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of white magistrates'. 152 
This raises the question of why Lanyon's location policy appears to have received such easy 
acceptance in Downing Street, while his suggestions on strengthening state control over 
contracted African labour on the diamond mines were turned down. 153 The Colonial Office 
records do not provide much in the way of explanation of this inconsistency, but there is an 
enclosure in the despatch, written by Lanyon, that probably tipped the balance and produced the 
official nod for his location policy. 154 Lanyon first made the point that Barkly had seen fit to 
sanction the policy, 155 which he felt should predispose Frere, Barkly's successor, to concur. He 
then went on to emphasise that the system would be to the advantage of the 'natives', give them 
all the advantages of colonial administration and protection against land-hungry Boers. Perhaps 
he had even persuaded himself, as a paternalistic imperialist, that this was so, but it seems more 
than likely that 'the people of substance' in Kimberley, the leaders of the settler elite and the 
overseas magnates 156 who were set to take over the management of the mining industry once 
Southey's ten-claim restriction on claim holding was lifted, were behind his actions. 157 
In the same letter of December 1877 to Frere, Lanyon pointed out that in the Barkly district alone 
no less than a very generous 355. 46 square miles had been set aside for Africans and Warren, 
who was busy with an extensive land survey at the specific behest of the Colonial Office, also 
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agreed that it was an excellent idea. In fact he was of the opinion that the Africans in the district 
of Hay should be provided with similar locations.158 Lanyon closed with a point that he obviously 
saw as particularly significant, namely that 'the missionaries' and 'others', notably the 
Aborigines Protection Society, 'who have interested themselves in the native question', had 
expressed their' great satisfaction' with the arrangements. Sir Michael Hicks Beach, who had by 
now replaced Carnarvon as secretary of state, and the members of his Colonial Office staff- four 
of whom minuted the proposal- do not appear to have had any reservations, with the exception 
of Malcolm, who wanted more control, to the proposal being approved. The issue of untoward 
colonial intervention in the livelihood of the communities concerned, or the erosion of their 
traditional chiefly power structures, seemed unimportant to them. 159 
In an earlier letter on the topic Lanyon had provided some details on this alleged sanction by 
British-based humanitarian agencies, including the Aborigines Protection Society's FW Chesson, 
although these details were not enclosed for the information of the Colonial Office when 
approval had been sought for his scheme. Using a particular Tlhaping community as an example, 
he claimed that: 
Locations have been provided for them [Jantjie Mothibi's Tlhaping] along the Hart (sic) River on land 
which is the richest for agricultural purposes in that district ... I have ... [shown these details] to Mr Ashton 
[of the London Missionary Society] ... and he considers that Jantjie and his people have been as well 
provided for as they could reasonably expect. In fact they ... have been left in undisturbed possession of 
those lands in which they were principally living .... I have appointed Mr Edwards, who was born and 
brought up amongst these people, to be agent and protector amongst them and the result has been 
satisfactory. Canteens will not be allowed in the locations and no effort will be spared on my part to 
mitigate as far as I can the evils referred to by Mr Ashton. I am glad to find that Mr Ashton recognises the 
fact that a change for the better has lately been made to promote the welfare and comity of the natives. 160 
Needless to say Lanyon's new land policy and his attempts to bring the Africans into line with 
the colonial will, eventually met with resistance from both the Griqua (who, it is worth 
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remembering, had been adjudged the rightful owners of the land at the beginning of the decade) 
and the Tlhaping, who were the most numerous of the southern Tswana people in the region. The 
major Tlhaping communities had established their principal centres of residence on the land 
between the confluence of the Vaal and the Harts Rivers long before the precious gems had been 
discovered; many of them had been settled in the area since the early 1800s. 161 It was not long 
before several of these African communities and the Griqua people, both of whom had been so 
summarily dispossessed of their land, showed resistance to this extension of colonial rule and 
the erosion of the power of their chiefs. Indeed Lanyon was still at the helm in Kimberley when 
trouble from groups ofTlhaping had to be quelled, and with Warren, who like Lanyon was a 
military man, he was heavily involved in military action against the Griqua rebels in the 
Griqualand West Rebellion of 1878.162 
As has been shown, Richard Southey, with his eastern Cape colonial background, was committed 
to economic development in Griqualand West which favoured colonial accumulation in both 
agriculture and the mines, but was determined to prevent foreign, non-colonial, monopoly of 
diamond mining. Lanyon, influenced by Crossman, was to take a different view. Southey had 
protected small-scale mining against takeover by large companies because he saw this policy as 
the best way to support colonial merchants and expand the commodity market on the diamond 
fields. Kimberley soon became a very busy market town, 'the richest community in the world 
for its size', boasted Cecil Rhodes, 163 and the Kimberley merchants, most of whom had strong 
commercial links with Port Elizabeth, grew in wealth and influence. Large Port Elizabeth-based 
companies such as Adolph Mosenthal and Lilienfeld Brothers dominated the trade in the region 
and soon branched out into banking and property ownership. This was all well and good, but 
Lanyon had the would-be mining capitalists baying at his heels. 
Lanyon's policy on the management of the mines was closely modelled on the outcome of 
Crossman' s enquiry and his report that followed. Crossman had begun his investigations into the 
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state of affairs in Griqualand West almost immediately after he had arrived in Kimberley with 
Lanyon in November 1875. His first, preliminary, report dealing mainly with financial affairs, 
was later published as Confidential Print African 89. This report was dated 5 February 187 6 and 
was received by the Colonial Office on 13 March. Crossman then returned to Britain and 
completed his full report, which subsequently appeared as African 96, dated 1 May 1876. This 
provided a detailed discussion of the causes of the digger unrest in the region, followed by 
Crossman' s suggestions for the 'management and arrangement' of the mines, based, by his own 
admission, on the recommendations of a committee appointed at a public meeting held on 26 
November 187 5 in Kimberley, and presided over by Lan yon. Crossman felt that the committee's 
report had been drawn up 'with much moderation and fairness' and that it reflected by and large 
what he had gleaned from his investigations. He had thus used it as the basis of his 
recommendations on the management of the mines. 164 
The most significant recommendation, the one that opened the door to foreign (specifically 
British metropolitan) investment, was the clause which 'strongly recommended' that Southey's 
ten-claim restriction, the Mining Ordinance of 187 4, be repealed. 165 Lan yon clearly set great store 
by Crossman's suggestions, and the two men had obviously been closely associated while 
Crossman had been conducting his investigations in and around Kimberley. The crown purchase, 
in 1875 forthe sum of £100 000, of the Vooruitzigt estate, the farm on which the rich Kimberley 
mine and the town itself were situated, virtually made the crown the town's 'proprietor' 166 and 
also facilitated changes in the management of the mining industry such as those that Crossman 
had suggested and Lanyon was now seriously contemplating. 
Lanyon did not act immediately, but his hand was forced in mid 1876 by a serious depression 
in Kimberley. There was a massive fall in the diamond price, and at the same time labour costs 
rose, capital was in short supply and a commercial crisis loomed. Lanyon wrote home to tell his 
father that things were looking very dark in Kimberley, 
The price of diamonds here is as low as it has ever been before ... merchants are tottering, bank managers' 
164 CP, African 96, Crossman- Camarvon, 1May1876, p 8. 
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hearts failing them ... many will be burnt, but the growth and elasticity of the Province will pull it through 
the ordeal, ... meanwhile the time is an anxious one. 167 
In November 1876, Lanyon finally abolished the ten-claim limitation and reconstituted the 
Mining Boards. 168 The floodgates of foreign capital and company production were thus opened 
and the diamond mining industry was set on a new course. As Worger puts it, 'With the repeal 
of the claim-limitation law the era of small holding ended and that of capital began.' 169 The 
development of monopoly capitalism in the diamond industry was now inevitable, and in early 
1877 Jules Porges, one of London's largest diamond buyers, spent more than £70 000 on claim 
purchases.170 As more capital was pumped into the industry the scale of production was stepped 
up by the introduction of machines, the depth of mining was increased and, as Lanyon had 
predicted in his letter to his father, Griqualand West appeared to have weathered the mid 1870s 
slump in the diamond industry. 
Although by 1880, when the full implications of company production were beginning to be felt 
in Kimberley, Lanyon had already been relocated to the Transvaal, he was unquestionably the 
key player in the revival and re-organisation of the diamond industry. His role in creating 
locations as labour reservoirs and securing the success of capitalist ownership of the diamond 
mines was of crucial importance. But his innovations in Kimberley do not end here. He was also 
the architect of a comprehensive system of control and recruitment of African labour. 
Labour: control and recruitment 
Almost immediately after arriving on the diamond fields, Lanyon was expected to address the 
labour crisis: the diamond mines needed labour and this labour had to be regularised. In 
accordance with the dictates of the new economic order, African men had to be recruited and 
then subjected, as far as was feasible, to strict controls. As company mining developed, so the 
167 TA, A596, vol 11, Lanyon - Charles Lanyon, 27 July 1876. 
168 Ordinance 12of1876 and Griqualand West Government Gazette, Government notice 332, 1876. 
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need for a cheap and ready supply of contract labourers grew. 
While Southey had claimed to be protecting the interests of Africans, Lanyon, as has been 
shown, had a general view of Africans as 'savages' who undertook the unskilled labour on the 
mines. However, he made no immediate move, in reaction to the pleas of the white diggers, to 
introduce discriminatory legislation. Such measures, he knew, were officially 'repugnant to 
British law and custom' and would be vetoed in London. 171 But Lanyon was very aware that the 
provision of labour was crucial on the diamond fields. In an early letter to his father he 
commented on the necessity of having a labour force of 'about 6 000 natives' ,172 and wrote of 
the growing concern in mining circles about the rising cost of African labour. He gave a vivid 
description of the migrant workers, some of whom had walked overland 'from as far as 1 400 
miles' 173 to work on the mines, and how they could be seen at any time of the day swarming 
around in the Kimberley big hole, with its 'huge cobweb of steel on which the buckets run up 
and down like gigantic spiders'. 174 
The labour issue that faced Lanyon was a thorny one, with many ramifications. There is little 
doubt that the conditions of employment for African workers on the mines were extremely harsh. 
The usual wage for a migrant labourer in the late 1870s was about 1 Os to 20s a week paid in 
cash, 175 and an additional 1 Os was sometimes paid in the form of sustenance. Poor wages and a 
shockingly bad food supply were among the main causes of one of the most keenly felt problems, 
that of labour desertion. A pass system, one of the first pieces of labour legislation on the 
diamond fields, was in force, and without a valid pass, renewable every month, an African could 
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be summarily arrested. 176 Workers had to report at the registry office where the employer paid 
a fee to register each worker, who was then strictly speaking allowed to remain only in his 
employ and was not allowed to seek alternative employment unless he re-registered under a new 
contract. Labourers were also subject to a long list of stringent, repressive rules prescribing 
worker behaviour, and these were enforced by the police and the courts; but under Southey the 
police force had been too small, inefficient and corrupt to cope. Moreover, there were not enough 
gaols and the courts were hopelessly overburdened. 177 
Lanyon decided that this state of affairs would have to change; firm and efficient control was 
needed. The claim-holders were complaining that the existing system did little to put any check 
on the increasing number of workers who either left the fields or frequently moved from one 
employer to another seeking better pay or conditions. 178 The theft of diamonds was also 
escalating, with white diggers accusing African diggers (claim owners) of undermining the 
control of labourers, and calling, as they had persistently done over the years, for a ban on 
African claim-holding. 179 When Lanyon arrived in November 1875, with the Black Flag Revolt 
barely over, most of the diggers were complaining that the old registration system was no longer 
workable. They wanted the state to step in and exercise more control over worker behaviour 
before the diamond mining industry collapsed into further chaos.180 
Lanyon lost little time. On 26 November 1875, little more than a week after he had moved into 
his office, he organised a public meeting to discuss 'general questions affecting the public 
interest'. 181 Following this, in early 1876, with a good idea of the issues that needed urgent 
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See also CP, African 96, Crossman - Carnarvon, 1 May 1876, p 16. Crossman advocated the use of a 
badge in a specified colour to indicate whether the worker was looking for work or was already employed. 
See under Richard Southey's legacy to Lanyon, above. 
Turrell, Capital and labour on the Kimberley diamond fields, pp 25-31; Worger, South Africa's city of 
diamonds, ppl 16-117. 
The Diamond Field, 28 November 1874. 
The Diamond Field, 13 January 1875 described the system of worker registration system as a 'farce'. 
CP, African 96, Crossman - Camarvon, 1 May 187 6, enclosure 3, 'A report on general questions affecting 
the public interest by a Committee appointed at a public meeting held in the Academy ofMusic on Friday, 
the 26th day ofNovember 1875.' 
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attention, he set up a labour commission to enquire how best to organise a more reliable and 
stable African workforce. The commission's report, which made extensive use of Crossman's 
recently released suggestions on the labour issue, 182 was published in the local Government 
Gazette. 183 It embodied a number of important recommendations. 184 The first was that no 
legislative limit should be placed on wages, as it was felt that high wages were the best way to 
entice labour to the mines. Secondly, it was seen as important to ensure, by means of a network 
of labour depots along the main migrant labour routes, that Africans were protected as they 
walked to the mines and that they be given food along the way. It was also suggested that a 
central labour depot be set up in Kimberley under the control of a white superintendent and that 
it be made compulsory that all hiring and firing be done at this depot. It was envisaged that this 
would cut out competition between prospective employers. Longer service contracts were also 
mooted. Above all, the commission's report emphasised the necessity of enforcing very strict 
control over Africans by means of vagrancy laws, 185 the closure of many of the existing African 
eating houses and 'sly grog shops' and that great caution be exercised about issuing licences to 
open canteens. 186 Lanyon was then instrumental in embodying the commission's report in a 
Native Labour Ordinance187 which was duly forwarded to the Colonial Office via Barkly, for 
consideration. Here it was summarily disallowed, mainly on the basis that laws in the colonial 
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Ibid, pp 15-16. On p 15 Crossman mentions that before he departed from Kimberley in January 1876 he 
was aware that Lan yon had already set up a commission for this purpose. See also CA, GH 1217, Lanyon 
- Barkly, 1June1876 and enclosed 'Report on the Commission upon the Griqualand Labour Question'. 
Griqualand West Government Gazette, 23 May 1876, 'Report on the Commission upon the Griqualand 
Labour Question.' 
Because the early labour laws were supposedly colour blind the terms 'master' and 'servant' were used 
when labour relations were discussed. However, in both Crossman's report and that of the Labour 
Commission, frequent reference was made to 'natives'. See for example CP, African 96, Crossman -
Carnarvon, 1May1876, pp 15-16. 
Crossman felt that 'in the case of natives found roaming about without employment they should be 
arrested and placed in a depot until they are hired or can be returned to their own tribes'; CP, African 96, 
Crossman- Camarvon 1May1876, p 18. 
CP, African 162, Frere - Hicks Beach, 2 August, 1878 and enclosed 'Report on the Commission upon the 
Griqualand Labour Question'. 
Ordinance no 10of1876: 'Ordinance to Provide for the Better Protection of Native Labourers and to 
Amend the Laws Regulating the Rights and Duties of Masters and Servants in the Province of Griqualand 
West and for other Purposes.' In the ordinance Lanyon consistently adopted the term 'native' rather than 
'servant' when referring to African workers. 
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empire that had been specifically drafted for 'natives' were unacceptable. 188 
This raises an interesting point. It will be argued in the conclusion to this thesis that while in 
Griqualand West Lanyon was by no means a puppet on an imperial string. He was given a great 
deal of freedom to act and his ground-breaking measures in formulating African colonial policy 
for the diamond mines are clear evidence of this. And yet here is a contradiction: his local policy, 
in this particular instance, fell victim to the imperial plan. It would seem that he was not, at any 
stage, even in Griqualand West, a completely free agent. 
However, as Worger points out, Whitehall and the Colonial Office were far removed from the 
practicalities of the situation and 'the niceties of the language of the law had little impact on legal 
practice in Kimberley'. Furthermore, Owen Lanyon was more than ready to take aggressive 
action in 'using the agencies of the state to help regulate the labour market'. 189 Making judicious 
use of Carnarvon's instructions - issued in the aftermath of the digger unrest - that the police 
force be increased in size and effectiveness, 190 he pushed the force up from 44 in January to 112 
in September 1876.191 He also took the decision to move the High Court from Barkly to 
Kimberley, where the majority of the cases had to be tried, which meant that the whole process 
of law enforcement was expedited.192 Through a contact in Natal, Zulu gaol guards were 
appointed, and this helped to streamline the penal system. Lanyon also created a civil-service 
position, to be filled by a Mr Maxwell, as head of prisons and of the African police force. This 
new force was to assist in the detection of crime among African workers, and Maxwell had to 
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Turrell, Capital and labour on the Kimberley diamond fields, p 90; Worger, South Africa's city of 
diamonds, p 121. In the light of the fact that Lanyon's proposed labour regulations were turned down on 
humanitarian grounds, see above under The land issue and the rise of mining capitalism for a discussion 
on the official approval of his location policy. For a discussion of the humanitarian influence in 
Carnarvon's grand scheme, see above under Carnarvon and his confederation scheme. 
Worger, South Africa's city of diamonds, pp 121-123. 
CP, African 83, no 95, Carnarvon - Barl<ly, 15 November 1875, p 312. Lanyon chose to ignore 
Carnarvon' s remark that 'it may not be necessary that the force be raised to the number of 100' which was 
the number that Crossman had recommended. 
Worger, South Africa's city of diamonds, p 122. 
CA, GH 12/40, Lanyon-Barkly, 7 February 1876. 
85 
step up the management of the gaols to cope with the increasing number of inmates.193 Gaols 
were also upgraded and new ones built to cope with the influx of offenders. 194 Lanyon apparently 
managed to effect all these changes without ruffling any humanitarian feathers in Frere's Cape 
Town office or in the Colonial Office. Carnarvon, his eyes and his mind firmly fixed on his 
'grand scheme' acquiesced in the changes, praising Lanyon's 'commendable activity re removal 
of abuses' in the police and gaol services on the diamond fields. 195 
Police action against African workers was stepped up considerably and the worker registration 
and pass system were stringently enforced; unemployed 'loafers' were arrested in droves. Both 
Inspector Percy, who was head of the local police force, and the administrator himself were 
reported in the press as saying that the increase in arrests did not point to a higher crime rate, but 
rather to the increased efficiency and zeal of the police force. 196 The courts struggled to keep up 
with the new activity in law enforcement and were overwhelmed with new cases. Sentences were 
increased and because of time restraints, it was alleged that magistrates tended to expedite the 
process wherever they could, sometimes even at the expense of hearing all the evidence. 197 
Although the number of worker registrations did go up, Lanyon's control measures were not an 
unqualified success. The magnitude of the task and the sheer number of workers involved, meant 
that at the end of the day, despite the increased endeavours and the large numbers of arrests, 
employers were still dissatisfied with the results. The bottom line was that there was still a 
shortage of labour, and the measures taken had hardly addressed one of the most troublesome 
problems, that of desertion. 198 In an attempt to curb this ongoing problem by affording the 
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CA, GH 12/42, Lanyon - Barkly, 23 March 1876. 
CA, GH 25/1, Barkly- Camarvon, 10 April 1876; and report on conditions at Kimberley gaol, Barkly-
Camarvon, 3 November 1876. 
CA, GH 2/3, Camarvon - Barkly, 23 December 187 6. See also GH 212, Camarvon - Barkly, 28 July 187 6 
in which the secretary of state approves Lanyon's measures in bringing about the 'increased efficiency of 
the Constabulary'. 
Diamond News, 21 September 1876. 
Worger, South Africa's city of diamonds, pp 123-124. 
Diamond News, editorial, 3 November 1877. 
86 
African workers some safeguards and thus, Lanyon hoped, creating the impression in the wider 
labour market that migrant workers on the diamond mines were not ruthlessly treated, Lanyon 
appointed a protector of African workers. The first incumbent, W Coleman, who was also the 
registrar of African labour, had to be present at the court to 'investigate and settle all cases in 
dispute between master and servant, to enforce payment of wages and to look after the interests 
of the natives in every way' .199 Although he was able to defend the workers successfully in some 
cases, the system in practice did not really address the rate of desertion or get to the root cause, 
which was the shortage of labour. 
Although Lanyon had refused to be drawn into an earlier suggestion, backed by Joao Albasini, 
and using the intercession of JW Crowley, a Kimberley merchant, to recruit African labour from 
the Soutpansberg region, he was more open to a similar scheme once the 1876 labour 
commission had highlighted the urgency of finding additional sources of labour.200 In 1876 a 
number ofLobengula's Ndebele headmen visited Kimberley. Lanyon took the gap and met with 
the headmen to ask whether or not it would be feasible to obtain workers from their country. At 
the interview Alexander Bailie, who was an official in the land surveying department, acted as 
interpreter. The Africans indicated their readiness to help, but asked that someone accompany 
them back home to do the negotiations. Although Bailie offered his services, Lanyon was 
somewhat cautious as this would virtually make Bailie (about whom, it would appear, Lanyon 
had some reservations, although he did not elaborate upon what these were) an official 
'Government agent', which clearly he was not. However, Lanyon's caution appeared to be 
outweighed by the' great advantage to the inhabitants here [the employers on the diamond mines] 
to obtain labour from that place' .201 Bailie duly set off on 24 June 1876 and his mission 
apparently bore some fruit, with the chiefs agreeing to cooperate.202 Early the following year 
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CA, GLW 9, Lanyon-Frere, 14 September 1877. 
Griqualand West Government Gazette, 23 May 1876, 'Report on the Commission upon the Griqualand 
Labour Question', paragraph 3. 
CA, GH 12/44, Lanyon-Barkly, 1June1876 and enclosure Bailie-Lanyon, 31May1876. See also GH 
25/1, Barkly- Carnarvon, 11July1876. The measure was duly approved in London; CO 107/2, 11 July 
1876,and this approval was relayed to Lanyon; GLW 12, Barkly-Lanyon, 24 August 1876. 
CA, GH 12/45, Lanyon- Barkly, 24 June 1876. For full details of Bailie's mission see CP, African 162, 
Frere - Hicks Beach, 2 August 1877, and enclosure JD Barry- Frere, 19 May 1877. 
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Lanyon was able to use the fact that Lobengula was 'now sending labourers to work here', in a 
letter to Frere reporting on the excellent relationship between the Griqualand West administration 
and the African chief.203 For his part, Lobengula must have been pleased with the new labour 
arrangements, because he sent Lanyon an ivory tusk as a gift. The scrupulous administrator 
promptly sold the ivory for £20-3s-5d and forwarded the cheque to the acting treasurer.204 
By way of conclusion, Lan yon' s considerable success in pulling the finances of Griqualand West 
out of the doldrums in the mid 1870s and putting the emerging diamond mining industry on it 
feet should not be underestimated. As Worger points out, the success of the diamond industry 
had become of considerable financial significance to the state205 and by 1876 diamonds had 
replaced wool at the top of the list of the Cape Colony's exports. Nor was Lan yon slow to remind 
the Colonial Office that the discovery of diamonds had rescued the Cape from the depression of 
the 1860s: 
... the prosperity which has been brought about to the Cape Colony ... [is due to] the energy, perseverance 
and toil of the inhabitants of Griqualand West. I need hardly point out that the Cape was well nigh 
bankrupt before these diamond mines were discovered ... the revenues of the previous ten years of its 
history showed annual and increasing deficits ... [and] the yearly blue-book reports show from whence this 
. . b "b d 206 prospenty is to e attn ute . 
It appears that the Colonial Office was indeed appreciative ofLanyon's efforts. Clearly Meade, 
the financial expert in the Colonial Office, Crossman, who had made a hands-on investigation 
of the situation, and Carnarvon himself, judged by his frequent letters of commendation, were 
well aware of the importance ofLanyon's contribution.207 When he had successfully weathered 
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the devastating mid 1876 depression in the diamond industry and had submitted his return of the 
revenue and expenditure forthe year, Carnarvon asked Frere to relay his congratulations, praising 
the 'ability and exertions of the Administrator to whose public services in this as in many other 
branches of the Griqualand Administration I desire to render full credit'.208 
Both De Kiewiet and Roberts discuss the new, rather more law-abiding social face of Kimberley 
and the more efficient management of the mining industry after Southey had left; and Crossman 
is given much of the credit for his thorough enquiry and the recommendations he made.209 Both 
historians neglect the role that Lanyon played in giving effect, under very difficult conditions, 
to the wide-ranging changes that Crossman had proposed. Crossman was only in Kimberley for 
a few short months. Lanyon laboured on, growing increasingly unpopular, for more than three 
years. His endeavours as an imperial agent, who was at pains to promote the imperial policies 
of his superiors by collaboration and cooperation with other southern African leaders, will be 
discussed in the next chapter. So too will his important military role in the Griqualand West 
Rebellion of 1878. 
To be sure, the measures Lanyon introduced, those discussed thus far, are by no means above 
criticism on moral grounds. And undeniably, his supercilious and autocratic demeanour meant 
that he wrecked many of the endeavours that a more congenial administrator might have 
accomplished, but nevertheless, his contribution as an innovator in Griqualand West was a 
crucial one. His role in the development of monopoly capitalism in Kimberley, his ruthless logic 
and dedicated work as the architect of a labour policy and his social engineering of locations, 
were all highly significant. He was one of the first colonial officials to recognise - and to act on 
his convictions - that if rigidly controlled and settled into locations, African communities could 
be converted into labour reservoirs to serve the needs of the burgeoning mining industry. In his 
career in Griqualand West thus far his actions show that despite the fact that he was carrying out 
imperial policies and never forgot that he was an imperial servant, he was not afraid of using his 
own discretion and was certainly no imperial puppet. 
208 Ibid, vol 4(b), Carnarvon-Frere, 21September1877, pp 211-212. 
209 Roberts, Kimberley, p 142; De Kiewiet, The imperial factor, pp 58-59 
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CHAPTER III 
THE IMPERIAL AGENT AND MILITARIST 
In a very specific sense this chapter looks at the 'real' Owen Lan yon, because at heart the 
punctilious administrator was a military man, and his militarism was the focus of the last stage 
of his career in Griqualand West. The Griqualand West Rebellion of 1878, which Lanyon put 
down with great aplomb, was the first of two armed rebellions against colonialism that Lanyon 
had to deal with while in South Africa. Lanyon was extremely proud that the troops under his 
command were not imperial troops. Instead they were volunteers from the diamond fields, men 
he had recruited, trained and equipped and who he personally - with the able assistance of 
Charles Warren - led in the successful campaign against the rebels in the rebellion of 1878. 
While he was involved in this military drive, his letters home reflect an enthusiasm and buoyancy 
that is otherwise uncharacteristic of Lanyon. In late 1879, by which time he had taken over the 
administration in the Transvaal, he was once again involved in a clash of arms against Africans, 
but this time it was not quite the same; he did not have the personal satisfaction he experienced 
in Griqualand West. Instead of leading the campaign, Lanyon was under Gamet Wolseley's 
command, and being Wolseley, the general monopolised all the glory ofhis imperial victory over 
Sekhukhune's Pedi, leaving few scraps of recognition for men like Lanyon who played a 
supporting role. His military achievements in Griqualand West thus became, certainly for him 
personally, the high point of his career in South Africa, and the CB that followed in recognition 
of his services in the Griqualand West Rebellion, was a source of pride because it proved, in his 
own words, 'that as a soldier I have got it'. 1 
Lanyon' s important contribution as an imperial agent on the South African periphery is an aspect 
of his civil office - as distinct from his military one - that will also be given some attention here, 
and his role as an informer is scrutinised. While Carnarvon was scheming in the Colonial Office, 
deciding how best to engineer the takeover of the Transvaal, Lan yon corresponded with contacts 
TA, A596, vol 13, Lanyon- Charles Lanyon, 24 December 1878. The CB, or Companion of the Order 
of the Bath, was the lowest award granted within the Order, and specifically recognised military service. 
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in Pretoria, passing on information to the secretary of state. And being posted at Kimberley, with 
its telegraphic link to Cape Town, meant that Lanyon was needed as the middleman, the quickest 
means of getting news to and from Theophilus Shepstone, who had by this time moved into the 
Transvaal to annex it to the crown. 
On a more personal level, Lanyon's term of office in Kimberley did not endear him to many of 
the people over whom he ruled, and he was apparently an unhappy, melancholic man. It will be 
seen that he proved to be unapproachable and dictatorial, and ran his administration on military 
lines, preferring to take decisions on his own rather than seeking the counsel of others. He did 
not win the confidence or goodwill of the people of Griqualand West; indeed it seems he was not 
particularly interested in doing so, and sadly, most people were pleased to see him go. And yet 
his reputation in the Colonial Office remained a positive one until the very end of his southern 
African career. 
While in Griqualand West he quarrelled with the press,2 fell foul of the merchants because of 
strict control measures and high taxes, and was hated by the mining community. His 
administration relied on the rigid application of strict rules and regulations and he appears to 
have been unprepared to 'talk things over', even in the legislative council.3 No doubt the 
antagonism directed towards him made him feel very isolated in the flat, treeless land so far from 
the rolling green hills of home. In his correspondence there was also occasional mention of his 
being under doctor's orders, so it is possible that ill health also played a role in his bitterness of 
spirit.4 Whatever the reasons behind his lack of popularity, within a year of his arrival in 
Griqualand West Lanyon was writing to say that he would 'be glad to get rid of a thankless office 
2 
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4 
See below for details of his involvement in a messy libel case in early 1877. He was proved innocent, but 
his popularity and his self-confidence were shaken by the incident. 
The Diamond Fields Advertiser, 13 January 1879, 'Notes in Council': ' ... the fact is that this Colonel 
Lanyon of ours thinks that no ordinary man has a right to ask a question about anything concerning a 
matter connected with his administration.' 
See for example TA, A596, vol 12, Lanyon- Charles Lanyon, 26 February and 19 March 1877. Lanyon 
admits to being under doctor's orders and that 'I have been so knocked up by over work that the doctors 
have positively ordered me to go [on leave]'. Lan yon died of cancer when only 44 years old, barely six 
years after he left South Africa. 
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which was attended with enormous anxiety'. 5 Certainly he was afraid of failure, and this may 
have made him edgy and irritable. 'One may fail at some point', he wrote, 'though I try hard to 
keep that word out of my vocabulary. '6 He began to complain and winge in virtually every letter 
that he wrote to his family; he was weary of the place and the thankless people. Early in 1877, 
with another two full years ahead of him before his transfer to the Transvaal, he was already 
anticipating his departure: 
Some day, not far off, I may say goodbye for good and all to the most hideous and disgusting place it has 
ever been my misfortune to enter. Nature has done its best to make it hideous, and man to make it vile. 
It is truly dreadful living in a place where one is so utterly out of the world. 7 
Significantly, the civilians in Kimberley made no attempt to thank Lanyon when he left for the 
Transvaal. When he finally departed from the diamond fields in the first week of 1879, only the 
members of his volunteer corps, the Diamond Field Horse, who had fought under his command 
on military expeditions, expressed their appreciation ofhis contribution for more than three years 
of hard work in Griqualand West.8 In stark contrast, Hicks Beach expressed his appreciation of 
Lanyon's efforts in Griqualand West: 'I note with pleasure', he wrote, 'the records ... of much 
good administrative work. '9 
Carnarvon 's agent on the diamond fields 
The Colonial Office's positive attitude towards Lanyon and his willingness to do its bidding, is 
well illustrated in Lanyon's role as an imperial agent in Griqualand West. At the age of 33 years 
Lanyon was young and impressionable and while ambitious for self-advancement, had enormous 
regard for both Carnarvon and Frere as well as the confederation scheme they were promoting 
in southern Africa. Frere, who was closer at hand, manipulated Lanyon with great finesse; the 
young administrator was a willing puppet on an imperial string, working to further confederation 
5 
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Ibid, vol 11, Lanyon-Charles Lanyon, 14 November 1876. 
Ibid, Lanyon - Charles Lanyon, 23 October 1876. 
Ibid, vol 12, Lanyon- Charles Lanyon, 22 January 1877. 
The Diamond Fields Advertiser, 13 January 1879. 
TA, A496, vol 4(b), Hicks Beach- Lanyon, 6 March 1879. Although he had left Kimberley in January 
1879, Lanyon only arrived in Pretoria from Pietermaritzburg, where he had been briefed on his new post, 
on 4 March 1879. 
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under men whom he admired. The more experienced Lanyon in the Transvaal had less regard for 
Hicks Beach, but while Frere was still there, he had a mentor with whom he could relate. Once 
he was gone, as will be seen, Lanyon became far less inclined to be manipulated by his superiors. 
In addition to his routine administrative functions in Griqualand West, then, Lanyon was very 
aware of his role as Camarvon's man-on-the-spot on the diamond fields and was highly 
motivated to do well. Certainly Griqualand West and Lanyon were central to Carnarvon's plans. 
If Molteno could be pressured into taking over Griqualand West, Camarvon hoped that this 
would be the preamble to hustling the Cape parliament into agreement to federate with Natal and 
the Transvaal. 10 Furthermore, Griqualand West bordered on the Free State, which also had to be 
wooed after the fiasco of the boundary issue and then won over to the idea of confederation. Boer 
incursions from the Transvaal into the Keate Award territory, a region which had to remain 
British if confederation were to succeed, also, by virtue of its proximity, fell within Lanyon's 
jurisdicition. And - most importantly perhaps - the diamond fields were the fount of the rising 
new industrial economy and had to be aligned with the Cape, which would put British pre-
eminence in the sub-continent beyond question. Whereas Froude had been Camarvon's local 
eyes and ears in the planning of confederation, Frere and Wolseley, and some of the more junior 
officials such as Lanyon and Shepstone, were the agents who were to implement it. 
Among the most interesting aspects of the collaboration between Carnarvon and Lanyon is one 
that has not yet been explored in the literature that deals with Carnarvon' s involvement in South 
African affairs. The evidence seems to suggest that in the latter part of 1876, Camarvon used 
Lanyon as a go-between to probe the situation in the South African Republic, a region which had 
come to occupy centre stage in the confederation scheme. Carnarvon was confident that if the 
Transvaal were annexed by Britain and groomed for self-government in the British confederal 
scheme, the other Boer republic would soon follow suit. Camarvon was unequivocal: 'the 
10 This was clearly Camarvon's plan. He admitted as much to Barkly, see CA, GHI/24, Camarvon- Barkly, 
14 December 1876. 
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Transvaal ... must be ours.' 11 In what was presumably a highly covert arrangement, 12 Lanyon, in 
Kimberley, was to correspond with a man, or men, 13 in Pretoria, and ask some leading questions 
about conditions in the Boer republic. In order to plan the annexation of the Transvaal it was 
necessary for Carnarvon to be informed about the effectiveness of existing state institutions, the 
popularity of Burgers, the feelings of the Transvalers regarding a possible British takeover, and 
the progress of the Boers in their ongoing war with Sekhukhune, the powerful leader of the Pedi 
to the north-east of Pretoria. In short, it was crucial for Carnarvon to have a reliable source of 
inside information. Without this he would not be able to time his takeover of the Transvaal 
correctly, nor would he be able to brief his chosen imperial agent, Theophilus Shepstone, on how 
to proceed. 
The information was obviously collated for Carnarvon's use, although his name does not appear 
on any of the letters. They are neatly collected as an entity, and are filed away in his personal 
correspondence, now part of the Carnarvon Papers at the Public Record Office in London. The 
letters makeup part of volume 36: Correspondence, Colonial Governors, Griqualand, July 1876 
-September 1877 and have been placed under the sub-heading 'Letters received', together with 
Lanyon's private correspondence to Carnarvon from Griqualand West during his term as 
administrator. It is significant that the dates span a period from ten months prior to the 
annexation of the Transvaal by Britain in April 1877, to about five months after Shepstone 
declared the Transvaal a British colony. As Lanyon was the only colonial official to head up the 
Griqualand West government during this time, it appears almost certain that he must have been 
the imperial agent who forwarded the letters to Carnarvon. 
The information gleaned through Lanyon's intercession is interesting. There are references to a 
British takeover of the Transvaal in most of the letters, and the ramshackle state of affairs in the 
Boer republic is emphasised ad nauseam: 
11 
12 
13 
PRO, Camarvon Papers, 30/6/4, Camarvon- Frere, 12 December 1876. 
There is no official record of this exchange of correspondence in the Colonial Office records, and the 
letters are written privately to and from Pretoria to Camarvon just before annexation. The fact that false 
names have been used, and the letters contain references to keeping the matter secret, make it clear that 
this was an unofficial, covert arrangement. 
See below for uncertainty about the true identity of the correspondents. 
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'I assure you ... the state ofaffairs here is bad.' 14 'As far as the monetary position of the Govt is concerned, 
cheques are dishonoured and the amount that the Govt is overdrawn in the Bank must be considerable ... 
Burgers is very unpopular.' 15 'The time is approaching ... the country is in such a bad mess ... Mr Burgers 
is very unpopular particularly in the Laager.' 16 'It is ... freely hinted at by our people that the time is fast 
approaching to appeal to the British Govt ... all admit that he [Burgers] has failed ... the way the Govt has 
been carried on here for the last 4 years we look upon as a perfect farce.' 17 'No person here is aware of 
what I am writing to you ... I promised you that I would communicate with you and I have performed it, 
... I give you leave to make any use of this you may think proper, always bearing in mind what you 
promised me.' 18 'The feeling generally amongst the enlightened people here is in favour of federation ... 
the war has done a good deal towards it.' 19'1 have not much to tell except that affairs just now seem to be 
in a very critical state and I am certain that they must go from bad to worse. The Govt is simply a mockery 
... there are many Boers in favour of British rule ... we want a good British rule to establish law and order 
in the country ... the Treasury is empty ... Sekhukhune will grow too strong.'20 'I have correspondents in 
every town now ... I am keeping my eyes and ears open. You may rely on me. 21 
Seven of these eight letters were sent from Pretoria to Kimberley to a certain HJ Owen 
(presumably a fictitious name based on Lanyon's second name - his full name was William 
Owen Lanyon) of Du Toitspan, so as keep Lanyon's true identity hidden. The greeting in these 
letters is to 'Dear Sir'. The letters, written regularly - in some cases as frequently as one per 
week - were presumably readdressed by Lanyon to the secretary of state, who then had access 
to first-hand information on the situation in the Boer republic. 
The identity of the informer (or informers) in Pretoria is unclear, although from the tone of the 
letters he was on cordial, almost friendly, terms with Lanyon. The letters of28 July, 4 August, 
10 August, 17 August, 25 August 187 6 and then, after a gap of nearly six weeks, of 5 October 
14 
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16 
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PRO, Camarvon Papers, 30/6/36, Becker- Owen, 28 July 1876. 
Ibid, Becker- Owen, 4 August 1876. 
Ibid, Becker- Owen, 10 August 1876. 
Ibid, Becker- Owen, 17 August 1876. 
Ibid, Becker- Owen, 25 August 187 6. This letter gives the impression that some sort of payment had been 
offered for the information supplied. Perhaps Becker and Herman were not simply different pseudonyms 
for the same man. Weatherley, the only identifiable person, may simply have been providing additional 
information for Lanyon. Perhaps Lanyon forwarded the letter along with the others because he felt that 
Weatherley' s additional input would be of use to Carnarvon. Weatherley was clearly not concerned about 
hiding his identity. He thought it safe enough to use Lanyon's correct name in his letters. 
Ibid, Herman- Owen, 6 September 1876. 
Ibid, Weatherley- Lanyon, 27 September 1876. 
Ibid, Becker- Owen, 5 October 1876. 
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1876, are signed by Charles J Becker. In the gap in Becker's letters is one dated 6 September 
1876 which is signed by Charles J Herman, but is also written to HJ Owen.22 On 27 September, 
also bridging the interval in Becker's correspondence to Owen, is a letter signed by Fred 
Weatherley. This letter addresses Lanyon directly as 'My Dear Lanyon' and is also written from 
Pretoria. Written (or copied?) in the same handwriting as the other seven letters, it provides 
similar information on the crumbling state of the Transvaal and makes an urgent plea for British 
intervention. 23 
Colonel Fred Weatherley is the only identifiable correspondent, and even then, information about 
him is sparse. He was apparently an ex-officer of the British army who lived in Pretoria in the 
1870s. He became well known in English-speaking circles in Pretoria because of his outspoken 
pro-British stance. On the eve of the annexation when Shepstone was in the town, waiting to act, 
and feelings were running high in the Transvaal capital, Weatherley was prominent in the 
formation of a so-called Defence Committee, a kind of neighbourhood watch that patrolled the 
streets of Pretoria at night to keep law and order. 24 A year later, in mid 1878, when dissatisfaction 
was mounting against Shepstone's particularly inept administration,25 two petitions were 
submitted to Frere, one of which suggested that Shepstone be replaced as administrator by 
Colonel Fred Weatherley .26 Nothing came of the petition and the Colonial Office was more than 
happy to go along with Shepstone's assurances that the 'great majority' of signatures on the 
petitions were fictitious.27 
In the last of the letters on prevailing conditions in the Transvaal, the one from Becker to Owen 
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23 
24 
25 
26 
27 
It may be significant that the signatory's initials, CJ, have been retained, although the surname was 
changed from Becker to Herman. All seven letters were addressed to HG Owen. 
PRO, Camarvon Papers, 30/6/36, Weatherley- Lanyon, 27 September 1876. 
MC van Zyl, Die protesbeweging van die Transvaalse Afrikaners, 1877-1880 (Pretoria & Cape Town, 
1979), p 14. 
See Chapter IV. 
C 2144, 'Petition of500 Transvalers', undated, p 176. 
C 2220, Hicks Beach- Frere, 31 August 1878, p 119. Shepstone alleged that of the 3 883 signatures on 
the first petition (C 2144, enclosure 1 in no 79, pp 143-145) that only 16 were legitimate and a further five 
were of doubtful veracity; Van Zyl, Die protesbeweging van die Transvaalse Afrikaners, p 69. 
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dated 5 October 1876, the writer not only asks Owen to 'let me have an outline of the 
confederation scheme as early as it can possibly be obtained', but also suggests that instead of 
addressing the mail to CJ Becker, as previously, it should be sent to Mrs HJ Oldham c/o CJ 
Becker, Pretoria.28 This is because, the writer adds conspiratorially, that there was a distinct 
suspicion that 'your previous letter to me was read, but luckily there was not much in it'. Perhaps 
the secret correspondence was intercepted by the Boers in early October 1876, because this 
appears to be the last letter in the series. On the other hand, with Shepstone already on the high 
seas with authorisation for his special commission safely in his luggage,29 there was little need 
to prolong the clandestine correspondence between Pretoria, Lanyon in Kimberley and the 
secretary of state for the colonies in London. 
The timing of these eight letters is significant. Given that the post from Cape Town to London 
took about a month30 the letters would have arrived at the Colonial Office at about the same time 
that Carnarvon was giving serious thought to the idea of sending Shepstone, who was currently 
the secretary of native affairs in Natal, to Pretoria on a mission to annex the Transvaal to the 
crown. Indeed, in mid September Shepstone, who was in London at the time, was summoned 
urgently to meet Carnarvon on 21 September 1876. At this meeting,31 Shepstone was informed 
ofCarnarvon's secret plans and the nature of his briefin the Transvaal as special commissioner 
'with powers to act under Sir H Barkly if near enough to consult, or without him if not, [and 
then] under my own responsibility'. 32 Moreover, Shepstone was informed, to his surprise and 
consternation, that he had to leave for Cape Town the very next day. There was no time to waste, 
as Camarvon had it on good authority - in the person of Owen Lanyon - that the time was ripe 
28 
29 
30 
31 
32 
Presumably another pseudonym to throw the suspicious person or persons who had tampered with the 5 
October letter, off the scent. 
CJ Uys, In the era of Shepstone (Lovedale, undated), p 177. Shepstone left England on 22 September 
1876. 
The mail between Cape Town and Southampton took about four weeks; BL Blakeley, The Colonial Office 
1868-1892 (Durham, 1972), p 64. 
Uys, In the era of Shepstone, p 177, claims that this was their first meeting but Etherington has shown 
conclusively that Carnarvon and Shepstone met several times for significant discussions on South African 
affairs in September 1874; NA Etherington, 'Labour supply and the genesis of South African 
confederation in the 1870s, Journal of African History, 20, 1979, pp 246-247. 
Quoted in Uys, In the era of Shepstone, p 177. 
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to act. 
On a far more formal basis, through Sir Bartle Frere, the high commissioner, Lanyon was 
approached, along with the lieutenant-governor ofN atal, Henry Bulwer, and Shepstone, who was 
by then in the Transvaal, to make comments on the Draft South Africa Bill, the embodiment of 
Carnarvon' s grand scheme for South Africa. 33 Lan yon' s typically thorough 22-page reply makes 
interesting reading because in effect it outlines his personal reflections on Camarvon' s federation 
plans.34 Lanyon rejected the Cape Colony's plea for a unitary government in South Africa with 
the Cape at the helm. He agreed with Camarvon that confederation was 'imperative' and would 
answer South Africa's needs far better. In Lanyon's view a number of states under different 
forms of government were 'unconnected in sympathy' and this, he claimed, had led to the 
problem of localisation. He went on to suggest that the 'general government' should settle 
disputes between the member states, provide mutual protection, set up central courts of appeal, 
deal with the imposition of general forms of taxation, and the regulation of public lands. He also 
made special mention - as Camarvon almost invariably did - of the desirability of a 'common 
native policy'. Lanyon was categorical about this - using his own version of the puppet on the 
string analogy-when he wrote: 'a vast number of natives cannot be held in a silken leash, but 
the power of Great Britain cannot for ever be exercised to control them.' It was unreasonable for 
the separate colonies to call on the help of the imperial government as Southey had done when 
trouble erupted in Griqualand West. The leash had to be made oflocal, more durable material, 
than was the case at present, and 'control' was the operative word.35 Here Lanyon suggested a 
local alternative to cut the Gordian knot. 
Lanyon's attitude towards the Boers in the OFS and the Transvaal, and their role in a possible 
confederation is no less interesting, particularly in light ofhis subsequent career in the Transvaal. 
Although he was later to become far more antagonistic and outspoken in his hatred of the Boers, 
in 1878 he saw them as stunted and backward as far as material, cultural and personal growth 
33 
34 
35 
TA, A596, vol 4(a), Frere-Lanyon, 20 September 1877, pp 175-188. 
Ibid, Lanyon - Frere, 27 February 1878. 
This assertion makes a mockery of the claim that imperial policy in the 1870s was motivated by 
humanitarian concern for the indigenous people. See also Chapter IL 
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were concerned. They 'are little changed' since the early part of the century, he said, 'except that 
time has softened the animosity of the vanquished [the Boers] to their conquerors [the British]'. 
What they needed was an injection of 'an English element ... which could not fail to be 
productive of good'. He felt that while the Boers would assuredly not be prepared to sacrifice 
their values in order to join a union under the Cape, he had observed that 'their antipathies are 
becoming less every day' (on this issue he was soon to be disillusioned), and was hopeful that 
they would be prepared to join a confederation.36 
Finally, Lanyon's outline of his attitude towards confederation shows him to be remarkably 
astute in one area at least, and is evidence again of his choice of a local option instead of an 
imperial design. He expressed the opinion that the Cape Colony was beginning to look with 
rather more than passing interest at the regions to the north. He foresaw a change in approach, 
prompted largely by opportunities for material gain and exploitation. The mother colony was not 
necessarily going to retain her mother hen and family of chicks preeminence: 
If we look forward - nay even look keenly into the present - we may discern that the balance is already 
quivering ere it tum in the favour of the Northern States. The more rapid this advancement, the more 
certain the tide of commerce and immigration will set in. In the Northern States were find a fertile soil and 
mineral wealth, which, sooner or later, cannot fail to attract colonies of labourers. Doubtless they are 
depressed now. The three great causes of that depression are: cheapness ofland, dearness oflabour, and 
want of capital. In the ordinary course of things these will diminish together.37 
Barely ten years were to pass before his words became stark reality. Lanyon died in the United 
States of America in April 1887, and after all the criticism he had had to endure in the early 
1880s it is to be hoped that he lived long enough to enjoy, if only briefly, the realisation that in 
this respect at least, he had hit the nail squarely on the proverbial head. 
Early in 1877 Lanyon was again consulted in his capacity as Camarvon's agent. He was 
requested to provide comment on the Draft Bill that had been drawn up for the annexation of 
Griqualand West to the Cape Colony,38 in other words to see if it was a 'workable measure 
acceptable to the people of Griqualand West'. He replied promptly with a comprehensive minute, 
36 TA, A596, vol 4(a), Lanyon-Frere, 27 February 1878. 
37 Ibid. 
38 Ibid, Frere - Lanyon (Confidential), 13 March 1877. 
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making it clear that the settlers on the diamond fields were 'to a man' against being absorbed into 
the Cape Colony- they wished to 'retain their individuality' as Griqualand West when crown 
colony status was exchanged for Cape rule. By March 1877 Lanyon had become convinced that 
Griqualand West would fare better under Cape rule. It was too remote, too dependent on the 
Cape harbours, and the fluctuating price of diamonds militated against retention of independent 
status. He added thattheexpenseoflimiting 'Boer aggrandisement' in the Keate Award territory 
was also costing more than the crown colony could afford.39 Furthermore, Lanyon knew that in 
Carnarvon's wider view, the annexation of the Transvaal in April 1877 made Cape rule in 
Griqualand West even more essential. But persuading the people on the diamond fields that this 
course of action was for the best was another matter. 
He also provided answers for the Colonial Office on the tricky question of representation for 
Griqualand West in the Cape legislative council and assembly after the planned takeover.40 
Camarvon could not have failed to be impressed by Lanyon's conscientious response to this 
particular aspect.41 The administrator went to endless trouble, providing copious notes and 
calculations to back up his recommendation that two members of the legislative council and six 
members of the House of Assembly should represent Griqualand West.42 
When the Bill, duly passed in Britain, was made known in Griqualand West there were angry 
rumblings, because although in principle the people were in agreement about annexation, the 
paltry number of representatives (one member to the legislative council and two to the assembly) 
and general lack ofrecognition for the region, bordered on insulting.43 Thus, although once the 
Bill was finally passed in the Cape legislature it should have been a mere formality to refer it for 
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CA, GL W 16, Lanyon - Barkly (Confidential), 20 March 1877. 
See for example, Ibid, Lanyon - Frere, 19 April 1877, pp 55-68; TA, A596, vol 11, Lanyon - Charles 
Lanyon, 27 May 1876. 
Carnarvon was liberal in his praise for Lanyon's hard work, and felt that 'no better plan could have been 
adopted for arriving at a conclusion'. He was confident that 'full justice would be done to the claims of 
the Province'; TA, A596, vol 4(b), Camarvon- Frere, 21 May 1877. 
Ibid, vol 4(a), Memorandum by Lanyon on representation ofGriqualand West in Cape Legislative Council 
and House of Assembly, undated. 
CA, GLW 8, Barry-Frere, 17 May 1877; Diamond News, 2 June 1877. 
100 
acceptance in Griqualand West, this was not the case. 
When he thought the time was ripe to do so, on 7 December 1877, Lanyon introduced a 
resolution in the Griqualand West legislative council in favour of annexation to the Cape. He was 
well aware that there would be opposition from 'certain members', when two of the council's 
elected members, Halkett and Murray, walked out to show their opposition.44 Lanyon claimed 
that the conduct of these two did not represent the general feeling of the public in Griqualand 
West or the Cape. Indeed, political and financial concerns were closely linked. Many aspirant 
politicians had 'interests at stake', based in Port Elizabeth and Cape Town.45 To get around this 
obstruction to the passing of the Bill, Lan yon dissolved the council on 8 December and organised 
a fresh registration of voters and a new election, fully confident that 'members favourable to 
annexation will be returned for the next council'. The problem was that this newly elected 
council would only be in place by February of the following year and to expedite the matter 
Lanyon urged Frere to resort to section 58 of the Imperial South Africa Act, in other words, to 
use his authority to proclaim Griqualand West a part of the Cape Colony.46 
Lanyon must surely have realised that such an untoward step would produce a furore in Cape 
political circles. He was apparently blind to the larger picture and, as it proved, not for the last 
time, he showed a curious lack of insight into the broad implications of decisions he took. 
Undaunted, he pushed the idea home in his letter to Frere, giving a number of cogent, if long-
winded, reasons why Frere should resort to this particularly foolhardy line of action. Typically, 
Lanyon was disinclined to brook any resistance; if a strong line of action could bypass the 
niceties of the situation, he was inclined to override objections and take the most direct (and not 
necessarily the most conciliatory) route. In this, it could be argued, he was like his mentor, 
44 
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46 
On the reasons why some residents opposed the annexation, see Roberts, Kimberley, turbulent city, p 15 5. 
Lanyon was certainly aware of the significance of the settler elite in the Cape Colony. Writing of the 
'nearly balanced ... Dutch and English parties in the Cape Parliament', he told his father, 'but the former 
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Charles Lanyon, 8 May 1877. 
Ibid, vol 4(a), Lanyon - Frere, 11 December 1877. 
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Carnarvon. Frere was guided by Lanyon's advice and put the wheels in motion. In March 1878 
he was empowered by the imperial government to announce that Griqualand West would come 
under Cape rule. But it was only in 1880 that this actually happened, by which time all hope of 
confederation was in shreds and JG Sprigg, the new Cape premier, could be pressurised into 
obeying the Colonial Office to agree. Lanyon, meanwhile, was in the Transvaal Colony, and 
Carnarvon had left the Colonial Office.47 
Cooperation and collaboration 
While in Kimberley at the head of the Griqualand West administration Lanyon had another 
imperial role to fill. In the implementation of British imperial policy in South Africa - as 
opposed to official (and unofficial) contact with the metropole-he cooperat~d and collaborated 
closely with two neighbouring states in the interior and their current leaders, Johannes Brand of 
the Orange Free State, and Theophilus Shepstone, who annexed the Transvaal as a British colony 
in April 1877.48 Lanyon's relations with Thomas Burgers of the Transvaal prior to the British 
takeover - in other words, from November 1875 to April 1877 - were far from cordial49 and 
centred mainly on the thorny issue of Boer encroachment to the west of the Transvaal, on the 
Keate Award territory, and on the land occupied by the Tswana people.50 
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Lanyon arrived to take over from Shepstone in March 1879. It will be argued below that Carnarvon's 
federation plan was a dead-letter after January 1879. In early 1878 Carnarvon resigned from the Colonial 
Office in protest over Disraeli's eastern policy. He was succeeded by Sir Michael Hicks Beach. 
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encroachment in this region was not motivated by humanitarian concern for the Tswana people, but rather 
by Britain's determination to keep open the missionary road to the north (for trade)and to control the 
Transvaal's 'malicious' interference with African labourers who were bound for the diamond mines. See 
for example Etherington, 'Labour supply and the genesis of South African confederation', p 244. 
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On Christmas Day 1875, barely a month after Lanyon's arrival in Griqualand West, the scene 
was set for good relations between Griqualand West and the Free State, when a cricket team from 
the diamond fields travelled to Bloemfontein, was welcomed in a friendly spirit by the Free 
Staters, and went home victorious.51 Lanyon and Brand, in similar vein, cooperated well from 
Lanyon's earliest days in Kimberley.52 Of course Lanyon had been instructed that after Southey 
and Barkly' spoor, indeed acrimonious, relationship with the Boers, he should take a much more 
conciliatory approach, particularly towards the strategically positioned Free State and to Brand. 53 
In April 1876 Brand sailed for England to appeal that the Free State's claim to some of the 
diamondiferous land be recognised. He contacted Lanyon before he left to say cheerily that he 
was on his way and that 'there is every prospect that the unfortunate differences between our 
respective Governments will soon be settled'.54 Arriving in London in May, he was almost 
immediately drawn into negotiations with Carnarvon,55 and these dragged on, in fits and starts, 
with Brand making no concessions on federation, which is what Camarvon had hoped he would 
be able to gain from the discussions. It was not until 13 July 187 6, on the advice of Donald 
Currie, 'whose firm are well known as owners of a very important line of steamers' on an 
appropriate sum to be paid to Brand, that a compromise was reached. 56 The Free State was to be 
granted compensation of £90 000, with an additional £15 000 for the development, within five 
years, of rail links to the British colonies. 57 An approximate boundary line was also agreed upon, 
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to be carefully demarcated in due course by two special commissioners, one of whom would be 
appointed by Britain and one from the Free State.58 
Writing from his hotel room in London on 19 July, Brand, his mission accomplished, informed 
Carnarvon that he was leaving for home on 20 August 1876. Although he undertook to have 
general talks with Camarvon in the intervening month, he was suitably vague about the matters 
he was prepared to discuss and was clearly not going to make any concessions on Carnarvon's 
grand scheme. 59 As far as confederation was concerned the Boer president had got the better of 
the bustling, forceful Carnarvon, and it was Lanyon who was left to pick up the pieces and 
salvage whatever he could in the way of imperial pride. As Carnarvon was quick to point out to 
General Ponsonby, the Queen's private secretary, all the diamondiferous land was now secured 
for Britain and in the longer term this was worth immeasurably more than Brand had received. 
'It is said that the Crown Lands alone are worth £1 000 000', wrote Carnarvon, and with this in 
mind, he had been happy to have Brand sign 'there and then' .60 
Lanyon, of course, knew very little about the agreement that had been reached until much later. 
When Carnarvon's letter finally reached him he was in for a shock. Camarvon felt that it would 
be 'most convenient that the Province should provide the sum which is to be paid' .61 After all, 
wrote Camarvon, trying to coat the bitter pill, 
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In enacting the necessary Ordinance for raising the loan required to carry out the agreement, the 
Administrator and the Legislature of the Province will bear in mind that the Interest and Sinking Fund will 
press very lightly now that the territory of the Province is secured to it and can be fully utilised; and that 
the requisite amount may indeed be covered by further retrenchments if that course should be thought 
expedient, or specially charged against the Land Fund. 62 
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Griqualand West, £90 000 upon the Crown Agents promissory note, for a period of 6 months at the rate 
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In a word, Lan yon and Griqualand West had to make the best of it. Brand's £90 000 payout had 
to be added to its debt and Lanyon was given the responsibility of raising the loan, handling the 
financial minutiae and seeing the money safely into his neighbour's coffers. All these dealings 
had to be done with sensitivity because the whole incident was something of an embarrassment 
to Camarvon. And like Lan yon, he was not one easily to back down. Camarvon bluffly explained 
that sorting out the 'unusually difficult and perplexed case' had proved to be an absolute 
minefield and that the only feasible way to settle it had been a compromise. He assured Frere and 
Lanyon that the monetary grant was by no means a 'recompense for any admitted wrong'. 63 But 
as the local Kimberley press was quick to point out, hush-money is seldom paid when there is 
nothing to hush. 64 To be sure, it was not the place of the administrator of a small, remote colony 
to criticise the secretary of state, although Lanyon had proved himself generally quick to criticise 
others in his private letters, and was not above grumbling to his father about the Colonial Office 
giving him a raw deal. 65 And yet it is significant that nowhere in his private correspondence is 
there any indication that he was critical of Camarvon's somewhat poor showing with Brand in 
mid 1876. The closest Lanyon came to questioning the secretary of state's decision to 'give a 
sprat to catch a salmon' was to comment wryly that 'it was hard on one small province to have 
to pay for the bait'. 66 
The follow-up arrangements then had to take their course; the agreed new boundary had to be 
laid down between the Free State and Griqualand West. Charles Warren was approached to take 
on the six-month assignment for the Colonial Office and he duly accepted the special 
commission.67 The Free State appointed Josias de Villiers.68 Lanyon and Brand were to monitor 
the demarcation and it appears that their cordial cooperation was a major contributing factor in 
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the speedy and efficient completion of the task.69 By May 1877 Warren had tied up his survey 
and submitted his report,70 and Frere was able to send Brand a copy of the report and convey the 
Colonial Office's sincere thanks for his friendly cooperation.71 
Other matters of a routine nature, such as postal arrangements and extradition rights between the 
two states, were handled in the same spirit between Brand and Lanyon, and it seems that these 
issues were generally agreed upon without a hitch. 72 Brand also gave permission for members 
of the Diamond Field Horse, a volunteer corps raised by Lanyon in Kimberley, to pass through 
the Boer republic on their way to the eastern frontier to assist the colonial troops in the uprising 
of the Ngqika Xhosa and the last war of resistance by the Gcaleka Xhosa in late 1877 and early 
1878. Brand was duly thanked for this 'fresh proof of amity and good feeling' .73 
It would seem that Lanyon undertook to do the travelling from Kimberley to Bloemfontein if 
circumstances required any consultation between the two leaders. In Lanyon's private 
correspondence to his father there is reference to 'running over to see Mr Brand', and discussion 
of these meeting is couched in terms which give the impression that Lan yon enjoyed the trips to 
the Free State and was grateful for the friendly hospitality he received from the president.74 
Indeed, on his way to Natal and then to the Transvaal to take up his new appointment, Lan yon 
spent 'three days very pleasantly with the Brands' in Bloemfontein.75 
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Brand was one of the first to send his hearty congratulations to Lan yon when news came through 
that he was to be sent to the Transvaal. He expressed his appreciation that he and Lanyon had 
'always worked so well together' in such 'friendly cooperation' and would, he said, 'always look 
back with kindly feelings to the time you were Administrator of Griqualand'. But the canny Boer 
statesman added a cautious note too; he knew the Transvalers far better than Lan yon ever would. 
In the Transvaal, he wrote, ' ... you will have a very arduous and difficult task to perform'. 76 His 
words proved prophetic. When Lanyon completely misread the gravity of the situation and 
matters boiled over into war in the latter part of 1880 and early 1881, the Free State president took 
an active role in trying to halt the war and was subsequently asked to serve, in a neutral capacity, 
in the peace negotiations. 
Brand was not the only South African leader with whom Lanyon was involved. Although his 
contact with President Burgers was limited to appeals on behalf of Africans living in the Keate 
Award territory who complained that Transvaal Boers were encroaching onto their land,77 
Lanyon had significant interaction with Theophilus Shepstone. This began when Shepstone 
arrived in South Africa in early 1877 on his special mission, engineered by Camarvon, to annex 
the Transvaal. Lanyon must have been well aware ofCamarvon's plans because it was he who 
had forwarded information to the secretary of state on the situation there in mid 1876.78 It was 
also through Lanyon that Shepstone was sent a monetary advance of £500 from the Griqualand 
West treasury, to be refunded later through the Crown Agents, to cover his expenses before he 
was officially instated in Pretoria. 79 
Lanyon and Shepstone also corresponded regularly on an unofficial basis. Making use of the 
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telegraphic link from Cape Town,80Lanyon became the middleman in speeding up 
communications between the Colonial Office, Cape Town and trouble-tom Pretoria. 81 He fell into 
the habit of writing a short, chatty note to Shepstone usually prefaced by 'I enclose this week's 
papers and telegrams' and making passing remarks about the state of affairs in Griqualand West, 
or showing interest in Shepstone's progress in the Transvaal.82 For this 'able and effective 
support and assistance ... constantly and cheerfully rendered me from the commencement of my 
mission to the Transvaal', Shepstone was clearly very grateful. 83 
In the months prior to annexation Lan yon broached a number ofimportant issues with Shepstone, 
including the ongoing unrest in the Keate Award Territory on the Transvaal's western boundary 
where the Transvaal Boers were encroaching on African land and hampering the free flow of 
labour to the diamond fields. 84 He also warned Shepstone, based on his own experience with the 
diggers in Griqualand West, that to allow the Boers any form of representative government once 
the British flag had been hoisted in Pretoria would be courting disaster. Anyone taking up the 
Govt', he wrote, 'would be seriously hampered were he to be handicapped by the elective 
element. ... Even here [Griqualand West] with only four electives, and a Govt majority, the 
electives can be obstructive. ' 85 
To his father, Lanyon made frequent reference to the Transvaal, to its poorly run republican 
government, and the notion of 'us' taking it over. In early 1877 he noted that 'affairs in the 
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Transvaal seem to be coming to a head' and 'I think before long we shall have the Transvaal 
coming under our rule. ' 86 Barkly, until his replacement by Frere in March 1877, also kept Lanyon 
closely infom1ed, because in Lanyon's private collection of official documents there are copies 
of two letters, one from Carnarvon to Barkly and another from Barkly to Shepstone, which 
contains detailed information that would be useful to Shepstone as he approached the Boer 
capital to pursue his 'special mission'. 87 Lanyon was in Cape Town on leave when the actual 
annexation took place, and was then delayed in the Cape until the middle of July 1877 ironing 
out problems about Griqualand West's absorption under Cape rule. While he was in Cape Town 
he also took the opportunity of making the acquaintance of Sir Bartle Frere, the new high 
commissioner. 
Lanyon was suitably delighted at the news that Shepstone had raised the British flag in Pretoria, 
and once back in Kimberley he wrote to congratulate him on a job well done, adding that 'I feel 
almost as pleased as you will be'. 88 He also told his father ' ... [The Transvaal] will add greatly 
to our possessions in South Africa ... I have from the first advocated this step. ' 89 Throughout his 
time in Kimberley, Lanyon continued his cordial interchange with Shepstone, who was 
struggling with almost insurmountable problems. 'The rehabilitation [of the Transvaal 
government] will be about as difficult a job as was ever given to any administrator', wrote 
Lanyon soon after the takeover, but then he could not resist making the comparison: 'they have 
however given him [Shepstone] troops and not left him to make bricks without straw as they did 
me ... '.90 In the event, the troops Shepstone had been given, straw or no straw, proved unequal 
to curbing the Transvaal's struggle with the well-armed Pedi under their canny leader 
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Sekhukhune.91 Shepstone's new government was floundering almost as helplessly as the Boer 
government under Burgers had done.92 Lanyon, in his usual conscientious manner, did what he 
could to help. When a financial expert in the person ofSargeaunt, one of the crown agents, was 
sent to investigate the deteriorating financial situation in the Transvaal and provide Carnarvon 
with answers for 'ill wishers to the new system' who were peppering him with questions in 
parliament,93 Lanyon offered advice on his experiences of a similar enquiry in Kimberley under 
the direction of William Crossman.94 
Lanyon also provided material assistance to Shepstone in the form of troops from Griqualand 
West. In March 1878 he sent Shepstone an offer to provide some volunteers from the diamond 
fields,95 but when his offer arrived in the Transvaal there was a temporary - very temporary, as 
it proved - lull in the hostilities and Shepstone's confidence revived. He turned down Lan yon' s 
offer, writing a particularly verbose (even for Shepstone) private explanation to Lanyon on why 
he had taken this decision. In essence, he did not want to give Sekhukhune the impression that 
the government could not cope, nor he did not want the 'British Govt and people' to believe that 
he was involved in a 'serious native war' .96 Barely two weeks later the Transvaal administrator 
realised that he had been too hasty in refusing Lanyon's help and wrote to ask Lanyon to see if 
he could, after all, raise '200 men or more, preferably mounted' to send to the Transvaal.97 
Lanyon meanwhile had trouble brewing among the Griqua people within his own borders and 
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needed all the soldiers he could raise, but he did manage to send a small 100-man volunteer force 
which arrived in the Transvaal at the end of May 1878. 
Shepstone duly thanked Lanyon, but slipped in a comment (which probably rankled with the 
hypersensitive Lanyon) that it was a pity that there were not as many men as he had asked for. 98 
These volunteers apparently served with great distinction and when they returned to Kimberley, 
Shepstone - still under great pressure from Sekhukhune - promptly sent a further request to 
Lanyon in December 1878. Shepstone was having scant success in recruiting men in the 
Transvaal and he had heard that Lanyon had ceased hostilities and signed an amnesty with the 
insurgents in Griqualand West,99 so he was hoping that the services ofLanyon's doughty diggers 
were no longer required nearer home. He also wondered whether 'a number of horses and 
equipments' might now be available, and if so whether these could be put to use to mount and 
equip the volunteer force. With Lanyon's permission arrangements were made for a Lieutenant 
P Raaff, one of Shepstone's military staff, to go to the diamond fields, where he managed to 
recruit more than 200 volunteers for service in the Transvaal. 100 Lanyon's prompt reaction to go 
to the assistance of the Transvaal also drew favourable comment from the Colonial Office and 
might well have counted in his favour when the decision was taken to name him as Shepstone's 
successor in Pretoria. 101 
Military action and the Griqualand West Rebellion 
Lanyon's involvement in military action during his term as administrator of Griqualand West 
was a great source of pride and even enjoyment to him. He went as far as to admit: 'I look 
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forward to the time when I get clear of civil duties, and return to soldiering . .io2 His letters to his 
father provide many details of his military forays in 1878. He revelled in roughing it in the veld, 
sleeping under the stars on bitterly cold nights, with his saddle as his pillow, and riding hard all 
day under the South African sun. 103 And he obviously gloried in his success. He made frequent 
reference to his military accomplishments, and retained in his possession an extraordinary 
number of congratulatory messages 104 to the effect that he had been successful despite being 
almost unaided, apart from the valued assistance of Charles Warren, in 'putting a little proper 
fear' into insurgents and 'having a fling' at the Africans. 105 He was also very proud that he had 
not resorted to asking for imperial troops, and once again, was showing a preference to using his 
own initiative rather than merely functioning in reaction to imperial directives. He had succeeded 
with a band of hardy local volunteers who had served him devotedly. 106 His carping about the 
local people being ungrateful, sullen and difficult to control, had magically disappeared, only to 
reappear when, on his return from the battlefield, he was obliged to settle down to more mundane 
matters. 
The wide availability of firearms in Griqualand West to people of all population groups after the 
discovery of diamonds had a close bearing on Lanyon's military exploits while he was 
administrator, because it meant that most of the combatants he encountered were relatively well 
armed. The fact that many of the African migrant workers on the mines spent their wages on 
arms and ammunition-which were not made available to Africans in either of the two republics 
- had been a contentious issue since the opening of the fields, and Lanyon also saw it as being 
linked to his energetic policy oflabour control. Southey had deliberately promoted arms traffic 
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in the knowledge that it would encourage African labour, of which there was a perennial 
shortage. During the last nine months of 1873, Southey's first year in Griqualand West, more 
than 18 000 guns were made available and 10 000 permits of sale were issued by his 
government. 107 The Kimberley merchants were of course more than happy with the lieutenant-
governor' s colour-blind policy towards unrestricted arms sales. It was the imperial policymakers 
who were feeling less comfortable about the growing firepower of Africans. 
Lanyon, for one, was highly critical of Southey's policy, because he claimed that Africans 
purchased firearms for 'purposes of war', rather than for hunting, and that armed Africans were 
far more difficult to handle. 108 He was probably also reacting to settler pressure to disarm 
Africans in the aftermath of the Langalibalele incident in 1873. Lan yon argued that firearms sold 
on the diamond fields soon found their way to other regions as the African contract workers 
returned to their homes throughout southern Africa, and being a military man and an imperialist 
to boot, he felt that there should be 'united action' taken against the arms trade on the diamond 
fields. He foresaw that there might be problems in keeping control of African insurgence if 
'every native ... was armed and well supplied with ammunition'. Guns, in a word, made Africans 
'formidable enemies'. 109 Indeed, when it became clear that border unrest might necessitate 
military action in early 1878, Lanyon had decided to put a hold on all trade in arms and 
ammunition. Some time later, once the Griqualand West Rebellion had been put down, he 
admitted that his action in this regard had been too little, too late. 'The moral effect of giving a 
native a gun', he maintained, 
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is to make him think he is on a par with the European, and he is more prone to rush into a war than he 
would be were he only possessed of native weapons. I would advance the native in every way possible in 
learning, and in the arts of peace and agriculture, but further than that he should be treated as a child, and 
as such, dangerous weapons should be kept out of his reach. 110 
For a discussion of the firearms trade among the southern Tswana in the vicinity of the diamond fields see 
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Unlike Southey, Lanyon was wary ofletting traders - who had submitted a petition to object to 
the suspension - have their heads in the sale of firearms. He argued that given any loophole, their 
greed would mean that they would sell guns 'indiscriminately' even in the knowledge that the 
weapons would later be turned against their fellow countrymen. Crossman had also expressed 
very similar views after conducting his enquiry in Griqualand West. 111 In sum, Lan yon' s stance 
was unequivocal, he wanted to see the imperial government put a stop to this trade, 'as they did 
the slavery question- so that any British subject in any part of the world would be criminally 
liable ifhe supplied arms or ammunition to any native'. 112 
Lanyon was not alone in these views. The sale of firearms to Africans had always been banned 
in the two Boer republics, and after the British annexation of the Transvaal, MW Pretorius 
complained bitterly on behalf of the Boer population that Africans 'who are our sworn foes' were 
bringing large numbers of firearms into the Transvaal from the diamond fields. 113 Newly 
established in the Colonial Office, Hicks Beach reacted positively to Pretorius' s letter and agreed 
substantially with his point of view. Indeed, he felt that 'all possible restrictions should be put 
upon the trade' both in the Cape and in Griqualand West, primarily because both regions were 
embroiled in putting down African resistance. Like Lanyon, Hicks Beach felt that a common 
policy should be adopted to 'control' the trade in firearms, but it is significant that he was careful 
not to express an opinion, as Lanyon had done, on a blanket ban. He called instead for comment 
on the matter from the four British territories in South Africa, and Lanyon's minute quoted 
above, was Griqualand West's contribution. 114 It appears that the issue was still unresolved, 
although there were some restrictions in place on the sale of firearms when Lanyon left South 
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Africa in early 1881. 115 Despite voluminous correspondence in the years 1878-1880 and several 
detailed memoranda on the arms trade, 116 Hicks Beach decided to refer the matter to a 
'conference of delegates from the various Colonies' which idea he then (yet again) referred back 
to his imperial agents in southern Africa. 117 
The 19th-century history of the early inhabitants of the region that later became Griqualand West 
after the discovery of diamonds, has received some attention from historians and Martin 
Legassick' s seminal work on interaction among the Griqua, the Sotho-Tswana and the 
missionaries on this frontier zone until 1840-some 35 years before Lan yon arrived to administer 
Griqualand West - throws some interesting light on the dynamics of the Griqua and African 
communities living there. 118 As for the 1878 rebellion itself, despite Shillington's assertion that 
it 'seldom receives more than passing reference in general histories of South Africa', 119 it is the 
subject of a dissertation which gives great attention to the military campaigns, and a doctoral 
thesis which studies the social dynamics of the people involved, with very little mention of the 
unrest itself or how it was quelled. 120 Shillington himself, whose research concentrates on the 
impact of colonialism on the predominant southern Tswana group in the region, the Tlhaping, 
discusses the resistance of this community to Lanyon's rule in a series of battles across 
Griqualand West's northern border in the southern Tswana's territory in 1878.121 A useful 
African interpretation on the reaction to colonialism in the region and the circumstances of the 
Ro long people under their leader Montshiwa, who was loyal to the British authorities, is that by 
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SM Molema. 122 All these sources have been used in conjunction with Lanyon's own lengthy 
report, compiled once the rebellion was over, 123 to assess the broad reasons why the insurgents 
resorted to force, and to trace an outline of the campaign. 
In the early 19th century the Griqua communities living in the territory that was subsequently 
annexed by Britain in 1871, were loosely structured and their leaders had no real legitimacy. This 
made them extremely susceptible to the missionaries, who schooled them over the years in 
western-European ways. Weakened by the veneer of a new lifestyle, traditions and political 
organisation, they showed little resistance to the gradual settler incursions into what had 
previously been their domain. The families of Kok and Berends were early Griqua leaders, but 
due to rivalries and the formation of factions there were four main Griqua communities in the 
interior by mid century. 124 Legassick claims that like the Griqua, legitimation of political 
authority among the Tlhaping in the territory was equally uncertain, thus also making them very 
susceptible to colonialism. 
As far as indigenous land claims were concerned, by the 1850s 'Griqua, Kora, Rolong and 
Tlhaping groups could all claim "rights" of one form or another to territory between the Harts 
and the Vaal; occupation there was, and continued to be, mixed.' 125 In flagrant disregard of this 
scattered distribution of diverse groups, the Griqua community based at Griquatown, under 
Andries Waterboer, was, as mentioned above, adjudged the rightful owner of the diamond fields 
in the arbitration process organised by Britain; a grant Waterboer saw fit to pass to the British 
crown in 1871. This was a recipe for disaster. Many of the other Griqua, Sotho-Tswana and the 
remaining Kora in the region lost both their autonomy and their land. Widespread dissatisfaction 
at this injustice ultimately led to the 1878 rebellion, a rebellion put down by colonial troops 
under Lanyon, and one which did not restore the land or their autonomy to the insurgents. 
Legassick sums it up neatly: 'The frontier zone situation ... facilitated a vicious circle ofland 
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alienation and erosion of political power which permitted further land alienation.' 126 
At the core of the 1878 rebellion of the Griqua, Tswana and Kora people in Griqualand West, 
then, was the tension arising from their former position of power and ownership ofland in what 
had been Griqualand, and the subsequent takeover by the British crown. The alienation ofland 
and the abrogation of chiefly power were symptoms of the expansion of white settlement in the 
interior at the time, a tendency which became more marked as the mineral revolution gathered 
pace and more settlers arrived in the southern African interior. And insidiously at first, and then 
at an increasing pace, African societies which resisted settler encroachment were defeated by 
force of arms and put under white control. 127 
In the 1870s the most popular colonial explanation for the widespread unrest in southern 
Africa 128 was the so-called 'conspiracy theory'. It was claimed that the 1878 war in Griqualand 
West was yet another incident in the country-wide African conspiracy against whites. After he 
had become administrator of the Transvaal Shepstone had popularised the notion - because it 
suited imperial plans for the Boers and Zulu - that the powerful Zulu nation was instigator of the 
trouble and was behind much of the unrest throughout southern Africa. 129 Frere was highly 
receptive to the idea and readily accepted it, convinced as he was that Shepstone knew the Zulu 
better than anyone. The claim was that current unrest on the eastern frontier, the Pedi conflicts 
in the Transvaal, the troubles in the disputed territory between the Transvaal and Zululand, and 
the 1878 rebellion in Griqualand West were all part of the same pattern. 130 Hicks Beach, it must 
be said, was less convinced of the merits of his predecessor's views on confederation and how 
best to implement them, but having only just taken over in the Colonial Office from Camarvon, 
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made the mistake of letting Frere have his head. 131 Imperial policy in southern Africa was thus 
dominated by Frere until early 1879 and he argued that what was needed to put a stop to African 
unrest was a federation and a 'common native policy'. All incidents of African resistance to 
white rule had to be firmly suppressed. 
From his earliest days at Kimberley Lanyon had to deal with complaints from dispossessed 
Africans in the Keate Award territory on the northern boundary of Griqualand West. 132 The 
Colonial Office was bombarded with complaints of trouble in the area and there were 
acrimonious exchanges with Burgers about Boer encroachment on the land occupied by Tswana 
people. 133 According to Molema, the relations between at least one of the prominent chiefs, the 
Ro long leader Montshiwa, and the representatives of the British government at Kimberley, were 
particularly cordial, 134 and there are many examples of friendly correspondence expressing the 
administrator's concern about the 'daily encroachments' by the Boers onto territory granted to 
the Rolong in defiance of the Keate Award. 135 
But there were clearly other communities within Griqualand West and on the northern border that 
were dissatisfied with colonial control and felt that Lanyon's administration should exercise its 
authority to keep the peace between settlers, Boers and Africans. In October 187 6 Lan yon wrote 
that local Africans were getting 'bumptious' and added that trouble might develop unless 
something be done in the way of putting some restraint on the 'aggressiveness of the Boers' in 
the north and the tendency of some of the Africans to resist the authority of the police. 136 No 
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doubt by this time he was fully aware that trouble in the Keate Award territory was going to be 
used as one of the reasons for Britain's takeover of the Transvaal in April 1877. 
By the beginning of 1878 Lanyon was busy organising and training his Diamond Field Horse 
volunteers to serve in the Cape. Soon after their departure, he felt it necessary to undertake an 
expedition to put down trouble allegedly caused by Botlasitse, a Tlhaping chief at Phokwani, 
some 70 miles to the north of Kimberley. Phokwani was just beyond the border, but Botlasitse 
also had territorial claims at Boetsap which lay within Griqualand West, and he wanted to assert 
his authority in the colony. 137 There was a great deal of cattle theft going on between all the 
farming communities in the area, and Botlasitse and several of his Tlhaping allies ignored 
Orpen's beacons and demanded tribute from white farmers who had settled on the Griqualand 
West side of the border. 138 These were proceedings which Lanyon felt 'I cannot allow'. He had 
a simple philosophy on dealing with 'the natives': they had to be put down promptly and very 
firmly before the spark of disaffection became an unmanageable fire. 139 Botlasitse would either 
have to pay a fine or, ifhe preferred, Lanyon was more than ready to fight and then to confiscate 
the chief's herds. In fact, he admitted to his father, 'As a governor I should prefer his adopting 
the former course, as a soldier the latter would be the more pleasant.' In the event, Botlasitse 
departed hurriedly before Lanyon arrived. On his return to Kimberley, Lanyon professed himself 
to be 'very satisfied with what was done', which was to fine the chief 445 head of cattle that had 
been found at Phokwani in the deserted kraal. 140 According to Shillington, Lanyon's expedition 
did little to check the trouble on the border, and the incidents of unrest increased in subsequent 
months, 141 but the Colonial Office was more than happy, with Herbert minuting: 'He [Lanyon] 
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is doing excellent work', 142 and Hicks Beach writing in appreciation ofLanyon's efforts. 143 
As far as Lanyon was concerned the only sour note was correspondence which subsequently 
arrived, via Frere, from FW Chesson of the Aborigines' Protection Society. Chesson pointed out 
that Phokwani was on land that had, after all, been granted to the Tlhaping in terms of the Keate 
Award. He wanted an enquiry into allegations that Botlasitse was 'absolutely innocent of wrong 
doing' and that Lanyon's removal of his herds had led to great privation among the chiefs 
community because their main source of nourishment had been confiscated and taken off to 
Kimberley. 144 Lanyon blustered that it was 'a parson's lie and a dodge to get money', that 
Botlasitse had instigated trouble on the Griqualand West side of the border and thus needed 
disciplining. Furthermore, Lanyon claimed that Botlasitse still had plenty of cattle to feed his 
people and that claims of starving Tlhaping were untrue. Lanyon had his attorney general make 
a formal enquiry - which was clearly not an independent inquiry - which the administrator 
promptly published, absolving Lanyon of all blame. 145 
In April 1878 a more serious case of unrest broke out and this time it was on Griqualand West's 
southern border and took both the Cape and the Griqualand West governments by surprise. The 
initial outbreak, among Xhosa and Kora who were vying for land along the Orange River, was 
put down by the Cape government with some help from Lanyon and his volunteers in the 
Diamond Field Horse. Lanyon left Kimberley with his troops on 23 April to cover the 160 miles 
towards the Orange River. He was expecting a long hard campaign of at least a month or more. 146 
While the administrator and his volunteers were on the Orange, the dispossessed Griqua rose, 
and by early May the unrest had become more widespread, with a number of Tlhaping groups 
142 
143 
144 
145 
146 
CO 107/5, no 5442, 4 February 1878, minute by Herbert, 4 May 1878. 
C 2100, no 64, Hicks Beach-Frere, 26 April 1878, p 87; TA, A596, vol 4(b), Frere - Lanyon, 28 May 
1878. 
C 2100, no 28, Chesson - Hicks Beach, 6 April 1878, pp 41-42. 
TA, A596, vol 13, Lanyon - Minnie Lanyon, 11 March 1878; C 2100, no 58, Colonial Office -
Aborigines' Protection Society, 20 April 1878, p 85. 
TA, A596, vol 13, Lanyon - Charles Lanyon, 22 April 1878. The Diamond Field Horse was in fact in the 
field for 16 weeks; C 2220, no 82, Lanyon - Frere, 30 August 1878, p 245. 
120 
also becoming involved. 147 
Sutton maintains that underlying the participation of the Griqua people in these incidents of 
resistance was their loss ofland, real or potential, and the loss of independence, or the threat that 
this was at risk. The claim is made that the single most important cause of the rebellion was the 
findings of Stockenstrom' s land court of 187 5 which had dispossessed many Griqua of their 
traditionally-held land. 148 Only 36 claims on Griqua titles were allowed while 224 others were 
turned down. The judgement virtually made the Griqua squatters on white land, nomads with no 
place to call home. 149 Then too, the Griqua probably reasoned that it was fully seven years since 
Barkly had annexed Griqualand West and had made his promise to provide an immediate 
settlement of the land question; by 1878 this had not materialised. 150 
Lanyon's attempts to negotiate with Donker Malgas, the Griqua leader in the region, apparently 
proved fruitless and by mid June he reported that all the Griqua were in 'open revolt' and that 
unrest was spreading rapidly to the communities on both sides of the Orange River. Lanyon, the 
Diamond Field Horse and Warren, when he arrived in early June, had a number of major 
encounters with the rebels over the months that followed. 151 
Meanwhile, as early as May 1878, while Lanyon and Warren were campaigning nearthe Orange, 
the Tlhaping communities in the Boetsap and Danielskuil regions seized the opportunity to begin 
quarrelling with white settlers over land rights and disregarded the surveyor's beacons. 
Shillington maintains that contrary to general belief, and certainly contrary to the impression that 
Lanyon's reports give, the Tlhaping and other Africans in the region did not commit many acts 
of violence within the colony's borders, and were not fully drawn into the rebellion of 1878 in 
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large numbers. 152 This is borne out by Molema, who claims that Montshiwa and his Rolong 
remained loyal to the Griqualand West government and even took an active role in 'ferreting' 
out some of the rebels and sending them under escort to Kimberley in August 1878. 153 
There were, however, a number of high profile attacks involving southern Tswana people. The 
first, in late May 1878 was the murder of three members of the Burness family, settlers who lived 
near Danielskuil. It is significant that Burness had been involved in enforcing adherence to the 
surveyors' beacons on Griqualand West's northern border. The Tlhaping fled north over the 
boundary towards the town ofKuruman and because Warren and Lanyon were not at hand, JH 
Ford, the government surveyor, a bad choice under the circumstances, was designated to collect 
a small force to 'relieve' Kuruman, where many of the settlers had taken refuge in Robert 
Moffat's mission station. 154 On 7 July Lanyon, having just arrived back in Kimberley after a 
hectic 10 weeks in the south against the Griqua, heard that Ford had crossed the border -
according to Lanyon he had been given strict instructions not to do so under any circumstances 
- and had 'got the worst of it'. Lanyon was worried that the incident had 'done damage to our 
prestige' and quickly raised some troops to go to Ford's rescue. 155 In a campaign that lasted two 
weeks he dealt severely with the Tlhaping, the encounter at Dithakong on 24 July 1878 being the 
decisive blow. He also had to handle the aftermath of two other skirmishes that had involved the 
Tlhaping leaders Jantjie and Botlasitse. One incident was at Boetsap on 7 July, when a trading 
store was looted, and about 10 days later a man called Thompson was murdered at nearby 
Cornforth Hill .156 It was Warren who subsequent! y mopped up the last murmurings of Tlhaping 
dissent when he undertook a final round trip of all the southern Tswana strongholds in November 
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1878 to secure the submission of all the chiefs. 157 
While Lanyon was away, JD Barry, the recorder, managed affairs in Kimberley158 and Francis 
Villiers, Lanyon's acting colonial secretary, kept Lanyon's father informed that the rebels were 
slowly but surely being checked. Villiers reported to Charles Lanyon that his son was apparently 
in good health and that his letters to his staff in Kimberley were 'cheerful'. 159 Lan yon returned 
to Kimberley in the first week of July, leaving Warren to 'finish the work of following up the 
enemy, who are well nigh played out' .160 The volunteers returned to Kimberley on 19 August 
1878 to a rousing welcome, 161 but a final expedition, in which Lanyon was not involved, was 
necessary to quell the rebels in the Langeberg region to the west in October 1878. 162 
The administrator looked back with a sense of great achievement on the entire campaign. What 
he had first thought was merely an isolated attack by Botlasitse, followed by a 'local border 
disturbance' in the south in April 1878, had certainly taken on far more serious proportions: 
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Then came the outbreak of the Griquas, assisted by Korannas, Bushmen, and Basutos, followed shortly 
afterwards by the invasion of the province by the Batlapins and Batlaros .... This was indeed almost a 
crushing combination for our resources, and as news of aggression, of cruel murders, and of wholesale 
plunder came pouring in from all sides, I at times almost despaired of being able to cope with our 
difficulties without Imperial aid .... But the Province proved itself to be equal to the occasion. In a few days 
700 men were in the field and in a little over three months from the day of my leaving Kimberley the 
enemy were met and completely defeated in 10 engagements .... From 24th April till the 12th June, I had not 
a single trained officer of any department to assist me. Few of the men had ever been drilled before, and 
hardly any had been under fire before the action at Koegas. On the latter date Lieutenant-Colonel Warren 
arrived .... Colonel Warren took up the duties of chief of the staff from the date ofhis arrival and much of 
the success of the campaign is due to the hearty manner in which he assisted me, courageous in action, and 
incessant in his work; I could not have desired a better officer .... [In the light of the fact that] in ten 
engagements so formidable an enemy has been met and defeated in so short a period, and over so large 
an area, ... I do not think I am wrong in asserting that what has been done by the volunteers of Griqualand 
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West has no parallel in the history of her Majesty's Colonial possessions. 163 
Lan yon was rejuvenated. 'I am now alright again and fit for any amount of work'. 164 He indicated 
that while Warren might well have to return to 'dislodge the rebels from the Langeberg 
Mountains where they have fled to and from where they are making raids on our farmers', he 
himself had finished his campaigning.165 Once Warren had done the necessary, farmers in the 
border areas started ploughing again and peace was on the face of it at least, all but restored. 
Lanyon was eventually able to issue a proclamation of amnesty to the rebels on 13 November 
1878.166 
Lanyon made full use of the currently popular 'conspiracy theory' in his assessment of the causes 
of the rebellion in Griqualand West to explain the necessity of his action against the rebels. 167 
And Frere backed him to the hilt. 168 Interestingly, Sutton argues that the preoccupation of 
contemporary whites with the idea of an African plot against colonists might well have been a 
defence mechanism to absolve themselves of blame for causing the unrest in the first place.169 
If this was a factor in Lanyon's rebuttal of the post-rebellion criticism, it was probably 
unconscious because in none of Lanyon's papers is there any indication of personal guilt or 
introspection about his motives for his broader 'native policy', his land and location policy, or 
his harsh action against insurgents. As has been shown, as early as September 1877, Lanyon was 
comfortably justifying the necessity of providing locations, the 'generous' land grants of355. 
46 square miles, and the fact that the 'missionaries and others' had expressed their satisfaction 
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on 'the provision made by the Government for these people' .170 Enclosed by Frere for the 
scrutiny of the Colonial Office was also a copy of the minutes taken at an interview that Lan yon 
had arranged at Griquatown before the uprising with Waterboer, ex-chief of the Griqua people, 
in which Waterboer had apparently expressed himself as being 'quite satisfied at the 
arrangements which had been made by the Government with reference to his land'. Whether 
'quite satisfied' indicated complete agreement on Waterboer's part, and whether indeed the ex-
chief could speak as representative of all the Griqua people may be open to question, but Lanyon 
was clearly happy to accept that the evidence complied on both counts. 171 
In November 1878, with the rebellion quashed and the amnesty proclaimed, Frere forwarded to 
Lanyon three matters for his attention, all of which had arisen in connection with the unrest. 
Frere made it clear in his covering letter to Hicks Beach that he personally absolved Lanyon of 
all blame in either causing the unrest or handling it harshly, but the responsibility of compiling 
the rebuttal fell to Lanyon. The first query had arisen from a debate in the Cape legislative 
assembly and was then outlined in an article in the Cape Town newspaper, The Argus, in June 
1878. The Griqualand West land policy, it was posited, and the dissatisfaction this had 
engendered, was behind the unrest. The other two complaints alleged that there had been 
'cruelties on the part of our volunteers' during the campaign and had arisen from comments 
made in the House of Commons in London by a Mr James, and a letter from the Aborigines 
Protection Society. 172 
Lanyon dismissed the two latter allegations out of hand. He had addressed the matter of cruelty 
in an earlier despatch to Frere and had apparently satisfied himself, and everyone else he 
considered important, that there was no truth at all in the allegations. 173 He was clearly not 
planning to revisit a debate he felt he had already won. He then proceeded to point out what he 
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considered to be the major reason for the outbreak: the conspiracy theory. To go into the causes 
of the rebellion, he wrote, 
would necessitate my beginning with the causes of the war in the Cape Colony, and also the disastrous 
action taken by President Burgers against Sikukuni in the Transvaal. I have no doubt in my own mind that 
most of the recent native troubles in South Africa had their origin in the aggressive native policy of the 
late South African Republic, which, when resisted by Sikukuni, it was unable to enforce. The policy in the 
Cape Colony of ignoring native dangers, ... [meant that] a local disturbance swelled into a general 
outbreak .... There is much evidence of concert between distant and apparently unconnected outbreaks here 
and elsewhere, and if there is anything like a combination among the evil-disposed in different Kafir tribes, 
there is no surer means of encouraging its spread than by delaying the complete reassertion of the authority 
of Government. ... the want of check[ing] armed disaffection ... threatened to sweep away white supremacy 
everywhere in South Africa. 174 
As for the land-question theory as a cause of the rebellion, Lanyon felt that this argument had 
little credibility. To add weight to his opinion, he had consulted both Warren and Orpen, who 
had both been closely involved in the process of surveying the agricultural land in Griqualand 
West. He had also approached the Revd AJ Wookey, who was a missionary at Kuruman, and 
who, according to Lanyon, was well acquainted with the Tlhaping people. He appended all these 
reports in his letter to Frere. Lanyon then pointed out that the first of the 'natives' to rise had 
been those over the border under Cape rule, and that the men who began the war, and many of 
those who fought against Lan yon' s volunteers, were after all 'Cape Colonial Kafirs' who had not 
been subjected to Griqualand West's land policy. Furthermore, he asserted that the government 
had not received a single complaint against Major Warren's settlement of the land question 175 and 
claimed that Warren's report gave full evidence of 'able and impartial' handling of all 
controversy about the allocation of land claims. Minor indiscretions by certain officials were 
excusable and had been satisfactorily handled. 176 It was thus 'manifestly unjust', Lanyon 
concluded, to blame the government for the outbreak, which was simply part of 'a general one 
in all parts of South Africa'. Indeed, the fact that Griqualand West had handled the uprising so 
efficiently was to its enduring credit. 177 And there the matter ended, presumably with the full 
concurrence of Frere, the Colonial Office and the imperial government. The fact that the 
campaign meant the end of chiefly power and the subjection of the indigenous population to 
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colonial authority was certainly welcomed by Frere. From the African perspective, however, 
colonial supremacy as exercised by imperial agents like Lanyon amounted to dispossession and 
the dislocation of their traditional lifestyle. 
White landowners in Griqualand West were no doubt relieved that their claims to the land had 
been recognised, the rebellion quelled, and order restored to the rural areas, although there is no 
record of their appreciation to Lanyon for role in putting down the rebel, or any upswing in his 
popularity. The Africans, according to Lanyon's reports to Frere, were returning to their farming 
pursuits, which he took to mean they were satisfied with the new status quo. Lanyon's imperial 
superiors were clearly impressed with his sterling efforts and there were several official letters 
of congratulation. 178 
There was also exciting news for Lanyon. A telegram arrived from Hicks Beach to say that he 
was to be sent to the Transvaal to take over the administratorship from Shepstone while he was 
on 'leave of absence' in Britain. 179 In a letter to Disraeli, Hicks Beach gave his motivation for his 
decision, telling the prime minister that he had 'settled that Lanyon, who has administered 
Griqualand with energy and ability' should succeed Shepstone. 180 In the light ofLanyon's sound 
performance on the diamond fields, Hicks Beach presumably had enough confidence in him to 
believe he could put Shepstone's mistakes right. Lan yon' s himself saw his new appointment as 
a 'high compliment' and he was clearly pleased, but at the same time he realised that he was in 
for an extremely testing time in the Transvaal Colony. 'On the whole it is an unenviable 
position', he wrote, 'and one which may easily result in a failure.' 181 Failure was indeed lurking 
around the comer in Pretoria, but for the meanwhile Lanyon was basking in his glory. On 
Christmas eve he received a telegram from the War Office that he had been awarded the CB and 
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had been promoted to a full Brevet-Colonel. This in effect meant, as he told his father, that he 
had been given a 'jump of over four years, as in the ordinary course of events I could not have 
got it before 1883, ie after having been a Lieut-Colonel five years' .182 Lanyon was thus able, to 
some extent at least, to seek refuge from his unpopularity in military success. 
Growing unpopularity and a sour send-off 
Despite his military achievements in Griqualand West, Lanyon had never been popular in 
Kimberley. He was a reserved, ungregarious man who by his own admission did not care for the 
company of ordinary citizens and was not well liked by the diggers. 183 He was clearly very 
conscientious and worked long hours pushing his pen. 184 While the legislative council was in 
session he also arranged to meet every evening for discussions with them, 185 and the combined 
effect of all this must have left little time for socialising. He did mention to his father that he 
enjoyed attending the opera and Kimberley's Lanyon Theatre was named after him. 186 Apart from 
the three-month spell that he spent in Cape Town in mid 1877, ordered there by his doctor when 
he became ill from overwork, and part of which break was spent on official discussions, 187 he 
appears to have had very few diversions from his daily routine. He thoroughly enjoyed a hunting 
trip of about five days in a group of six men over Easter of 187 6, but makes no mention of the 
friends who accompanied him. 188 It appears that he was lonely and introspective. 
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The fact that Lanyon was involved in a libel case in November 1876, when he had only been in 
the diamond fields for a year, goes far towards explaining the souring of relations between 
Lanyon and the mining community as well as his growing disenchantment with Kimberley. 189 
From this time onwards, his letters home show very clearly that he was embittered and 
disgruntled with life. He was all the more sickened by the whole affair because although he was 
proved innocent, word of the scandal reached the Colonial Office and Lanyon was a very 
ambitious man who was clearly anxious to keep on good terms with the people who mattered in 
imperial circles. 190 The whole incident was riven with personal animosities and was closely 
linked to the fact that Lanyon had fallen foul of the local press. 'They threatened me once,' he 
wrote, 'and I showed my teeth - nasty steel ones - so they have barked from a distance.' 191 He 
became the butt of criticism in the newspapers on several occasions, 192 the most embarrassing 
and most public being an allegation that he had purchased a diamond illegally. 
One of the local Kimberley newspapers, the Independent, was owned by JB Robinson, who used 
it to promote his political career as mayor of Kimberley. His editor, Mortimer Siddall, picked up 
on the story of Henry Tucker who had been convicted ofbuying diamonds without a licence, and 
published an editorial accusing Lanyon of the same offence. Lanyon, who had indeed bought a 
diamond but had been in possession of all the necessary documentation, flew into a rage about 
this 'lying charge', protested his innocence and laid a civil charge against the proprietor and a 
criminal one against Siddall. 193 The Kimberley people made no bones about the fact that they 
sided with Robinson. Through the intervention of a sympathetic jury the criminal case was 
thrown out of court, but Robinson, the proprietor, then faced civil action, was found guilty and 
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For Lanyon' s version of the incident see Ibid, vol 11, Lanyon - brother Charles Lanyon, 20 November 
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TA, A596, vol 11, Lanyon- Charles Lanyon, 27 November 1876. 
According to the Diamond News, 21March1877, 'it has become the fashion to carp at the man and pick 
him to pieces ... we expect too much from governors and governments ever to be satisfied with either'. 
TA, A596, vol 11, Lanyon - brother Charles Lanyon, 20 November 1876; vol 12, Lanyon - Charles 
Lanyon, 6 February 1877. 
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fined £10 000 damages. 194 Lanyon, having proved his point, deemed it best to graciously allow 
the proprietor to publish an unconditional apology and Robinson, later worth a great deal of 
money as a mining magnate, was let off the hook. 195 The whole debacle made Lan yon even more 
bitter, and he became increasingly impatient to shake Kimberley's dust off his feet. 196 
On an official level, at least while in Kimberley, 197 he wrote of cordial personal relationships with 
Barkly, Frere, Shepstone and Brand, and it is claimed that Warren and Lanyon were very 
friendly, 198 probably because one ofLanyon' s few passions in life was his soldiering, and Warren 
was also a military man. But it appears that he was very demanding and short-tempered towards 
those who worked under him, and his letters home are full of complaints about lazy, incompetent 
officials, to whom he could delegate few responsibilities. 199 He claimed that it was less nerve-
wracking for him to do the tasks himself, and he then complained bitterly to his father about the 
never-ending toil of his thankless position.200 That he was a relentless autocrat there is no doubt. 
In one particularly revealing statement he writes: 'It is very hard and anxious work being an 
autocrat and having everything to do, and getting the abuse of everyone into the bargain. ' 201 
As has been shown, Lanyon soon grew disgruntled living in dry, treeless Kimberley with its 
'bohemian' people, and he longed to leave the place; it was only his lengthy military campaign 
from early 1878 to July that seemed to breathe new life into him. He certainly saw himself as a 
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Wolseley, p 206. 
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See for example TA, A596, vol 11, Lanyon- Charles Lanyon, 14 November 1876; Ibid, vol 12, Lanyon 
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Ibid, vol 12, Lanyon- Charles Lanyon, 14 August and 4 December 1877. 
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soldier rather than a civil administrator,202 which is probably why he enjoyed the respect he 
earned from his volunteers of the Diamond Field Horse203 and the praise for his military exploits, 
to the full. So much so, that he frequently boosted his flagging morale by writing to his family 
in Britain about his daring exploits amidst the heat of the battle. 
Lanyon's long spell in Cape Town did him good and when he returned in mid July 1877 he was 
welcomed officially, which cheered him. 'It was very gratifying', he wrote, 'I think absence 
makes the heart grow fonder and the good folks found out that there are worse gubernatorial 
personages than your son. '204 A month later he was complaining again that the community was 
always 'ready to abuse and villify' his efforts and that he hated the place heartily.205 But with 
unrest spreading throughout South Africa his spirits lifted as he prepared to become involved in 
raising volunteer troops, sending contingents to neighbouring territories and contemplating the 
necessity of quelling trouble within his own borders. There was no more talk of leaving 
Griqualand West; on the contrary Lan yon wrote 
Of course it is very much my wish to remain here now for I don't think a single soldier could be well 
spared at present. The time is a very critical one for South Africa and my being able to raise a force here 
makes one's services useful ... our volunteers are pronounced to be the best they have, which is not a little 
1 . 206 p easmg ... 
Lanyon's military exploits were no sooner over than he heard about his move to the Transvaal, 
and he was pleased and honoured. Warren was sent off to clear the last dissidents out of the 
Langeberg Mountains while Lanyon tried to catch up on his administrative tasks and prepare 
himself for his new responsibilities.207 In Lan yon' s words, 'the mills of red tape grind slowly', 
and having been informed at the end of August 1878 about his move to the Transvaal, almost 
four months went by before Frere contacted him again to provide him with further details about 
202 TA, A 596, vol 13, Lanyon- Jack (brother-in-law), 17 November 1878. 
203 Ibid, Lanyon - Charles Lanyon, 8 April 1878. 
204 Ibid, Lan yon - Charles Lanyon, 17 July 1877. 
205 Ibid, Lanyon- Charles Lanyon, 14 August and 1 October 1877. 
206 Ibid, vol 13, Lanyon- Charles Lanyon, 8 April 1878. 
207 Ibid, Lanyon - Charles Lanyon, 27 August 1878. 
131 
making his way to Pretoria via Pietermaritzburg.208In mid September Frere had left the Cape 
Colony for Natal, where he was going to address the Zulu 'problem' ,209 after which he was due 
to visit the Transvaal. Lanyon was told that he should go to Pietermaritzburg where he would be 
briefed by Frere before making his way to Pretoria. Shepstone meanwhile had been requested 
by Hicks Beach to return 'as soon as convenient' to Britain to 'complete his leave of absence' ,210 
but he had delayed his departure to help Frere with advice on how to handle negotiations with 
the Zulu and to meet Lanyon so as to hand over the reins of the Transvaal Colony.211 
But first Lan yon had to take his leave of Griqualand West. 'I have had most kind addresses from 
the good folks here on leaving them', he wrote.212 The One Star Contingent, one of the volunteer 
corps he had led with such success during the rebellion, presented him with a handsome silver 
goblet that was suitably inscribed and was accompanied by a flattering address referring in 
glowing terms to the manner in which he had 'unflinchingly shared the hardships and dangers 
in the late struggle between advancing civilisation and barbarism in this Province and 
neighbouring territories' .213 But if the newspapers are to be believed, it was only the volunteers 
who regretted his departure. From the rest of the inhabitants he received a sour, almost ludicrous 
send-off, which shows just how unpopular Lanyon had become on the diamond fields. His final 
adjournment of the legislative council had been 'sad and silent ... with no "Goodbye, Colonel, 
and hope to see you again some day", because nobody there did wish to see him again some day'. 
Looking back on his departure two days after he had left, The Diamond Fields Advertiser 
reported: 
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The departure of His Excellency Colonel Lanyon was fixed for 3 o'clock on Saturday afternoon and the 
big guns and volunteers were ordered out that there might be some military display on the occasion ... At 
about 4 o'clock the Great Man came out and mounted his horse ... he was joined by Field Marshal 
Ibid, Lanyon- Charles Lanyon, 25 November and 24 December 1878. 
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Maxwell ... guns fired ... but not another flag was hoisted, not a cheer was heard, as the procession went 
out of the market square. So, dinnerless and cheerless the Colonel went - and joy go with him, say we. 
This was loyalty made to order, but as some loyalty was essential to the departure of the Magnificent 
Presence this was better than none, and without it there would have been none.214 
Making his way towards Natal, Lanyon spent a few pleasant days with Brand in Bloemfontein. 
If indeed the president tried to give the younger man any pearls of wisdom on how to deal with 
the Transvaal Boers, his words obviously fell on deaf ears. He arrived in Pietermaritzburg on 25 
January 1879, only days after the 'awful disaster' of Isandlwana, so he must have found the 
usually urbane, cool and composed Frere in a state of high shock and dismay at the British defeat 
at the hands of Cetshwayo's Zulu.215 With British pride in tatters in the sub-continent and 
mounting Boer discontent in the Transvaal, the British presence in South Africa was in deep 
crisis. Owen Lanyon could hardly have arrived to take over his new responsibilities at a more 
hazardous time. 
Lanyon's first posting in South Africa came to an end when he left Griqualand West for the 
Transvaal. The climax of his career thus far was - certainly as far as he was concerned - his 
successful military campaign as a firm and uncompromising commander of the colonial troops 
against the rebels in the Griqualand West Rebellion of 1878. He had also earned the respect of 
Sir Michael Hicks Beach and Sir Bartle Frere, both of whom had praised him for his purposeful 
and conscientious administration on the diamond fields, and particularly for his financial 
management. He had steered Griqualand West through a troublesome period in its history, and 
the fact that the Cape finally agreed to take the region under its wing in 1880 was due in no small 
measure to Lanyon, who had rescued the administration from the doldrums and placed it on a 
firmer financial footing. 
Furthermore, what must rank as Lanyon' s most significant contributions as far as 
industrialisation and social engineering in South Africa are concerned, were achieved while he 
was in Griqualand West. He had done ground-breaking work in regulating the African labour 
force for the mines, creating a labour reservoir through the establishment of locations. He was 
also responsible for innovative changes in the existing mining regulations which had expedited 
214 Diamond Fields Advertiser, 13 January 1879. 
215 TA, A596 vol 14, Lanyon- Charles Lanyon, 26 January 1879. 
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the development of monopoly capitalism in Kimberley. It will be argued in the conclusion of this 
thesis, but also bears mention here, as Lanyon left Griqualand West for the Transvaal, that while 
Lanyon's role on the diamond fields was important at the micro-level, in that he was caught up 
in the struggle between the imperial power, the settlers and the Africans, it can also be seen in 
larger context. Lan yon undoubtedly played an important role in the developing struggle for white 
control over the land and labour resources of Africans, and in the transition of pre-mineral South 
Africa into the new aggressive capitalist era of the 1870s and 1880s. 
In the sense that he used his own initiative and made a significant contribution to a number of 
important developments Lanyon, was no puppet while in Griqualand West. It may perhaps be 
argued that Carnarvon appointed him as a puppet in 187 5 to further a particular policy - that of 
federation - but there is no question that Hicks Beach selected Lanyon as the new Transvaal 
administrator in 1878 not as a puppet but because he had proved himself to be an able 
administrator. 
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CHAPTER IV 
IN THE TRANSVAAL 
Fresh from Griqualand West where he had earned the praise of his imperial superiors both for 
his administrative efforts and his successful military campaign, Owen Lanyon embarked on a 
term of office of two years as administrator of the Transvaal Colony from 4 March 1879 to 8 
April 1881,1 an appointment that saw the end of his southern African career and culminated in 
disaster and humiliation. In order to trace the vicissitudes of his career in the Transvaal it is 
necessary first to look back at the situation he inherited from Theophilus Shepstone, the man who 
had been his predecessor in Pretoria since 1877 when Shepstone annexed the region for Britain, 
using tactics which the Transvaal Boers later described as 'craft, deceit and threats' .2 
Lanyon's legacy from Shepstone was even less enviable than the one he had inherited from 
Southey in Griqualand West. Shepstone had run a very inefficient and despotic proclamation 
regime and had neither understood the Boers nor earned their goodwill. As a result they were 
understandably wary of Lanyon, yet another British official whom they had every reason to 
believe would be as high-handed and unsympathetic as his predecessor. They would almost 
certainly have also been well aware of his reputation in Griqualand West. Furthermore, by the 
time Lanyon arrived in early 1879, the Boer agitation against the Transvaal's colonial status was 
becoming more vociferous. A spirited nationalism was rising in their ranks, and after the final 
defeat of the Zulu removed the threat on their south-eastern borders this was to become more 
pronounced; they wanted their independence restored. In looking back to see how difficult the 
situation was that Lanyon inherited, light will be cast on his efforts to grope his way forward. 
2 
Lanyon was appointed in a temporary capacity on 4 March 1879. It was only on 4 June 1880 that he was 
appointed as permanent administrator of the Transvaal; TA, ZAR/55, Transvaal Government Gazette, 4 
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Another issue that will be explored briefly before embarking on an assessment of Lan yon' s role 
in the Transvaal is the significance of Lord Carnarvon' s resignation as secretary of state for the 
colonies in January 1878, following a split in the cabinet over Disraeli's eastern policy. He was 
replaced by Sir Michael Hicks Beach,3 nicknamed Black Michael. Hicks Beach was by no means 
as convinced as Carnarvon had been that a federation policy was the best one to pursue in 
southern Africa and the imperial urgency behind the confederation policy began to wane.4 But 
to offset this, Carnarvon's chosen proconsul, Sir Bartle Frere, was still in southern Africa. Hicks 
Beach did not feel confident enough to countermand what Frere was doing in South Africa and 
until Frere's influence over Transvaal affairs was removed, he had a direct bearing on the 
policies that were handed down to Owen Lanyon. 
Events in southern Africa in the closing years of the 1870s had, from imperial Britain's point of 
view, deteriorated into an alarming morass ofregional difficulties. And Whitehall's woes were 
compounded by an event that brought with it the worst possible embarrassment and loss of 
prestige. It was a confrontation that caused what Lanyon described as 'the severest panic that 
South Africa has ever had'5, the humiliating defeat of imperial troops at an unfortified British 
camp at Isandlwana in Zululand on 22 January 1879 at the hands of Cetshwayo's Zulu. Hicks 
Beach wrote to inform the Queen when the shocking news came through to the Colonial Office: 
It has been a very agitating day with this terrible news from South Africa .... This sad news has come when 
by indefatigable efforts everything was beginning to look bright. It will change everything: reduce our 
continental influence and embarrass our finances ... 6 
The situation in early 1879: Theophilus Shepstone's legacy to Lanyon 
Even before he had summoned Shepstone to the Colonial Office to receive instructions for his 
special mission in southern Africa, Lord Carnarvon had written to inform Queen Victoria that 
there was 'a very real prospect of bringing back the Transvaal under Your Majesty's rule', and 
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thus, he argued, of taking a positive step towards implementing his confederation plans, 'for 
when the Transvaal republic becomes British, the Orange Free State cannot long retain its 
independence' .7 He was also fully confident that Shepstone, with his imposing demeanour and 
dominating character, was the right person for the job,8 the best choice to wield what he called 
'these secret powers', because, as the Colonial Office had come to believe, the secretary for 
native affairs in Natal had all the necessary 'experience, capacity and judgement' .9 Camarvon 
also had it on good authority, from reliable sources in southern Africa, including Owen Lanyon, 
that the Transvaal was in a state of chaos and that a 'large majority' of the people, notably those 
of British origin, were anxious to come under British sovereignty. 10 'Of the disposition of the 
Dutch', he admitted, 'it is more difficult to speak', but he was confident that given time and 
Theophilus Shepstone's knowledge and expertise, this obstacle could be satisfactorily 
overcome. I I The Boers had to be won over despite the disaffection (one of Camarvon's favourite 
words) of Boer hardliners. To justify annexation Camarvon harped incessantly on the state of 
panic caused by the Pedi attacks, the exhausted republican treasury, and the' cruelty and baseness 
of this wretched little govt.' who were bringing misery to local AfricansI2 and causing havoc 
among frontier communities on the western and south eastern boundaries of the republic. I3 Force 
was positively to be the last resort, to be used only when all else failed, because, as Camarvon 
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put it, 'the game we are playing is a delicate one' .14 
When Shepstone arrived in southern Africa in October 1876, circumstances were not as grave 
in the Transvaal as he had expected. Camarvon had, however, left Shepstone's instructions vague 
precisely because he anticipated that 'circumstances may have considerably changed' when the 
time eventually came to act. The annexation would have to be carefully engineered if it was to 
be made to be seen, 'as far as possible the act of the Dutch part of the population' and done with 
their cooperation. 15 Although many whites in the Transvaal were dissatisfied with the parlous 
circumstances in the republic it was significant that it was only those in mercantile circles, which 
were almost exclusively dominated by people of British origin, and the miners of the eastern 
Transvaal, 16 who were actually calling for British intervention. 17 The Boers were largely self-
sufficient and in any case valued their independence too much to actively seek a British takeover 
of their government. 
If the immediate Pedi danger in the Transvaal had been temporarily averted when Shepstone 
arrived, he was well aware that there was always the Zulu threat in the 'disputed territory' on the 
republic's border with Zululand, to fall back on. 18 Perhaps this could be used to scare the Boers 
into accepting British overlordship. 19 This was an avenue of thought that had gathered some 
support in the Colonial Office as a means of dislodging the Boer govemment.20 Interestingly 
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Bulwer, 31January1877. 
This piece ofland lay between the Buffalo and Pongola Rivers beyond (on the Zululand side) of the town 
of Utrecht. The Boers claimed that Cetshwayo had ceded it to them in 1861 and they tried to settle there, 
but they met with fierce resistance from the Zulus. On the effects of the protracted struggle in this region, 
see J Laband, 'An assessment of the consequences of the Zulu-Boer conflict over the control of the land 
in the "Disputed Territory", 1852-1888', Paper presented at the 16th biennial conference of the South 
African Historical Society, University of Pretoria, 6-9 July 1997. 
On the allegation that Shepstone made use of the Zulu threat to expedite the annexation of the Transvaal 
see RL Cope, 'Shepstone, the Zulus, and the annexation of the Transvaal', South African Historical 
Journal, 4, 1972, pp 45-63. 
PRO, Carnarvon Papers, 301613, Carnarvon- Victoria, 25 September 1876. 
139 
enough, in a letter written to Shepstone just before the annexation, Lanyon also made mention 
of using the Zulu to frighten the Boers into federation. He expressed surprise that the Boers 'are 
so blind to their own interests and neglect to take the proffered hand of assistance which has been 
held out to them to their own interest', and suggested that they would have only themselves to 
blame if 'Cetchwayo [sic] and other sable potentates ... step in with the "baptism ofblood'".21 
But using the Zulu as a means of pressurising the Boers had its risks. 'What was needed was 
sufficient pressure to topple Boer hegemony, but not so much to threaten British hegemony as 
well. ' 22 
By 20 December 1876 Shepstone felt that it was time to act. He wrote to inform Burgers that he 
was on his way to the Transvaal and without waiting for a reply from the president23 he set off, 
arriving in a tense Pretoria on 22 January 1877.24 In the more than three weeks that his journey 
took, trouble in the disputed territory was escalating, with both the Zulu and the Transvalers 
claiming full rights to the same land and neither being prepared to step back. As a correspondent 
in The Natal Mercury expressed it, 'The pressure put on by Cetshwayo is driving many to their 
wits end ... The prospects of federation look blooming on this side of the Vaal River.'25 But the 
border unrest had really persuaded only the directly-threatened Boers in the Utrecht and 
Wakkerstroom areas that federation under Britain was the answer, and elsewhere the 
'disaffected' Boers in the rural districts were far from welcoming to the imperial agent. Writing 
to Bulwer a few weeks after his arrival in Pretoria, Shepstone reported that '500 formidable 
Boers' had arrived at his door to announce that they did not want 'federation or confederation 
or any other "ation" that will bring them into closer contact with Her Majesty', and he went on 
to admit that 'there is a class, and a large one, that must see the strong arm before they will 
yield'.26 Although the Pedi had concluded a peace settlement with the Boer government in 
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February 187727, the Zulu remained an important part of Shepstone's annexation plot; he was still 
hoping that they could be used to frighten the Boers into accepting British rule. 
In a private letter written from Pretoria to Lanyon, Shepstone related his obvious delight that he 
had been received by so many people with extraordinary enthusiasm.28 He did not make much 
of the fact that it was largely the commercial sector of Pretoria, which was predominantly 
English-speaking, that turned out to cheer, nor did he make more than passing mention of the 
sullen 'immovability of the Dutch population'. 29 Burgers did not attend the rousing Pretoria 
welcome afforded by some of the British residents. Nor did he organise a state welcome although 
Shepstone tried to create the impression that he had. 
Less than three months later, on 12 April 1877, Shepstone annexed the Transvaal for Britain. 
Camarvon was delighted and sent ' ... hearty congratulations on the patience, tact, courage and 
judgement with which you have executed your difficult and responsible task', although he did 
add that he would have been even better pleased 'had the President and the Raad themselves 
proposed the annexation' .30 The details of the steps that Shepstone followed are irrelevant here, 
but the reaction of the Transvalers, and the manner in which they were subsequently ruled by 
Shepstone, are indeed significant, because less than two years later Lanyon was to be confronted 
by the legacy of hostility he had inherited from Shepstone. 
The act of annexation did not immediately produce resistance. The Boers were aware that there 
were imperial troops on the border, although Shepstone was hardly secure with his 25 mounted 
policemen to protect him. Burgers did no more than make a formal protest before bowing out of 
the picture. The Boer executive council also delivered a protest and promptly named two of its 
members, SJP Kruger and EJP Jorissen, to go to Britain to plead for a reversal of the annexation; 
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indeed, less than a month later they were already on their way.31 This overt resistance from the 
Boers effectively scotched Carnarvon' s hope, reiterated to Shepstone by Bulwer, that there would 
be some declaration of cooperation or assent on the part of the Boer leaders, a declaration that 
might well have proved useful later to justify Shepstone's actions in the Transvaal in April 1877 
and 'silence all future questions'. 32 
Furthermore, having initially used the Zulu threat to frighten the Boer authorities into consenting 
to annexation, Shepstone then proceeded to use his black peril tactics to justify his inability to 
gain official Boer consent or co-operation. He dismissed the Pedi, who were at the time not a 
threat, as 'unwarlike' compared to the Zulu.33 The British takeover was used to promote the Zulu 
image as one of a 'fierce and aggressive menace', hordes of marauders who were part of the 
countrywide black conspiracy against the settlers. If Britain - in the person of Theophilus 
Shepstone, the Zulu expert - had not stepped in to help the floundering republic and to 'restrain' 
the Zulu, the Boer government would have been powerless to resist the imminent Zulu inroads 
and would thus have put all the whites in South Africa at grave risk.34 
Now at the head of the new government, Shepstone issued a proclamation which made confident 
assurances to the Transvalers that Britain had their interests at heart.35 He pointed out that the 
Boer government had 'fallen into helpless paralysis' and made much of the fact that the 'native 
tribes' were growing in strength and confidence. He assured the people that the Transvaal Colony 
would be governed as a separate state, 'with its own laws and legislature'36, that civil servants 
could retain their posts, and that both the Dutch and English languages would have official status. 
31 
32 
33 
34 
35 
36 
Van Zyl, Die protesbeweging van die Transvaalse Afrikaners, p 20. 
NA, Shepstone papers, A96/18, Bulwer- Shepstone, 4 April, 1877. 
Cope, Ploughshare of war, p 129. 
On the anti-white conspiracy theory and its alleged relationship to the widespread African unrest in South 
Africa in the late 1870s see Chapter III. There was some basis to Shepstone's view on the precarious 
position of settlers in the interior. On the comparative superiority of African societies in relation to white-
ruled states in the early 19th century in southern Africa, see Chapter I. 
C 1776, Proclamation by Shepstone, 12 April 1877, pp 157-159. 
Shepstone's failure to meet this requirement to the satisfaction of the Boers was one of their main 
grievances. See also Chapters IV and V. 
142 
All the inhabitants, including the Africans, were to be 'made to contribute their fair share towards 
the support of the state', which presumably meant that taxation was to be levied and collected 
on a far more efficient basis than had previously been the case.37 Shepstone, and Lanyon after 
him, was to find that paying taxes was one area of civil duty in which the Transvaal Boers were 
notoriously tardy. This particular clause was presumably included in reaction to Camarvon's 
growing concern about the necessity of increasing revenue and cutting expenditure in the 
Transvaal Colony,38 an issue that was to be a recurring problem in the British governance of the 
region for the entire period until the Boers regained their independence in 1881. 
It was all very well for Shepstone to outline his plans in his annexation proclamation, but it was 
quite another to put them into effect. On 3 0 May 1877, reacting to Shepstone's first reports about 
conditions in Pretoria, the secretary of state sent his instructions by return of post: 
I trust that it is now certain that the risk of native disturbances is virtually at an end. Your firm and steady 
administration of the country must do the rest. My only immediate cause of anxiety lies in the financial 
position, and I fear that it will be some time before you will get any local payments made to replenish your 
absolutely exhausted Treasury .... I need not remind you how very desirable it is not to count upon imperial 
assistance in point of money ... Parlt. does not like to be made to pay even for what it approves ... Your 
object therefore must be to bear in mind these two opposite considerations - effective government and 
d f: . . ·1 th 39 economy - an as ar as crrcumstances permit, to reconc1 e em. 
Shepstone was unable to reconcile them. Carnarvon had not foreseen the stubborn Boer 
resistance to the new British regime in the Transvaal, the resurgence of Pedi discontent or the 
escalation of border disputes, all of which Shepstone appeared to be ill equipped to handle. The 
more critical the situation grew, the worse the financial condition of the colony became. 
Shepstone was a schemer, 'a master at the art of vagueness' ,40 not a hard-headed, down-to-earth 
administrator able to get things done. His rambling correspondence that elaborates and goes off 
at impossible tangents is perhaps the best indication of his inability to apply himself to the issues 
at hand. By 1878 Camarvon, who had been impressed by Shepstone's credentials, had left the 
37 
38 
39 
40 
In July 1877 Shepstone told Carnarvon 'there is a large income to be derived from a judicious taxation of 
the native population' but this would depend on the 'appointment of officers for the management and 
control of the natives', PRO, Camarvon Papers, 3016123, Shepstone - Carnarvon, 23 July 1877. 
See for example Ibid, 30/6/3, Carnarvon - Ponsonby, 11 September 1877. 
Ibid, 30/6/23, Carnarvon- Shepstone, 30 May 1877, also NA, A96/20, pp 106-112. 
Cope, Ploughshare of war, p 128. 
143 
Colonial Office and it is clear that Frere was at his wits end with Shepstone's inability to govern 
the Transvaal. His terse comment in June 1878 that Shepstone' does not seem to have conciliated 
the Boers', took on a decidedly irritable edge about affairs in the Transvaal by August, when he 
agreed heartily with Hicks Beach's suggestion that Shepstone should perhaps be replaced by 
Lanyon.41 To the argument that Shepstone was a man of administrative stature and ability, who 
had been an influential imperial official for years in Natal, Frere was positively dismissive: 
The Shepstonian policy, as it is called, on which Natal prided itself, is played out... it did nothing to 
improve or raise them [the Zulus] or to make us known to them, or to make them known to us. Everything 
in the Native Department was an official secret and mystery, carefully veiled from non-official eyes and 
indeed from everyone but the Head of that Dept. 
He went on to say that he seriously doubted whether Sir Theophilus could ever be 'useful in his 
present position' in the Transvaal Colony, where in Frere's opinion, nothing constructive in the 
administrative sphere had been done for more than 18 months. 42 
In the opening months of 1879, until Lanyon took over in March, criticism of Shepstone 
continued to flow freely from Frere's pen. It was not, he wrote, going to be at all easy 'to dispose 
of him unless you can let him retire ... he has been ... totally devoid of constructive and 
administrative faculty - unless I had seen it I could not have believed that in two years things 
could have drifted into such a mess.'43 Frere's was not the only criticism of Shepstone's slack 
administration. Hicks Beach's biographer alleges that the new secretary of state was also 
dissatisfied with Shepstone's 'single-handed autocracy' and untoward secrecy about what, if 
anything, he was doing in the Transvaal.44 The most heated objections and allegations of 
unfulfilled promises and poor governance came from the people who were most closely involved 
- the white Transvalers, the Pedi people within the republican borders and the Tswana 
communities in the Keate Award territory to the west. And in the disputed territory on the 
Zululand border the Zulu felt betrayed that their so-called 'father' had summarily changed sides 
in the border dispute with the Boers. It remains to examine whether the criticism of Shepstone's 
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alleged 'drifting, do-nothing policy' in the Transvaal Colony was justified. Because they were 
among the key issues that had to be addressed during his term of office, Shepstone's handling 
of the Transvaal finances, his relations with the Boers and his policy towards the Africans in and 
around the Transvaal, will be examined. All these issues were an integral part of the legacy that 
Shepstone left for Lanyon. 
Appropriately enough, the financial state of the Transvaal was one of the first matters that the 
Colonial Office tried to address. Shepstone appeared reasonably confident that he could succeed, 
despite the heavy debt he had inherited from the Boer govemment.45 In an attempt to conciliate 
the Boers he had immediately abolished Burgers' unpopular war tax,46 and within weeks of the 
annexation he also appointed a commission to look into the finances of the colony.47 The 
commission's report was such that Shepstone was obliged to cast about-Bulwer in Natal was 
one source that proved unproductive48 - to boost his funds. Frere was eventually able to arrange 
for an advance grant from the military chest of £20 000 but things were looking decidedly 
bleak.49 It is also significant that while this financial crisis was being experienced, Shepstone was 
off on a month-long tour of the western Transvaal. 50 His administration in general terms, and thus 
the money being spent, was being hampered, he said, because he had to work with an unbroken 
team who had only 'the most hazy ideas of the manner in which their respective duties should 
be discharged'. 51 He left Pretoria again in August 1877, this time for a protracted tour of the 
eastern Transvaal and the disputed territory, where border disturbances kept him away for 
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months. 
Frere was unimpressed by vague promises, excuses and delays and had meanwhile started his 
barrage of criticism. He rapped Shepstone over the knuckles for paying out several large amounts 
to creditors who should have been made to wait. 52 Having identified the severity of the problem, 
Shepstone did little to remedy it and criticism had also begun to mount against his frequent 
absence from his desk in Pretoria. As one correspondent expressed it, 'While Sir Theophilus 
remains on the border, attending exclusively to one matter, and all others are allowed to "slide" 
for the present, people can scarcely be blamed for grumbling. ' 53 
All was obviously not well. Shepstone was unable to tum the finances around despite the long-
winded optimism displayed in his correspondence. Writing in August 1877, some four months 
after annexation, Camarvon was very concerned about the still-empty treasury. So much so that 
he organised for one of the crown agents, WC Sargeaunt, a 'good financier and accustomed to 
that particular line of work' to make a brief visit to the Transvaal to look into the situation, to 
give Shepstone the benefit of his expertise, and then to draw up the necessary reports which 
Camarvon could then present when enquiries were directed to him about the issue in 
parliamentary debates. In the meantime, Shepstone was warned, ' ... keep expenditure down' .54 
But the signs were unmistakable and Camarvon was clearly edgy that the 'success and merit' of 
his Transvaal plans looked as if they might be 'jeopardised by this financial folly' .55 When the 
matter came up for discussion in the Colonial Office in August 1877, Camarvon' s cousin, Robert 
Herbert, who was the permanent under-secretary, minuted: 'I very much fear that we shall find 
... Shepstone to have been negligent or imprudent to an extent which will seriously 
counterbalance the great merits of his political achievements ... It is truly disappointing to see 
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a very able stroke of policy drawn down into the mire by financial muddling. ' 56 When he read 
the minute Carnarvon must have been alarmed because he promptly took the precaution of 
dropping a note to Herbert to tell him: 'I think that we should hold very guarded language as 
regards the Transvaal. ... I see no chance of carrying the latter on without further assistance. The 
Treasury should be prepared for a considerable call on them .... ' 57 
Sargeaunt's bulky report only appeared in September 1878. In a word, the economy was found 
to be so bad and so little had been done to rescue it, that an autocracy, with the tax collector and 
the British soldier to bolster its authority, seemed the only way to go.58 But Hicks Beach, who 
had in the meanwhile taken over from Carnarvon, and more particularly Frere, realised that this 
route was impossible given the plans they had for the Transvaal. The Boers hankered for a return 
to self-rule and Shepstone had given them assurances that this wish would be fulfilled. A Boer 
deputation to plead for re-instatement of their independence had knocked on Camarvon's door 
in 1877 and another arrived to see Hicks Beach in mid 1878. The delegates had been told that 
under no circumstances could they be given back their independence.59 As far as the Colonial 
Office was concerned, even with Camarvon gone, the Transvaal was still to become part of a 
confederation. Now in a very tight spot, both Hicks Beach and Frere agreed that Lanyon, who 
had shown considerable ability in steering Griqualand West through troubled financial waters 
with such 'admirable vigour' and firmness - 'firmness' had by now become Lan yon' s trademark 
- should be asked to pull things straight in the Transvaal.60 With the benefit ofhindsight this was 
hardly fair on Lanyon; but more of that later. 
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Shepstone had never seen eye to eye with the Boers. He had 'no sort of sympathy with them' and 
enjoyed neither their confidence nor goodwill,61 nor it seems, did he really try to find out how 
they felt. 62 This was one of the recurring criticisms of his rule in the Transvaal. After the failure 
of their first deputation to Britain, 63 the Boers' sullen acceptance of British annexation soon 
turned to rumbling discontent, but Shepstone continued to insist that he had the support of the 
majority ofTransvalers.64 In a private letter to Hicks Beach at the end of May 1878, by which 
time Shepstone had been at the helm for a full year, Frere outlined what he saw as the main 
reasons for Boer dissatisfaction, in other words, the issues that had to be addressed with all 
urgency. 65 These included the lack of a visible, effective administration, the fact that no attempt 
had been made to set up a representative legislature, and the disturbed state of the Transvaal -
Zululand border. There were also complaints that the promise to accord the Dutch language equal 
recognition had not been met, and that the railway tax was still being levied despite there being 
no sign of a railway line. Furthermore, ill-feeling had arisen because too many Natal officials -
rather than Transvalers- had been appointed to the civil service.66 Most of these were issues that 
Frere felt could be remedied fairly easily but one of the most important grievances, the lack of 
representative institutions, was going to be the most difficult to solve.67 Frere's predictions 
proved to be unduly optimistic; as far as the Boers were concerned Lanyon remedied none of 
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their grievances. 
Shepstone was thus under great pressure to introduce representative governmental bodies almost 
as soon as he had taken over in the Transvaal, despite the fact that personally he did not favour 
the idea. Lan yon' s experience in Griqualand West may well have influenced his thinking on this, 
although Shepstone's style in Natal had also been decidedly autocratic. Being of a military, obey-
me-or-else frame of mind, Lanyon had struggled in Kimberley with an obstructive legislative 
body that included an elective element. 68 Just prior to the annexation of the Transvaal he gave 
Shepstone the benefit of his advice, warning him to avoid elective bodies if at all possible. 'Even 
here', he wrote, 'with only four electives, and a Govt. majority, the Council can be obstructive, 
by the electives walking out and leaving us without a quorum. ' 69 
Despite Lanyon's input, it was not Shepstone's decision that the Transvaal Boers be denied an 
early opportunity to gain some representation in the governance of the colony, but Carnarvon's. 
Under pressure from the Boers, and in deference to the assurances he had made in his annexation 
proclamation, Shepstone in fact drew up a memorandum at the end of July 1877. He proposed 
that there be two councils in the Transvaal, one an elective body of 42 members on the lines of 
the old volksraad, and another with 12 nominated members to serve as an upper house and an 
executive organ. 70 His suggestions were subsequently endorsed by Frere, 71 but Carnarvon, fearing 
that giving the Transvalers a political say might jeopardise his federation ambitions - as had 
certainly proved to be the case with responsible government in the Cape Colony- turned down 
Shepstone's proposals, indicating that the matter could perhaps be addressed later. He felt it 
would be 'ill advised' to grant any 'representative institutions, and the simpler the form of govt. 
the better'. 72 
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This decision had an extremely negative effect in the Transvaal. The levels of anger and unease 
increased. Complaints started to appear in the local press that the people had been promised the 
'rights and privileges which all enjoy in every country under the British Flag'; instead, they 
claimed, 'there is nothing but rank despotism and high-handed official authority'. 73 The lack of 
representative institutions became one of the major, festering reasons for Boer discontent, and 
when the Boers moved to organise a 'monster meeting' to discuss their plan of action, Shepstone 
tried to put the lid on the trouble by issuing a proclamation in March 1878 to quell what he saw 
as dangerous 'agitation and alarm ... threats of violence and seditious utterances'. 74 Although Van 
Zyl claims that the Boers did not at this juncture have plans to take up arms, Shepstone was 
clearly worried that they might well do so.75 Despite attempts by local magistrates to prevent 
gatherings of a political nature, these went ahead in the first week of April 1878. A petition 
proving that the overwhelming majority of Boers 76 rejected British overlordship and wanted their 
independence reinstated, was collected and a second deputation comprising P J Joubert and SJP 
Kruger was elected to approach the Colonial Office again. After consultations with Frere in Cape 
Town, where the high commissioner reiterated that Britain would never be prepared to relinquish 
the Transvaal, the deputation arrived in London on 29 June 1878 only to receive much the same 
answer from Hicks Beach. 77 
Nor, during his term of office, had Shepstone done much to resolve issues relating to Africans 
within the Transvaal or on the borders of the colony. In his annexation proclamation he had made 
his attitude clear: 'The native tribes living within the jurisdiction and under the protection of the 
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Government must be taught due obedience to the paramount authority. ' 78 His plan was to 
decentralise control of outlying areas by appointing groups of magistrates who would work under 
a commissioner in about three to five designated rural districts. 79 The commissioners were to 
attend to any regional matters that cropped up, but their prime task was to liaise with the African 
headmen. The headmen were to be informed of their choice: to accept British overlordship, in 
which case they were liable for taxes, or to move out of the Transvaal and settle elsewhere. Those 
who chose to remain were not permitted to fight among themselves and had to agree to pay an 
annual hut tax that had been set at 1 Os per annum. 80 
Despite Shepstone's optimism and that of his son Henrique, who had been appointed as secretary 
for native affairs, this system did not bring the desired results. 81 Tax collection proved well-nigh 
impossible within the colony and during Shepstone's term of office there were many incidents 
of unrest on the western border, in the eastern Transvaal where the Pedi people were growing 
restless and in the southeast where clashes between Boer frontier farmers and Zulu were more 
or less endemic. 82 All these regions were still trouble spots when Lanyon took over in March 
1879. 
Reference has already been made to Lanyon's role, while stationed in Kimberley, in the conflict 
in the Keate Award territory, where Boer frontier farmers in the Bloemhof and Christiana regions 
encroached on land that had been granted to the Tlhaping people. 83 Lan yon was also implicated 
to a more limited extent in the Shepstone government's quarrel with thePedi under Sekhukhune, 
when he arranged to send a volunteer force, the Diamond Field Horse, to assist Shepstone in the 
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renewed unrest in the eastern Transvaal in April 1878.84 The situation in neither of these two 
regions changed for the better under Shepstone's rule, and both remained vexing issues to be 
addressed by the new administrator. 85 
Prior to his arrival in the Transvaal, Lanyon had not been drawn into the equation in boundary 
dispute with the Zulu in the Utrecht and W akkerstroom districts, 86 but Shepstone in contrast had 
a long, 20-year history of contact with the Zulu before moving to the Transvaal. 87 Here too, 
despite protracted tours through the area, and leaving his administrative duties to accumulate 
alarmingly in Pretoria, he had made little real progress towards resolving the impasse before 
Lanyon took over.88 The most closely contested area, with neither Boers nor Zulu, or their 
respective governments being prepared to step down to grant land-ownership rights, was the land 
to the east of the Ncome (Blood) River. When the republican authorities had tried to collect taxes 
in the area in 1876, tension had reached such a pitch that the following year Shepstone, as has 
been seen, was able to use the fracas to put 'black peril' pressure on Burgers and the republican 
government to try and make them agree to British rule. Although it has been conclusively argued 
that Cetshwayo had no such plans to attack the Transvaal, 89 disputes continued to plague the 
border area and white frontier farmers demanded, with justification, that the new British 
authorities take steps to protect them and establish some sort of order in the region.90 
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In October 1877 Shepstone was in the disputed area meeting a Zulu delegation, but his proposals 
for a settlement were unacceptable to the Zulu, who accused him of being a turncoat who was 
now, despite his former reputation for sympathy with their cause, clearly a loyal Transvaal 
Boer.91 With matters growing progressively more heated, Carnarvon, just weeks before he 
resigned, ordered Shepstone not to provoke a war under any circumstances. 'A native war is just 
now impossible you must avoid it ... ,' he warned.92 By this time too, Henry Bulwer, the 
lieutenant-governor of Natal had suggested that perhaps the time had come for negotiation, and 
after sounding out some of the parties involved he sent an enquiry to Cetshwayo.93 Bulwer then 
began making arrangements to set up a commission of enquiry, much to Shepstone's irritation 
that the ball was no longer in his court.94 
The border commission completed its month-long investigations in April 1878 and the report 
was duly presented to Frere for arbitration in July. Its findings favoured the Zulu rather than the 
Transvaal claims and Frere realised that politically speaking, if confederation was the end goal, 
its implementation would be disastrous. He then proceeded to accept it in form and to nullify it 
in practice, on the grounds that the Zulu had not complied with the technical requirements of the 
agreement. This amounted to Frere's conciliation of the Boers at the expense of justice to the 
Zulu, although Frere was careful not to admit to any such thing. 
In Frere's view the' Zulu obstacle' had to be removed. This was the key to federation. When this 
was effected everything else would fall into place. He modified the recommendations of the 
commission and sent them to Cetshwayo on 11 December 1878 with what amounted to an 
ultimatum. This sealed the inevitability of war because it made what amounted to impossible 
demands. Hicks Beach could do no more than resign himself to the fact that 'Frere had made up 
his mind not to be stopped', but he was bargaining on an easy, quick disposal of the Zulu by the 
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troops he had sent in reply to Frere's request.95 He could not have been more wrong. 
To Hicks Beach, Frere had written privately to explain his difficult position. He had to 'deal' 
with Zulu and waylay Boer' explosions'; in his mind the two issues were inextricably linked, and 
he had thus he said, no other alternative than to take the line he had followed. 96 Within weeks of 
writing this letter, matters between imperial Britain and the Zulu kingdom were precipitated on 
the battlefield, and Britain had suffered ignominious defeat. That the eventual outcome of the 
Anglo-Zulu War was in Britain's favour never quite extinguished the embarrassment of that 
opening encounter at Isandlwana. 
Back in Pretoria, and prior to the British defeat by the Zulu, Shepstone's administration had 
clearly not been effective on any grounds and he was rapidly losing the confidence of virtually 
everyone. Newspapers were full ofletters of criticism97 and even English-speakers in Pretoria 
drew up a petition to complain about the poor administration, although Shepstone was later to 
claim that all but 16 of the signatures were of questionable origin.98 Certainly his lacklustre 
administrative performance left Lanyon with an unenviable legacy, particularly in so far as it led 
to an increase in Boer discontent. If some of the promises Shepstone had made in April 1877 had 
been fulfilled, the levels of agitation after the return of the first deputation with their 
disappointing report-back, would perhaps have been less marked. This was certainly the 
impression of one outsider who visited Pretoria in 1878.99 On the other hand it has been argued 
that not even a good administration would have dissuaded the Boers from taking up the cudgels 
to regain their independence. The die-hard republicans, who constituted the large majority of the 
Boer population, had been against the annexation from the start and had only accepted it under 
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protest. They cared little about administrative matters, either good or bad. JOO 
Predictably, having been told in August 1878 that he was to be replaced by Lanyon, and that he 
should go to London to discuss 'several important questions connected with the Transvaal', 101 
Shepstone dallied. And as a result Lanyon heard nothing more about when he was to go to the 
Transvaal or the circumstances surrounding his new position for three months. Shepstone 
meanwhile remained in Pretoria writing long, rambling letters offering to help everyone before 
he left. He really felt that it would be wise to wait long enough to give Frere valuable assistance 
when the high commissioner made his proposed trip to the Transvaal. He also felt sure that 
Lanyon needed time to wind up his affairs in Kimberley. 102 Then too, it was also necessary that 
he delay long enough to hold important discussions with Chelmsford to give him advice on how 
to approach the Zulu. J03 In a long letter to Lanyon he explained that he certainly would not dream 
of going until he had seen him in Pretoria 'to enable me to explain such matters to you as may 
require to be explained, and of such there are probably not a few'. He was 'in no great hurry, a 
month or two is a matter of indifference to me; indeed I would rather avoid spending the whole 
of the winter in England'. J04 In a word, Shepstone must have realised that he was being recalled, 
and was not particularly inclined to go. He agreed that he needed a rest after all the tension and 
hard work, and admitted that perhaps the administration needed a new hand, someone 'with a 
little more sternness than I can well exhibit', 105 but he apparently saw through Hicks Beach's 
rather transparent explanation that there were 'important questions' to discuss with him in the 
Colonial Office. J06 After all, important questions that needed discussion would normally have 
been relayed to him through the high commissioner. 
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Ultimately, as has been shown, Hicks Beach felt he could not let matters drift any longer. With 
all the formalities for Shepstone's recall taken care of, he wrote to Disraeli 
... Things look bad in the Transvaal, though I do not at present think we shall have to send more troops 
out. Shepstone has contrived to offend Dutch, English and Zulus. I have recalled him - by asking him to 
come home on leave and consult with me- and settled that Lanyon, who has administered Griqualand with 
energy and ability, should succeed him temporarily in the Transvaal. 107 
In any assessment of Lanyon's subsequent failure in the Transvaal between 1879 and 1881 it 
should at least be admitted that he was thrown into very deep, very hot, Transvaal water. 
Shepstone bequeathed to Lan yon an angry, rebellious Boer population, and a percolating African 
policy that steamed with confrontation and contestation. Lanyon also inherited severely depleted 
financial resources and a fiercely autocratic political style. This legacy weighed on Lanyon's 
ambitions and intentions, weakening any prospect of righting the wrongs of failed federation and 
Shepstone's botched administration. It seems therefore that policy had been pre-ordained and that 
Lan yon' sown particular brand of imperial hubris simply compounded the Transvaal's problems 
and his own. 
Hicks Beach in the Colonial Office 
In January 1878 Disraeli finally accepted one of several letters of resignation that Camarvon had 
submitted in the previous months and Sir Michael Hicks Beach was named almost immediately 
as his successor. A new secretary of state in the Colonial Office, a new puppeteer to pull the 
imperial strings in London, was bound to make a difference to the imperial agents, the puppets, 
in the colonies. Camarvon, who was enthusiastic about getting closely involved in colonial 
policy gave way to Hicks Beach, who was less passionate about confederation in South Africa 
and was content, both literally and figuratively, to keep his distance and let Frere dictate matters 
from Cape Town. Whereas Camarvon can be seen as a puppeteer using agents to further his 
confederation policy, the same can hardly be said of Hicks Beach. He was not trying to 
manipulate events; he appointed Lanyon in the Transvaal on the strength of his credentials as an 
administrator. 
107 Quoted in Hicks Beach, Life of Sir Michael Hicks Beach, Hicks Beach - Beaconsfield, 24 September 1878, 
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Hicks Beach met with Camarvon on 31 January 1878 to be briefed on colonial matters, including 
South African affairs. 108 The information he gleaned could hardly have been good news even if 
the new secretary of state had been aware that there was unrest in the subcontinent. There was 
a war going on in the eastern Cape Colony, to which, as has been shown, Lanyon had sent 
volunteer troops from the diamond fields to assist the redcoats. Shepstone, also with some 
assistance from Lanyon, was struggling against Sekhukhune in the Transvaal and trying, 
unsuccessfully, to contain trouble between the Boers and Cetshwayo's Zulu on their common 
border. Lanyon himself was busily putting down boundary unrest in the Keate Award territory, 
and within Griqualand West the Griqua rebellion was threatening to mushroom into serious 
trouble - which indeed occurred less than three months later. As Camarvon was bound to admit 
to Frere, and no doubt to Hicks Beach in their discussions, there were 'clouds gathering all round 
the horizon' .109 
Nor had Camarvon' s political ambitions for a South African confederation under the British flag 
borne much fruit. The acceptance of Griqualand West under Cape Colony rule had been 
obstructed at every tum by a suspicious Molteno and his parliament, and in February 1878,just 
as Hicks Beach assumed office, Frere had taken the controversial step of dismissing Molteno and 
placing John Gordon Sprigg at the head of the ministry, in the hope that the new prime minister 
would be more malleable.Natal settlers had been suspicious offederation until Gamet Wolseley, 
with his 'champagne and sherry' tactics, manoeuvred them into the constitutional position of 
having to conform with imperial policy. The Transvaal Boers, after nine months of British rule, 
were growing ever more insistent that they wanted their independence reinstated, and the Free 
Staters showed no sign whatsoever of being prepared to lose theirs. Not only did Hicks Beach 
inherit a parlous South African situation in 1878, he also inherited Camarvon' s federation policy 
- at the time somewhat becalmed - and Sir Bartle Frere, the high commissioner, the man who 
had been specifically appointed by Camarvon a year earlier to implement his grand design. Frere 
was absolutely determined to see it through. 
Camarvon's disappearance from the Colonial Office caused a hiccup in Britain's pursuance of 
108 PRO, Camarvon Papers, 30/6/11, Disraeli- Camarvon, 31January1878. 
109 Ibid, 30/6/34, Camarvon - Frere, 2 January 1878. 
157 
a federal policy in South Africa, and, by implication, was reflected in Lanyon's role as an 
imperial agent in Griqualand West and the Transvaal. Camarvon had been the motor of the 
scheme; he had initiated and pursued it with great vigour and passion, aided and abetted by his 
imperial agents at the periphery, one of whom was Lanyon. 11° Furthermore, Carnarvon was 
genuinely and personally interested in affairs in South Africa and was anxious to enhance his 
standing as an eminent statesman. 111 This same passionate level of involvement was not apparent 
in Hicks Beach, who had a reputation for being as brusque, sombre and reticent as Camarvon 
was outgoing, arrogant and publicity seeking. 112 Black Michael 'habitually thinks angrily' wrote 
a contemporary observer,113 while a more recent researcher describes him as 'difficult' and 
'probably the most demanding colonial secretary' of the mid-Victorian era. 114 But he had the 
advantage ofbeing on close and friendly terms with Disraeli, something that Camarvon had not 
enjoyed. 
When Camarvon left the Colonial Office, Hicks Beach realised that he would not be able to stop 
the confederation roller-coaster in South Africa - even if it was slowing down in 1878 -
particularly while Frere was orchestrating developments from Cape Town. But territorial 
expansion would henceforth be discouraged until such time as the new federal legislature was 
set up to take on the responsibilities involved. The whole point of confederation was not to 
govern from Britain, but to use local collaborators to do so. 115 Hicks Beach had no special 
knowledge or interest in South African affairs, although his daughter maintains that 'he looked 
to the gradual advancement of the policy of confederation' and had an earnest 'desire to press 
forward with the policy of confederation as a solution of many South African difficulties' .116 This 
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was, however, a new, cost-cutting version of Camarvon's expansive 'grand scheme'. Benyon 
maintains that Hicks Beach was 'cautious' about federation - which certainly neither Camarvon 
nor Frere were - and that with Camarvon gone the new secretary of state for the colonies left the 
initiative to Frere.117 The Colonial Office was 'growing weary of the mounting problems in South 
Africa and becoming increasingly inclined to avoid trouble rather than strive for federation'. 118 
The expensive and debilitating wars had to be stopped. And new wars were certainly not to be 
wantonly provoked. Camarvon's complicated plans had clearly run out of a great deal of their 
steam. 
In March 1878 Hicks Beach wrote his first letter to Frere and it appears that some ofhis thoughts 
on several key South African issues of the time were beginning to crystallise. 
I ... have been doing my best to make myself acquainted with my new work, and more especially with 
South African affairs ... I cannot however let another mail pass, without sending you a few lines to assure 
you of my earnest desire to give you all that support and co-operation in your difficult position which you 
have a right to expect ... and, as it may be of use to you to know the drift of my own thoughts ... I do so, 
really not to express a definite opinion, but to invite your criticism and get information ... The negotiations, 
through Bulwer, with Cetewayo, should be pushed on ... to obtain a peaceful solution. As to the disputed 
boundary itself, I mistrust the fairness of the Boer treaties; and one can hardly feel surprised that Cetewayo 
declines to accept Shepstone's settlement of the question, now that the latter hold his present position ... 
But we must take care not to increase Boer disaffection by appearing not to assert their just rights ... 119 
Several important points come to the fore here. Hicks Beach expresses his 'support and 
cooperation' for Frere, showing no sign of wanting to redirect Frere's policy from the outset. 
Realistically he could not but have had this attitude. Being new in his post and Frere being 
Camarvon's appointee, the federation expert on the imperial periphery, he chose-temporarily 
at least - to let Frere have his head. Hicks Beach wanted comment and criticism of his views so 
that he would be able to formulate his own opinions, but Frere virtually ignored the request. He 
had clearly decided his own opinions were what he planned to follow and wanted to avoid any 
possible interference from Hicks Beach. When he eventually replied to the secretary of state's 
call for comment, some six weeks later, he made only brief and passing comment to the trouble 
in the disputed territory. 
1!7 Benyon, Proconsul andparamountcy, p 152-153. 
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Hicks Beach had also been careful, again understandably, not to be too categorical. But his 
opinion on the continuance of the border negotiations through Bulwer - whose views on 
precipitating a war with Cetshwayo were diametrically opposed to Frere's120 - and that of 
discouraging a war with the Zulu, were opinions that Frere blatantly chose, once again, to ignore. 
Hicks Beach's 'peaceful solution' was not one that Frere was seeking. Given the delays of about 
a month each way for correspondence to go back and forth, between London and South Africa, 
and the cabinet's indifference to South African affairs, 121 Hicks Beach's invitation for comment 
upon his first impressions was relatively simple for the high commissioner to sidestep. 122 Even 
a telegram took no less than 16 days (via Madeira) and Frere could also use the excuse that he 
was heavily involved with other matters. 
In 1878, his first year of office, Hicks Beach also showed concern - more, it would seem than 
Frere - about the deteriorating situation in the Transvaal. Indeed by June he 'judged that in all 
the tangle of South African affairs, the most pressing need was for prompt attention to the 
practical requirements of the Transvaal' .123 Receiving the second deputation in July he explained 
to Frere that he had been firm in pointing out the 'impossibility' of the Transvaal regaining its 
independence, 124 but expressed the belief that Camarvon had been too wary in refusing to grant 
the Boers any representative institutions at all. 125 
I should like generally to give the people as much self-government as possible, consistently with such 
checks as would prevent their Parliament from passing a resolution declaring its independence, 126 
he wrote, and when Wolseley was sent to the Transvaal he had Hicks Beach's instructions, not 
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Frere's, to address this problem as one of his priorities. 127 It was also on Hicks Beach's 
suggestion, not Frere's, although he agreed to it, that Lanyon was appointed to try to rescue the 
Transvaal from the chaos into which it had sunk. 128 
Frere, Camarvon's chosen statesman, was not easy for Hicks Beach to control. And directing 
colonial policy from London, as has been shown, had its built-in difficulties, which Frere 
exploited to the full. The imperial string, in this case, was extremely slender. Camarvon and 
Frere were personal friends 129 and had similar temperaments. Frere became personally involved 
in promoting Camarvon's grand scheme; it became a mission to be pursued with every ploy 
possible. When Hicks Beach took over he was only 41 years old, by far Frere's junior. 
Furthermore the 63 year-old Frere had an impeccable reputation as an elder statesman and was 
blessed with a quick, independent mind. But on the other hand it is doubtful that the secretary 
of state allowed himself to be dominated. Hicks Beach was apparently 'an overbearing and 
forcibly-spoken man,' which does not suggest that he would have deferred to the urbane Frere's 
credentials for long, despite the fact that they were impressive. 
Hicks Beach's appointment clearly had important implications for Lanyon, who had a good 
working relationship with Frere. But Frere was clearly out of step with imperial injunctions, and 
this gave a colonial twist to Lanyon's policy making in the Transvaal. As will be seen, Lanyon 
had barely settled in Pretoria when several weeks later, in April 1879, Frere visited the Transvaal 
to hold discussions with the aggrieved Boers and to help Lanyon devise measures to improve the 
administration of the Transvaal. 130 But Frere's control over Lanyon and the Transvaal ended in 
mid 1879, and Wolseley, Lanyon's newly appointed superior, changed Lanyon's role -
temporarily at least - from that of an innovator to that of a civil official who kept the Transvaal 
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administrative machine running smoothly in Wolseley's slipstream. 131 
Isandlwana: the death knell for confederation 
If Camarvon's resignation and his replacement by Hicks Beach represented a hiccup in the 
confederation policy, Isandlwana was its death knell. Indeed, the surprise British defeat by the 
Zulu 'utterly transformed every feature of Confederation policy', 132 and more to the point for this 
thesis, it changed the Colonial Office's thinking about the Transvaal. Indeed, when he received 
the news oflsandlwana, Hicks Beach reacted almost immediately by having Robert Herbert draw 
up a memorandum on the question of whether or not there was a connection between the British 
annexation of the Transvaal in 1877 and the war with the Zulu. 133 Because of his relationship 
with Camarvon, Herbert was the one man in the Colonial Office most likely to support the 1877 
takeover. Hicks Beach promptly took Herbert's vindication of the annexation to Disraeli in an 
attempt to dispel the general feeling of concern in government circles. 134 Hicks Beach must 
surely have been resentful of having to make excuses to Disraeli for Camarvon's errors of 
judgement. Herbert's argument, which raked up all the time-worn excuses for the annexation, 
is singularly unconvincing, mainly because it included many half truths: 
The Transvaal Republic ... was on the point of being invaded by Cetewayo when (in 1877) Sir Theophilus 
Shepstone annexed the country. If that step had not been taken at that moment, the Transvaal must 
certainly have been overrun by the Zulus, and in all probability the white population ... would have been 
destroyed. It may be taken as incontrovertible that there was ... no possibility ofkeepin~ the Dutch republic 
on its legs at all ... the annexation was necessary and could not be at all postponed. 1 5 
Edward Fairfield, another influential, long-serving member of the Colonial Office staff, added 
his memorandum on the same issue the following month, and took a diametrically opposite view. 
He openly admitted that the annexation had been a mistake and advocated abandonment of the 
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Transvaal. 136 Herbert, who had valiantly tried to keep the federation flag flying, was ultimately 
forced to concede that 'it is a fairly open question whether the Trans Vaal should not after all be 
"retroceded'". 137 
It is clear that in the months that followed- until Kimberley took over his portfolio in April 1880 
-that Hicks Beach kept the possibility of withdrawal from the Transvaal in the forefront of his 
mind, although this was not publicly made known. 138 In fact his view was in marked contrast to 
the puffing words of imperial agents in the Transvaal, such as Wolseley who in December 1879 
maintained that the annexation 'cannot and never will be undone'. He was supremely confident 
- as Wolseley appeared to be about everything-that 'as long as the sun shines in the heavens' 
the Transvaal would 'for ever' be an 'integral part of HM dominions'. 139 
It is also significant that before January 1879, southern African policy had been formullated by 
the secretaries of state or their proconsuls in South Africa. Personal involvement and intentions 
thus played an important role and the prime minister and cabinet showed little interest in 
southern African affairs. In contrast, after Isandlwana, with Frere discredited, the British prime 
minister, and the cabinet took over a shared responsibility of policy making with the secretary 
of state. In other words, circumstances at the periphery, rather than the personal convictions of 
office bearers were the key to how the South African colonies should be ruled from 1879 
onwards. 140 
On 12 June 1879, about five months after Isandlwana, Hicks Beach made a last concession to 
his predecessor's confederation scheme. He went through the formalities of sending Frere a 
despatch on federation. If the Cape was ready to shoulder its responsibilities of 'cooperation and 
leadership' it was to be given the chance to do so. The federation that Britain now sought was 
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not of the expansive type that Camarvon had envisaged, but one designed to cut the: cost to 
Britain of her colonies in South Africa. But the Cape turned down the offer; understandably it 
did not want the responsibility for the current chaos. 'The great question of the union of the 
South African communities has been postponed for a time', said Frere, one of its last surviving 
proponents. He was the last one, however, not to realise that 'confederation was not postponed; 
it was dead' .141 It was officially ended when Sprigg withdrew a resolution to discuss thi~ matter 
in the Cape parliament in June 1880, and the newly formed Liberal government finally recalled 
Bartle Frere. 
From the moment of his arrival in the Transvaal, then, Lanyon found himself having to deal with 
a situation where, as a result of Isandlwana, imperial policy in the Transvaal became 
rudderless. 142 The enormous expense of the Anglo-Zulu War, in soldiers, money and prestige, 
was a bitter pill for Britain to swallow, and to make matters worse, events in other parts of the 
world were causing concern. It was seen as too risky to focus on South African issues. In sum, 
confederation was no longer a viable imperial policy. And the watershed year for confederation 
was 1879, not 1881. 
Hicks Beach wasted no time in adapting his policies away from the federal ideal and this will 
become evident in the chapters that follow. The appointment of Gamet Wolseley as high 
commissioner for South-East Africa was one such move. Frere was mortified that he was to be 
'reduced to simply Governor of the Cape Colony' ... 'The only explanation that suggests itself', 
he stormed, 'is that you wished to express either disapproval of what I have done in tht::~ past or 
distrust of what I may do in the future' .143 Unwittingly, or perhaps blinded by sheer bravado, he 
was probably correct on both counts. Even a querulous letter to Hicks Beach from Queen 
Victoria expressing her whole-hearted support for the wounded Frere, 144 made Black Michael 
more determined to press on with his plans. He assured the queen that with the war not yet over 
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it was inappropriate that Frere be 'placed in command of an army'; Wolseley was the man for 
the job. Nevertheless he 'very much regretted that in making this appointment, it was necessary 
to deprive Sir B. Frere of his powers as High Commissioner' .145 And that was that. 
Shortly after his arrival in the Transvaal, therefore, Lanyon found himself in a position where he 
was the man who would have to implement an un-clear post-Isandlwana British colonial policy 
in the Transvaal. He himself remained an avid Carnarvon and federation supporter, yet would 
have to make significant adaptations to his Griqualand West mind-set. If post-1879 confederation 
was to be a financially driven rather than an expansive policy as Carnarvon had envisaged it, then 
perhaps Lanyon, with his proven administrative and financial expertise, might prove to be the 
right choice in the Transvaal. But many challenges lay ahead, not the least of which were the 
'disaffected Boers' were now very aware of British vulnerability. Lanyon was also de:stined-
although he did not learn of this until some months later - to work closely with the m:w high 
commissioner for South-East Africa. Wolseley, as Lanyon was to discover, was not th~: easiest 
person to work with. And once again, as had happened in Griqualand West, Lanyon soon grew 
to hate everyone and was to be heartily disliked in return. 
Lanyon takes over in Pretoria 
Having arrived in Pietermaritzburg from Griqualand West on 25 January 1879, Owen Lanyon 
spent just over two weeks there before leaving for the Transvaal on 11 February to tak1e up his 
new appointment. In Natal, in the immediate aftermath of Isandlwana, there was general panic 
that the Zulu might follow up their victory and overrun the colony, thus living up to the 
dangerous and ferocious image which Frere and Shepstone had been at pains to construct of 
them. 'Everything is pretty well chaos here and elsewhere', Lanyon reported to his father, 'they 
[the Natal colonists] alternate between abject panic and a fools paradise, I have little patience 
with them ... I suppose the Colonists will find what they are pleased to call their heads, 
someday.' 146 
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Lanyon was also acutely aware of the damaging blow that the defeat had inflicted on British 
pride and on the future formulation of British policy in the sub-continent: 'The disaster will have 
a sad effect, I fear, all over South Africa, and where it will end, I know not; we certainly will 
have hard work to retrieve our prestige.' He anticipated that the recalcitrant attitude of the Boers 
in the Transvaal, about which he had been kept informed by means of regular correspondence 
with Shepstone, 147 might also have hardened. In this he was correct. In the weeks after 
Isandlwana, Shepstone had gone to Standerton in a vain attempt to persuade some of the local 
Boers to join a force to defend the eastern border. While away his secretary, Melmoth Osborn, 
had been under considerable stress in Pretoria. Rumours were rife that the Boers were planning 
to attack the capital and Osborn, who had neither the authority nor sufficient firearms to organise 
the defence of Pretoria, was told to talk his way out of the situation by assuring the British 
residents in the town that the rumours had no basis at all. 148 Lanyon, as yet in Pietermaritzburg, 
but making preparations to leave for the Transvaal, must have been concerned about the situation 
there, and wrote to sketch the scene for his father: 
Matters are in a critical state there for the Boers, taking advantage of the troubles on the Zulu border are 
making demands for their independence being restored to them, and threaten to take it by forc·e. I don't 
anticipate that they will do much more than talk but there are many troubles and much anxiety biefore one 
. th 14q 
m at country. 
It is significant that even before he arrived in the Transvaal, Lanyon was underestimating their 
determination to regain their independence. The only member of the Boer protest movement that 
he had met thus far was PJ (Piet) Joubert, one of their leaders, who had held discussions - at 
which Lanyon had been present - with Frere in Pietermaritzburg early in February.150 In his 
correspondence while he was still in Kimberley, Lanyon was already referring disparagingly to 
'that unwashed party [who] have things pretty much their own way' [at present] but the English 
element will before long stamp them out then we will have things pretty much our own way'. He 
was confident that he would be the one to bring them to heel. Apart from his reflections on the 
Boers' personal hygiene, which may or may not have been correct, time was to prove that he 
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could hardly have been more wrong in his other predictions. 151 
In order that his growing reputation as a military strategist could be put to good use immt~diately, 
Lanyon decided to travel to Pretoria via Utrecht - the town in the disputed region near the 
Zululand border - where he was planning to organise a defensive force against Zulu invasion. 152 
He then headed for Standerton, which he found to be 'an English little place', the best possible 
compliment in his eyes, yet where he was startled by the crowds of glowering Boers. In what was 
to become a typical attitude of bravado he shrugged off any danger they might present: 
... all round is the hotbed of Boers, and I believe they breathe out threats against me. If they wish to be 
nasty they have a fine opportunity, for I am travelling without any escort, but I have no fear of their gas, 
as I know the Boer character too well. Besides there is only a portion of the people anta~onistic to our rule 
and they are led on by a blatant lot who have little or no real interest in the Province. 53 
On what basis Lanyon thought he 'knew' the Transvaal Boers is not clear, because he had only 
just entered the Transvaal Colony. Perhaps Brand had discussed the Boer character with him, but 
Brand, an Afrikaner himself despite his British outlook and preparedness to cooperate with 
imperial officials, 154 would hardly have been as negative about them to Lanyon, or give:n him a 
blatantly wrong picture of their determination and courage. What is more likely is that 
Shepstone, whom Lanyon met for the first time in Standerton in mid February 1879, had begun 
his well-meant but misguided information sessions with his successor. As has been shown, 
Shepstone had very little sympathy with the Boers, and had not earned their confidence or 
goodwill, so he was hardly the best adviser Lanyon could have had in winning over the 
disgruntled Boers or even understanding why they were dissatisfied under British rule. 
Nonetheless, Lanyon found the 66 year-old Shepstone a 'charming old gentleman', and after 
consulting with him on the rigours awaiting him in Pretoria, seemed confident enough of success. 
'I have no doubt all will come right', he told his father, 'but the Transvaal will be an anxious 
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work for some time to come.' 155 
As far as the Boers were concerned, Lanyon arrived in Pretoria with a dubious reputation as an 
autocrat, although De Volksstem suggested that the new administrator should perhaps be given 
a fair chance to take the volkinto his confidence and prove that he could govern without stringent 
controls. Ifhe chose to take this path, it warned, he would surely alienate the people even further. 
A small crowd went out to give the new administrator a somewhat subdued welcome and JR Lys, 
the landdrost of Pretoria,156 delivered a welcoming address that made mention of the 'loss' of 
Lanyon's predecessor, a loss, De Volksstem was at pains to point out, that had not caused much 
griefin local circles.157 But if the Boer population was looking for a less draconian administrator, 
it was to be sorely disappointed. To his father Lanyon had been particularly blunt on his arrival 
in the Transvaal, expressing his satisfaction that in Pretoria he would be the head of a 'simple 
dictatorship'. He refused to be dragged down by politically illiterate Boers, people who, like 
children, should not be placed in a position they were unequipped to handle; they could not be 
expected to take informed decisions. 158 Although the Boers were probably not yet aware of 
Lan yon' s attitude about granting limited constitutional freedom to colonists, he had already made 
it clear in Griqualand West that as far as he was concerned governance of a British colony should 
be entrusted to unfettered colonial authority. 159 Here Lanyon clearly meant that he planned to 
interpret Colonial Office policy as stringent colonial authority - a convenient guise for his own 
authoritarianism. 
Lanyon was duly sworn in as administrator of the Transvaal Colony in Pretoria on 4 March 
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1879.160 His first letter home was a hasty note written a month later, explaining that he had been 
frantically busy dealing with all the necessary formalities. He found time only to comment on 
the Boer population about whom he made his customary unflattering comments. He told his 
father that they were 'semi-civilised wind-bags and require sorely to be pricked', and he sensed 
that they were in a 'goodly funk' about his arrival. 161 He was also busy making arrangements for 
Frere's impending visit- about which he had been informed while in Natal- and settling into 
Government House on the northwestern comer of Andries and Schoeman Streets. 162 Lanyon does 
not comment on what he thought of his new home or of Pretoria, but Wolseley did some months 
later in his diary: 
Govt. House here is a nice little place with a garden and an orchard around it. The rooms are very good 
& it has a comfortable air around it. Every house here has its garden & as the hedges are almost all of rose 
bushes, now in blossom the effect is very pleasant. 163 
In 1879 Pretoria was to all accounts a pleasing little town covering barely three square 
kilometres. It was home to about 4 000 people, of whom an estimated 2 250 were white, and was 
the capital of a sparsely populated Transvaal of some 814 930 inhabitants. The overwhelming 
majority, about 760 000 in total, were Africans. The local Pretoria press comprised De 
Volksstem, which appeared in both Dutch and English editions and had a circulation of about 
700, and an English language newspaper, The Transvaal Argus and Commercial Gazette. The 
Argus had a small circulation of about 300 in 1878, but its readership increased over the next 
few years as a steady trickle of people of British descent settled in the town and began to 
dominate the commercial sector of the district. 164 
Lan yon, who initially was military head of the Transvaal forces as well as administrator, lost no 
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time in improving the defence capability of Pretoria, prompted by the news, widely reported in 
De Volksstem, that the Boers were organising a meeting of the volk for 18 March 1879. Lan yon 
claimed that there were indications of the Boers' aggressive intent because they were gathering 
fully armed and were refusing entry to their camp to anyone who was 'not of their way of 
thinking'. Furthermore Lanyon made the allegation - one that he made repeatedly in the 
following months165 - that some of the Boers had tried to 'incite the natives, both friendly and 
neutral, to join them in this agitation against Her Majesty's rule'. He also claimed to have 
reliable information that the Boers were talking of the possibility of entering Pretoria in small 
parties during the night with the purpose of hoisting the republican flag. 166 With the help of JR 
Lys and the commander of the British forces in the Transvaal, Colonel Hugh Rowlands, Lanyon 
therefore organised that the government buildings on Church Square, the government stables and 
the gaol were equipped to fend off such an attack. He also appointed a number of spies and 
arranged for the formation of a local citizen force of 500 men for Pretoria's defence. 167 
The Boers were meanwhile making plans to hold a meeting to discuss the form their protest 
against the British annexation would take, particularly in the light of the fact that Frere was due 
to arrive in the Transvaal shortly to hold discussions with their leaders. The elected volkskomitee, 
the people's committee, under the chairmanship of MW Pretorius, had the initial task of 
reporting back to the people on the outcome of Joubert's meeting with Frere the previous month. 
The high commissioner had made it abundantly clear that at the coming discussions he would 
be prepared to discuss the granting of representative institutions and the issue of British help 
against the Zulu in the border area, but the question of the reinstatement of Boer independence 
was specifically excluded from the agenda. Britain was not, under any circumstances, going to 
return the Transvaal to the Boers and the sooner they accepted this, he said, the better for all 
165 
166 
167 
See for example TA, Administrator of the Transvaal Colony, (hereafter ATC)/5, Lan yon - Kimberley, 1 
February 1881. 
C 2367, enclosure 2, no 24, Lanyon- Frere, 13 April 1879, pp 58-59. 
PRO, C0291/2, Lanyon- Hicks Beach, 2 April 1879, and minute by Lanyon, 18 March 1879. Colonel 
William Bellairs subsequently took over from Lanyon as military leader of the Transvaal. 
170 
concerned. 168 
By 18 March 1879, despite heavy rains over the previous two days, a large crowd of Boers had 
arrived at Kleinfontein, a farm about 36 miles from Pretoria on the Heidelberg road. Estimates 
of the number of people who attended vary from 2 000 to as many as 5 000. 169 In his subsequent 
report to Frere, Lanyon claimed that this latter estimate was grossly exaggerated, and that in any 
case, intimidation had been used to force people to join the throng. 170 The question of regaining 
independence from Britain dominated the proceedings. With two failed deputations to Britain 
already behind them, the Boers had not budged one iota from their stance that the restoration of 
their independence had been, and still was, their priority. 171 
Frere, who was still making his way from Natal into the Transvaal, did not arrive in time for the 
Kleinfontein meeting, but Lanyon agreed to attend. However, he refused to join the throng of 
rank and file Boers, indicating instead that he was prepared to meet with some of their chosen 
delegates. 172 This meeting was held just off the Heidelberg Road, some 22 km from Pretoria, on 
24 March 1879. Lanyon was accompanied by his private secretary, CE Steele, and two 
interpreters who helped him with the intricacies of the Dutch language. The Boer pleas centred 
on the possibility of regaining independence and Lanyon, in the same vein as other British 
officials, was immovable on this issue. He pointed out that the Boers should surely no longer be 
in any doubt that Britain was there to stay. He then launched into the arguments which he 
repeated with monotonous regularity throughout his term of office in the Transvaal. The Boers 
had, according to him, proved hopelessly unequal to the challenges of self rule and it had 
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therefore been necessary for Britain to rescue them in 1877, to rescue them, indeed, from 
themselves and the Zulu. He then went on to outline the great advantages of British rule. 
Transvalers should, in a word, be grateful for what they had gained, rather than carping about 
what they had irretrievably lost through their own ineptitude. Kruger's attempts to fill Lanyon 
in on what the Boers felt were the true circumstances about the annexation fell on deaf ears. 173 
Lan yon' s assurances that Frere would be prepared to discuss the matter of introducing a liberal 
constitution when he met the Boers a few days later, did little to mollify the Boers. Joubert 
pointed out that this would not give them back their independence, nor would it address the fact 
that British annexation had been in flagrant violation of the terms of the Sand River Convention, 
a binding document granting the Boers independence, to which Britain had affixed her signature 
in 1852. The meeting ended with both sides claiming that the other had been misinformed, and 
Lanyon refusing to be drawn on whether Frere would be prepared to reopen the debate on 
independence in the impending discussion. He could merely confirm that the high commissioner 
was already on his way to the Transvaal from Natal and would be meeting them as soon as it 
could be arranged. 174 
This was hardly an auspicious start- less than three weeks into his term of office - to Lanyon's 
relations with the 'disaffected Boers', but on the other hand, the minutes taken during the 
meeting indicate that between the two parties there had been a frank and open discussion which 
had cleared the air. This was something which Shepstone, who had always held his cards 
notoriously close to his chest, had never deigned to do. Instead he had stubbornly insisted, 
despite all evidence to the contrary, that the Boer leaders did not represent the majority opinion 
among the settlers in the Transvaal, and that the 'people' were solidly behind British rule. 175 
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It could be argued that although Lanyon had barely had time to settle into Government House, 
he had seen the Boers for what they were: stubborn, uncomplicated people who nevertheless had 
passionately strong convictions and who could be mobilised by highly motivated, intelligent 
leaders. That he chose to close his eyes to the danger they presented in commitment to their 
ideals, was due to his own obdurateness rather than the cunning or concealment of their true 
colours by the Boer delegates. For their part, the Transvalers also had a reasonably accurate 
picture of what they were up against in the person of the new administrator. They probably 
recognised immediately that he was likely to be an unbending official in the mould of what De 
Kiewiet calls the 'military tradition of government', one who was likely to be both aggressive 
and peremptory.176 All these fears were to be realised as the months passed and Lanyon's 
administrative system took on a distinctively regimented appearance. The Boers were also well 
aware that he was a military man, fresh from Griqualand West, where he had successfully 
quashed the rebellious Griqua, who, like the Boers were well armed and accurate shots. The 
Boers were canny even if, as Lanyon was wont to point out, they were 'backward and 
uncouth' .177 And in the course of time Lanyon was to be proved mistaken in his belief that they 
were full ofbrag, but lacked the courage to act. 178 Moreover, the Boer leaders knew only too well 
that with the power of the imperial army to back up his opinionated words, Lan yon would be an 
extremely hard nut to crack. But they also knew that imperial troops moved very slowly, that 
British reinforcements took a long time to arrive, and that while an overwhelming number of 
imperial troops were virtually unstoppable in open terrain, if they could be lured between rocky 
outcrops, a comparatively small force of hidden sharpshooters could cause havoc in their ranks. 
Owen Lanyon and Bartle Frere in the Transvaal 
Owen Lanyon and the people of the Pretoria district awaited Frere's visit with great anticipation. 
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For months Frere had been indicating to Hicks Beach and to various Transvalers179 that he felt 
it was imperative that he go to the Transvaal. He wanted to assess the position there for himself 
in the wake of Shepstone's 'drifting do-nothing policy', about which he had been so mercilessly 
critical. 180 Brand had also urged Frere to consult the Boers before it was too late 'to stem the tide 
of discontent' and, in their correspondence, Frere had taken the opportunity to consult Brand 
about suitable representative organs that might be set up in the Transvaal. 181 Frere was among 
the few British officials in southern Africa who felt that serious trouble might be brewing in the 
region in early 1879, but his preoccupation with Zululand had made it impossible for him to enter 
discussions with the Boer leaders. He had also, of course, observed the 'intensity of the Boer 
feeling' against the border commission, and by mid February 1879, with Lan yon about to take 
over in Pretoria, he felt that the Boers had to be shown that 'we are masters of the situation' .182 
No doubt the very public censure he had to endure after Isandlwana was a bitter pill, but he had 
recovered his composure and still had no inkling of the humiliation ofWosleley's appointment. 
He was anxious to show the Boers that Britain still had southern African affairs under control; 
any thought that their chances of independence had been improved by developments in Zululand 
had to be discounted immediately. 183 
Frere's role as Carnarvon's 'great statesman' was obviously one that he was reluctant to shed, 
despite the fact that Carnarvon had left the Colonial Office and that hopes of confederation had 
been dwindling since January 1879. He therefore felt that it was imperative to undertake the 
journey to the Transvaal and that he 'assist Lanyon in his very difficult task ofkeeping the Boers 
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quiet' .184 He was in perfect agreement with Lanyon that an aggressive stance should be taken in 
the face of any show of opposition and was convinced that it would be 
a great disgrace to throw up the Transvaal because we cannot perform what we undertook when it was 
annexed, but it would be a still greater misfortune if we had to put down by force opposition which but 
for our apparent weakness would not be attempted. 185 
Having met with the Boers a few weeks earlier and given them some plain answers, Lanyon was 
concerned that they might adopt a threatening attitude towards the high commissioner, so he rode 
out towards Heidelberg on 10 April 1879 to meet Frere and guide him safely through the Boer 
camp. 186 He need not have worried. The Boer leaders had in the meanwhile sent Frere a courteous 
letter promising that the meeting would be 'quiet and dignified'. 187 The Erasmus farm, some six 
miles to the east of Pretoria, was chosen as the place for discussions and Lanyon and Frere 
travelled to Pretoria to prepare themselves for the meeting. 188 In a letter to his sister, Lanyon 
reported that 
He [Frere] passed through it and stopped for a short time; they [the Boers] were very sullen, but they were 
quiet. Tomorrow we will meet their representatives where they will receive the same reply as they got from 
me. After that it will remain to be seen what they will do. I don't think they will fiftht, though one can 
never be sure what a silly, ignorant lot of people as they are, may be led into doing. 89 
Frere had already decided that he was not going to give in to any pressure for independence, but 
he also had to take the 'gravity of the situation' into consideration. While on his journey through 
the rural districts of the Transvaal he claimed that many people had approached him to complain 
about intimidation to compel people to join the malcontents. Because the Colonial Office had 
refused the Boer requests to hold a plebiscite to prove the wide support they enjoyed, they were 
clearly hoping to impress upon Frere that the large majority of Transvaal whites were in favour 
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of rescinding the annexation, and would accept nothing less. 190 
Lanyon had arranged to have a tent pitched at the appointed site and the conference was held 
there on 12 April 1879. Frere and Lan yon were accompanied by a party of seven, and the Boers 
were represented by four of their most prominent leaders - MW Pretorius, M Viljoen, SJP 
Kruger and P J Joubert - as well as a group of 19 supporters. The polished Frere, who was a 
skilled speaker and a quick thinker, was well prepared and dominated the discussion completely, 
putting the Boers on the defensive and avoiding any discussion about British withdrawal from 
the Transvaal. 191 Apparently cowed by Frere's emphatic oratory, and his firm statement that in 
any case he had no authority to give them back their republic, the Boer delegates tried to argue 
their case, but Frere would have none of it. He insisted that he would only continue the 
conference if the discussion turned to the granting of acceptable representative institutions under 
British rule. Frere went so far as to promise the Boers 'as large a measure of self-government as 
was enjoyed by any Colony in South Africa', 192 but the leaders were apparently not interested 
in talk of such concessions. Instead they asked if Frere would be prepared to forward a petition 
on their behalf to the British government. He agreed to do so, but emphasised that he would 
under no circumstances add his personal recommendation to what he considered to be an 
unwarranted and futile request for independence. Frere, Lanyon and their party returned to 
Pretoria that same afternoon, leaving the Boers to discuss the compilation of the proposed 
petition and accompanying letter. 193 
At the 12 April 1879 discussions, Lanyon and the other British officials backed Frere's 
arguments wherever they could, and the minutes show that Lanyon had made an important 
contribution by way of comments and suggestions. Writing to Hicks Beach after the meeting, 
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Frere singled Lanyon out for the 'energy he has shown for putting Pretoria in a state of defence 
as well as his temper and judgement in dealing with these excited and misguided people'. 
Despite the fact, said Frere, that prior to Lanyon's arrival the government of the country was 
'virtually in abeyance' outside the capital, he was convinced that Lanyon would rectify the 
situation and that under his exemplary and 'vigorous rule, law would assert its authority' in the 
Transvaal. 194 Lanyon was proud and pleased with the compliments from the high commissioner 
and wrote to tell his father how well he had done and what an asset he was to the Colonial Office 
staff, even if they were tardy in realising it. 
Sir Bartle has reported home that I 'averted a civil war by my firmness and conciliation'. It is very kind 
of him to say so for he had as much to do with it as I; in about 8 months time possibly the C Office may 
acknowledge the despatch, though had there been a civil war there would have been no knowing where 
it would have stopped, and the ministry would have had a rough time of it.195 
On 16, 17 April and 23 April a small Boer delegation of six men held discussions at Government 
House on the format of the Boer petition that Frere had agreed to hand over to the British 
government. They also conferred with Frere on the contents of the accompanying letter- stating 
the Boer case - that Frere had undertaken to write to Sir Michael Hicks Beach. Again Lanyon 
was present, and a perusal of the minutes makes it clear that he asked some leading questions and 
made a meaningful contribution to the discussion. 196 To Frere's credit, the letter he wrote in 
fulfilment of his promise to the Boers, was a reasonable summary of the opinions of the 
volkskomitee. At no point did he pass judgement on their arguments. Furthermore, unlike Lan yon 
and Wolseley who were always free with their denigration of the Boers and their lack of 
credibility as civilised people, Frere referred to them as respected leaders, whose opinions were 
worthy of Hicks Beach's 'earnest consideration' .197 The non-judgemental tone of the letter, which 
was duly approved by the volkskomitee was an important reason why the Boer leaders were able 
to calm their followers and persuade them to disperse quietly. There must have been some 
concern about possible trouble because Lanyon was relieved at their orderly departure on 18 
194 Ibid, p 57. See also GRO, Hicks Beach Papers, Pcc/2/17, Frere - Hicks Beach, 25 April 1879. 
195 TA, A596, vol 14, Lanyon- Charles Lanyon, 25 April, 1879. 
196 For the minutes of these meetings, see C 2367, pp 146-149. 
197 Ibid, no 36, Frere - Hicks Beach, 17 April 1879, pp 83-84. 
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April, and wrote home to say that the crisis had been averted. 198 
Hicks Beach's assessment ofFrere's handling of the Boer agitation in April 1879 is perceptive. 
In a handwritten minute in the margin of Frere's letter, passed, as was the practice, to each of 
the senior Colonial Office staff, Hicks Beach made the following comments: 
Sir B.Frere has in this matter shown singular coolness and courage in a very trying position. And even if 
the result has merely been to gain time by referring the matter here again, that alone is a great gain. Any 
act of violence by the Boers at the present moment would probably have entailed very serious 
consequences, and at the best would have added immensely to the difficulties of a situation already 
ffi . 1 199 su 1c1ent y grave. 
In retrospect, had Lanyon been less blinded by crass prejudice some 18 months later he might 
have paused to learn from Frere on how to handle the Boers. The contrast between the Boers' 
attitude to Frere and that towards Lanyon is quite marked. The Boers clearly had far more respect 
for Frere than for the administrator. Perhaps Frere' s seniority, age, reputation and urbane manner 
had a great deal to do with this, but his handling of the Boers and his recognition of them as 
people who were entitled to respect, was also important.200 Lanyon was far less conciliatory; he 
had pre-judged them as worthless and uncivilised and stubborn without listening to what they 
had to say. Had he endeavoured to see the merits of another point of view, even while holding 
a diametrically opposite opinion, the explosive situation that developed in November and 
December 1880, particularly as there was a new government in power in Britain, might 
conceivably have been peaceably averted. In the event, the responsible imperial agent in the 
Transvaal could hardly have been a more disdainful and dismissive person. One of the most 
significant flaws in Owen Lanyon's character was becoming increasingly clear: his own point 
of view was the only one that mattered and to ask or accept advice, or to lean towards another 
opinion, was to show weakness and thus to become vulnerable. This made him blind to the 
hidden dangers of pent up resentment that had no avenue for acceptable expression. The paradox 
here is that Lanyon believed implicitly in imperialist control but translated it into colonial 
prerogative in policy making; indeed, he appeared to regard imperial and colonial control as one 
198 
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and the same thing. This had the effect of weakening imperial authority as relations with the 
Boers (and others before them) deteriorated. 
To return to April 1879. Frere remained in Pretoria with Lanyon until the end of the month. 
There were important constitutional and administrative issues to discuss, for both men agreed 
that the Transvalers deserved a better government than they had thus far enjoyed under British 
rule. Following their discussions, Frere drew up a report which embodied 'the measures which, 
in consultation with his Excellency Colonel Lanyon, have been devised during my stay in the 
Transvaal for the preservation of peace, and for the better administration of the territory'. The 
report was submitted to Hicks Beach in the form of a long letter, dated 6 May 1879. It comprised 
suggestions for a new constitution with representative organs, and also gave an outline of what 
Frere and Lanyon had decided about judicial administration, police and gaols, district councils, 
and the assessment and collection of taxes.201 
The proposals put forward for a new Transvaal constitution under British control indicate an 
intriguing combination of the ideas of each man. As has been shown, Lanyon was not in favour 
of representative bodies. He disliked the idea of being a puppet, of being manipulated by anyone, 
although he had been willing to further Camarvon's confederation scheme which embodied a 
policy that he endorsed. But in truth he preferred to keep rigid autocratic control, confident that 
this was the best way of getting things done effectively. But the far more experienced Frere must 
have prevailed upon Lanyon's better judgement; in April 1877 Shepstone had made promises 
to the Transvalers, and Britain had to make a gesture to deliver on these promises. The 
Transvalers should be given some form of limited self-rule with a view to their becoming part 
of a confederation. Frere was still hopeful, despite all indications that this was now a virtual 
impossibility, that confederation might yet come to pass. The suggestions the two men eventually 
made fell between two stools. They amounted to very little more than a gesture, and the so-called 
'dummy' legislature they recommended was destined, when eventually implemented, to become 
the cause of a great deal of criticism for the hapless Lanyon. 
201 African 193, 'Proposed measures for the future administration and preservation of the peace of the 
Transvaal', Frere- Hicks Beach, 6 May 1879, pp 1-10. 
179 
In his report Frere suggested that crown colony rule was the best option for the Transvaal and 
that an executive council should be formed comprising the administrator, the commander of the 
troops, the colonial secretary, the attorney general and the secretary of native affairs. This council 
should also have an additional three non-official members, 'to be selected by the 
administrator'. 202 Frere was, however, tentative about proceeding prematurely to a representative 
legislature. He and Lanyon were of the opinion that for the present it would be best to make use 
of a legislature comprising the executive council plus the chief justice and six members - who 
could be either official or non-official at the discretion of the administrator - to be selected, as 
were the additional members of the executive, by the administrator.203 
The reaction in the Colonial Office to Frere and Lanyon' s proposals for the 'future administration 
and preservation of the peace of the Transvaal' is interesting. Hicks Beach's conviction, 
expressed a year previously, that the Boers be granted as much self-government as possible,204 
had presumably been tempered in the aftermath of the British setback at Isandlwana. Lanyon 
could make no move to act on Frere's proposals until given the go ahead. When Frere's letter 
was circulated for comment in the first week of July 1879, news was breaking that Chelmsford 
had finally managed to get the better of the Zulu at Ulundi on 4 July, but matters in the region 
were obviously still in a state of confusion. Fairfield felt it best to delay any decision on a new-
look Transvaal administration until there was clarity on the settlement of the Zulu. Bramston 
provided another talking point - one that Lanyon subsequently acted upon - by suggesting that 
if several of the Boer leaders could be persuaded to serve, as non-official members, on the 
proposed executive council, this might be a useful tool to manipulate Boer resistance in the 
Transvaal. 205 
His work completed in the Transvaal, and with other regions to visit for similar consultations, 
202 
203 
204 
205 
Ibid, enclosure lin no 1, Minute by Frere, 15 April 1897, p 7. 
Ibid, Frere-Hicks Beach, 6 May 1879, pp 3-5; Ibid, enclosure lin no 1, Minute by Frere, 15 April 1897, 
pp 7-8. 
See above. 
PRO, CO 291/2, no 10661, Proposed measures for the administration and preservation of peace in the 
Transvaal, minute by Fairfield, 5 July 1879; minute by Bramston, 7 July 1879. 
180 
Frere had to move on. It was envisaged that Lanyon would accompany Frere to Kimberley, 
where the high commissioner would spend time conferring with Charles Warren, who had 
succeeded Lan yon as administrator of Griqualand West. Lan yon, who admitted to being 'awfully 
busy' with local matters, was then planning to hasten back to undertake what he felt was a 
necessary campaign against Sekhukhune. On 1 May 1879 Frere and Lanyon duly set off for 
Potchefstroom, the first stop on their journey, where they received an enthusiastic welcome from 
the local British residents. Almost immediately, however, Lanyon received word from 
Chelmsford that his services were required to organise border defences while the imperial troops 
advanced into Zululand, and Lanyon had to take his leave of Frere and return hurriedly to 
Pretoria. Once he had caught up with 'pressing matters', he told his father, he would go to 
Utrecht.206 
Frere's visit to the Transvaal and the discussions held on the Erasmus farm in April 1879 were 
something of a turning point in the relations between the British government and the Transvaal 
Boers. Not only had two Boer delegations to Britain failed to produce any favourable result; now 
the most senior representative of the British government in southern Africa had effectively ended 
all hope of a voluntary British hand-over of the Transvaal, and Frere's right-hand man during the 
proceedings, Owen Lanyon, who was the head of the Transvaal government in Pretoria, had done 
the same. The Boers must have been bitterly disappointed that they had reached such a low point 
in their campaign and Lan yon should perhaps have realised that if this setback did not bring their 
endeavours to a halt, nothing would. When resistance flared up again and the hydra grew several 
new heads such as a seditious campaign in the press and an organised drive against paying taxes, 
he should, in retrospect, have been alive to the possibility that armed revolt might be the next 
step. 
After Lanyon had left Griqualand West behind him and embarked upon his Transvaal career, it 
appears that his attitude towards subject peoples was hardening, and may well have been the root 
of his failed administrations in both these developing regions in the southern African interior. 
This is an issue that will now be scrutinised for the years that Lanyon spent in Pretoria. His utter 
failure to empathise with the Griqua or to understand their resistance to his authoritarianism was 
206 TA, A596, vol 14, Lanyon - Charles Lanyon, 25 April and 3 May 1879. 
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to have parallels in his attitude of disregard towards the Boers and his failure to realise the 
intensity of their developing nationalism. Furthermore, Lan yon' s progress- and lack of progress 
-is mirrored in that of British rule at the time. And Lanyon's hand is everywhere. The litany of 
imperial mistakes from the war in Griqualand West to Isandlwana to the Boer War that was about 
to erupt, did not bode well for Britain's position in South Africa. The prognosis for Lanyon in 
the Transvaal at the beginning of the 1880s was indeed no better than that for Britain in southern 
Africa. 
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CHAPTERV 
LANYON IN WOLSELEY'S SLIPSTREAM 
For the first of his two years in the Transvaal Lanyon was under close imperial control. At this 
time, more than any other during his years in South Africa, Lanyon must have felt like a puppet, 
powerless in the hands of his immediate superior, the high commissioner. Even while Frere 
retained his full brief over southern Africa, Lanyon probably felt irked by the fact that it was the 
high commissioner who was making the important decisions in the Transvaal. After being left 
largely to his own devices in Griqualand West, he now had to take second place. Frere, not 
Lanyon, had laid down the administrative priorities for the Transvaal, 1 and Lanyon had to wait 
for these to be sanctioned by the Colonial Office. As will be seen below, Lan yon was to feel even 
more powerless during the high commissionership of Sir Garnet Wolseley. Then too, quite apart 
from the stifling presence of the high commissioners, Lanyon was also subject to the dictates of 
the home government. In 1879 circumstances in the Transvaal were not conducive to great 
progress and Lanyon faced a difficult task. Shepstone's term of office had left Lanyon hamstrung 
not only by Boer anger and resentment but also by a lack of public funds, and crippling 
legislative restrictions which meant that he was only able to rule by proclamation. 
As for Lanyon's subjects, there was stout resistance from the Pedi who were struggling to retain 
their land in the face of colonial pressure. As long as the ownership ofland in the region where 
they lived was under question, Sekhukhune saw no necessity to pay taxes. He had resisted Boer 
imperialism for years and would not lightly give way to British inroads into his domain. The 
Boers were also reluctant to pay taxes to a government that they did not recognise, and were 
becoming more determined to regain their independence. They neither liked nor respected 
Lanyon, and he did nothing at all to appease them, believing that conciliation was a sign of 
weakness. Firm control was needed; this was the only way he knew how to rule. 
African 193, 'Proposed measures for the future administration and preservation of the peace of the 
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It is to Lanyon' s credit that under these difficult circumstances, and despite imperial supervision 
that was often restrictive, he was able to make modest progress in his first six months in Pretoria. 
However, it was not long before he had to adapt to another twist of fate. London saw fit to 
remove the disgraced Bartle Frere's control over the eastern regions of southern Africa, and to 
appoint Wolseley as high commissioner of South-East Africa and governor of Natal and the 
Transvaal. 
For Lanyon, Wolseley's appointment had important repercussions. It is the intrigues of colonial 
power - the politics of colonial authority in which the jockeying for position made Lanyon a 
lieutenant to Wolseley- that come to the fore in this chapter and the next. The imperial strings 
were very evident in the appointment of Wolseley, and Lanyon felt them keenly. The new high 
commissioner, not only outranked Lanyon by far, but the small general was a flamboyant person 
who loved the limelight. While he was in the Transvaal from the end of September 1879 until 
April 1880, he completely outshone Lanyon, who was not by nature outgoing or attention 
seeking. But this is not to say that Lanyon had no role to play while Wolseley was in Pretoria. 
Wolseley took all the credit for the more public imperial achievements in the Transvaal, but it 
was Lanyon who beavered away in the high commissioner's slipstream, keeping the 
administration going and putting colonial controls in place. In some cases Lanyon functioned in 
accordance with Wolseley's instructions, while in others, he showed his considerable skill as an 
innovator. 
Two examples will suffice here and others will become increasingly evident as these two 
chapters unfold. Firstly, it was Wolseley who arrived in the Transvaal with expansive promises 
of a new constitution for the Transvaal, but it was Lanyon who actually did the groundwork and 
set up the new legislative and executive bodies in March 1880. Secondly and perhaps the most 
striking evidence ofLanyon's contribution was that although Wolseley conquered Sekhukhune 
in a blaze of glory in November 1879, it was Lanyon- after Wolseley had left the Transvaal-
who implemented imperial controls over the polity in June 1880. He was the imperial official 
who subjugated the Pedi in line with the dictates of the rising new capitalist political economy. 
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The administrative challenge: getting started 
In the first six months in the Transvaal, from early March until September 1879, before Wolseley 
burst into Pretoria, Lanyon was able to make some progress in streamlining the shaky 
administrative system of the Transvaal. Frere had told Hicks Beach that the Transvalers were 
entitled to a 'strong, firm and well-established Government of some sort', and he was confident 
that Lanyon's 'firm yet conciliatory rule' would do the trick.2 Lanyon was to be guided by 
Frere's report. The highly autocratic character of the previous administration was the first matter 
Frere had indicated needed Lanyon's attention, but as sanction from the Colonial Office was 
needed for this, Lanyon began with reform in other areas. The judicial system, the question of 
police and gaols, the establishment of district councils and the overhaul of the entire system of 
tax assessment and collection of public revenue were singled out as his priorities.3 To these 
Lanyon applied himself with his customary vigour, just as Frere had predicted he would. 
More or less as he took over, Lanyon had a crisis on his hands in the form of a blow struck at the 
rule oflaw in the Transvaal by the chief justice, JG Kotze. Like Shepstone before him, Lanyon 
was faced with a dilemma when it came to the question of whether or not, as administrator, he 
was empowered to introduce new legislation in the Transvaal. The controversy had started two 
years earlier, in May 1877, no more than a few weeks after the annexation of the Transvaal. 
Kotze, the republican chief justice, continued in his office after the annexation. In May he ruled 
that Shepstone was not empowered to 'alter or abrogate existing laws', but only to issue 
proclamations of an administrative nature. Kotze maintained that although the Transvaal had 
come under British control, this had not been by 'conquest, occupancy or cession', and therefore 
Shepstone's proclamation of 12 April 1877 and the undertakings given in this proclamation were 
still binding. Shepstone had put it down in black and white, and signed it to boot, that as a 
colony, the Transvaal would remain a 'separate Government with its own laws and its own 
legislature'. He had also promised that the laws in force in the republic would be retained until 
altered by a 'competent legislative authority' .4 The law officers of the crown, when the matter 
was referred back to London, although expressing a somewhat different view, reluctantly agreed 
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that the administrator did not have full legislative power and that Shepstone's 'provision for the 
peace and good government of the Transvaal' would have to be done by way of proclamations. 5 
There the matter rested for two years until it surfaced again early in 1879. There was still no 
legislative assembly in the Transvaal, although there were plans for one, to be introduced later 
by Wolseley. To Lanyon's anger and frustration similar restrictions were placed on his authority 
by Kotze, now Lanyon's chief justice, when he gave his judgement in the case of White & 
Tucker v Rudolph, on 17 May 1879. The dispute arose when Lanyon, in compliance with a 
request from Colonel Evelyn Wood, the British commander of an imperial force in the Utrecht 
area, ordered the landdrost of Utrecht, GM Rudolph, to seize all the supplies of strong drink in 
the town because Wood felt that liquor was having a disruptive effect on the military 
preparedness ofhis soldiers. White and Tucker, who were the licensees, objected strenuously and 
took the matter to the high court, where the case was heard by Kotze on 14 May 1879. Using 
much the same argument he had given two years earlier, Kotze ruled on 17 May that neither Her 
Majesty in Council nor her officers in the Transvaal had any authority to legislate or enforce 
instructions that were binding in the region. 6 This decision was most unfortunate for Lan yon, 
coming as it did right at the beginning of his rule, because it cast a shadow of illegality over 
every move he made. It opened a chink in his armour for his antagonists, and put him on the 
defensive rather than on his favoured firm, confident front foot. 7 Inevitably, De Volksstem seized 
upon Lan yon' s questionable authority to legislate. The newspaper made much of the fact that the 
British government had apparently been acting illegally in the Transvaal for more than two 
years.8 The obvious corollary then arose: was the government authorised to tax the Boers? 
Lan yon could do no more than retain his customary bravado and resign himself to the fact that 
like Shepstone, he had to rule by way of proclamations until an elective legislative assembly of 
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Transvalers was constituted. 
No sooner had this particular constitutional crisis passed than word came through to Lanyon 
from Hicks Beach at the end of May 1879 that Garnet Wolseley had been appointed 'to take chief 
command of the military forces in South Africa, and at the same time to hold th~ chief civil 
authority in the Transvaal and in Natal, and to discharge the duties of High Commissioner in the 
adjacent territories' .9 
There had been a great deal of debate in the Colonial Office and British governmental circles 
generally, in the aftermath of the January 1879 defeat of the British at Isandlwana. As has been 
shown, ignominious defeat at the hands of the Zulu was a turning point in British colonial policy 
in southern Africa, 10 but as Benyon so graphically puts it, although 'the fatal cancer that 
Isandlwana had implanted in the vitals of confederation was of slow growth', 11 some emergency 
measures had to be taken to make sure it did not die too publicly. 
The first and most obvious method of damage control was to find someone to blame, and here 
Frere, who had so ardently pursued the removal of the 'Zulu obstacle' in order to further 
federation, was the prime target. The obvious failure of British policy in the Transvaal and the 
growing danger of a Boer revolt12 was arguably one of the major reasons why Frere had 
instigated a war with the Zulu in the face of the very explicit wishes of the home government. 13 
Despite his vast experience and lofty reputation, Frere had been blinded by his passionate belief 
in the grand design and his policy, 'for all its dynamism, was no more than Carnarvon's policy 
pricked :from a canter to a gallop by the presence in South Africa of a man who combined the 
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authority to initiate with the capacity to execute'. 14 Frere had convinced himself that when the 
Zulu were defeated and Zululand was safely annexed, a federation of southern African states 
would fall neatly into place. Despite Hicks Beach's frantic efforts to curb Frere's relentless 
pursuance of a Zulu war, Frere had gone ahead anyway. As the secretary of state explained in a 
letter to Disraeli, 'I have impressed this view on Sir B. Frere ... to the best of my power, but I 
cannot really control him without a telegraph- (I don't know that I could, with one) ... ' .15 Frere 
had simply decided that he was not going to be stopped, and the unexpected Zulu attack at 
Isandlwana rocked the British presence in southern Africa back on its heels. 
Disraeli's cabinet was under great pressure to salvage its position. The British government had 
been quick to point out that there was no blame at its door: it had sent out all the troops that had 
been requested. Frere became the obvious scapegoat. In both the Lords and the Commons, there 
was acrimonious comment and much debate, and Hicks Beach was hard pressed to defend the 
highly unauthorised action Frere had taken in South Africa. 16 And the always outspoken British 
press was relentless in its criticism. In Natal, however, the urbane high commissioner recovered 
his composure remarkably quickly and sent in a calm request for more regiments; it was just a 
matter of time, he said, before the Zulu would bow to imperial Britain. But Frere could not pass 
off this grave error so easily, for all his smooth protestations of the absolute rectitude of his 
actions. Due to the intercession of Hicks Beach, who had to go to great lengths to extol Frere's 
great success elsewhere, and apparently even had to call on all his influence with Disraeli, Frere 
was not immediately recalled. 17 Instead he was virtually sidelined by the appointment, on 23 May 
1879 of the 46 year-old Sir Garnet Wolseley as high commissioner for South-East Africa. 18 
In making this decision, Disraeli had effectively removed the authority of both Frere and 
Chelmsford. Once Wolseley arrived in Pietermaritzburg, Frere's powers would be restricted to 
14 Goodfellow, Great Britain and South African corifederation, p 166. 
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Cape affairs and Chlelmsford was outranked by the 'super general', the opinionated, outspoken 
Wolseley, who could be relied upon to get things done in a hurry. His reputation 'to gallop 
through everything as ifhe were God Almighty,' 19 was well known. He had little time for Bartle 
Frere, whom he frequently referred to in his personal letters to his wife Louisa,20 and in his diary, 
as 'Bottle Beer' .21 Wolseley was apparently indifferent to Frere's humiliation in South Africa 
after May 1879. Indeed it appears that he might even have enjoyed it. Until Frere specifically 
asked for information on the settlement of the Zulu and the situation in the Transvaal, Wolseley 
gave him none, and when he did write to Frere his tone was not one of respect to a distinguished 
colleague, although these letters were signed off 'very truly yours'.22 In his diary Wolseley 
recorded: 
I sometimes think that Frere is going off his head: at least he has certainly begun to write silly despatches, 
and my position here in complete independence of him seems to have soured his temper & to make him 
fretful like an injured old maid. I fancy the Govt. will have to recall him sooner or later, the sooner the 
better if they don't want to run any more risks of expensive wars.23 
That Wolseley was such an abrasive go-getter served to rub even more salt in the wounds of the 
dignified Frere, who wrote privately to Hicks Beach to protest. He felt injured at the slur the new 
appointment had cast on his good name, and considered that the whole issue could have been 
handled with more sensitivity. His position had, in effect, been reduced to that of governor of the 
Cape Colony' .24 
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In Zululand, meanwhile, Lord Chelmsford was left to grind away at his task of subduing the Zulu 
by force of imperial arms and finally at Ulundi in July 1879, he was able to defeat the Zulu 
conclusively and thus save his tarnished image. Wolseley, to his great irritation, arrived just too 
late to claim any credit for Chems ford's imperial victory; Wolseley' sown piece of military glory 
in southern Africa had to wait until later in 1879 when he orchestrated a British victory over 
Sekhukhune's Pedi in the Transvaal. But before moving north to join Lanyon in Pretoria, 
Wolseley was charged with engineering the post-war Zulu settlement. Zululand was not to be 
annexed after all, which was a sure sign that Frere's opinion no longer held much credibility in 
Whitehall or the Colonial Office, and that British policy was losing its momentum in South 
Africa. Indeed, from a British point of view, 'the settlement of Zululand was an act of scuttle', 
and Hicks Beach had made it perfectly clear to Wolseley that expansion in the region was no 
longer on the British agenda.25 
Lanyon was not at all pleased by the news that Wolseley was soon due to arrive in the Transvaal 
in a temporary capacity26 to straighten out matters on behalf of the Colonial Office. He was fully 
confident that he needed no help and was handling his brief in the Transvaal very competently. 27 
Lanyon was one ofFrere's staunch admirers, although Wolseley's statements that Lanyon was 
'completely under Frere's thumb' and that he was 'completely spell bound by him',28 were 
probably somewhat exaggerated, as were many of the statements Wolseley habitually made. 
Certainly Lanyon expressed his great dismay to his father at the news that Frere was to be 
sidelined and Wolseley was to take over as high commissioner for South-East Africa. Lanyon 
was in Sekhukhuneland when the news came through, but in his letters home, once he returned 
25 
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28 
De Kiewiet, The imperial factor, pp 246-247. 
Wolseley was determined that he would only be in the Transvaal for a few months and would leave for 
home by the end of 1879. Despite frequent complaints that he had finished his work and wanted to return 
to England, Hicks Beach kept him in the Transvaal until April 1880; Hove, Wolseley Papers, SA 1, 
Wolseley-Hicks Beach, 3September1879; WP 8/24 i Wolseley-Louisa Wolseley, 11September1879; 
WP 9/1 ii, Wolseley- Louisa Wolseley, 2 January 1880. 
TA, A596, vol 14, Lanyon- Charles Lanyon, 16 May 1879. 
Preston, The South African journal of Sir Garnet Wolseley, pp 130, 201. Wolseley also claims that there 
was a rumour that Lanyon was engaged to Frere's daughter; there is no evidence that this was true. Had 
there been any substance to this piece of gossip, some mention would surely have been made of the 
relationship in Lanyon's letters to his father. 
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to Pretoria, he accused Wolseley of'throwing stones all round since he came out without in the 
least knowing where they would fall or having any cause for their being hurled' .29 'Things are 
not going pleasantly with us here', he wrote, 
The ministry has made a grand mistake, they have turned out two excellent and experienced men [in Frere 
and Chelmsford] and have substituted one who knows nothing of the position, and who further was wholly 
untried as a politician. They have also put up the backs of the Colonists, and effectively spoked the wheel 
of confederation.30 
In marked contrast, Lanyon was full of praise for Frere, whom he felt had been 'set upon by Sir 
M H-B in a very unfair way,'31 Lanyon was full of praise: 
... he is one of the most able and conscientious men I have ever met. He has more statesmanship and ability 
in his little finger than his successor has in his whole body, and I think I can setup as being a judge having 
served under both. 32 
Not only did Lanyon criticise Wolseley for the early implementation of his new brief in South 
Africa, he also cast aspersions on what he saw as the general's unscrupulous publicity-seeking 
tactics. Lanyon alleged that Wolseley had manipulated the press through the appointment of his 
personal staff as correspondents of leading British newspapers. St Leger Herbert, who was 
Wolseley's private secretary, and Captain Biggs were writing for the Times, while Captain F 
Maurice was on the Daily News, Colonel Henry Brackenbury on the Standard and another of 
Wolseley's cronies, WH Russell, was writing for the Daily Telegraph. Lanyon remarked sourly 
that he had no doubt that 'they will make him [Wolseley] out the most successful general ever 
made, in the hopes that they may get a lift up by holding on to his coat-tails'.33 To say that 
Lanyon was bitter about Wolseley's appointment is putting it mildly. To someone as anxious to 
collect 'kudos' as Lanyon was, it is ironic that he could complain so bitterly that 
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I very much fear that there is too much grasping after kudos and too great a desire to reap the credit of 
everything in South Africa in the actions of the present regime, and consequently everything likely to 
result in kudos is reserved for the carrying out of the one great man. 34 
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As Wolseley, rather than Frere, was to be Lanyon's new guiding hand, Lanyon was not to 
implement any of the changes outlined by Frere, particularly those of a constitutional nature, 
until Wolseley arrived. For the rest Lan yon could follow the general directions Frere had plotted 
for the Transvaal and wait for Wolseley's input.35 Wolseley had been asked to proceed to the 
Transvaal as soon as it was convenient for him to do so, to provide this guidance for Lanyon. 
Hicks Beach was also very careful not to ruffle Lanyon's feathers- or indeed those of Bulwer 
in Natal either36 - and had told both men that Wolseley' s temporary appointment to settle matters 
in Zululand and the adjacent territories in no way indicated a lack of confidence on the part of 
the Colonial Office in the excellent work the two men were doing in their respective posts. 
While waiting for Wolseley's arrival, Lanyon undertook important preparatory work. He 
conducted a census to establish the population of each district and appointed more landdrosts for 
better control.37 These officials acted as magistrates to enforce the law and also dealt with local 
administrative matters. The existing republican system of landdrosts had been retained by 
Shepstone, with many of the Dutch incumbents keeping their posts, a tradition Lanyon decided 
to keep in place. He also took steps to promote education in the Transvaal and by September 
1879 the number of state schools had been increased substantially.38 
To ensure that the annexation promise to accord equal status to the Dutch language was met, 
Lanyon sent out a circular to establish the language proficiency of his staff. His investigation 
revealed that of the 88 officials, 21 were British, 21 were Hollanders and 21 were Cape colonials. 
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Frere had provided detailed instructions on the form of the proposed executive and legislative councils in 
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There were also six officials from Natal,39 nine Transvalers and ten Germans. Only 14 had no 
Dutch at all, and most had been placed where proficiency in Dutch was unnecessary.40 JA Vorster 
claims that Lanyon's statistics do not tell the whole story, and that there is evidence that in the 
treasury department and the supreme court the business of the day was conducted entirely in 
English. To the irritation of the Boers the landdrosts issued receipts in English, and only in the 
case of the surveyor general's department was Dutch used more or less exclusively.41 Lanyon 
himself was not conversant in Dutch, although in one of his letters to his father he writes that 
'owing to the number of Dutch speaking people, officials must know that language, and I am 
myselfleaming it, for I find it is essential'.42 
The majority of landdrosts, including those appointed by Lanyon, were local Dutch-speaking 
Transvalers. The efficient and orderly collection of taxes was the responsibility of the landdrosts 
in each district, a duty that proved particularly onerous since many of them sympathised with the 
Boer cause and with the growing Boer habit of making non-payment of tax a means of 
expressing dissatisfaction towards the government.43 Lanyon decided therefore that absolute 
loyalty of everyone on the government payroll, including those in the districts, was imperative. 
Shepstone had initiated the idea of civil servants taking an oath of allegiance but had not pursued 
it effectively. Now under Lanyon, officials were summarily informed that if they had not yet 
done so they were required to take the oath,44 the argument being that they would then be unable 
to participate in the Boer protest movement. Had Lanyon been more sensitive to human nature 
he would have realised that to be forced to take such an oath detracted from its very significance, 
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These statistics appear to contradict the claim that Shepstone had appointed many Natalians on his 
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and was bound to arouse vehement opposition. Demanding a compulsory oath was an indication 
of weak rather than strong administration, and the measure was greeted with scorn by the man 
on the street. There were a number of Boer officials who refused to comply and handed in their 
resignations. Piet Joubert, who was a justice of the peace and had been appointed by the 
republican government refused to resign but also declined to take the oath. He maintained that 
he had taken an oath of allegiance to a government that still, according to Kotze, had legal 
standing.45 It is significant that Lanyon did not dismiss Joubert or try to make a test case of the 
issue. Joubert and the Boer leaders must have seen this as a minor victory. 
Policing necessarily became one of the pillars ofLanyon's administration, precisely because his 
whole regime rested on the strict enforcement of controls. His governance became an endless 
round of putting down Boer sedition and forcing them to pay taxes and arrears; in effect it 
gradually evolved into a fiscal and police despotism, making Lanyon increasingly unpopular. 
Frere had suggested that a police force under government control, rather than the one in use, 
which was based on informal 'burgher responsibility', should be introduced without delay.46 
However, no such force was ever raised, and presumably Lanyon had to use the military when 
the law had to be enforced.47 In a letter to Hicks Beach, written as he approached Pretoria, 
Wolseley also stressed the dire necessity of an effective police force, but bemoaned the fact that 
'at present we have not the money to support a police force even if we had the necessary legal 
power to create it' .48 It appears that this was yet another aspect ofLanyon's early administration 
that was hamstrung by his lack of constitutional authority to legislate, and perhaps more 
importantly, by lack of money. 
45 
46 
47 
48 
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While in Griqualand West Lanyon had gained the reputation ofbeing capable of pulling a colony 
out of the red and balancing revenue and expenditure. Indeed his sound financial management 
was one of the reasons why Hicks Beach had decided to give him the Transvaal post.49 Early in 
March 1879 the British treasury was still reeling from the huge cost of the Anglo-Zulu War and 
the large bill for the Griqualand West Rebellion had raised eyebrows in Whitehall too.50 The 
whole question of finance was thus a very sensitive issue in the Colonial Office. When Lanyon 
arrived in the Transvaal he found that his available staff knew little about even the most 
rudimentary accounting principles such as preparing the estimates. He set to work to improve 
matters,51 but it was going to be a slow process.52 Nevertheless, due to the 'establishment of a 
more secure form of government and an improved system of collection and supervision,' the 
revenue of £82 319 in 1878 was increased to £93 408 in 1879 without a hike in taxation.53 After 
a year he was proud to report a surplus in revenue over expenditure of nearly £6 000,54 writing 
home that 'so satisfactory a statement of affairs as has been brought within the last 12 months 
... though I say it, who oughtn't, I may crow over the past 12 months work ... '. 55 
Lanyon soon discovered that there was 'considerable laxity' in the collection of various forms 
of taxation. 56 The system previously used was very irregular and there was no proper assessment 
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of tax; those who paid their dues did so more or less voluntarily, while those who refused usually 
managed to get away without paying.57 Moreover, the 10 shilling hut tax Africans were obliged 
to pay was not collected efficiently either, and Sekhukhune's dissatisfaction over settler land 
claims in what he considered to be Pedi territory was making his subjects increasingly reluctant 
to part with any tax.58 Lanyon decided that it was necessary to establish a new post, that of a 
revenue commissioner, whose brief would be 'to inquire and report on the mode of assessing, 
collecting and bringing to account all existing sources of revenue',59 and he appointed CES 
Steele to the position. 60 Steele subsequently became Lan yon' s close adviser on matters financial, 
and Steele and WB Morcom, the attorney general, who was also one of Lanyon's close 
confidants, became almost as unpopular among Transvalers as Lanyon. All three were the butt 
of merciless criticism at the hands of the local press, particularly De Volksstem and its editor, JF 
Celliers.61 
The militarist in Lanyon was not long in coming to the fore, and he wasted no time in setting up 
small garrisons in the main Transvaal towns to keep the peace and quell any African or Boer 
unrest that might arise. Taking his cue from Shepstone and Frere, Lanyon anticipated that his 
military expertise would soon be called into play against the Pedi polity and on the Transvaal 
border with Zululand. In the latter region, matters were still in a state of flux as Chelmsford's 
imperial troops struggled to overcome the Zulu. As far as the Pedi under Sekhukhune were 
concerned, Lanyon's determination to keep the peace soon saw 'the embers ofresistance fanned 
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into the flame of open revolt'. 62 The Transvaal needed revenue and Lanyon was determined to 
collect it, but the state's claim to much of the territory in the north east, land occupied by the 
Pedi, was questionable, and Sekhukhune argued that if the state's legitimacy was rejected, its 
right to collect tax also fell away. The Pedi had been under pressure from settler land 
encroachment for years and festering conflict between white farmers and the Pedi was more or 
less endemic. Typically, Lanyon did not flinch from enforcing old republican claims to land or 
from taking aggressive action if he met with any Pedi recalcitrance, but he did appear to be 
disturbed by the fact that Africans were not permitted to own land under republican law. He 
pointed out that: 
The law that natives cannot hold land is repugnant to the letters patent and British law generally. The 
sooner it is done away with the better. The question is, what can be done to alter this? Can a proclamation 
affect a law that is in existence? If so it would be well to take steps at once to do so. I should be obliged 
by the Attorney-General advising on it. 63 
Until such time as a legally constituted legislative assembly was set up in the Transvaal, there 
was nothing Lan yon could do to change an existing republican law, and despite the establishment 
of the legislative assembly, British rule was ended before the question of African landownership 
could be brought before it. 64 
Delius sees the larger picture on the fortunes of the Pedi in the 1870s. He maintains that land 
rights in this region of the Transvaal provided one of the most significant bases for the emergent 
capitalist order by facilitating the accumulation of land by Transvaal-based individuals and 
companies, as well as those operating from the other British colonies in South Africa and from 
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London. If'the shaky foundations of this pattern of property holding' were exposed or allowed 
to fall prey to the assertion of Pedi land rights, not only would the authority of Lanyon's state 
be prejudiced, but in a wider context colonial and imperial interests could be undermined and 
evenjeopardised.65 Then too, the prevailing climate of economic transformation did not only 
lead to the loss ofland claims; throughout southern Africa it also undermined and subsequently 
broke down the authority of African leaders, yet another step towards the loss of independence 
and subjugation of all the African societies under colonial rule before the end of the century. 
Lanyon's campaigns in Griqualand West had initiated the imperial onslaught against the Griqua 
and the Tlhaping in 1878. In the case of the Zulu, Frere and Shepstone had together engineered 
the process of conquest, and once Chelmsford had succeeded, Wolseley was to 'settle' Zululand 
and the Zulu before moving up to the Transvaal. In Pretoria, Shepstone - and Lanyon after him 
- mistakenly thought that Sekhukhune' s Pedi would be relatively easy to bring under the control 
of the Transvaal state, particularly once the Zulu (in Shepstone and Frere's minds the alleged 
leaders of the plot against white rule), had been defeated. But it was not until late in 1879, when 
Wolseley arrived and was backed by imperial troops and a large contingent of Swazi,66 that 
Sekhukhune was captured and his polity forced into submission. 
In the early months of his new post Lanyon found that the Pedi were not, however, going to be 
an easy nut to crack. Sekhukhune's people had been subjected to almost continuous warfare for 
years and this had taken its toll. Their agricultural production was down and there was a shortage 
of grain. Furthermore there was internal disunity in their ranks and some groups had moved off 
under new leaders.67 Nevertheless, Lanyon was aware that Sekhukhune was still a force to be 
reckoned with, and he began laying plans for a campaign against the Pedi headquarters. 68 He re-
manned the forts in the region with his customary thoroughness and patrols were resumed to 
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stamp out any sign of alleged Pedi resistance to and non-compliance with Transvaal law. Lanyon 
was gratified that his efforts were apparently having the desired effect and that there appeared 
to be 'a changed attitude' not only among the Pedi but also among Africans under Mapoch and 
other communities in the vicinity.69 
Early in May 1879, once Lanyon had escorted Frere out of the Transvaal, he decided that he 
should improve the military preparedness of the state on both the south eastern and the north 
eastern borders. He planned to go first to Utrecht to organise a special peace-keeping corps to 
assist Wood on the Zululand border before beginning his drive against the Pedi.70 Before leaving 
for Utrecht Lanyon held an interview with the Boer leader, MW Pretorius, and scored what he 
felt was a moral victory when the Boer leader agreed to raise a volunteer force of 500 Boers who 
would operate as a peace-keeping border force. Lanyon felt that this represented a breakthrough 
in his relations with the Boers,71 but his satisfaction was short-lived because Pretorius 
subsequently changed his mind and withdrew his undertaking in the face of pressure from his 
fellow Boers and criticism of his apparent collaboration with Lanyon.72 
Towards the end of May 1879 Lan yon was back from Utrecht. While there, Chelmsford- who 
was the commander-in-chief of the imperial troops in southern Africa-had asked him to take 
on the responsibilities of commander of the Transvaal forces as well as his administrative 
duties.73 Pleased with this mark of confidence, Lanyon was keen to begin his campaign against 
Sekhukhune but had to wait for reinforcements that Chelmsford had promised to send him. 74 The 
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Pedi leader, said Lanyon, 
has been a thorn in the side of our northern border for the last three years and ... is becoming stronger and 
more aggressive every day ... we must begin operations at once ... Sikukuni's [sic] country is deadly to 
horses save during the four winter months, so we must begin on 1st June. 75 
He anticipated that this expedition against the Pedi would be 'much the same as I had all last 
year' in which case his experience would be useful. He had also been actively involved in raising 
'a tidy little force' including some Africans, and was warming to the idea of being involved in 
another military campaign. He predicted happily that in his new post it was beginning to look 
as ifhe might well be 'more of a military administrator than ever', 76 but this was a hope that was 
dashed in mid June when he heard that Wolseley had been appointed to take over supreme 
control of both the military and civil affairs of the colony.77 Lanyon, however, had the bit 
between his teeth and did not let the news interfere with his planned attack on Sekhukhune. 
While he waited for the promised reinforcements, he sent out a number of patrols to take cattle 
and harass some of the small Pedi settlements. As far as Lanyon was concerned, these patrols 
were just beginning to achieve some success, when to his great irritation, he received a telegram 
from Wolseley ordering him to stop all operations against the Pedi. Wolseley told Lanyon in no 
uncertain terms: 
I do not approve of the present very extensive weekly expenditure. Please check and restrict it in all 
possible ways, and do not embark on any new plans entailing large outlay of public money. Desire 
paymaster to report at once, in writing, the payments he has already made, giving all possible details to 
objects of expenditure, and report to me fully, yourself, on the subject. In future you will please take orders 
only from me. 78 
The tone of the instruction was perhaps unfortunate, even in a telegram, and it harped on two 
areas where Lanyon felt that he was on particularly safe ground - his reputation as a penny-
pinching civil administrator and his competence as a military commander with recent success in 
Griqualand West, and one who furthermore had just been asked by Lord Chelmsford to take over 
military command of the Transvaal forces. To Hicks Beach, not Lanyon, Wolseley admitted that 
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he was concerned lest Lanyon's force was too weak to take the Pedi stronghold. For British 
troops to be repulsed again by an African polity would be nothing short of disastrous and 
Wolseley did not want to take the risk of denting his own pride, as high commissioner for the 
region, or that of imperial Britain. 79 
Lanyon was furious. 80 He protested to Wolseley that the expense involved in his drive against 
the Pedi was not high when the cost of everything in the Transvaal was taken into account. 
Moreover, all expenses had been scrupulously authorised and horses, which were expensive, 
were a vital part of any attack on Sekhukhune's fortress. Lanyon justified each item of 
expenditure meticulously, giving all the details that had been requested, but he was clearly 
irritated by what he saw as undue intervention by Wolseley in the governance of the Transvaal, 
which he felt he had under efficient and scrupulous control. He made the point that both Frere 
and Shepstone had concurred that Sekhukhune's 'aggressive attitude' towards 'existing 
authority' urgently needed to be checked. After all, he concluded, once the Pedi were subdued, 
'a very large revenue may be expected from native taxes ... our revenue would thereby be 
doubled'. 81 
In his letters home in mid 1879 Lanyon had nothing but criticism for Wolseley. He berated him 
for 'upsetting everything', for not contacting Lan yon immediate! yon his arrival in Natal, and for 
putting him in the position that he could neither deal with the Africans who were 'daily 
becoming more aggressive' nor discipline the Boers who were now 'more open in their 
opposition to Govt'. 82 He also claimed, with some justification, that Wolseley knew little about 
the conditions in the north-eastern Transvaal, and he even hinted to his father that he suspected 
Wolseley wanted to save the glory of defeating the Pedi for himself- which, on the face of it was 
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probably not far from the truth. 83 Of the 'new order' being implemented by the home government 
he wrote despairingly: 'Anything more stupid or ill-advised than their action could not well be 
imagined.' 84 
Nevertheless, Lan yon had his orders and he was obliged to follow them. For the best part of six 
months he was indeed reduced to little more than a puppet controlled by the irrepressible Sir 
Garnet Wolseley. Before assessing how Lanyon and Wolseley fared in the Transvaal for the 
remaining months until April 1880, when Wolseley went home - and there was a change in 
government in Britain and a new secretary of state for the colonies took over - it is necessary to 
examine the relationship that had developed between Lanyon and the discontented Boers. 
Lanyon had proved himself to be a capable administrator, but administrative skills were by no 
means all that were required of him. Coming to terms with stubborn republicans, who had little 
respect for or goodwill towards officious imperial agents, was not Lanyon's strong suit. 
'Lang Jan' and the disaffected Boers 
In mid 1879 while Lanyon was setting the Transvaal administration on a better footing, the Boers 
were impatiently awaiting the British reaction to their petition of April 1879 to Queen Victoria. 
The Volkskomitee had also taken the opportunity to put out feelers in the Cape, Natal and the 
Free State to see what support they had for their quest for independence. In the Free State this 
tentative enquiry had caused ripples of discontent because Brand favoured a neutral stance and 
his volksraad wanted to be more supportive of their kin in the Transvaal.85 There were also 
indications of strong support in Cape Afrikaner circles which later took the form of a petition to 
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the queen indicating sympathy with the Boer cause. 86 Generally speaking, there was a lull in 
organised Boer resistance against the government after the Kleinfontein meeting, in expectation 
of the outcome of the petition of April 1879. 
Lanyon's administrative drive in the Transvaal was closely linked to his relations with hardline 
Transvalers, not least because his efforts to put the Transvaal's budget back on track involved 
extacting taxes from tight-fisted Boers.87 But it was more than this. The very virtues of the new 
administration, its efficiency and penny-pinching made it unpopular, and the way Lanyon 
imposed the new measures conspired to make him hated. His reaction was to hate back and to 
tighten controls. Within five months of starting his new post he complained- in his now familiar 
vein - to his father: 'I am sick of the place, for it has ever been the grave of reputation and 
honesty'. 88 It is also true that unpopularity makes reconciliation harder and tends to breed 
autocracy. Throughout his career in South Africa, Lanyon was averse to and critical of 'others' 
on the imperial periphery, be they Boers or Africans.89 It was a racist attitude, but it was not 
specifically anti-Afrikaner or anti-black. Rather, it was an extraordinary preconceived dislike of 
anything and anybody that was un-British. 
It was not long before Lanyon's surname was slurred by Dutch-speaking tongues into the 
nickname 'Lang Jan',90 meaning 'Tall John'. Somehow, too, although it is not clear how this 
originated, the rumour was spread-in a community where to be 'coloured', or anything other 
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than white, was to be oflower class, uncivilised and of questionable worth - that Owen Lanyon 
had 'mixed blood'. Wolseley, soon to become Lanyon's fellow imperial agent in the Transvaal, 
linked Lanyon's unpopularity and his 'vindictive' personality in a typically outspoken statement 
about the administrator as he left Pretoria after working with Lang Jan for six months. He wrote 
in his diary: 
It is curious how very unpopular Lanyon is here: his character is to be personally vindictive and the 
tendency of his mind is to view everything from a personal standpoint. He will never be a good Govr. in 
my opinion although he is a very good fellow & by no means wanting in brains. I cannot help thinking that 
his vindictiveness comes from the taint of black blood which he evidently has had the misfortune to 
inherit.91 
Some light is cast upon the origin of this rumour in the work of another of Lanyon's 
contemporaries, Bellairs, who was appointed commander of the troops in the Transvaal in 18 80. 92 
He quotes an excerpt from an article called 'The Boers at Home' in Blackwood's Magazine of 
December 1881: 
Sir Owen Lanyon who followed Sir Theophilus Shepstone, proved a most unfortunate selection; exactly 
the man to rub up the Boers the wrong way, and that with no wish on his part, but with the desire to do all 
that he could forthem compatible with his duty. To begin with he was a soldier; and to a Boer a rooi batjee 
[sic] is the incarnation of all that it bad in the English Government. He belonged to a West India regiment, 
and the cleverer Boers were not slow in finding out that these are black regiments. To associate or have 
anything to do with blacks, except to make them work or sjambook [sic] them if they don't work hard, is 
an unpardonable crime in a Boer's eyes. Worse than all, the Governor [sic] was a man of swarthy 
complexion, and they at once started the idea that he was of black descent himself; carrying their hatred 
of the race to such a height, that I am told that one day a Boer said to him to his face that he would not be 
ruled by a black man. Of course the idea was utterly false, the Governor (sic) being as pure-bred an 
Irishman as any other; but it was spread about, notwithstanding, and did much harm to him and his 
93 government. 
On the face of it, the rumour that Lanyon was of mixed descent was without foundation; he was 
an Irishman with Celtic blood.94 Nor is the fact that he was of swarthy complexion apparent in 
the available photographs of him. Lanyon certainly looks melancholy and reserved and none of 
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the photographs shows the least hint of a smile, but more than that he is as inscrutable as are the 
available documents about his real nature. His letters to his father, and several references to his 
wife, whom he married the year after his return to England,95 do show a more human side to his 
character, but while in the Transvaal he showed little, if any, of this to the Transvalers. 
Nevertheless, it is very clear that there was mutual dislike and animosity between Lanyon and 
the Boers for the entire duration of his career in the Transvaal, and this does not at any stage 
appear to have tempered in the very least. While it is probably true to say that at this time British 
officials were generally unpopular with Boers and vice versa, the degree of animosity in the case 
of Lan yon and the Transvaal Boers was intense. While the Boers were spreading rumours about 
him of the worst kind they could conceive of, he in turn was calling them 'cowards', 'semi-
civilised windbags' and 'pusillanimous toads' ... from first to last.96 Bellairs was very critical of 
Lan yon' s administrative style and his alleged poor decisions on troop reduction in the Transvaal 
in late 1880. 97 He claims that Lan yon made absolutely no concessions in his 'high-handed system 
of government, nor did he make any apparent effort to conciliate the Boer people or their 
leaders.98 
In addition, Lan yon questioned the sincerity and motives of the Boer malcontents. He maintained 
that there was only 'a frail cordon of agitators and place seekers' and that in most cases the Boer 
rank and file were distrustful of one another and were far from united: 'Were the annexation 
cancelled', he said, 'these men would at once drop the common cause in order to secure 
individual advancement, and a general scramble for power would ensue which would be 
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disastrous. ' 99 According to Van Zyl, Lan yon grossly underestimated the unity and resolve of the 
Boer protest movement in 1879 .100 It was an underestimation that would subsequently cost 
Lanyon dearly in 1881. 
In June 1879 when Lan yon was himself under strain because he had just heard that Wolseley was 
arriving soon to lord it over him, he decided that it was time to show the Boers that he was not 
cowed by their opposition. He had heard that a meeting had been held in the first week of June 
on a farm near Potchefstroom and that some of those present had suggested an 'appeal to arms' 
if the reply to their petition was unfavourable. Anticipating that there might be trouble, Lanyon 
drafted a strongly worded proclamation designed to 'curb the evil disposed and to strengthen the 
well-inclined', threatening to take concerted action against any further show of seditious 
behaviour. 101 He sent the draft proclamation to Frere for approval. Although Frere approved the 
proclamation, his supercession by Wolseley meant that it was sent to the new governor for 
approval. Wolseley promptly vetoed the idea, 102 quite conceivably because Frere had agreed to 
it. He felt, quite rightly, that Lanyon's proposal was far too confrontational, and pointed out that 
the administrator did not have enough troops to back up his threats. Although Wolseley 
thereupon organised to send reinforcements to Pretoria, soldiers who could be spared now that 
the Zulu had been defeated, he told Lanyon to drop his ambitious plans to hold the Boers in 
check. He was to do nothing at all until Wolseley arrived in Pretoria. 103 
Again Lanyon had been hamstrung by Wolseley, and again he resented what he saw as undue 
intervention 104 by someone whom he alleged knew very little about the prevailing circumstances 
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in the Transvaal. 'Experience and local knowledge go for little now,' he complained to his 
father. 105 To add insult to injury a new commanding officer was appointed for the Transvaal 
troops. Wolseley explained that as he could now spare a regular officer, a new appointment 
would relieve Lanyon of his onerous military duties and leave him free to concentrate on his civil 
responsibilities. Lanyon claimed that as the man Wolseley was planning to send up to the 
Transvaal, Lieutenant Colonel Harrison, was from an engineering section of the British army, 
he would have 
no experience whatsoever in commanding in this sort of work. However I suppose one must bow to higher 
authority, but I can only say that there is not a soldier in S. Africa who is not disgusted at the work which 
is now going on, save the 'brilliant staff' which came out at the eleventh hour and out of whose way 
everyone else is quietly elbowed in order to make room for them. For of such is the present regime. 106 
Despite Wolseley's rejection of Lanyon's idea of a proclamation, Lanyon persisted. He sent 
another despatch in the same vein to Wolseley on 16 August 1879, giving the high commissioner 
the news of another Boer meeting that was to be held near Heidelberg on 24 September. Lan yon 
reiterated that some 'decided steps' should be taken by the government at once. He claimed that 
it would be 'highly prejudicial to the peace and tranquillity of the Transvaal were another 
meeting of this sort to be assembled' .107 Because ofLanyon' s insistence, Wolseley gave reluctant 
approval to the idea, but then drafted his own shorter and less detailed version of a 'more 
suitable' proclamation. He also pointed out that the reinforcements he had organised should reach 
Pretoria soon, and hopefully this would be' sufficient to overawe the disaffected party' .108 Within 
a month Wolseley arrived in the Transvaal and Lanyon felt it unnecessary to publish Wolseley's 
draft version of the proclamation. He felt irritated that the high commissioner saw fit to tamper 
with his proposed draft, and he might well have decided to hold it back when the Boer meeting 
did not prove to be of major import. 109 
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While Lanyon was having to deal with the situation at the periphery, Hicks Beach was pondering 
how best to react to the Boer petition Frere had submitted to him. Although the feeling in the 
Colonial Office, and indeed public opinion, was now markedly non-expansionist, Hicks Beach 
thought it best that Britain retain the Transvaal. He was, however, by no means convinced of 
what line he should take. And he certainly did not want to be pushed to keep the colony by force 
of arms. In a private letter to Frere, written at the end of May 1879 - by which time Hicks Beach 
had studied the petition and Frere had had time to digest the devastating news that Wolseley was 
on his way to South Africa - Hicks Beach explained: 
For every reason we should keep the Transvaal if possible. But we could not keep it by force of bayonets 
against the wish of a large majority of the population. Public opinion here would probably not sanction 
such a policy at all, and would certainly not pay the cost it would entail. 110 
He went on to make the very valid point that neither Frere nor Lanyon had provided any 
evidence of' any opposite feeling in any part of the country'. If the malcontented Boers did not 
represent the majority opinion among the Transvalers then why had this other point of view not 
yet manifested itself? And why had Lanyon not provided the secretary of state with any 
substantial proof of this opposite feeling? Revealingly, Hicks Beach asked: 'Is it because people 
don't believe we shall give the country up? If so, it is really time they should bestir themselves.' 
It is interesting that Wolseley, who in his forthright manner was the first to admit that Boer 
opposition to British control in the Transvaal did, in fact, represent the majority view. And being 
Wolseley he repeated it several times, increasing the emphasis on each occasion. 111 Shepstone, 
Frere and Lanyon had all consistently avowed that the malcontents were no more than a lunatic 
fringe. 
But at the end of May 1879, when Hicks Beach had to react to the Boer petition, he had not yet 
had the benefit of Wolseley's new insight. Nevertheless Hicks Beach comes across as almost 
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inclined to allow the Boers their right to independence; he may perhaps have seen this as 
inevitable. He decided to try to win them over by introducing representative governmental 
organs. Encouraged by Frere's report ofhis recent Transvaal visit, 112 Hicks Beach went a long 
way further towards considering retrocession of the Transvaal than Frere, Wolseley or Lanyon 
ever did. 113 He foresaw that in the Transvaal the newly elected legislative assembly, 
. .. as soon as it met, would very likely proceed to discuss, and perhaps to pass, resolutions for 
'independence', on the passing of which resolutions they might perhaps be dissolved and an appeal on the 
point thus made to the country. All this would take time, and keep people quiet: our friends would see they 
must move if they want to keep us: and thus matters might be ultimately brought right. 114 
With this at the back of his mind, Hicks Beach planned to send his reply to the Boer petition 
along with an outline of his proposed new constitutional reforms based on Frere's original 
proposals. Wolseley could then announce that specific details, once approved, were on their 
way. 115 Hopefully this would keep trouble at bay. Wolseley was told to make an announcement 
of these plans an urgent priority once he arrived in the Transvaal. If nothing else, setting up a 
legislative assembly in which a number of the troublesome Boers would presumably serve, 
would take time. 116 And time, he hoped, might bring some relief of the tension that Lanyon had 
told him was building up with renewed vigour. 
In the end, however, no official, written response to their petition was ever sent to the Boers. 
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Hicks Beach wanted to make sure that the result of the Anglo-Zulu War was afait accornpli 
before sending the Boers a definite answer; success in Zululand would free troops for possible 
trouble in the Transvaal. 117 It was therefore not until Wolseley arrived in Pretoria, gave the Boers 
his own strongly worded statements that Britain would never, under any circumstances, reverse 
the annexation, and promised them that some constitutional reform was on the way, that Hicks 
Beach's message finally filtered down to the Volkskornitee. 118 Once more the Boers were 
disappointed and once more they resolved to renew their efforts to regain their independence. 
Enter Wolseley with a flourish: the conquest of the Pedi polity 
As Wolseley travelled to Pretoria where Lanyon awaited his arrival, the general made loud 
statements to the press, the Boers, and anyone else who was prepared to listen, that Britain would 
never, under any circumstances, withdraw from the Transvaal. 119 The annexation, he said, 'cannot 
and never will be undone' and 'as long as the sun shines in the heavens' the Transvaal would 'for 
ever be an integral part of HM' s dominions'. 120 He was a particularly outspoken ultra-imperialist, 
and it is interesting that as such he did not reflect the prevailing attitude to the South African 
situation in the Colonial Office or that of Hicks Beach in mid 1879. As has been shown, the 
feeling in London was far more subdued and there was already talk of a more conciliatory 
approach, reducing the government's commitments, and even of withdrawal. 121 The British 
government, in other words, was not whole-heartedly behind Wolseley's appointment, and it is 
a measure of its uncertainty at the time, as De Kiewiet has remarked, 'that to so unconvinced a 
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policy it gave so decisive an agent' 122• The more bombastic, outspoken and energetic Wolseley' s 
actions became in the Transvaal, the more tentative and nervous was the support of the Colonial 
Office. 
Wolseley entered the Transvaal through Zululand on 7 September 1879 with a large force of 
imperial troops, 123 and arrived outside the Transvaal capital on 27 September 1879. He was met 
by Lanyon and the Pretoria Horse, and escorted into the town, where there was an impressive 
guard of honour and all the appropriate pomp and ceremony. According to Wolseley there was 
a big crowd to witness his arrival and he took the opportunity to tell the gathering 'what I had 
generally told everyone else since I entered the Transvaal' - that Britain had no intention 
whatsoever of reversing the annexation. 124 
In his correspondence while on his journey through the Transvaal, Wolseley was already 
complaining of having to deal with the 'half civilised Dutchmen'- a reference to an interview 
on 19 September with Joubert whom he found to be 'an unrelenting hater of the British' - in an 
attempt to smooth the 'ruffled dignity of these stupid and illiterate Boers'. 125 Like many imperial 
agents in southern Africa in the 1870s, including Lanyon, Wolseley had little regard for the 
Boers. He considered them a 'cowardly lot' and found them difficult to reason with, precisely 
because they were not inclined to be bullied into agreeing with his point of view. As Wolseley 
arrived he was sent a letter from the Volkskomitee reiterating its continued protest against the 
annexation and asking whether or not there was any reply to their petition from the queen. 126 
Wolseley claimed to be the bearer of the queen's reply, which was that the annexation would 
never be annulled. To do so, he pronounced, would assuredly lead to anarchy and civil war in 
the Transvaal, but he had good news for them about a new constitution. But they were 
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unenthusiastic about the prospect of representative organs under British control. 127 'I have done 
all in my power to be gracious', he wrote, 'but there is no arguing with them ... They have all the 
bad qualities of the Zulu without his noble traits. It is much easier to deal with a clever knave 
than an illiterate Boer.' 128 It seems that Lanyon and Wolseley, like many imperial officials at the 
time, had similar sentiments about the Boers. But Lanyon was less outspoken about his feelings, 
except perhaps to his father. 
Wolseley's was not interested in maintaining of the status quo or in slow progress of the kind 
that Lan yon was empowered to make. He very soon found Lan yon too tardy: 'Lan yon is a slow 
coach' he wrote in his diary 'and I cannot work him up to quick action.' 129 He wanted to achieve 
his goals as quickly as possible before returning to Britain in a blaze of glory to more important 
matters, namely the furtherance of his career in the top echelons of the military establishment. 130 
Wolseley meanwhile moved into the 'little bunk' which Lanyon had rented for him in 
picturesque Pretoria. 'In front of it are two fine lilac trees about 20 feet high now one mass of 
blossom,' he wrote in his diary, 'this is certainly a very pretty town; in no part of the world have 
I ever seen such a profusion of roses; every hedge here is one mass of flower.' 131 
Within two days of his arrival Wolseley issued a proclamation to the effect that the Transvaal 
was to remain part of Her Majesty's dominions in South Africa, come what may. 132 In a second 
proclamation - despite the fact that he had not yet received full details of the new representative 
organs that had been approved for the Transvaal, he announced that in the near future an 
executive council comprising five official members and three non-official members would be 
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set up, and a new legislative assembly would then follow .133 Because Wolseley embarked in mid 
October on a protracted campaign against the Pedi, from which he only returned early in 
December 1879, the promise of a new constitution was clearly a holding tactic to parade in front 
of the Boers. The executive and legislative organs, when they were eventually set up by Lan yon 
the following year, became the object of much scorn from the Transvalers because they were 
decidedly illiberal bodies. 
One ofWolseley's main objectives - and here he would have had the full support ofLanyon-
was to make the situation in the Transvaal more conducive to the collection of taxes. Within a 
week of taking over in Pretoria he announced to Hicks Beach that he was 'setting to work at 
overhauling the financial position here' by first collecting all the dues from the whites before 
turning to 'collecting taxes from the natives' .134 Wolseley's plans thus implied, firstly, calming 
the Boers with the introduction of a new constitution, so that they would become obedient 
taxpayers. Secondly, taxes and acceptance of British sovereignty had to be enforced on the Pedi, 
because as far as the other Africans communities in the Transvaal were concerned, 'none will pay 
as long as Sikukuni [sic] is allowed to go untaxed'. 135 This would not only almost double the 
revenue in the state coffers, but would also comply with the larger plans for the region, namely 
that it should serve as a base for the emergent capitalist order in southern Africa and encourage 
the accumulation of land by Transvaal-based individuals and companies, as well as those 
operating from other British colonies and from London. 136 With this in mind, the ongoing 
recalcitrance on the part of the Pedi - in imperial terms, their vehement resistance to British 
supremacy- had to be brought to a swift and satisfactory close. Wolseley believed he was just 
the man to do it and this could have been a reason for his insistence that Lanyon refrain from 
marching against the Pedi. After all, when it came to the routine matters, the actual 
implementation of British control, the mundane issues that Wolseley found too boring, he had 
the services of Lan yon, who could be relied upon to put the necessary measures in place. It was 
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this fine-tuning of colonial policy that became Lanyon's task; it was also the task that ensured 
British expansion. 
Lanyon was also expected to be closely involved in Wolseley's endeavours, but certainly only 
in a subordinate role. While Wolseley was in Pretoria, Lanyon was certainly his puppet. At the 
root ofWolseley' s rather patronising disdain ofLanyon was the administrator's esteem for Frere, 
whom Wolseley disliked intensely. Lanyon was not senior enough, or indeed enough of a public 
figure to detract from Wolseley's image as a brilliant soldier and diplomat. In Wolseley's eyes 
Lanyon was a pleasant, if ordinary and rather slow young imperial official, who was useful 
enough to do the work in Wolseley's slipstream. Needless to say, he felt that the administrator 
was too much in the Frere mould, being bent on having a war at every tum, rather than 
concentrating on 'ways and means' of collecting revenue and settling the community down 
happily under British control. 137 In his diary Wolseley recorded: 'I am afraid that Lanyon is 
severely bitten with Frere's madness for wars: he is always referring to various disturbances on 
his frontiers in a manner that makes me feel he would like to march a military force to the 
locality to put it down.' 138 Such wars as Frere and Lanyon were inclined to wage, Wolseley 
complained, were expensive and brought with them 'a sad reaction', because 'trade is checked, 
almost paralysed for the time being'. Presumably he also had Lanyon's May-June 1879 
expedition against the Pedi in mind here, the one Wolseley had nipped in the bud.139 
In early October Boer unrest broke out in Middelburg. They seized ammunition from the local 
stores and Lanyon had to hasten there with some troops to take matters in hand. Although there 
were a number of other issues underlying the outbreak, 140 Lanyon blamed it on the home 
government's ill-conceived 'new order' and Wolseley's lack of experience in the Transvaal. He 
grumbled, not without some justification, that once the high commissioner had left, 
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I am the poor devil who will have to reap a crop of blunders which I have neither sown nor helped to sow 
... I am not happy about the future of the territory, nor is anyone else who knows what is being done- and 
I was so hopeful before. What is the use of working like a slave when one is ignored and experience put 
on one side. I am angry; if an angry shot be fired by the Boers it will be the outcome of blundering policy 
at home. 141 
Wolseley meanwhile left Pretoria in mid October and after a show of military strength in 
Middelburg to remind the Boers that imperial troops were not to be trifled with, he moved on to 
the north east to persuade Sekhukhune and his Pedi people to accept British sovereignty. With 
some justification, in the light ofWolseley's criticism ofLanyon's warmongering and the order 
which had ended Lanyon's military endeavours so abruptly in May, Lanyon was bitter that the 
high commissioner was setting off on a similar expedition. 'Sir Garnet has gone to Sikukuni's 
with a force of 2 000 whites', he wrote, 
and he has incurred ten times the expense for which he wigged me. He is beginning to see that it would 
have been better had he been a trifle more careful in his orders and less precipitate in his jumping at a 
conclusion about matters of which he was totally ignorant. 142 
In the hope that the recent British defeat of the Zulu had inspired enough fear in Sekhukhune for 
the Pedi chief to accept peace terms, Wolseley sent Captain M Clarke, the native commissioner 
for the Lydenburg district, to consult with Sekhukhune on 10 October 1879. The terms offered 
were that Sekhukhune accept British sovereignty and the payment of tax, and that he henceforth 
take responsibility for peace in the areas under his control -those areas the government had ruled 
were indeed his. Furthermore he was liable for a fine of 2 500 head of cattle and had to allow the 
government to set up military posts in his territory. 143 Lan yon played no part in these negotiations 
with the Pedi. On Wolseley's instructions he remained in Pretoria to monitor the Boer protest 
movement and keep the administration running smoothly. 
Smith and Delius both make the point that the British government's right to exert their rule over 
the Pedi in the first place, is open to argument. 144 The matter was debated in the Colonial Office 
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and Fairfield minuted that 'Our title to sovereignty ... is very weak, and has been discredited by 
ourselves.' However, he quickly justified Wolseley's proposed attack by pointing out that 
Sekhukhune had been guilty of 'mischief for years and that Britain therefore had the 'moral 
right' to insist on the acceptance of sovereignty and the payment of taxes. Hicks Beach concurred 
that this was the best line of argument. 145 Wolseley added his comment that one could not, after 
all, settle such matters using the usual civilised methods of adjustment as far as Africans were 
concerned. He felt that instead, the issue would have to be dealt with 'by the confirmation of the 
ascendancy of the stronger and the subjection of the weaker' .146 The ongoing difficulties in the 
north east, he said, were not of Britain's making. They had been 'inherited from the Boers in 
annexing the territory and should be settled by a war, provided we come well out of it, as I have 
every confidence we shall' .147 To his wife, Wolseley admitted that ifSekhukhune did not accept 
the terms that he had been offered, 'I must do something to annoy him' .148 
There is no evidence either in Lanyon or Wolseley's correspondence that Lanyon was consulted 
in 1879 for advice about how best to negotiate with Sekhukhune or what action, if any, should 
be taken against the Pedi. This despite the fact that Lanyon had been administering the 
Lydenburg region, liaising with the Pedi chieftains and carrying out raids in the Steelpoort area 
for six months before Wolseley arrived in the Transvaal. Under the circumstances, it is not 
surprising that Lanyon felt injured that the domineering little general was taking all the credit for 
the consolidation of British supremacy in the Transvaal in 1879. 
To Frere, whom Wolseley had ironically seen fit to criticise for being too fond of wars - as 
indeed he was - Wolseley gave what must rank among the most callous and yet most revealing 
summaries of the November 1879 British campaign against the Pedi: 
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wanted to fight so I am forced by this savage to enter the lists against him. I have however the satisfaction 
of knowing that the war is none of my creating and that I have done all that any Governor could do to avert 
it. As he has defied me I hope to read him a lesson he is never likely to forget and one that may have a 
lasting effect on the native mind in these regions. All the natives both within and without the Transvaal 
borders are now anxiously watching events here, and on the manner in which Sikukuni is disp.osed of, will 
very much depend our future success or want of success in dealing with native questions.1 9 
The evidence suggests that although Sekhukhune called a pitso to discuss the peace terms Clarke 
delivered, the Pedi chiefs political power was under threat by 1879. He was in no position to go 
against the majority opinion among his people, which was to resist the British demands, and he 
was eventually obliged to tum down the terms offered. 150 Over the next weeks Wolseley was 
based at Fort Weeber and corresponded infrequently with Lanyon; he was far too involved in is 
campaign to be concerned about much else. It was particularly significant that Wolseley was able 
to raise a contingent of 8 000 Swazi warriors, who arrived to join the imperial force on 19 
November151 and was destined to play a vital role in the subsequent British victory. 152 The battle 
began at dawn on 28 November 1879 against Sekhukhune's mountain stronghold in the Leolu 
Mountains, and took a very heavy toll of both Pedi and Swazi warriors. Sekhukhune himself 
escaped but was subsequently captured and taken to Pretoria, arriving there on 9 December 
1879. 153 
A crowd of onlookers witnessed Wolseley's triumphant return and Sekhukhune's bemusement 
and shame. Lanyon sent out a detachment of the King's Dragoon Guards to escort the party into 
Pretoria, 154and it was also the administrator who organised the imprisonment of the Pedi chief 
in the local gaol. The suggestion was made that Sekhukhune be sent to the Cape to join 
Langalibalele, but this was subject to the approval of the Cape legislative assembly and in the 
end the Pedi chief was held in Pretoria until his release, by the restored republican authorities, 
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in 1881.155 
Wolseley was thus able to report to Hicks Beach that Sekhukhune's power had been broken and 
that taxes collected from the Pedi and other African communities, who were now obliged to 
respect British sovereignty, would henceforth be a good source of revenue in the Transvaal 
coffers. Clearly he had no intention of setting any of these measures in place himself, this was 
to be Lanyon's task, although he did not say as much to Hicks Beach. Wolseley did, however, 
make a point of telling the secretary of state that the victory would 'have a very good effect upon 
the Boers,' who themselves had been unsuccessful over the years against the Pedi. This would 
show them the awesome power of imperial troops and in his view the impressive victory would 
certainly help to quell any ideas they might have harboured of resorting to armed resistance. He 
also managed to slip in a mention of his earnest desire to return home to Britain now that matters 
looked far more settled. 156 
In the immediate aftermath of the Pedi conquest, Lanyon and Clarke - the latter appointed by 
Wolseley to assist the administrator in effecting the settlement of what had been Sekhukhuneland 
- were instrumental in notifying the African chiefs that taxes of 10 shillings per hut were payable 
to the Transvaal state. Furthermore, as no successor to Sekhukhune was to be appointed, each 
Pedi headman had to surrender his firearms and would in future be answerable to a resident 
magistrate. In December 1879, as an added precaution to enforce control of the area, a new fort 
to be known as Fort Albert, was built on a carefully chosen site overlooking the Steelpoort 
valley. 
Although it was Wolseley who masterminded the conquest of the Pedi and took all the credit for 
the impressive victory, his involvement in African policy in the Transvaal Colony began and 
ended there. It was Lanyon who had to engineer and then implement the subjugation of the Pedi 
polity. Lanyon's crucial contribution in this regard will be assessed in the next chapter, because 
it was only after March 1880, in the newly-created Transvaal legislative assembly, that Lanyon 
155 Smith, The campaigns of the Bapedi ofSekhukhune, pp 57, 60. 
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was empowered to pass the necessary legislation. 157 By June 1880, by which time Wolseley had 
already left the Transvaal, Lanyon embarked upon an extensive tour of the Middelburg and 
Lydenburg regions to address the Pedi and other African chiefs in surrounding areas. It fell to 
him to ensure that they accepted British sovereignty, surrendered their chiefly power, and paid 
their taxes. It was Lanyon, in other words, who completed the process of subjugation that 
Wolseley had begun with his dramatic conquest of Sekhukhune in November 1879.158 His 
presiding presence in the making of African policy, both in Griqualand West and in the Transvaal 
is of crucial importance in any assessment of his role in southern Africa. 
The imperial intervention that ended Pedi independence was a turning point in Transvaal history. 
In contrast to the situation in 1876, when the Pedi polity was still proudly independent and the 
Transvaal state was in such disarray, by 1881, when Britain withdrew, the power of the colonial 
state and white supremacy had been secured. As Delius shows, Lanyon's administration of 
Africans in the Transvaal state became more effective and centralised than that of his colonial 
predecessors after the Pedi defeat, and it was under his direction that a relatively efficient method 
of revenue collection was introduced. A system of private land ownership had been secured and 
the migrant labour system, which depended heavily upon Pedi labour on the diamond mines, was 
facilitated. 159 Under Lanyon, in other words, the state structure of the Transvaal was more 
efficient in terms of the rising capitalist order in southern Africa than it had been before he 
arrived. And significantly, by the end of the 19th century the Transvaal had become the hub of 
the southern African economy. With two of the most powerful independent African chiefdoms, 
the Zulu and the Pedi, subdued by force of imperial arms by the end of 1879, the balance of 
power had swung decisively in favour of a society in southern Africa that was dominated by 
whites. Lanyon's role in these developments was a significant one. 
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CHAPTER VI 
THE PRELUDE TOW AR 
The year 1880, which is the focus of this chapter, was a crucial one for the Transvaal and for 
Lanyon in many respects. In the closing months of 1879 Wolseley was in Sekhukhuneland on 
his military campaign against the Pedi and Lanyon had meanwhile to keep the Transvaal 
administrative machine operating smoothly and quell the growing Boer discontent as best he 
could. While he was away Wolseley corresponded with Lanyon on a fairly regular basis and 
sometimes sent the administrator instructions, but he was also called upon to exercise his own 
discretion on a number of occasions, particularly in his dealings with the Boers. 
Wolseley returned victorious to Pretoria in December but was impatient to leave for home, and 
was not committed to promoting progress in the Transvaal in matters that he considered 
mundane. Indeed, when Colonial Office approval for the new Transvaal constitution finally came 
through it was not Wolseley, but Lanyon who began to set up the vital legislative machinery that 
would release the Transvaal from its restricted proclamation-driven regime. Wolseley was then 
called away to Natal for six weeks until the end of February 1880, so Lanyon once again had to 
take full responsibility for the governance of the colony. Wolseley had no input in the 
constitutional process that Lanyon was orchestrating in Pretoria, returning barely in time to 
attend the official opening of the new assembly. 
Less than a month later, on 3 April 1880, Sir Gamet finally left Pretoria and Lanyon laboured 
on alone. And very significantly, within weeks ofWolseley's departure, the news arrived that 
there was a new ruling party in Britain and that Kimberley had returned to the Colonial Office 
as secretary of state for the colonies. These developments had important implications for British 
colonial policy in southern Africa, and the same can also be said for their impact on Lanyon. 
Wolseley' s successor as high commissioner for South-East Africa was George Pomeroy Colley, 
but as will be seen, he had significantly less control over Lanyon and Transvaal affairs than 
Wolseley. Indeed - for the first time since leaving Griqualand West - Lanyon enjoyed 
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considerable freedom of action. He was still, of course responsible to the Colonial Office, but 
the imperial string was less taut and Lanyon, like many other imperial agents of his time took 
advantage of the fact that London was conveniently far away and that communications were slow 
and, in the case of the Pretoria telegraph line, frequently unserviceable. 1 
Now with the authority to legislate-in fact well-nigh autocratic authority because of the illiberal 
nature of the new constitutional organs - Lan yon again, as he had done in Griqualand West, was 
able to play a crucial role in the making of African colonial policy. It will be shown that he was 
instrumental in deciding the fate of the Pedi and other African communities resident in the 
Transvaal. On a protracted tour of the north-eastern districts in June-August 1880 he established 
colonial control over them, began collecting taxes and started formulating a land policy. 
Sekhukhune's arrival in the Transvaal capital at the end of the previous year, bound for the local 
gaol,2 had been witnessed by crowds of curious onlookers and Wolseley was hopeful that the 
Boers would be suitably awed by the impressive imperial victory, would curb their aggressive 
intentions and pay their taxes with better grace. But this was not to be. As Britain was soon to 
realise, it was one thing for imperial soldiers to put down untrained and poorly armed blacks but 
quite another in the case of well-armed whites who were inspired by a common cause. Despite 
Lan yon' s assurances that the Boers were settling down and that he had everything under control 
in the Transvaal, as 1880 drew to a close Boer resistance to colonial rule gathered momentum, 
exacerbated by Lanyon's determination to collect taxes that were due to the state. But Lanyon, 
who had beavered on, weathering one crisis after another for nearly two years, did not, it seems, 
realise that this time the situation was teetering on the brink of war. 
Lanyon and Wolseley in the Transvaal 
Wolseley's brief in the Transvaal was to stabilise British rule and improve the financial status 
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of the colony by putting down the resistance of the Pedi and the Boers. With Lanyon's 
conscientious but rather grudging assistance- because the administrator, as he confessed to his 
father, was finding it oppressive to work under Wolseley -the two British agents made some 
progress. The working relationship between Lanyon and Wolseley was often contradictory and 
will be addressed again below, but it is sufficient at this stage to say that while neither had much 
respect for the other, and each, indeed, on occasion expressed criticism of the other, they worked 
together well enough. Lanyon went out of his way to be cordial and helpful to Wolseley, for 
which the general was grateful.4 In short, Lanyon was a dutiful puppet although he did not 
approve of Wolseley's showy, limelight-loving personality, and chafed to be allowed to take 
responsibility for rule in the Transvaal once more. 
On at least one matter they saw eye to eye: the dissident Boers. Neither Lanyon nor Wolseley 
made any effort to understand the reasons for their resistance to British rule and Lanyon's 
contempt for the Boers5 was matched by that of Wolseley, who was as always particularly 
outspoken: 
I believe the Transvaal Boer to be a coward pure and simple, who will swagger & talk big when he knows 
he can do so with impunity, but the moment he is collared he collapses ... A Boer's idea oflife is that he 
should pay no taxes of any sort or kind, that he should be amenable to no sort oflaw he disliked, that there 
should be no police to keep order. 6 
He had recognised the Boers' fierce individualism but had little insight into their aspirations for 
independence and the force this exerted on their protest movement. To fulfil their commitment 
to improving the finances of the Transvaal, and in the pursuit of peace and order, it was necessary 
that Lanyon and Wolseley gain the Boers' confidence and persuade them to pay their taxes. The 
Boers were the settler land-owner elite and without their contributions to the state revenue the 
Transvaal coffers would remain comparatively empty. This was despite the fact that the traders 
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and merchants in Pretoria - which as yet was the only Transvaal town with any significant 
commercial development - were largely of British origin and could be counted among the 
supporters of British rule. 
Although Wolseley arrived full of confidence that the Pedi and the Boers would soon be made 
to toe the imperial line, his success with the Pedi - from a British point of view - was not 
matched as far as the Boers were concerned. As De Kiewiet puts it, 'It is clear how utterly he 
stood outside the Dutch ... because he saw their faults and their unconformity before their virtues 
and their affinity, his every step became a chafing and a fretting. '7 He proved to be as inept as 
Lanyon in making any headway with the hardline republicans. On his way to Pretoria from 
Natal, Wolseley had his first encounter with one of their leaders, Piet Joubert. Wolseley used his 
most winning ways, offering Joubert a well-paid position on the executive council that was about 
to be introduced, and was amazed when Joubert flatly refused to be tempted. He hid his surprise, 
however, when reporting to Hicks Beach: 'He is irreconcilable as I expected to find him. ' 8 On 
his arrival in Pretoria he informed the Transvalers in his usual brusque manner that he 'intended 
to enforce a due respect for the law', and that if necessary he would enforce the payment of taxes 
through sale of the property of the guilty party.9 The local press immediately criticised such brash 
British confidence, taking the view that the present government had very shaky legal standing 
in the Transvaal. IO Instead ofintimidating the Boers, Wolseley's affirmation ofLanyon's tactics 
simply antagonised them. 
It was Lanyon who had to put down an incident of Boer unrest at Middelburg in mid October 
1879. 11 Wolseley was too busy preparing to leave for the north-eastern Transvaal on his military 
campaign. This was to be characteristic of Lanyon's role for the next two months - while 
Wolseley was defeating the Pedi Lanyon took full responsibility for running the administration 
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and trying to keep one step ahead of the Boer unrest. At Middelburg Lanyon organised the trial 
of the Boer suspects and then hurried back to Pretoria to make sure that the danger of an armed 
revolt was over, reporting to his father that 'they talk very big about resisting the Govt. if any 
[Boer suspects] be punished, but they are such braggarts I don't think they will attempt 
opposition in the face of a military force' .12 
Both Lanyon and Wolseley noticed that during October 1879 the Boers seemed to have 
developed a more determined frame of mind. From Fort Weeber, where he was now 
orchestrating the Pedi campaign, Wolseley remarked to Hicks Beach that word was going around 
that the Boers 'now mean business'. He put this down to pressure from their leaders and what 
he called 'an inflammatory press', presumably De Volksstem. Apparently more astute at reading 
human nature than his administrator, Wolseley began to realise that the Boers were inspired by 
a certain 'sentiment'. Even if defeated, they would 'at least have the satisfaction of knowing that 
they have struck a blow for the cause they believe to be that of truth and justice', thus erasing 
their shame at having allowed Britain to take their republic in 1877 'without firing a shot' .13 In 
his letters to Hicks Beach, 'Hitch Bitch', as the disrespectful Wolseley referred to the secretary 
of state in his letters to Louisa, 14 the general went so far as to suggest that Britain might even at 
some stage have to consider withdrawing from the Transvaal altogether. 15 The Colonial Office 
must have been taken aback at this new insight on the Transvaal imbroglio. To some extent it 
answered the question Hicks Beach had posed to Frere some five months earlier: 'If such feeling 
[support for annexation of 1877] exists [in the Transvaal] why is it not manifested?' 16 Wolseley 
made it clear in his despatch that support for annexation had not been manifest because it was 
virtually non-existent. 'The main body of the Dutch population are disaffected to our rule,' 17 he 
concluded, 'we are hated by 9 ho of the Boers with an intense hate.' The annexation should never 
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have taken place; in Wolseley' s opinion, it had been 'a great political blunder'. 18 
While he was out of Pretoria on his military campaign the only way Wolseley could keep the 
Colonial Office accurately informed about the Boer protest movement and whether it was likely 
to escalate into armed conflict, was through Lanyon. It was frequently left up to Lanyon, as the 
man-on-the-spot, to take the decisions on how best to handle Transvaal affairs. For example, 
Lanyon reported to Wolseley that the Boers were planning a mass meeting for 10 December 
1879 at Wonderfontein between Pretoria and Potchefstroom 'to discuss and determine their 
future line of action', 19 and that they were actively spreading rumours that they intended to 
escalate their resistance into an armed struggle. Wolseley, never at a loss for a cunning ruse, 
decided to play the Boers at their own game, and told Lanyon to 'adopt the Boers tactics of 
spreading all sorts of alarming rumours' .20 
In the Transvaal Argus Lanyon accordingly placed a notice about the 'horrible and annihilating 
effects of a newly-invented explosive ... to be used in our shells', explaining that a consignment 
of these shells had just arrived for use in the Transvaal.21 In order to discourage attendance at the 
mass meeting of 10 December, Lanyon, also spread the rumour that on the way back home from 
the Pedi expedition the Swazi warriors would be passing through the Lydenburg and Middelburg 
districts and would be given instructions to destroy the homesteads and take the livestock from 
farms that had been left unoccupied for the week of the meeting. Wolseley was confident that 
rumours of this type were likely to 'find credence with these ignorant Boers'. 22 Lan yon' s opinion 
of these harebrained ideas is not recorded, and he did not mention them in letters to his father. 
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They apparently had little or no effect on the Boers.23 
Lan yon also made a concerted effort to thin out the ranks of Boer leadership by offering certain 
individuals well-paid government posts. On Wolseley's instructions he approached Paul Kruger 
- 'a difficult man to deal with' - Jorissen and Bok with lucrative job offers. He also tried to 
persuade Pretorius to accept nomination as one of the non-official members in the executive 
council that was soon to be formed, on the condition that he did whatever was necessary to get 
the Boer meeting to disperse quietly. Wolseley claimed that Pretorius was 'so hard up that a little 
ready money down, might square him', so he told Lanyon to lure Pretorius into the British fold 
with a bonus of £300, for which Wolseley himself would foot the bill.24 Lanyon's efforts came 
to naught. None of the Boers accepted the posts.25 Pretorius subsequently kept Laynon guessing 
for some months; he simply could not be persuaded to say yes or no to Lanyon's offer. 
Military precautions were also taken by Lanyon in case the December meeting escalated into 
violence. He made sure that there was a strong body of troops in Pretoria 'with all three arms', 
and he stationed several companies of infantry at Heidelberg to protect the town. The 2nct 
Regiment and the two companies of the 801h which were in the district would also reinforce 
Lanyon's forces.26 Once these steps had been taken Wolseley felt reassured that Lanyon would 
be 'quite strong enough to put down by force of arms any number of Boers that may assemble 
together to make war upon us'. But Wolseley added a note of caution: Lanyon was to avoid 
armed conflict. A clash would not look good at home.27 'The first overt act of hostility and the 
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first shot must be fired, if one is to be fired at all, by the Boers and not by us. '28 Britain could not 
be seen as culpable in any armed outbreak. 
Lanyon also arranged to have a notice published in both Dutch and English in the Transvaal 
Government Gazette of 21 and 25 November and 2 December 1879 to warn the Boers not to 
disturb the peace in any way or to intimidate others into attending their mass meeting. To do so 
would be asking for trouble because the republican laws against treason and sedition were still 
in force in the Transvaal and 'all persons convoking or attending meetings for a treasonable 
purposes (sic) ... or aiding in treasonable projects' might well find themselves charged with 
breaking the law. 29 
Many Boers decided to hold their taxes back at least until the December meeting was over and 
there was more clarity on what steps, if any, the Boers were going to take against the 
government. Paying tax had become a key issue. On Wolseley's suggestion Lanyon embarked 
on a strenuous programme oflaw enforcement in November. Anyone trying to avoid paying tax, 
inciting others to do so or coercing the 'loyal and quietly disposed people into attending the 
meeting' was to be charged in court.30 The government had to be seen to be firmly in control. 
Lanyon acted promptly and a case was duly lodged against JF Celliers, the editor of De 
Volksstem, and EJP Jorissen, the legal adviser to the Volkskomitee, for refusing to pay tax.31 On 
the usual gambit, the two Boers averred that the present government was not empowered to 
demand taxation; they were citizens of the republic and would only pay tax if called to do so by 
the legally constituted republican volksraad. Celliers was particularly outspoken in his editorials 
in De Volksstem, blatantly advising all Transvalers to refuse to pay taxes to the government.32 
When the two men lost their case in the Pretoria landdrost court they appealed to the high court, 
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a case that was heard on 27 November 1879. 33 Kotze reserved his judgement and in the meantime 
Lanyon's hands were tied. Being unable to collect any taxes, his irritation knew no bounds. It 
was untenable that the judge could hold the government to ransom. Lan yon and Wolseley agreed 
that it was time that Kotze be relieved of the chief justiceship. 34 And Lan yon began what almost 
amounted to a personal hate campaign against Kotze.35 When judgement was finally delivered 
on the Celliers and Jorissen test case on 12 January 1880, the ruling went against them and they 
were obliged to pay their taxes.36 This did not, however, bring the tax issue to an end, and many 
Boers still refused to pay until forced to do so, under protest, by the due process of the law. The 
whole tax debacle, as will be seen in Chapter VII, culminated in the Bezuidenhout affair in late 
1880, and proved to be one of the issues which accelerated the outbreak of war. 
That the pro-British element was relatively small in number and was based almost exclusively 
in Pretoria became apparent three weeks before the scheduled Boer gathering when a meeting 
of Pretoria residents was held in the town on 17November1879. Those who attended, about 500-
600 people according to the pro-British Transvaal Argus,37 expressed their satisfaction that the 
Transvaal was to be kept under British sovereignty, but made an urgent appeal for the 
introduction of significant constitutional changes that would enable them to promote economic 
progress in the Transvaal. They elected a committee to negotiate with the Boer Volkskomitee and 
to inform them that 'loyalists', the commercial element in Pretoria, were determined to work 
towards maintaining the British presence in the Transvaal.38 This meeting of British residents 
apparently had little impact on the Boer resistance movement, but it did place Lanyon in a 
predicament because the constitutional changes this commercial sector was looking for were 
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certainly not to be found in the so-called representative organs that he was about to introduce. 39 
As 10 December 1879 drew nearer, Lanyon remained confident that the Boers would not resort 
to arms, but that if by any chance they did pluck up courage, the fight would be 'a very short one, 
and not sweet to them' .40 On 9 December 1879 a triumphant Wolseley returned to Pretoria, fresh 
from his conquest of the Pedi, arriving just as the Boers were gathering at Wonderfontein. 41 Both 
Lanyon and Wolseley felt that the news ofSekhukhune's comprehensive defeat and the chief's 
very public entrance into Pretoria - on the eve of the Boer meeting- on his way to the local gaol, 
would make an impression on the Boers and give them a sense of what they were up against.42 
To reinforce this Lanyon organised a flashy military parade in Pretoria to re-enforce the image 
of British military superiority.43 The Pretoria people, wrote Lanyon, were 'astonished' by this 
impressive parade of about 2 000 imperial troops. 
The guns astonished them more than anything else, for they would not believe that they could move about 
so quickly. It will have a great effect upon the Boers who are now having their mass meeting, and threaten 
to plalt us all out. Poor devils, they are all brag and bunkum and I don't believe in their pluck or anything 
else'. 
The Boer meeting at Wonderfontein did not, after all, end in an armed clash, although those who 
attended resolved to keep up their protest until they reached their goal. The estimated 6 000 
Boers45 spent a full week discussing future plans, and although there was some support for 
violent measures the leaders were able to keep this tendency in check. The Volkskomitee 
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compiled a list of resolutions which reiterated the Boers' determination to reclaim their country 
and recognise their own volksraad once again. Those present also undertook to avoid bloodshed, 
but strenuously to oppose any restrictions on their nationhood, and to boycott the purchase or 
sale of produce from those who supported the government. On 17 December they dispersed 
quietly.46 
Lanyon was smugly satisfied that he had been right about the Boers' lack of spunk and wrote to 
tell his father that they had done nothing 'save to resolve that they will hold another meeting next 
April'. 47 Wolseley too, made light of the week's deliberations and reported to Hicks Beach that 
as he had predicted, the meeting had been 'a sort of picnic where they [the Boers] can indulge 
in that tall talk they delight in'. He now took a 'very hopeful view of the present condition of 
affairs' in the Transvaal. If the matter of the Boers could be 'disposed of, everything would be 
very plain sailing'.48 
The aftermath of the Boer meeting was, however, not without incident. In their capacities as 
chairman and secretary respectively of the Volkskomitee, Pretorius and Bok were the signatories 
to the list of resolutions that was sent to Wolseley once the Boers had dispersed. Wolseley took 
legal advice on whether or not, in terms of the proclamation Lanyon had issued, the two men 
were punishable on grounds of'treason and sedition' .49 The attorney general, CG Maasdorp, was 
of the opinion that there was indeed some basis for this charge, and the two men were arrested.50 
Lanyon was in full support ofWolseley's action and even ventured some predictions about the 
future of the Transvaal. 'It is useless trying the conciliatory measures any longer,' he wrote, 'for 
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the Boers only say we do so because we are weak. We must look to a troubled reign here for 
some time to come, but it will all come right in the end. ' 51 The decision to make an example of 
Pretorius and Bok did not prove to be sound, and the whole issue eventually fizzled out. De 
Kiewiet maintains that having arrested Pretorius, Lanyon saw that there was little he could do 
to make an example of the elderly Boer, the 'silly old goose' as Wolseley called him. 52 He was 
sick and had only chaired the Boer meeting twice. Kotze would certainly not find him guilty, and 
there was not a suitable prison to keep the old man in relative comfort.53 Further attempts to bribe 
Pretorius into accepting a position on the executive council by offering to drop the case against 
him and to give him a cash 'bonus' proved fruitless. Pretorius could not be persuaded to make 
any firm undertakings at all, although he made plenty of vague hints that he might perhaps be 
tempted.54 To punish him was not advisable either; the last thing that Lanyon and Wolseley 
wanted was to give the Boers a martyr. The trial was postponed for three months and a few days 
before Wolseley left Pretoria he decided to '"wriggle" out of the affair' as best he could. He 
claimed that the threat of the trials had served their purpose, and the matter was quietly shelved. 55 
Another of Lanyon and Wolseley's attempts to control Boer resistance - one which was 
apparently equally ineffectual - was an attempt to establish a Dutch newspaper in Pretoria. 
Wolseley instructed Lanyon to start a bi-wet;kly paper in opposition to De Volksstem and have 
it delivered free to the Boers. Sir Garnet enclosed his own cheque for an initial sum of £300. In 
his diary Wolseley refers to the new publication as the' Volifreund', but Wolseley's spelling in 
his diary is suspect at the best of times, and apparently Lanyon's new enterprise was to be called 
the Transvaalsche Volksvriend.56 There are no known copies extant, and no indication of who 
the editor might have been; it appears that the endeavour must have been a failure. 
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Among the other matters that Lanyon and Wolseley handled before Sir Garnet left was a failed 
customs arrangement with Natal that would bring more revenue into the Transvaal. Lan yon had 
begun his campaign with Bulwer of Natal as early as July 1879,57 arguing that the interior 
communities were entitled to some share of the customs duties collected at the British ports. But 
even when Wolseley added his weight to put pressure on Natal, the bid failed.58 In December 
1879 the tight-fisted Natal executive council rejected the Transvaal overtures.59 In retaliation 
Wolseley entertained hopes of developing a railway to Delagoa Bay to serve Transvaal imports, 
a move which would have cut Natal revenue and serve them right for their heartlessness.60 But 
this was as unrealistic as Burgers' s pipe-dream had been. Delagoa Bay was too far away and too 
underdeveloped, and the British treasury was horrified at Wolseley's financial projections of 
what it would cost to make the idea viable.61 
An issue in which both Lanyon and Wolseley were involved was the appointment of a new chief 
justice to replace the controversial JG Kotze. Kotze, as has been shown, was a staunch member 
of the Boer protest movement and had been a thorn in Lanyon's side since the administrator's 
arrival in the Transvaal. 62 He had bedevilled the legislative process at every tum and as far as 
Lanyon was concerned the first requirement of a new chief justice was that he should be more 
malleable. Wolseley agreed that it was 'impossible to go on here with Mr Kotze as our only 
judge' and felt that Kotze was 'very unfit to hold such an office'. A number of candidates were 
proposed by Wolseley and the man he eventually selected was JP de Wet who had been the 
recorder in Griqualand West. 63 It fell to Lanyon to inform Kotze of the new appointment and 
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offer him a position as one of the puisne judges under De Wet. Kotze was outraged and refused 
to suffer this indignity. He wrote a letter of protest to Hicks Beach,64 sent an appeal to Queen 
Victoria and subsequently accepted the more junior post only while this appeal was pending.65 
Wolseley maintained that Lanyon had handled the incident tactlessly, which was probably true. 
Lanyon had a reputation for being outspoken and opinionated; he disliked Kotze and no doubt 
bore a grudge against him. He probably enjoyed giving Kotze the bad tidings that he was to be 
replaced as chief justice, and might well have made good use of the opportunity to humiliate 
Kotze. Kotze, for his part, was self-assured and inclined to be supercilious and according to 
Wolseley had a high opinion ofhimself.66 All the ingredients were there for what must have been 
a very explosive encounter. The inability to forgive was certainly a flaw in Lanyon's character, 
and one that had already become apparent in his years in Griqualand West. He disliked Kotze 
and had made a bitter and permanent enemy of him. In Wolseley's words: 
He [Kotze] attributes all his misfortunes to Lanyon's dislike of him ... It is curious how all classes of the 
officials dislike Lanyon. It seems to me that the moment any man runs counter to his wishes or plans, from 
that moment he hates him, & would do him all the harm in his power: I am afraid he will never be a first-
rate Govemor.67 
With the Pedi under control and the Boer meeting safely over, Wolseley was very anxious to 
leave for home. He had already been in the Transvaal far longer than had originally been 
envisaged. 68 It appears that he was becoming impatient that the Boer unrest was still a factor and 
general progress in the Transvaal was moving too slowly, and he blamed Lanyon for dragging 
his feet. 'Lanyon is a slow coach and I cannot work him up to quick action,' he complained in 
his diary.69 This was somewhat unfair in light of the fact that Wolseley himself had been in the 
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Transvaal for months, supposedly getting the Transvaal on track, but it is also a clear indication 
that Wolseley saw Lanyon as responsible for keeping the government machinery turning. 
Wolseley, it would seem, felt that his own role had been accomplished without so much as a 
hitch: he had conquered the Pedi and this alone more than justified his six-month sojourn in the 
Transvaal. Lanyon had to take care of the rest and he should hurry up about it. Lanyon, for his 
part, found his work very demanding and slow or not, was apparently working conscientiously. 
He complained to his father that he was buckling under the strain. He claimed that he was very 
busy with routine administration and monitoring the Boers and that he was working into 'the 
small hours of the morning, for our troubles increase every day'. 70 
Nor did it help matters that Lanyon's unpopularity was reaching new heights in the Transvaal; 
he could do nothing right. This, Lanyon felt, was as a result of his efficient system of tax 
collection: 'As we touch the people's pockets', he wrote in what was surely mock bravado 
so do they increase in their abuse of me. it is truly delicious to find oneself once more the best abused man 
in Africa. I have in their ideas no head, no heart and but a poor body, and evidently they think I can 
stomach anything they may write. It pleases them but doesn't hurt me.71 
Hicks Beach delayed his permission for Wolseley to return to Britain, feeling that there were a 
number of matters that still needed attention. The introduction of the new constitution was one 
of these, and when the London post arrived in Pretoria on the morning of 1 January 1880, the 
letters patent were there with parliament's sanction of the new constitution.72 With Wolseley 
itching to leave for home, and having received instructions from the Colonial Office that he 
should go to Natal to settle some constitutional matters there,73 Lanyon had to organise the 
inauguration of the new executive and legislative councils for which the Transvaal had waited 
so long. His handling of this will be discussed below.74 Once again Wolseley was happy to put 
the responsibility on Lanyon's shoulders. 
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Surprisingly, despite Wolseley's criticism that Lanyon was rather slow, very unpopular and 
generally not the sort of man to be successful in a leading civil service post, Wolseley wrote him 
a very favourable testimonial. The indications are that this largesse was probably to serve the 
general's own purpose by strengthening his case that he be allowed to return home as soon as 
possible. Although both Lanyon and Wolseley were military officers and might perhaps have 
been expected to get along better than they did, Lanyon was clearly not in the same flamboyant, 
outgoing mould as Wolseley. As has been shown, when Sir Gamet was first appointed Lanyon 
was highly critical of him and his image as an exhibitionist. But once the general arrived their 
working relationship mellowed. Although there was never any real warmth or friendship between 
them they were cordial to one another. Bethat as it may, Wolseley recommended to Hicks Beach 
that 'Colonel Lan yon be made supreme in the Transvaal', so presumably, despite his reservations 
about Lanyon, he had enough confidence that he would be able to cope with the situation. He 
even claimed that his own continued presence in the Transvaal over Lanyon - and over Bulwer 
in Natal - was hardly fair on the two officials because it 'injured their authority'. They were both 
capable and they should, he felt, be given the opportunity to test their wings. 75 
To his wife Wolseley was more frank about his own self-interest rather than the well-being of 
either Lanyon or, indeed, the Transvaal: 
It is very hard on me that I should be kept here to do merely governor's [sic] work. I came out here to do 
the work of a soldier and diplomatist, to destroy all enemies I might find in the field against me and then 
to settle the country from which those enemies were driven. This I have now done and I regard my mission 
as over. ... Now all this is duty work and not that for which I came to South Africa .... All this is very 
provoking ... I think this is working the willing horse rather too far. Everyone's private wishes seem to be 
thought of and considered except mine. 76 
Wolseley assured Hicks Beach that there was little more he could accomplish in the Transvaal. 
Lanyon's new constitution was bound, he said, to be a great success, and the Boers were much 
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quieter.77 This was hardly accurate on either count, and again Wolseley's motives must be 
questioned; he was clearly anxious to leave. His arrest of Pretorius and Bok had estranged him 
even further from the Boers, and his inventive efforts to quell their resistance to British rule, 
carried out largely by Lanyon, had all failed. Lanyon, it is worth noting, agreed that the Boers 
were beginning to settle down. Before Wolseley set off for home, Lan yon wrote to tell his father: 
'The Boer troubles are gradually disappearing, and I feel pretty confident that we shall quietly 
overcome opposition and live down distrust. ' 78 
Some months earlier Wolseley had recommended Sir George Pomeroy Colley, 'the ablest man 
in the army' as the best candidate to succeed him when he returned to Britain.79 In March 1880 
Lan yon heard that Colley was to take over from Wolseley 80 as high commissioner for South-East 
Africa and governor of Natal, and would have the military command of Natal and the 
Transvaal.81 Lanyon initially accepted the news with equanimity: 'He is a lucky fellow, but he 
has worked hard for it and deserved all he has got.' 82 But by the end of May he was clearly far 
less accepting of the new appointment. What irked him most was that he thought - mistakenly 
as it turned out-that Colley was to be governor of the Transvaal as Wolseley had been. Colley 
had no previous experience in a governor's position and Lan yon' s nose was clearly out of joint. 
He wrote to his father to complain: 
77 
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I should like to get away from here for that brute Hicks Beach has put me under the Natal Lieut Governor. 
Now Colley is a very nice fellow, but as he has never before been in the position of a governor, I consider 
it is hard times putting me after 12 years Colonial Service, (5 of which were in charge of govt) under one 
who is fresh to the work. 83 
See for example Hove, Wolseley Papers, SA 1, Wolseley- Hicks Beach, 30 January 1880; Preston, The 
South African journal of Sir Garnet Wolseley, p 264. 
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Hicks Beach, who certainly had the reputation of being a hard task-master, had in fact done his 
utmost not to ruffle Lanyon' s feathers, but he clearly had doubts about Lanyon' s ability to cope 
with what he saw as a potentially dangerous situation in the Transvaal. In a long private letter 
to Wolseley, explaining how the new south-eastern dispensation in South Africa would work, 
he made some interesting - and prophetic - observations about Lanyon's abilities and 
sensitivities: 
Although Lanyon is known to be a good officer, yet it is of course no flattery to say that the public 
confidence in him is very much less than their confidence in you. If anything did occur and we had 
sanctioned your return before April without replacing you by such a man as Colley as Genl. and High 
Comm., we should certainly be severely blamed and I think should deserve blame. Therefore I have 
pressured you to stay ... Colley will not be placed over Lanyon as you were. Lanyon will have the Civil 
Administration of the Transvaal, but looking both to the military requirements and to Colley's position 
as High Comm, Lanyon will be instructed to consult him on important functions, and to be guided by his 
opinions - the Transvaal correspondence with the CO passing through Colley .... I propose to recommend 
Lanyon for a KCMG, so that I trust he will understand that his worth is appreciated and will not consider 
himself superceded by Colley' s appt. 84 
Lanyon was flattered and highly delighted when he heard of the award of the 'well earned 
honours' from Hicks Beach. 85 In the same mail which brought news of his knighthood, Lan yon 
heard from Wolseley and to his great relieflearned that 'Colley was not to be Governor of the 
Transvaal, but only of Natal'. He had high hopes that this would mean that he was to be 
independent; being a puppet was not the ideal role, particularly as he had now grown in 
confidence and experience. 'I like working on my own', he told his father, 'I work better. It is 
always annoying to have to report through another man who gets all the kudos of one's 
trouble. ' 86 He resolved to write to Lord Kimberley, who had just taken over from Hicks Beach 
in the Colonial Office, to appeal to him that as administrator of the Transvaal he should report 
directly to the secretary of state ratherthan through Colley, the high commissioner for South-East 
Africa.87 
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Lanyon was not the only one to have reservations about Colley's appointment. Bartle Frere had 
been hoping that with Wolseley going he would regain high commissionership over the entire 
southern Africa. He complained bitterly to Hicks Beach of this second blow to his wounded 
pride. 88 He also wrote privately to Kimberley bemoaning this twist of fate and asking why, now 
that Wolseley's post-Isandlwana appointment as 'dictator' was over, he could not be reinstated 
to his former position. 89 
On 4 April 1880 Wolseley, who had been chafing to get back home for months, finally left 
Pretoria.90 Over the previous months he had complained frequently to his wife that 'Hitch Bitch 
kept on inventing silly reasons for my staying on' .91 Wolseley brushed aside any argument that 
his presence was still needed in the Transvaal. He assured the Colonial Office that the Boers no 
longer represented any real threat.92 They had come to realise, he said, that they were hopelessly 
outclassed militarily and had begun paying their taxes. The arrest of Pretorius and Bok had had 
a sobering effect on them and he was still hopeful that Lanyon would be able to win Pretorius 
over.93 Wolseley had misread the gravity of the situation completely. Pretorius had no intention 
of being bought and although some taxes were being paid, others were not. More importantly, 
the attitude of the Boers towards British overlordship was becoming increasingly sullen and 
determined. 94 
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Wolseley was clearly grateful that he had received such loyal support from Lanyon for the six 
months they had worked together. To show his appreciation he asked Louisa 
to buy the showiest silver cup you can purchase for £20 or £25 ... I feel I ought to give him [Lanyon] 
something for I have lived upon him for months and I don't know what I could do better to show him my 
gratitude for his kindness and hospitality. It should be a cup to stand on his dinner table as an ornament, 
but it need not be an old one as he has no taste in plate .... Size is of more consequence than good taste. 95 
With Wolseley gone, Owen Lanyon, soon to be the proud owner of a large silver cup, was left 
to cope alone as best he could. He seemed oblivious to the inherent danger of his situation. 'The 
Boer troubles are gradually disappearing and I feel pretty confident,' he wrote to his father the 
day before Wolseley departed.96 His confidence was not well grounded. George Pomeroy Colley 
was indeed on his way to South Africa, but was to be based in Pietermaritzburg, not Pretoria. 
And Colley, for all his good credentials, knew little about the hazards of the simmering situation 
in the Transvaal. By mid April the news came through of a Liberal Party victory at the polls in 
Britain. Gladstone became the British prime minister and Lord Kimberley returned to the 
Colonial Office. All of this had implications for the Transvaal. 
The Liberal Party policy and Kimberley in the Colonial Office 
With the British parliamentary election looming in early 1880, Lanyon was among those imperial 
agents in South Africa who had been hopeful that Disraeli and the Conservative Party were safe 
enough to retain power,97 but he was also realistic enough to fear that if by any chance 
the Conservatives go out, there may be some attempt made to give way to the clamour of the Boers which 
would have the effect of unsettling everything and cause the European element to become troublesome. 98 
When the election results were known a week later he declared that they 'have perfectly 
astounded everyone here; I am at a loss to understand the feelings of the British public, ... I 
suppose ... that Dizzy, ifhe can live under his disappointment, will be able to come in on another 
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flood wave of Toryism.'99 But in the meanwhile changes were bound to reverberate in the 
Colonial Office and Lanyon was to find himself in the thick of changes at the periphery. 
In Britain, some months prior to the election, the writing had been on the wall. British opinion 
towards the colonies was changing. Although Britons could not begin to fathom why Transvalers 
did not appreciate the advantages of British rule, there was talk of the possibility of retrocession, 
particularly because the southern African possessions were proving so expensive. Lanyon's 
reports of balancing his revenue and expenditure and collecting more tax in the Transvaal paled 
into insignificance in the face of the alarming reality that British military expenses in southern 
Africa had increased tenfold over the previous eight years, and by 1879 stood at a staggering£ 1,5 
million.100 Why, it was asked in the press and elsewhere, if the settlers did not want British 
control, was the British government paying so much to force it upon them? 
From the end of 1879 there had been what Goodfellow calls 'intense irritability' in the treasury 
over southern African questions. The Colonial Office staff had been made very aware that 
expenses had to be curbed and that any talk of more funds for promoting confederation was out 
of the question. Even the ever-hopeful Herbert had to admit that it seemed unlikely that British 
money would continue to be poured into the seemingly bottomless pit of confederal policy in 
southern Africa. Discussions began increasingly to tum to Britain's changed responsibilities, 
particularly in Natal and the Transvaal, if federation were finally to be abandoned and self-
govemment were granted to the settlers and the Boers. The whole issue of self-rule in these two 
regions would have to be 'reconsidered' very seriously. 101 
In his Midlothian speeches, delivered in the closing months of 1879 and early 1880, before the 
British general election, Gladstone had put particular stress on the failed Tory policy overseas. 
In his widely publicised view, imperial expansionism had to be tempered, and conquest and 
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annexation had to give way to a policy of protecting only what belonged to Britain. The best way 
to preserve the imperial link was for the home government to allow self-rule in the colonies. And 
importantly, British policy overseas had to be cheap. Gladstone's attitude was also sympathetic 
to subjected or down-trodden nationalisms, 102 and the Transvaal Boers chose to think that 
Gladstone had all but promised to give them back their independence. But they were to learn that 
pre-election promises and policies were seldom kept by prime ministers in power. 
The Transvaal Boers reacted directly after the election results came out. On 10 May 1880 Kruger 
and Joubert wrote to Gladstone from Cape Town,103 where they were doing what they could to 
help abort Frere's proposed conference on confederation. But even before their letter arrived in 
London, their hopes were dashed. They heard of the official announcement on 20 May in London 
that the Transvaal would remain - in terms almost as blunt as Wolseley had used - forever 
British. The Boers considered this a breach of faith. They saw Gladstone as having used their 
country 'as a bludgeon against his political opponents', only to cast the Transvaal aside when it 
had served his base political purpose. But as De Kiewiet points out, the Boer reading of events 
was skewed. Gladstone's bitter election campaign against Disraeli had not been provoked 
specifically by events in the Transvaal, even if that is how the Boers had chosen to read it. 
Meanwhile, the Whigs had a government to run. Black Michael stood down in the Colonial 
Office for John Wodehouse, the first Earl of Kimberley, who returned for a second term, having 
previously been secretary of state for the colonies from 1870 to 1874.104 He was to all accounts 
not an intellectually brilliant man, nor indeed a very popular figure, but was widely recognised 
as a solid and conscientious statesman. 105 Early in May 1880 Gladstone's cabinet met to decide 
what policy they should follow in southern Africa. A number of memoranda on the 'present 
position of confederation' were prepared by Colonial Office staff for submission to the cabinet; 
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the most important was one on the situation in the Transvaal, compiled by Edward Fairfield. 106 
As has been seen, Fairfield was personally in favour of withdrawal,107 but his May 1880 
memorandum is a dispassionate account of events from the April 1877 annexation onwards, 
making it very clear that the large majority of Boers were opposed to British rule. Fairfield also 
attached a copy of Wolseley's despatch of 13 November 1879 to Hicks Beach to his 
memorandum. Wolseley made it plain: the Boers were incapable of governing themselves and 
giving them self-rule would be a recipe for chaos. There was also another document that came 
under consideration: Frere had sent a desperate telegram to Kimberley pointing out that 
abandonment of the Transvaal would 'be fatal to confederation' and that he was hoping to hold 
a conference if such a proposal was accepted by the Cape parliament. 108 
The cabinet took its decision onl 2 May 1880- the one that came through to the Boers before any 
reply to their letter: the policy of confederation had to be upheld. However moribund it had 
become, confederation remained an outside possibility in the Cape and it might yet rescue 
Britain's position in southern Africa. Kimberley's telegram conveying the news to southern 
Africa was sent to Frere, 109 but the following day a slightly abridged version was sent to Lanyon: 
Sir B Frere has been instructed to use his best efforts to secure confederation, and has been informed that 
the sovereignty of the Queen over the Transvaal cannot be relinquished, but I hope that the speedy 
accomplishment of confederation will enable free institutions to be given to that Colony with 
. d 110 promptltu e. 
Frere was to remain in his post, despite mounting Liberal pressure for his recall. To prevent 
Frere's interference in either the Transvaal or Natal in the briefinterregnum between Wolseley's 
departure and Colley's arrival, however, he was bluntly told to keep his hands off the south-
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east. 111 Frere and confederation had survived, but not for long. 
Gladstone replied courteously to Kruger and Joubert's letter from Cape Town of 10 May, but re-
iterated the decision of the cabinet on Britain's continued presence in the Transvaal. If they 
agreed to confederate, the Transvalers could of course have control over their local affairs, but 
that was as far as he would go. To this he added the argument - one he had also used against 
Leonard Courtney, who had pleaded the Boer cause in the Commons - that Britain had an 
obligation to retain control of the Transvaal for the sake of the indigenous population. 112 In 
Pretoria on 7 June 1880 Lanyon's newly constituted legislature113 passed a resolution in favour 
of a federal union114 but decisions of this body were hardly significant in terms of popular 
consent, and were simply ignored by everyone. 
The two Boer leaders had been in the Cape since early April 1880 and had been working avidly 
with Cape Afrikaners to scotch Frere's plans for a confederation in which they would have no 
part; it would certainly have a detrimental effect on their protest movement. Gladstone and 
Kimberley were also eagerly awaiting the outcome of Frere's date with destiny. On 22 June 
1880, the eastern Cape confederationists moved the resolution proposing a conference but it was 
opposed so vehemently that it was eventually withdrawn. Kruger and Joubert were delighted, and 
claimed with justification that their hard work over the past weeks had played a decisive role in 
the outcome. 115 Kimberley, for his part, regarded the whole debacle as positive proof that 
confederation had 'completely broken down' and added his own voice to the widespread clamour 
in parliamentary circles that now, at last, Frere had to go. 116 Bartle Frere was recalled on 1 
August 1880. In his telegram Kimberley explained to Frere that he simply no longer represented 
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the opinions of the Liberal Party. In fact, he said, 
there had been so much divergence between your views and those of Her Majesty's present Government 
... that they would not have thought it ... fair towards yourself that you should remain at the Cape, had it 
not been for the special reason that there was a prospect of your being able ... to forward the policy of 
confederation. This special reason has now disappeared ... and Her Majesty's Government have therefore 
with regret come to the conclusion ... to replace you by another Governor. 117 
When he heard the news, Lanyon was 'disgusted' with the way the Liberals had pushed his 
mentor, Bartle Frere, out of office; this was further proof, he told his father, that South Africa 
was 'the grave ofreputations' .118 On Kimberley's recommendation, Frere was to be replaced by 
Sir Hercules Robinson, 119 and until such time as he could get to the Cape from New Zealand, Sir 
George Strahan would act as governor. 
However, it proved easier to replace Frere than his policy. Gladstone, Kimberley and the Liberals 
had to deliberate on how best to fill the policy vacuum. Eventually it was decided that the Cape, 
Natal and the Transvaal, certainly for the years 1880-1881 (and thus, conveniently for the 
purposes of this thesis) would be treated separate! y according to the needs of each region. It was 
however, stressed that British policy in the colonies had to be comparatively cheap. Exorbitant 
amounts such as those spent in southern Africa in 1879 would simply not be tolerated. 
Lanyon labours on 
Kimberley's brief in the Transvaal in 1880, with Lanyon at the helm, was to economise. 
Federation was no longer an issue but peace and order were, and so was the avoidance of 
expensive wars against Africans or Boers, Britain's traditional combatants in the Transvaal. 
Wolseley had neutralised the Pedi threat to imperialism, but he had not yet formalised control 
over the Africans, nor had he persuaded the Boers to accept British rule. These tasks fell to 
Lanyon. Once Wolseley had left the Transvaal in the first week of April 1880 Lanyon had 
comparative freedom to act on his own. Colley- who was in any case to have less authority over 
Lanyon than Wolseley-did not arrive immediately and the Liberal Party government had only 
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just come to power and would still take some time to find its feet. 
Lan yon' s first project on his own was to get the new Transvaal constitution up and running. This 
was a legacy from Wolseley, a task the Colonial Office had assigned to Sir Gamet and one he 
had conveniently fobbed off onto Lanyon because of the delay in official sanction from the 
cabinet. 120 This permission, as has been seen, only arrived in Pretoria on the first day of 1880 and 
because Wolseley was in Natal from mid January to the end of February, and then left for Britain 
a month later, it was Lanyon who had to put the constitutional wheels in motion in the 
Transvaal. Indeed, Wolseley only arrived back in Pretoria after five weeks in Pietermaritzburg121 
in time to attend the opening of the first session, on 10 March 1880, of what he was happy to call 
'Lanyon's legislative council', and to sit through the celebratory dinner, 'a heavy, dull affair,' 
which Lanyon organised for that same evening. 122 
When Lanyon had taken over in Pretoria in March 1879, the governmental system in the 
Transvaal was purely autocratic. Shepstone had been supported by several government 
departments which were very poorly organised and had had only a skeleton staff. Because there 
was no representative element in the governance of the colony, the settlers, including the wealthy 
Boer landed class, 123 many of whom did not read English newspapers, knew little of how the 
government was being run. Furthermore, none of the Boer leaders held any important 
administrative office. 124 The Transvalers, Frere had said in his May 1879 report to Hicks Beach, 
needed some concessions in the way of a more liberal constitution. But he was wary of trusting 
them with too much power, particularly in a legislative assembly that might not have enough 
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checks on the law-making process. 125 Goodfellow suggests that Frere's motives were not merely 
to offer a sop to Boer agitation, but were rather an attempt, on the part of this ever-hopeful 
confederationist, to create the kind oflegislative body that would be likely to adopt a resolution 
in favour of confederation in the future. 126 Frere still fostered these ambitions, but his days of 
influence over Transvaal affairs were numbered, and since Isandlwana the Colonial Office was 
less sanguine of holding on to the ex-republic. Both Fairfield and Herbert had minuted that the 
British government might well have to reconsider its position there in the near future. 127 
The instructions Lan yon had to work with were based, to the letter, on Frere' s recommendations 
that he and Lan yon had devised in Pretoria in April 1879 .128 The two 'representative' bodies were 
by no means liberal. The executive council comprised five officials, namely the administrator 
and four of his departmental heads: the commander of the imperial forces in the Transvaal; the 
colonial secretary; the attorney general and the secretary for native affairs. A further three 
members were then selected and appointed by the administrator to represent non-official 
interests. They were to be paid £300 per annum for their services, and it was suggested that they 
should preferably be persons with trade or landed interests. 129 
The executive council was to advise the administrator on all matters, but the final responsibility 
for the measures adopted would rest with the administrator - a stipulation that suited Lanyon 
very well. In effect his fellow councillors, both official and non-official, were merely advisers 
and he had the freedom to act as autocratically as he wished. The only limitation of his power 
was that ifhe took a decision that was opposed by fellow councillors he was obliged, within a 
month, to inform the secretary of state, through the high commissioner, of his motivation for the 
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decision. 130 The non-official members were virtually powerless. Not surprisingly the executive 
council had little or no credibility, particularly being under the control of a self-confessed 
autocrat, 131 and the council did not address the need for representative organs at all. Even the pro-
govemment Transvaal Argus expressed some reservations about the representative nature of the 
new constitution.132 Lanyon was nevertheless satisfied that he had done what was required of 
him. Representative institutions were all very well, but rigid law enforcement and financial 
stability were his prime objectives. 
The Transvaal's new executive council met for the first time on 23 February 1880.133 With 
Wolseley still away, Lanyon appointed PJ Marais, JC Holtshausen and JS Joubert as the three 
non-official members, all of whom had previously been members of the republican volksraad. 134 
Lanyon had apparently decided to ignore the stipulation that 'trade interests' should be 
represented on the council. The inauguration of the legislative assembly followed, opening for 
the first time several weeks later, on 10 March 1880, once Wolseley had returned from Natal. It 
comprised the executive council plus an additional six nominated members. Again, as the press 
was quick to point out, this was hardly a liberal body because there were no elected members at 
all, and the new assembly soon earned the nickname of the 'dummy' legislature. 135 None of the 
prominent Boer leaders who had been approached to join agreed to serve. The nominated 
members were CK White, OW AF orssman and four farmers: JA Esterhuyse, FAR Johnstone, AH 
Stander and JH Nel. 136 All these members, said Lanyon in his opening address, were men who 
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'from their position and character, fitly represent the general interests of the Province, and cannot 
fail to command the confidence of their fellow countrymen' ,137 to which De Volksstem retorted: 
'We have no wish to discuss the character of the chosen nine but with the public at large we are 
at a total loss to know what interest in the country any one of them "fitly represents".' 138 
In truth the appointees who had been named for the new legislative assembly were not 
representative of the white Transvalers across the board, quite apart from the fact that there was 
no thought of African representation. De Volksstem was brutal in its criticism of the 'hybrid 
Executive Council and Legislative Assembly ... nine persons - we cannot call them men - [are] 
ready to play dummies in his [Lanyon's] model puppet councils' .139 It described the opening of 
the first meeting in a report headed: 'Opening of the Legislative farce. ' 140 The nominees did not 
include a single acknowledged member of the protest movement, the largest group of Transvaal 
Boers, although Wolseley claimed that almost all those selected are well-known Boers. 141 Men 
such as Joubert, Bok and Pretorius, the latter Lanyon's favoured target, were conspicuous by 
their absence. All had turned down the offers made to them except Pretorius. He had not turned 
the repeated offers down, nor had he yet accepted. The Boers, it must be said, appeared unmoved 
by the introduction ofLanyon's new constitution. 
Backed by his executive and legislative councils - that he himself had nominated - Lanyon now 
had virtually full control over all civil matters in the Transvaal. Furthermore he could veto 
anything he disapproved of and he could- and did- manipulate these bodies as he saw fit. For 
the first time in his southern African career he had become the puppeteer, pulling the strings 
controlling his councillors. Moreover, because of his appeal to Kimberley in June 1880, Lan yon 
had been given permission to send his official correspondence directly to the secretary of state 
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rather than through Colley. He was no longer manipulated, in fact he was as unfettered as he had 
ever been in South Africa. He was responsible, for the first time, directly to London, and the 
imperial string was wellnigh invisible. Colley had to be sent copies of the despatches and he was 
responsible for military matters and affairs involving Africans in the Transvaal. The reality was 
that he exercised no restraint over Lanyon at all; he was more than busy in Natal and made very 
few, if any, demands on the Transvaal administrator. 
With added authority Lanyon's administrative style, if the local press is to believed, became 
more dictatorial and unpopular.142 He was slated mercilessly by the local press, particularly the 
Boer newspaper, De Volksstem, and by mid 1880 he was already feeling the strain of all the 
acrimony. 'South Africa stinks in my nostrils', he wrote, 'and my murmur is daily "How 
long?"' 143 He felt that he 'had harder work and more anxiety than most men' and 'wished to get 
out of it'. 144 He wrote to his father early in the year when he read in the British newspapers that 
Lord Dufferin stood a good chance ofbeing posted to India as viceroy, thinking that perhaps the 
position ofDufferin' s private secretary would be one he would enjoy, as he had 'long wished to 
go to India'. Lanyon asked his father if he could make discreet enquiries about the post, 145 but 
to his disappointment, Lord Ripon, not Dufferin, was appointed. Lanyon resolved instead to write 
to Herbert in the Colonial Office to see whether he could organise a spell of leave to go home 
to Britain for a good break. 146 
Lanyon's relentless pursuit of solvency in the Transvaal in 1880 did not prevent him from 
making some progress in other spheres. The minutes of the 'dummy' legislative assembly show 
that he presided over two sessions of this body. The first was froml 0 March until 11 June 1880, 
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on which date the legislature was adjourned until 15 November 1880.147 The second session 
lasted only two weeks, from 15 to 30 November 1880. Due to the unrest in the Transvaal, the 
subsequent outbreak of war and the siege of Pretoria, the work of the assembly was suspended 
and it did not meet again. 148 
One of Lanyon's most significant contributions in the Transvaal, as indeed it had been in 
Griqualand West, was his presiding presence in the making of African policy. He was very aware 
that the imperial conquest of the Pedi the previous year had brought a changed attitude not only 
among the Pedi people but also among other African communities in the vicinity who had been 
waiting to see how well Sekhukhune fared against the British. 149 Now that they had their answer, 
Lanyon felt that it was imperative to meet the African chiefs personally and impress upon them 
that his government had their interests at heart. In return, for all the benefits of the Transvaal 
state, Africans would be obliged to pay hut tax and agree to accept British rule. 
From 15 June to 13 August 1880 Lanyon undertook an extended tour of north eastern Transvaal, 
visiting Middelburg, Lydenburg, Pilgrim's Rest, Sekhukhune' s stat, Marabastad and Spelonken. 
He held 'most successful interviews with all the chiefs' about their responsibilities to the 
government in Pretoria, and duly collected the 1 Os per hut dues that had not been paid for 
years. 150 According to Lanyon the Africans were 'all paying up quietly' and were 'anxious to be 
on good terms with the Govt'. 151 Henrique Shepstone, Lanyon's secretary for native affairs, 
subsequently took over the duty of tax collection and reported to Lan yon that by the end of 1880 
no less than £33 690 had been 'cheerfully paid' .152 
From August 1880 Lanyon, Colley and Kimberley were involved in a three-way correspondence 
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on African affairs which included the question of land rights for Africans in the Transvaal. 
Although the discussion on the land issue had only just been broached and had not reached 
anything like finality before the outbreak of war at the end of 1880, the matter bears reflection 
because it provides insight into Lanyon's views on African landownership rights and the 
possibility of creating locations in the Transvaal similar to those he had set up in Griqualand 
West. 
In May 1880, the Revd G Blencowe of London, who had previously resided in the 
Wakkerstroom district of the Transvaal for some years, addressed a letter to the Colonial Office 
in reaction to the queen's speech at the opening of parliament in which she mentioned provision 
being made for 'the security of the indigenous races' in the Transvaal. In his letter he sketched 
a brief history ofland ownership in the Transvaal under the Boer republic, pointing out that the 
'late government' had seen fit to give away 'nearly the whole of it in farms' - which were more 
often than not left largely unoccupied. This was despite the fact that the land belonged to the 
original African inhabitants who had 'been in continuous possession, although without title'. 
Blencowe felt strongly that the British government now had no right to confiscate this land from 
Africans, despite an undertaking in 1877 upon annexation to take over 'all the rights and 
obligations of the late government'. He called upon those in whose hands the matter rested -
Lan yon and Colley - to honour the queen's assurance to 'maintain native rights' and restore the 
ownership of the land to the Africans. Blencowe also made an appeal that the Transvaal's levying 
of the 1 Os hut tax be reassessed. He had, he said, seen the proud claim to having already collected 
£35 000 of a projected revenue of £50 000 from this source. He felt that the burden of this tax 
upon Africans, most of whom lived in far-flung rural districts and did not benefit from much in 
the way of state services, was grossly unfair. 153 
Copies of Blencowe's despatch were sent by Kimberley to both Colley and Lanyon. In his 
official response, advised by Lanyon, Colley pointed out that although he was well-meaning, 
Blencowe was not particularly well-informed about the difficulties of controlling Africans in the 
153 C 2740, no 3, Blencowe - Colonial Office, 24 May 1880, pp 5-6. 
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Transvaal. Colley and Lanyon had discussed the matter fully in Pretoria154 and had also decided 
to consult someone 'far more knowledgeable' about the well-being of the Pedi people, the Revd 
A Merensky of the Berlin Missionary Society at Botsabelo, who had submitted his memorandum 
to Lanyon. 155 Not surprisingly, Merensky's evidence was in full support ofLanyon's policies. 
On the tax issue both Colley and Lanyon openly disagreed with Blencowe; the 1 Os hut tax was 
neither unfair nor excessive, and the fact that Africans were paying it so readily was proof that 
they recognised the advantages for them of a strong government. Lanyon pointed out that many 
Pedi, who were migrant workers on the diamond fields and earned good wages, had considerable 
spending power. So much so, that many had appeared well able to pay their taxes and had done 
so without reluctance. The present hut tax, in Lanyon's words, was 'fair and equable', was far 
lower than that paid by Africans in Natal, 156 and would in any case not cover the amount which 
the state incurred on behalf of Africans residing within the Transvaal's borders. 
As far as African land ownership was concerned, Lanyon agreed that there were injustices 
inherited from republican days, but insisted that Blencowe had many of his facts wrong. 
Furthermore, Merensky's evidence showed that Blencowe's allegations of undue missionary 
involvement in land deals to the detriment of Africans, were false. Land ownership by Africans 
was a complex issue, but the first necessity was a land survey, a matter which Lanyon assured 
Kimberley was receiving his 'close attention'. But, as Colley put it, returning land to Africans 
was not necessarily always to their advantage, because 
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and Native alike. 157 
And there the matter rested. The query into taxation of Africans was now obviously considered 
closed: it was working well and the government felt fully justified in collecting these dues. It was 
also clear from Lanyon's memorandum that state controls over African policy were closely 
geared to the provision of labour to the diamond mines and to serve the new economic order. 
Lanyon's rule in the Transvaal thus translated into facilitating the labour supply as well as 
controlling land use, increasing taxation and implementing a pass law. All this put Africans, 
particularly the valuable Pedi, the fount of migrant labour, securely under imperial control. 
Lanyon did address another letter on the land issue to Kimberley on his return to Pretoria from 
his tax collecting mission in the north east in September 1880. This despatch is particularly 
interesting in that Lanyon takes the land issue a step further. He refers to the 'subject ofland for 
native locations', so presumably he envisaged a system oflocations to serve as labour reservoirs 
similar to those he had created in Griqualand West. There is no mention in this letter of property 
rights for Africans, which was presumably landownership as Blencowe understood it. Instead 
Lanyon's version entails the state 'buying back land' taken from Africans under the republican 
government 'by reckless and dishonest land inspectors' and only then being in a position to set 
up 'native locations'. But implementing this policy, Lanyon said, could only commence once the 
land had been properly surveyed, a matter that he would address shortly. In the meantime, as the 
'natives are still in occupation, pending a legal decision', there was no immediate necessity of 
interference. 158 Nothing more was done in this regard, and within a matter of months of writing 
this letter, Lanyon had left Pretoria and the government of Africans in the Transvaal reverted to 
the republican authorities. 
In addition to this significant contribution in African policy making, Lanyon and his legislative 
assembly were active in a number of other fields in 1880. Despite the fact that the legislature had 
little public support, Lanyon pushed ahead and considerable progress was made. Certainly Colley 
was impressed by Lanyon's efforts and reported to Kimberley that in the Transvaal 'a strong 
157 C 2740, no 52, Colley-Kimberley, 8October1880, p 88. 
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government' had been set up and 'the evidences of progress are most remarkable' .159 Lanyon's 
new legislation, some introduced by the members of the legislature, included measures to 
improve conditions in government schools; impose a more comprehensive and restrictive pass 
law for control of Africans; make improvements to gaols; establish the Transvaal Police; 
inaugurate 'municipal corporations' in the main towns, and establish a new system of district 
councils. 160 The better collection of import duties was also addressed, 161 and a committee was 
formed to look into the possibility of a railway link to Delagoa Bay. 162 On 15 November 1880, 
with the legislature now in its final session, a bill was introduced to reduce the unpopular railway 
tax, 163 but no finality could be reached before the legislative assembly faded into disuse. 
The activities of the legislative assembly ended on a sour note. On 29 November 1880, the day 
before it finally closed, CK White, a nominated member, tabled a motion of no confidence. In 
a lengthy tirade which drew a great deal of discussion from the other members, none of whom 
supported White, he pointed out that the legislative assembly was by no means representative 
of the settlers, and that Lanyon's overbearing voice in its every move made its deliberations no 
more than a farce. 164 Lanyon brushed the criticism aside. He wrote to Kimberley several days 
later to say that White's views were oflittle consequence, but it was very unfortunate that he had 
chosen to raise this issue at a time 'when a certain section of the inhabitants are defying the law'. 
Lanyon was also under a great deal of strain as a result of a poorly handled tax collecting crisis 
in Potchefstroom, and to make matters worse the Boers were planning another mass meeting. 165 
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He admitted to Kimberley that while the legislature was by no means liberal, even to contemplate 
giving the Boers legislative power would be 'most risky and dangerous', and the present unrest 
near Potchefstroom was the best proof of this. 166 The fact that the legislative assembly held only 
one more meeting, on 30 November 1880, before its demise, was probably because of the 
troubled situation in the Transvaal, 167 or perhaps Lanyon felt it would be wiser to adjourn the 
session and nominate new members, possibly replacing White, before continuing the work of the 
assembly. Either way, he was rapidly running out of time. 
The Boers, it is true, had been disappointed by Gladstone's reply to their May appeal, and felt 
badly done by. But on the other hand, as De Volksstem put it when Sir Gamet departed, the little 
general had stimulated the protest movement rather than curbed it and Lanyon, his 'faithful 
lieutenant', looked set to add even more fuel to the fire of Boer discontent. 168 Nevertheless 
Lanyon was confident that the situation in the Transvaal was under control. He felt that 
Gladstone's unyielding attitude to the Boer plea for independence had been a cruel setback for 
them, and that it would make them realise that to accept British rule was their only feasible 
option. At the end of June 1880 he wrote as much to Kimberley. There was, he said, a 
'considerable change for the better in the feelings of the population'. In his opinion - which, 
characteristically, was not humble - there were two reasons for this. In the first place there was 
a realisation that his 'strong and stable government' and the new legislature in the Transvaal 
were progressing admirably. Secondly, the news that the Liberals were not going to bring about 
'a change of policy' had settled any doubts the people had about the Transvaal's future. He 
assured Kimberley that 'anything like open and avowed insubordination' would be 'firmly dealt 
with, in order to prevent others being drawn into the whirlpool'. And he concluded his despatch 
with a confident: 'But this I do not anticipate or think probable. ' 169 
Lanyon was, however, misreading the situation. He was equating silence with acceptance. Van 
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Zyl shows that there was a reasonably high level of unrest, and gives examples of Boer 
antagonism towards British 'loyalists' in June and July in the western Transvaal and the 
Rustenburg area, both of which received wide coverage in De Volksstem. 17° Furthermore, the 
payment of tax by Boers was not progressing very well at all-despite Lanyon's insistence that 
it was. It was unfortunate indeed that a man with a fixation on the collection of taxes should have 
been placed in a position of authority over a community that comprised largely oflandowners 
who hated parting with their hard-earned money and found every excuse to baulk at handing it 
over to Lanyon. The idea of paying arrears was even more abhorrent, and many Boers had not 
payed taxes for years, even under their own government. A number in the Rustenburg area 
refused point blank to pay their dues. When charged and forced to do so they requested that their 
strenuous objection to paying tax to an illegal government be reflected on their receipts. British 
officials also had trouble exacting dues from Boers in the Potchefstroom district; so much so that 
by August 1880 less than half the estimated revenue from taxation in that district had been 
collected. 171 
Kruger and Joubert returned to Potchefstroom from Cape Town in late July 1880. It was felt that 
the full committee should meet the volk to discuss what to do about Gladstone's reply. It was 
decided to hold such a meeting on 8 January 1881 at Paardekraal, MW Pretorius' s farm near the 
present town ofKrugersdorp. The Boers' decision to persist with their quest for independence 
was no longer at issue. It was now a matter of how and when this should be effected, and whether 
or not Gladstone's May 1880 reply should be made the catalyst. Leonard Courtney's strenuous 
efforts - which had come to naught - on the Boers' behalf in the House of Commons at the end 
of August 1880, had proved that another approach to Gladstone would probably be in vain. 
Realistically speaking, with Lanyon's assurances to Kimberley that all was quiet in the 
Transvaal, and news from Colley that he and Lan yon had agreed that three of the minor military 
posts in the Transvaal could be abandoned and one regiment of infantry be dispensed with, 172 
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neither Gladstone nor Kimberley was likely to be receptive to the idea of handing back the 
republic to the Boers. 
For his part, when Lanyon heard that a date for another mass meeting of Boers had been set, he 
was not unduly perturbed. He wrote to Kimberley that nothing much had transpired at the 
discussions held by Kruger and Joubert with the sub-committee on 14 September, and that 
although another big meeting of the volk was being arranged for January, he was confident that 
little would come of it because the signs were all there that the Boer protest movement was on 
the wane. It was merely being kept alive by men like Pretorius and Bok who were dependent on 
the salaries they received from the Volkskomitee. There was little cause for concem. 173 
In any assessment of Owen Lanyon's achievements, in this case specifically during the nine 
months prior to the outbreak of war in the Transvaal in 1880, his financial management is perhaps 
the sphere of his work that brings him the most credit. This was Lanyon's forte and his 
management style was focused upon increasing his revenue by efficient tax collection, balancing 
his budget and keeping a meticulous set of accounts. His considerable success in turning the 
Transvaal finances around was reported with great self-satisfaction to his superiors174 and to his 
father, 175 although in a colony as cash-strapped as the Transvaal, the improvement was hardly 
sensational. 176 Between January and August 1880 under Lan yon' s direction, the revenue 
collected by CES Steele, the finance and revenue commissioner, whom the administrator praised 
for his zealous hard work, reached an unprecedented £ 146 000. 177 The defeat of the Pedi in late 
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1879 had of course opened up a new avenue for the collection of the statutory 10 shilling hut tax. 
Despite Wolseley' s veto of a move initiated in March by the newly constituted executive council 
- supported by Lanyon - to double the hut tax to £1,178 collection of this tax from Africans 
proved lucrative, although it only commenced in June 1880. The revenue from Africans, over a 
mere matter of months, reached £20 000 of the estimated £35 000 for 1880. 179 Lanyon reported 
his good progress in the financial sphere to Kimberley, 180 who was suitably impressed and 
congratulated the administrator, remarking that 'your statement as to the financial condition of 
the province has afforded me much satisfaction'. 181 In December 1880, despite the turmoil 
created by Boer resistance to payment of taxes in November- an issue which will be assessed 
in the next chapter of this thesis- Lan yon published his financial statement for 1880-1881 in the 
Transvaal Government Gazette of 6 December 1880. The mass of facts and figures compiled by 
the painstaking administrator bristle with confidence. He mentions only in passing that due to 
'political causes' the current taxes had thus far 'failed to reach the amounts estimated' and might 
unfortunately have to 'stand over for the time' .182 
Lanyon looked back with satisfaction on the dedicated work he had done since Wolseley's 
departure. Progress had been made in a number of fields. Importantly, the state's policy towards 
Africans was being addressed. In accordance with the new economic order after the discovery 
of diamonds, the authority of the African chiefs in the Transvaal had been replaced, in Lanyon's 
view, by African acceptance of British sovereignty and the supply of African labour had thus 
been facilitated. Issues of land ownership and the possibility of setting up locations had been 
broached, a pass system put in place and-most importantly as far as Lanyon was concemed-
Transvaal Africans had begun to pay taxes. He was particularly proud that there had been no 
general increase in taxation; success began to depend, in his mind, on boosting revenue by 
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efficient collection of the taxes that were due to the state. He told his father: 'They may look 
through the history of any other colony, and will fail to find a precedent for this statement. ' 183 
He had weathered a change of government at home and brokered a new-style independence in 
his administratorship of the Transvaal. 184 It was true that he had not managed to control the 
recalcitrant Boers, but felt reasonably sure that despite their sullen attitude to British rule and to 
him personally, they were all brag and lacked the courage to fight for the independence they so 
dearly sought. 185 
Ironically, in November 1880, as will be seen, it was Lanyon's blind determination to push the 
Transvaal revenue up to impressive new heights and earn more praise to boost his flagging 
morale in the face of growing unpopularity, that started the roller coaster that led to war and his 
humiliating recall. To the Boers, the payment of taxes symbolised an acceptance of British 
overlordship, which they hated with a passion. Lanyon's reading of the issue was in a curious 
way similar: his dogged enforcement of tax collection - among both Boers and Africans - was 
proof that British rule was alive and well in the Transvaal. 
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CHAPTER VII 
WAR, WITHDRAW AL AND LANYON'S RECALL 
By the end of 1880 the 38 year-old Owen Lanyon, now Sir Owen and proud to be the youngest 
knight of the distinguished order of St Michael and St George, 1 was weary. He had completed 
five long years of colonial service in southern Africa in two struggling, new British colonies. His 
years in Griqualand West had been challenging and his subjects far from easy to control, but he 
had found that his autocratic rule had borne some fruit, even at the expense of personal 
popularity: he had balanced his books, formalised imperial control over Africans and put in place 
an all-important African labour supply system and implemented rigid labour controls. 
Furthermore he had rounded off his rule in Kimberley with brief military glory. Now 
administrator of the Transvaal, as the year 1880 drew to a close, he felt that he was beginning 
to make significant headway, but it had been tough going. 
Wolseley was gone, there was a new ruling party in Britain, and Lanyon felt that the financial 
stability of the Transvaal was at last within his grasp. With five years experience behind him, he 
was happy to be in more or less sole control of the governance of the Transvaal. He liked it that 
way.2 No matter that he was unpopular- this was the price he felt he had to pay for being the 
instrument of firmness. Lanyon chose to put the acrimony down to Boer dislike of any sort of 
control, much less his strong and determined brand of control. In any case, a reformer was always 
unpopular. 3 In his letters home to his father, he expressed the opinion that the Boers were settling 
down at last, and he also reported this comforting news to both Colley and Kimberley.4 Although 
this was not a true reflection of the situation, the indications are that he believed this fervently. 
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Colley, fed by Lanyon's complacent reports about orderly government in the Transvaal, 
announced in his speech at the opening of the Natal legislative assembly, a copy of which he sent 
to Kimberley, that all was quiet in the Transvaal in October 1880 and there was every reason to 
hope for 'permanent prosperity' under Lanyon's 'firm and settled Government'. 5 
The administrator, to his own detriment, underestimated the extent of his unpopularity as surely 
as he underestimated the Boers' courage and resolve to oppose British rule. Throughout 
Lanyon's years in Pretoria, De Volksstem had kept up a constant barrage of criticism ofLanyon 
personally, his 'dummy' legislature, his officials and the 'iron heel of despotism' which was the 
mark of his administration.6 Certainly Lanyon was aware that Celliers' vitriolic pen had been 
'productive of much of the agitation' against British rule and 'had kept alive the spirit of 
antagonism'7, but he did not realise how powerful that antagonism was, or how committed the 
Boers were to regaining their independence. Colonial officialdom in the Transvaal under Lan yon 
was not only marked by firmness, it was also characterised by unwarranted complacency, and 
the two proved to be an ominous combination. 
As a bulwark against this unsparing criticism from the press and the public in general, Lanyon 
drew a few chosen officials around him. These men appeared to respect him, despite Wolseley's 
opinion that Lanyon had 'succeeded in making everyone his enemy', including his staff.8 WB 
Morcom, the state attorney, was one ofLanyon's close associates, and was frequently slated-
with justification - by the press for being grossly underqualified for the position he held. 9 CES 
Steele, whom Lanyon appointed as finance and revenue commissioner at a salary higher than the 
other officials, was another. According to Wolseley, Steele'sbiggerpaypacketwasagreatcause 
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of jealousy and had been 'unwise' on Lanyon's part, but then Sir Garnet had never seen eye to 
eye with Bartle Frere, and anyone who professed to admire Frere - as both Lanyon and Steele 
did - was doomed to suffer under Wolseley's pen: 'Except that Lanyon is completely under 
Frere's thumb & that Steele is Frere's protege,' he wrote in his diary, 'I cannot understand why 
it is that Lanyon endeavours at all times to push this wretched little man to the front. ' 10 Lanyon's 
private secretary, GY Lagden, 11 and G Hudson, the colonial secretary, were apparently more 
acceptable to the Transvalers, possibly because they were not seen as part of Lanyon's inner 
circle, and Hudson was of South African birth, which might have counted in his favour in Boer 
eyes. 12 Godfrey Lagden corresponded as a friend with Lanyon after he had left southern Africa, 
so he must have been reasonably close to the administrator. 13 Lanyon made very infrequent 
reference to his Transvaal officials in his letters home, but in late October 1880, when there was 
an outbreak of typhoid in the Transvaal and Lagden fell victim to the disease, he was apparently 
nursed back to health in Government House. 14 
At the beginning of September 1880 Lanyon felt that there was every inducement to take a well 
earned rest. He had worked extremely hard and had done everything that could be expected of 
him. He had been dogged by poor health since his days in Kimberley, 15 and now that the Boers 
seemed quiet, he wrote to the Colonial Office requesting six months leave: 
After five years of hard work and some anxiety, I really feel the want of a change to more pleasant scenes 
than South Africa can afford. I am sorry to say that I am again suffering from that numbness in the arm 
and the hand which obliged me once before to take sick leave in 1877 from Griqualand West, a sort of 
scribblers' paralysis, which is not a pleasant companion. But I do not wish to leave unless I see that I can 
do so without prejudicing my service ... in the Transvaal. 
He pointed out that there was 'a change for the better among the Boers' and - inevitably- that 
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he was 'very proud of the improvement in our revenue' despite not having resorted to increased 
taxation. The leave was approved in the Colonial Office, although Kimberley minuted that 
Lanyon's replacement would have to be 'thoroughly trustworthy and efficient' .16 He need not 
have worried; Britain did not have occasion to replace Lanyon, and he was only credited with 
six months' leave after he had been relieved of his post as administrator. 
On the same day as he wrote to the Colonial Office, Lanyon addressed a similar letter to 
Kimberley, underlining that he had not been absent from his work 'beyond the 2 months sick 
leave in 1877 when my health broke down from overwork'. He did not mention a specific date 
on which he wished his leave to commence because he undertook to go only if all was quiet. But 
he had good reason to feel that it might be possible to go home 'towards the end of the year'. 
And again he judged improved circumstances in the Transvaal by a financial yardstick: there was 
'a decided change for the better ... the natives are paying up their taxes quickly'. 17 
The notion that Africans in the Transvaal were indeed being made to accept British sovereignty 
and rigid colonial controls, and that Lanyon, as had been the case in Griqualand West, was the 
instrument of these measures, is borne out by the evidence. 18 When Lanyon appealed that he 
might be independent of Colley's direct influence in the Transvaal as far as civil matters were 
concerned, Kimberley was inclined to agree, but in the Colonial Office there were some 
reservations about Lanyon's competence - principally those suggested by Robert Herbert. 
Herbert felt that Lanyon was far too abrasive and autocratic, particularly in his handling of the 
Boers, and mindful of this, Kimberley granted Lanyon's request on two express conditions. 
Firstly, Lanyon had to refer all matters pertaining to African affairs directly to Colley, who was 
held in high regard and could provide his input more promptly than could the Colonial Office. 
Secondly, although Lanyon was granted permission to address his despatches in all other civil 
matters to the secretary of state, except in the event of war, in which case Colley had overall 
16 
17 
18 
PRO, CO 29116, (Separate), Lan yon - Colonial Office, 3 September 1880, and minute by Kimberley, 8 
October 1880. Colonel William Bellairs, the commander of the Transvaal forces was named to act; Ibid, 
CO 291/7, Colonial Office - Bellairs, 14 October 1880. 
PRO, CO 291/6, (Separate), Lanyon - Kimberley, 3 September 1880. 
For a discussion ofLanyon's African policy in the Transvaal in 1880 see Chapter VI. 
263 
control, Colley had to be sent copies of everything for his information. It would not do for the 
high commissioner for South-East Africa to be kept in the dark about affairs in the Transvaal. 19 
However, Lanyon did not allow Colley's official supervision of the administration of Africans 
to become a damper on his progress. He was confident enough to think that he knew far more 
than Colley, the newcomer to southern Africa, about matters in the region. As has been seen, the 
administrator's two-month tour of the north-eastern regions to hold discussions with the chiefs 
and collect the hut tax in each district was from the colonial government's point of view 
successful,20 in that the Africans paid up 'willingly' and without exception were 'anxious to 
demonstrate their friendliness towards the government' .21 By the end of 1880 a start had also 
been made with defining state control oflabour, passes and land use.22 
The fact that Lanyon was unable to take his leave at the end of the year was not only because of 
the increased recalcitrance of the Boers. In September 1880 when Lanyon's programme of tax 
collection and his tightening of imperial screws on the Africans was progressing well, his Cape 
counterparts were having less success. At the time that Kruger and Joubert were meeting in the 
Potchefstroom district to decide how best to proceed in the Transvaal Boers' continued quest for 
independence, and Lan yon was oblivious of their determination to succeed, the Cape government 
was experiencing determined resistance to the imposition of colonial control from the well armed 
Sotho in Basutoland.23 
The wide availability of arms on the diamond fields, an issue that Lanyon was well acquainted 
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with, and on which he had expressed his unequivocal opposition,24 was behind yet another 
expression of African resistance to advancing colonialism. The Cape decided that it was 
necessary to disarm the Sotho as part of the process of extending colonial control over subject 
Africans, and the Basotho strenuously resisted this move. The 1880-1881 Basotho War is only 
relevant to this thesis in passing, because it was in the midst of the Sotho upheaval that the Boer 
rebellion in the Transvaal broke out, adding to Britain's woes in southern Africa. The Basotho 
War and the inevitable necessity of using imperial troops - and, by implication, involving 
imperial expense - which is exactly what Britain wanted to avoid, therefore influenced the 
British decision to withdraw from the Transvaal in 1881, which in tum meant the end of 
Lanyon's southern African career. 
In Pretoria, Lanyon observed that trouble was brewing for the Cape Colony and wrote to tell his 
father about the serious implications this could have: 
I am sorry to say I fear the Cape Govt are in for a row in Basutoland, for which they are neither ready nor 
able to cope with. If there be trouble, it will be a serious matter for the Basutu (sic )can tum out some 8 to 
10 000 mounted men exclusive of the more than double that force of footmen and their country is 
admirably adapted for cavalry work ... the Cape people will have more on their hands than they can 
manage, and ultimately the Imperial Govt will have to help for it cannot stand by and see its colonists 
thrashed. 25 
Once the war began, volunteer forces were hurriedly raised in the Cape, but as Lanyon put it , 
'they should have been ready with an extinguisher when playing with fire'. Priding himself on 
being something of an old hand at raising and equipping volunteers, Lanyon offered to send a 
force of 300 men and two guns from the Transvaal. As will be seen, his decision was ill-advised. 
It was a drain on his own defences, and only a few weeks later these soldiers were as urgently 
needed in the Transvaal as was an extinguisher. The Cape initially turned down his offer, only 
to change its mind and accept a week later when matters grew worse. As for the Transvaal, 
Lanyon felt that all was 'quietude'. He seemed so preoccupied with the notion that the Cape 
unrest would spark African disturbances elsewhere, as to be oblivious to any danger nearer home. 
By the end of October 1880 he resigned himself to the fact that with the Cape war still raging he 
would not be able to take his leave as planned. 'It is very hard on the rest of us', he complained, 
'for I was looking forward to the prospect of getting a holiday, which of course will be 
24 See Chapter III. 
25 TA, A596, vol 15, Lanyon- Charles Lanyon, 11 September 1880. 
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impossible so long as active operations are going on. '26 
After his letter of 30 October, Lanyon did not write to his father again until 22 November 1880, 
a full three weeks later, which was unusual for this devoted son and punctilious letter-writer. The 
reason was that November 1880 proved to be a fateful month, providing the spark that set the 
Boer rebellion alight. Ironically, because accumulating revenue for the state was so central to 
Lanyon's confidence of administrative success, it was a dispute about Boer non-payment of tax 
that precipitated the armed revolt. 
Collecting tax in Potchefstroom: the spark to light the powder keg 
The state revenue, the symbol in Lanyon's mind of any government's stability, had increased 
again in 1880.27 He felt that it was now simply a matter of mopping up outstanding taxes from 
the more recalcitrant Boers; he planned to redouble his efforts to bring the full force of the law 
to bear on those who chose to be obstructive about paying their dues. As has been shown, in the 
latter part of 1880 there were increasing incidents of Boer reluctance to pay their taxes. 28 Many 
Boers saw such payment as tacit recognition of the authority of the government. Lanyon, in 
response, told his officials to step up their efforts; in cases where payments were made expressly 
'under protest' the money was to be accepted but care taken by the officials not to give either 
verbal or written recognition of such protest.29 Blunt refusal to pay was to be followed by court 
action.30 
The Boer stronghold of Potchefstroom seemed to be the eye of the trouble. On 7 October 1880, 
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following the Rustenburg example, about 130 burghers drew up a letter of protest which they 
handed to the local landdrost, AM Goetz, to say that they were not prepared to pay tax to an 
unlawful government and that they would only do so if it was recorded on their receipts that they 
did so under protest. Their stance was published in De Volksstem,31 and Goetz began issuing 
summonses to the men involved. Similar incidents meanwhile cropped up in Standerton and 
Pretoria,32 but it was in Potchefstroom, where less than half the revenue from taxes had been 
collected by August, that events were precipitated in the case of a certain PL Bezuidenhout. 
Bezuidenhout was prepared to pay £14 of the £27 5s in taxes that the government was demanding 
from him, which according to him was all he owed, but Goetz held out for the full amount. When 
summonsed, Bezuidenhout again refused, upon which his wagon was attached by the authorities. 
Goetz reported to Lanyon on 11November1880 that it was the intention to have the wagon sold 
that same morning. He added that there were 'About at least 100 Boers ... assembled in front of 
my office on the Church Square', and that their 'foremen' were addressing them and saying that 
they would not allow the sale of the wagon to take place.33 When the wagon came up for sale, 
PA (Piet) Cronje and a number of Boers seized it and returned it to Bezuidenhout. Goetz's staff 
tried to restore order but were hopelessly outnumbered.34 This was open defiance and Lanyon 
refused to brook such opposition. In his view, defiance of the law had to be met with force; any 
other response would be one of weakness. He called in the troops.35 
Lanyon wrote to Kimberley on 14 November 1880 informing him of the 'action of some of the 
disaffected Boers' in Potchefstroom. Despite the fact that he was, he said, fully confident that 
the matter could be resolved, he had requested William Bellairs, the officer commanding the 
Transvaal forces, to send troops to the town 
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to support the civil authority and to show these misguided people that the law cannot be defied. I do not 
anticipate that any serious trouble will arise out of the affair. It is only a repetition of what has occurred 
at Middelburg and other places where there was no force available. But it is time that more serious notice 
should be taken of such acts in order to deter further breaches of the peace. 36 
The troops, under the command of Major Thornhill, entrenched themselves outside the town. 
Lanyon and Morcom, the attorney general, also made the necessary arrangements to bring the 
guilty rebels and their ring leaders of this 'outrage' to justice. The principal offenders, said 
Morcom, were to be imprisoned without the option of a fine, and the legal system would then 
proceed.37 Lanyon also sent Hudson, the colonial secretary, to Potchefstroom to deal with the 
situation.38 In the days that followed, Captain PE Raaff, sent to the town to apprehend the four 
main participants, proved unsuccessful, with Piet Cronje, the Boer spokesman, defying Raaffs 
authority and warning him of the consequences should he and his men try to arrest any Boers. 
Furthermore there was to be no more tax collection, or the Boers would resist. 39 Raaff and 
Thornhill decided to stay their hand and await orders from Lanyon on how to proceed. In truth 
they had no other option. 
Meanwhile Lanyon determined to make an example of JF Celliers of De Volksstem by arresting 
him on charges of treason and sedition. In addition to his constant barrage of criticism, Celliers 
had seen fit on 16 November to publish a defiant declaration by a group of Boers that they would 
not pay their taxes, or if they did so, it would be under protest.40 To Lanyon, Celliers' gall in 
encouraging the non-payment of tax, the life blood of government, was like a red rag to a bull. 
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Lanyon explained to Kimberley that Celliers was the source of' evil counsels and false reports'; 
his influence was behind much of the Boer agitation and had to be curbed. Lanyon had Celliers 
arrested so that the Boers would realise that there was no question of any leniency. As far as the 
Boers were concerned, he said, leniency meant 'weakness' and conciliation was interpreted as 
'indecision'. The volk- the 'people' - as he put it, were merely an incited, clamouring crowd, 
which was 'not even a constituted part of an organised whole'. The Boers had no plan of action; 
they were ignorant and could do no more than follow their leaders blindly, and they had to be 
taught a sharp lesson. Action like the imprisonment of Celliers would do the trick, and with luck 
the Boers might even give up the idea of their January 1881 mass meeting: 'If the people see that 
the government is determined and strong enough to enforce the law, I do not believe that 
anything will come of it.' In the conclusion to this inordinately long letter, Lan yon reiterated: 'I 
do not think that there is much - if any- cause for anxiety. ' 41 
He remained unafraid. He was backed by troops and the Boers would not have the courage to 
take them on. It seems almost inconceivable that with his military experience he did not realise 
that his troops were limited and awkwardly scattered. Almost as ifhe could not bring himself to 
admit that he had been wrong about the 'quietude' in the Transvaal, or that his orderly 
government had been found wanting, a week later he repeated to his father the 'no reason for 
concern' platitudes he had made to Kimberley on 14 and 19 November 1880: 
I have just arrested the Editor of a paper here for sedition and I expect eveiy day to have to go to 
Potchefstroom (100 miles off) to keep things quiet there. I have two horses in readiness to start away if 
I hear of any chance of a row. I don't believe that these cowardly Boers have it in them to fight, but there 
is a possibility, tho' not a probability of a row. I am woefully hard pressed, ... They [my staff] say I am 
killing them with work; all I can say is that they don't do half as many hours as I do, so they can't 
I . 42 comp am. 
Nor, it would seem, was Lanyon's stubborn denial his only shortcoming. The author of The 
Transvaal War, who was in all probability William Bellairs,43 accuses Lanyon of two grave 
tactical errors in the immediate aftermath of the tax debacle in Potchefstroom. Bellairs also 
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contacted Lanyon on 16 November 1880 and expressed his concern that, because of the departure 
of the troops to Potchefstroom, the force left in Pretoria was seriously depleted.44 His informed 
advice to Lanyon was that more troops should be brought in from one of the rural outposts, but 
inexplicably, Lanyon demurred, delaying until 23 November 1880 before sanctioning this move. 
The delay, Bellairs said later, was a grave tactical mistake on Lanyon's part because it was not 
until 27 November that the call for additional forces reached Lydenburg and the movement of 
troops to Pretoria could be effected. The Lydenburg detachment of the 94th Regiment 
subsequently clashed with the Boers at Bronkhorstspruit, with disastrous results.45 Secondly, 
having persuaded himself - despite all indications to the contrary- that there was no immediate 
cause for concern, Lanyon delayed his decision to telegraph Colley in Pietermaritzburg for 
military assistance until as late as 25 November 1880. His telegram gave no hint of urgency. He 
asked Colley to send the 581h Regiment back to the Transvaal because the Boer protest had 
become 'more marked' and they were planning a meeting in January. Colley, clearly not in 
possession of the full facts and lulled into a sense of false security by the equable tone of 
Lanyon's telegram, reluctantly agreed to comply because he felt that the 58th might well be 
needed in Pondoland, where trouble had also broken out.46 He was unhurried in his shuffling of 
the available troops to see what he could spare for the Transvaal, and in the end so much time 
was lost that when the forces eventually reached Standerton, they were too late to be of much 
help.47 
In effect, Lanyon had split up his patently inadequate forces by stationing small parties of 
soldiers at different and distant points. He could safely have dispensed with posts at Rustenburg, 
Marabastad and Lydenburg, and used them to strengthen Pretoria, as Bellairs had suggested, but 
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instead these were retained48 and only the 94th began its belated and fateful march to Pretoria. 
Lanyon also reluctantly admitted that his magnanimous gesture of sending volunteers to 
Basutoland had been ill-advised; they were sorely needed nearer home.49 As De Kiewiet puts it 
in his criticism of the administrator, a self-confessed militarist of considerable experience, 'The 
cardinal sins of strategy were all his. ' 50 
As the fateful month of November 1880 drew to a close, Lanyon was under mounting pressure 
from all sides, but he found time to write to his father to assure him that things were still under 
control in the Transvaal: 
The Boers are as troublesome as they can well be, the natives are restless on account of the Basutu (sic) 
War, the Legislative Assembly is sitting ... the folks say I am killing them all with work, but there are very 
few here who know what honest conscientious work is ... [As for me,] a reformer is always unpopular, and 
I am a moral Ishmael in this place ... The Boers are very troublesome just now for they think the Basu tu 
war is their opportunity ... I don't believe in their brag and bounce, but I am almost alone in this opinion, 
and general funk prevails. But I cannot close my eyes to the fact that a crisis is at hand, and we may have 
a row on any day unless careful handling is practised. 51 
Seemingly by the time he wrote this letter, Lanyon was aware that there was a crisis on his 
hands, but he was still confident that it could be put down. He realised that he was virtually alone 
in his complacency, and yet his self-assurance overrode the counsel of others. Perhaps his need 
to answer his detractors and stem the growing tide of unpopularity- which he admits here to his 
father- had something to do with his foolhardy attitude. It is possible that he was determined to 
prove them wrong and take all the glory. There seems to be no other explanation for his 
blunders. 52 
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Lanyon's despatches in the aftermath of the November disturbances were not well received in 
the Colonial Office. His bombastic assurances that he had everything under control did not ring 
true. There were too many snide remarks about the Boers' ignorance and lack of courage and the 
government's ability to handle it. In a word, Lanyon came across as too cocksure. Herbert 
minuted his disapproval of the arrest of Celliers and wondered whether it had precipitated the 
outbreak. He felt that Lanyon relied far too much on the 'notorious cowardice of the Boers'. 
Kimberley was also irritated by Lan yon' s patronising attitude and like Herbert feared that trouble 
might well be on the way. 53 
Paardekraal: the die is cast 
On 5 December 1880 Lanyon wrote to Kimberley again to inform him that the Boer meeting 
originally planned for January had been brought forward to 8 December 1880. The Boers had 
decided that with feelings riding high and Lanyon apparently in a quandary, 54 it would be a good 
idea to bring the January meeting forward. They felt that this decision was warranted even if it 
meant that some of the Boers would be pressed to reach Paardekraal, the appointed place some 
35 miles south west of Pretoria, by the new date.55 Even at this stage the administrator did not 
see how critical the situation had become: 'I still do not think there is much cause for anxiety,' 
he wrote, 'but the position of affairs is one that requires careful attention and watching. ' 56 He 
brushed aside the fact that the troops he had requested from outlying posts would not be able to 
reach the Pretoria district before the date of the meeting when he might well have need of them. 57 
On the eve of the Boer meeting there were those who saw the impending danger and they did 
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what they could to intervene. In Pretoria JG Kotze wrote to Lanyon, giving him some advice on 
other forms of government that might be acceptable to the Boers in place of the present autocratic 
regime. Perhaps offers such as these could have averted the immediate crisis. Lanyon did no 
more than acknowledge receipt of the letter.58 Brand of the Orange Free State contacted both 
Strahan in the Cape, who was acting while awaiting the arrival of Robinson, the newly appointed 
high commissioner, and Colley, asking each of them to take whatever action they felt appropriate 
to calm the worrisome tension in the Transvaal.59 Colley's almost breezy reply to Brand makes 
it clear that he had little clue of the gravity of the situation. He was, he said, confident that 
Lanyon had matters well under control.60 In fact, two days earlier Colley had written to 
Kimberley about other general matters and in his final paragraph he mentioned in passing: 
There is little news from the Transvaal. The present agitation seems principally connected with the annual 
tax notices. Protests have been made ... a good deal of violent language has been used .. .I still trust that ... 
a firm enforcement of the law will ultimately tire out these spasmodic efforts of disaffection.61 
It was patently clear that not only had Lanyon failed to give Colley the full facts; he had given 
him virtually no news at all. It is true that Lanyon had been under immense pressure, and that 
Colley had presumably been sent copies of Lanyon's despatches to Kimberley. Nevertheless, 
bearing in mind that any instructions from the Colonial Office in reaction to letters from Pretoria 
took several months, Lanyon might have been expected to have been in frequent telegraphic 
communication with Colley, who was, after all, the high commissioner of the region and the 
supreme commander of the imperial troops. Lanyon' s insistence that he preferred to work alone, 
that Colley was his junior in terms of service in southern Africa and that Colley knew little of 
the circumstances in the Transvaal, are hardly convincing excuses for Lanyon's conduct, which 
bordered on dereliction of duty. Nor, it must be said, can Colley be exonerated. True, he was 
distracted by the urgency of the situation in Pondoland and his heavy military responsibilities, 
but on paper his was the final responsibility, and he later paid the ultimate price for Lanyon's 
poor judgement and complacency, and for his own inept acceptance ofLanyon's assurances. 
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Lanyon's father, as ever, was given enough news to stop him fretting about his son. In an 
unusually short letter, Charles Lanyon was told: 
In two days we shall have an excited camp full of Boers close to our capital, and the usual amount of funk 
on both sides. The situation is both interesting and amusing for a few days might possibly see us on the 
war tramp tho' I don't think it is by any means probable. However, long before you get this you will have 
heard by wire whether the pusillanimous Boers have mustered or rather drunk sufficient Dutch courage 
to try conclusions with the Govt. I enclose you an account of our budget speech which will show you how 
. 62 
we are gettmg on. 
It is significant, and even verges on the ludicrous, that at a time of such high political crisis, 
Lanyon once again saw fit to equate the well-being of his Transvaal administrative machine with 
the state of its finances. 
On 6 December 1880, he published a notice in the government gazette. It outlined his version 
of the lawlessness at Potchefstroom the previous month, and warned those who were planning 
to attend the Boer meeting in two days' time that all defiance of the law would be punished. He 
reminded them that meetings held for seditious purposes were unlawful and that the authority 
of the British crown would be upheld. As for the 'quietly disposed', they were reassured that the 
government would make sure that the law was respected.63 The notice had no apparent effect on 
the Boers other than to make them more determined to attend. They claimed with some 
justification that Lanyon had left them with no choice. By exercising what they saw as their basic 
right to independence they became declared rebels. Lanyon had made the decision easier for 
them.64 
On 12 December1880, while the Boers were deliberating at Paardekraal, Lanyon wrote to his 
father to complain that Pretoria was filled with the 'panic-stricken who have flocked into the 
town for protection', so he was well aware that the general public was of the opinion that the 
Boers meant to take up arms if necessary to reclaim their independence. Lanyon - who was 
growing increasingly sensitive to criticism - claimed many of those who had come into the 
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capital were abusing his government 
for not taking proper steps to defend them, so one gets abused all round. However, this don't (doesn't?) 
interfere with my appetite or sleep so it don't matter much. The Boers say they really intend to fight this 
time; I won't believe it till I hear their bullets. But they are assembled in camp ... and talk very big - the 
inflated toads. 65 
Lanyon also informed Kimberley that he had been told by the native commissioner in the 
Zoutpansberg district and by Henrique Shepstone, the secretary of native affairs, that some of 
the Boers were trying to 'incite the natives to join issue with them against the Government' but 
that the chiefs had remained loyal and refused to submit to the Boer entreaties. Whether there 
was any truth in these reports is open to question. 66 Be that as it may, Lanyon then turned the 
information into a tool to impress Kimberley: ' ... this serves to prove how gladly the natives 
welcome the change of rule, even though it necessitated their paying their taxes and being 
subordinate to the government. ' 67 
The Boer meeting at Paardekraal was attended by approximately 6 000 men, although due to the 
short notice of the meeting some of the Boers arrived several days late. Conflicting estimates of 
total attendance varied from 4 000 to as high as 8 000, and even 10 000 Boers.68 The 
deliberations began on 9 December and lasted for nearly a week. Lanyon did his best to plant 
some spies among the Boers but found it 'almost impossible to obtain the services of reliable 
men to go to the camp'. Those who managed to infiltrate the Boer ranks were soon detected and 
'had to fly'. 69 The general Boer attitude was one of determination that this time their quest should 
not be denied. It was agreed that the old volksraad should be reconstituted and at its first 
65 
66 
67 
68 
69 
TA, A 596, Vol 15, Lanyon- Charles Lanyon, 12 December 1880. 
Similarly, the Boers made allegations that the British had 'armed natives in the field', although Lanyon 
claimed that all offers of assistance from friendly chiefs were naturally refused; Davey, The siege of 
Pretoria, p 199. 
TA, ATC/5, no 198, Lanyon-Kimberley, 12 December 1880, p 32. 
De Volksstem 14 December 1880. An estimate by a government spy, was put at 5 000; Van Zyl, Die 
protesbeweging van die Transvaalse Afrikaners, pp 161-162. Bellairs, The Transvaal War, pp 59-60, 
claims that there were 4 000 men at the meeting as it opened, but that others arrived later. All told he 
estimated that the Boers claimed to have 7 000 men under arms. 
TA, ATC/5, no 1, Lanyon - Kimberley, 23 January 1881, p 50-57. In this letter to Kimberley, written 
while besieged in Pretoria, Lanyon gives a report of proceedings in December 1880 to fill the secretary 
of state in on events since his previous letter of 12 December 1880. 
275 
meeting, on Monday 13 December 1880, a triumvirate comprising Kruger, Joubert and Pretorius 
was formed. Heidelberg was to be the seat of the new government. 70 The triumvirate immediately 
drew up a proclamation to announce the restoration of a republican government. It did not 
exclude the possibility of conferring with the British government, or even, under certain 
conditions, of considering federation, but it was clear that acceptance of British overlordship was 
a thing of the past. This was a virtual declaration of war. 
Cronje left to have the proclamation printed in Potchefstroom and on 15 December the Boers 
moved away from Paardekraal and headed for Heidelberg. On their way they cut the telegraph 
wires,71 putting an end to Lanyon's communication with Colley in Natal; one of the last 
telegrams that left Pretoria was Lan yon' s sobering report to the high commissioner that the Boers 
had decided to re-establish their republic. 72 On 16 December 1880 Heidelberg was occupied, and 
the Boers then took over the government offices and raised the Vierkleur. 73 
Lanyon, secure for the moment in Government House, had no official information of these 
developments until a letter, which amounted to an ultimatum, was delivered to him by a Boer 
representative on 17 December 1880. He was handed a copy of the Paardekraal proclamation and 
informed that the republican government had been duly established at Heidelberg. He was given 
48 hours to respond to the call for the recognition of the Boer republic and asked to agree that 
Pretoria be transferred back under Boer control. 74 This was clearly unacceptable to Lanyon and 
his reply was prompt and characteristically unequivocal. The Boers had acted unlawfully and 
their resistance to the government constituted a rebellion. He issued a proclamation the following 
day calling on the commander of the imperial troops to take the necessary steps against the rebels 
in order 'to vindicate the authority of Her Majesty's Government, and to put down insurrection 
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wherever it may be found to exist' .75 This message was also sent back to the triumvirate.76 
Some shots had already been fired in Potchefstroom on 16 December but the first major 
encounter of the war was the virtual elimination of the 94th Regiment that had been called from 
Lydenburg to Pretoria by Lanyon on 23 November. Bellairs, who had recommended on 16 
November that reinforcements be requested, was critical that Lanyon had delayed so long to 
issue the order.77 But in his letter to Kimberley, Lanyon took none of the blame. His order had 
been given promptly once affairs were 'beginning to assume a more serious aspect,' he declared, 
but in Lydenburg a shortage of transport and the very slow preparations on the part of the officer 
in command - Lieutenant Colonel PR Anstruther - meant that the 250 men only started out on 
5 December 1880. Furthermore, said Lanyon, Bellairs had specifically warned Anstruther to be 
wary of a possible Boer attack on the way to Pretoria. Anstruther was not careful enough, and 
at Bronkhorstspruit, on 20 December his force was intercepted and decimated by a body of about 
1 500 mounted Boers under Frans Joubert.78 
The next day, 21December1880, when news of the disaster that had befallen the 94th reached 
Pretoria, Lan yon declared martial law throughout the Transvaal. 79 He argued that this was 
necessary to ensure public safety, more particularly because there were many Boers in the town 
who were flushed with their success of the previous day.80 With the hoped-for reinforcements 
snuffed out at Bronkhorstspruit, Pretoria was under siege, encircled by Boer troops that were 
closing in on the capital and cutting off all communication and supplies. For a full 100 days, until 
the news came through to Pretoria on 15 March 1881 that an armistice had been concluded, they 
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had to hang on in the hope that Colley's relieving force would come to their rescue.81 
Lanyon and Bellairs, the administrator and the commander of the Transvaal forces respectively, 
although they did not really see eye to eye, 82 were the two senior government officials in the 
beleaguered town. Under martial law, Bellairs, to Lanyon's irritation could- both literally and 
figuratively - call the shots. Furthermore, Lanyon's brief as administrator in full control of all 
civil affairs in the Transvaal was superceded by Colley 'in the event of war'. 83 Once again 
Lanyon was forced into puppet status and was powerless to change his circumstances. 
Admittedly, Colley was in Pietermaritzburg and between him and Lanyon there was no 
telegraphic link and no regular mail. Blockade-runners did manage to deliver some despatches 
in and out of Pretoria,84 but for his final 100 days in Pretoria, while Lanyon was 'cribbed, 
cabined, confined and bound in', 85 along with the other residents of Pretoria, he would almost 
certainly have found it very irksome that he had very little public standing, if any at all. 
Lanyon and the siege of Pretoria 
The siege of Pretoria, as far as the Boers were concerned, was a sound tactical decision. They 
realised that despite their early success in the war it was to their advantage to tie down a large 
British force which might otherwise have advanced on Potchefstroom or their new capital of 
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Heidelberg. 86 It left them free to reinforce the south east approaches to the Transvaal, where they 
knew that their commandos would be put to the test by the professionally trained imperial 
troops.87 On 19 December Colley's heavily armed reinforcements finally left Natal for the 
Transvaal, and could be expected, he told Kimberley, to reach Standerton by 20 January 1881. 88 
This is clear evidence of just how slow and ponderous the imperial forces were, and how difficult 
it was to move troops and equipment along the rough tracks through the veld.89 Colley's 
reinforcements would take a full month to be within helpful distance of Pretoria, where the relief 
of the capital was presumably their first priority. 
Within the town there was much to do. Lan yon was full of praise for the 'excellent arrangements' 
made by Bellairs.90 The town was evacuated and the residents of the town were moved into the 
adjacent military camp, gaol and convent, 'in quarters and under canvas' ... 'The town is very 
open and scattered', explained Lan yon, 'and it would have been impossible to guard it from any 
sudden raid'. There had also been concerns that the Boer residents might try to make contact with 
the enemy if not kept under close surveillance. A rationing system was introduced and foodstuffs 
in the town were commandeered. 91 Despite the cramped conditions morale was apparently high 
among the residents, particularly after a messenger had managed to enter the town with the good 
news that reinforcements were on the way.92 Lanyon made a public announcement in the 
government gazette that strong reinforcements had arrived in Natal from Britain, more were on 
their way, and that Colley was 'on the South-Eastern Districts with a strong column' .93 It was a 
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vain hope. 
The defence of Pretoria and the command of the armed forces were the responsibility of 
Bellairs,94 but Lanyon was involved in the raising of a local mounted volunteer corps. He 
reported that it was disappointing that only a third of the men who were capable ofbearing arms 
offered their services.95 The lack of a regular cavalry force made the largest of these units, the 
Pretoria Carbineers, particularly useful to Bellairs, and they were assigned the task of conducting 
regular patrols around the town.96 Lanyon reported that within the first month of the siege 
'several engagements have taken place in the immediate vicinity of Pretoria, in all of which our 
men have been successful' .97 Perhaps anticipating criticism from the Colonial Office for his lack 
of conciliation towards the Boers, and his poor judgement about the severity of the situation in 
the months prior to the war, Lanyon made brief mention of the excuses he was to repeat time and 
again over the following months. In a later despatch, he said he would report fully on the 'causes 
which led to this sudden outbreak and show how unanticipated it was, even by the people 
themselves'. 98 That it was the result of a sudden impulse, he claimed 'there can be little doubt' .99 
The evidence proves that the contrary was true. The outbreak was not sudden, nor had the Boers 
acted on impulse. And it was anticipated by many people. Indeed, Lanyon, by his own 
admission, was one of the very few who did not foresee a war. 
He was unable to write to his father for more than a month, there being no postal service to and 
from the town, but on 23 January 1881 a despatch rider volunteered to make a dash through 
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enemy lines, and he took the opportunity to send his father some news. He was still confident 
of victory, and although there were skirmishes almost daily, the Boers were risking an attack on 
the town because they knew they would be outclassed: 
I have no greater opinion of their bravery than I had before, and the whole thing will collapse when our 
reinforcements arrive and they get one good dressing ... Colley should be here next month ... The rising 
surprised everyone and no one more so than the Boers themselves. [sic] In fact it was the result of a mobs 
impulse, and having put their foot into it they are afraid to stop. 100 
That Lanyon believed what he wrote about the outbreak of war is difficult to comprehend. And 
yet there seemed no need to lie to his father. There is no apparent explanation other than the 
possibility that he had convinced himself that what he wrote was true. 
Apart from the administration of justice and his civil correspondence to Kimberley to keep him 
appraised of developments within the beleaguered town and the progress of the government, 
Lanyon, as ever, kept a close check on Transvaal finances. A few days after the war broke out 
he appointed a four-man valuation and compensation board to regulate the prices paid for 
foodstuffs and the level of compensation payable to those whose goods were commandeered. 
This board liaised closely with the commissariat and also organised the distribution of rations 
to the civilians in the town. 101 Lanyon also ensured that there was sufficient African labour for 
running the besieged town. The approximately 1 400 Africans in Pretoria formed a useful labour 
pool and Lan yon also arranged for workers to act as scouts, messengers and scavengers. The pass 
system was still rigidly applied during the siege, but a notice was issued within a week of the 
beginning of the siege that there was to be no threatening behaviour or ill-treatment of Africans 
by either the military or civilians. 102 On 22 February 1880 Lan yon was able to send the secretary 
of state one of his familiar self-laudatory reports on the condition of the Transvaal finances. He 
provided impressive comparative figures on the revenue and expenditure returns for the years 
1878-1880, and made much of the fact that annual revenue, without an increase in taxation - and 
despite the fact that revenue was 'almost uncollected' for the last two months of 1880 - had 
almost trebled since the British takeover in 1877. He put this 'great improvement' down to the 
fact that 'the establishment of a more secure form of government and an improved system of 
100 TA, A596, vol 16, Lanyon- Charles Lanyon, 23 January 1881. 
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collection and supervision' had been introduced. 103 He was clearly hoping that his progress in 
matters financial would stand him in good stead should there be any recriminations about his 
handling of the crisis. 
Lanyon's inability to get on well with most of his fellow officials became even more focused in 
the confined situation of a siege. With JG Kotze, the demoted ex-chief justice, Lanyon had a long 
history of animosity and he was not one to set a grudge aside. The executive council which was 
still functioning- under Lanyon's domination -had occasion to complain about delays in the 
legal system which apparently met with hostility by Kotze, who for his part, as were many 
others, was critical ofLanyon and his close associates, particularly Morcom and Steele. 104 Under 
martial law the high court and landdrost courts were closed for the duration of the war and this 
gave rise to friction between the military and the law-enforcement officers. Lanyon's way out 
of the difficulty was to rely heavily on Morcom's input and to appoint Steele as inspector of 
prisons, 105 which proved to be an unpopular choice. Because there was little else to report upon, 
the camp newspaper, The News of the Camp, seized upon these snippets of information. Even 
after the siege, when the publishers reverted to printing the Transvaal Argus and Commercial 
Gazette, it criticised Lanyon for allowing himself to be misled by his close advisers and being 
guilty of what it called 'misdirection of affairs' in the Transvaal. 106 
February and March 1881 were apparently quiet months in besieged Pretoria after the number 
of brisk 'engagements' Lan yon had reported in January, and to counter the boredom in the camp, 
diversions were arranged such as concerts, performances by a band and occasional sporting 
activities. In his diary, Gamet Wolseley recorded that while in Pretoria he played tennis with 
Lanyon, 107 but apparently Lanyon's athletic ability also stretched to cricket and during the siege 
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he took part in a cricket match between the military and the civil officials. He did not fare well; 
he was 'run out' for one run. 108 
It was a matter of a few weeks before he was to leave Pretoria that Lanyon had another 
opportunity to send a letter to his father. He reported that all was quiet in the town and that the 
lack of news about the war outside was very trying. He wished heartily that he could 'cast off 
civil thralls' and take part in the fighting. There is no mention of the progress of the war in his 
letter or the fact that Colley had not yet arrived. Again, but more determinedly, he reiterated his 
views on the outbreak of war, and there is a hint that criticism might be coming his way: 
I more I see and hear the more convinced I am that there was no one in the Province, not even the rebels 
themselves or their leaders, who had any idea that the crisis was so near at hand when the rebellion broke 
out and I feel quite certain that such will be acknowledged when facts are known, and the public at home 
are fully aware of what has transpired.109 
In a letter to Charles Lanyon, two days after the armistice had been concluded, Robert Herbert 
of the Colonial Office explained that the cease-fire meant that the relief of Pretoria and the 
release of 'your gallant son' would have to wait for a few more weeks, but he assured him that 
'I hope it will not be long before your son marches out with all honour' .110 Herbert's minutes on 
Colonial Office correspondence had thus far been decidedly critical of Lanyon's conduct of 
Transvaal affairs; presumably on 8 March 1881, when the note to Charles Lanyon was written, 
discussions about 'gallant' Lanyon's fate had not yet been held. One would like to think that 
Herbert had some pangs of conscience about his glowing report of the Colonial Office's soon-to-
be-recalled imperial agent. 
There had been whisperings coming through to Pretoria about peace talks towards the end of 
February, but it was only on 15 March 1881 that the people in the besieged town heard that an 
armistice had been concluded. Unbeknown to them, Colley had made one last desperate attempt 
to invade the Transvaal but his force had been stopped in its tracks. Rumours of the Boer triumph 
at Majuba on 27 February 1881 and the fact that Colley had been mortally wounded, were rife 
108 Davey, The siege of Pretoria, p 295, footnote 3. 
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in the besieged town in subsequent weeks, but were only confirmed officially on 24 March. 111 
Meanwhile the Boers still maintained their siege and the Pretoria garrison kept up its vigil. 112 
Lanyon addressed a letter to Kimberley on 18 March 1881, amidst all the conflicting rumours, 
asking for clarity on the situation. The government, he said, 'is utterly ignorant of what is going 
on around us' and had only been able to glean some information from 'friendly natives' from the 
surrounding districts. The despatch then provides a general report on progress during the siege 
and a justification of the efficient and orderly manner in which Lan yon and his government had 
prevented the capital from falling into the hands of the enemy, listing the numbers of men killed 
and wounded in Pretoria's defence. 113 Furthermore he refutes most indignantly the 'wholly 
unreliable' Boer statements about his non-conciliatory attitude, the harsh treatment of prisoners 
and the British manipulation of African people to participate in the war effort against the Boers. 
He writes most pointedly that 
I feel very deeply the position in which the Government has been placed by these and other mis-statements 
made, for many will be led to believe what we have been powerless to contradict. I only trust that a rigid 
enquiry may be hereafter instituted, for nothing has been done by the Government which it need be 
ashamed of or would afford cause for animadversion. I only ask that judgement may be suspended 
regarding any statement which may emanate from such sources, till the government shall have had an 
. f 1 . th 114 opportumty o rep ymg to em. 
Lanyon's earnest appeal to Kimberley did not reach the Colonial Office before the decision had 
been taken to relieve him of his position in the Transvaal and recall him to Britain. 
On 28 March 1881 the siege of Pretoria was at last lifted when an officer rode into Pretoria to 
deliver instructions from Sir Evelyn Wood, Colley' s successor. Facing up to the grim reality that 
a 'peace without honour' had been conceded, did not come easily to Lan yon. His obvious distress 
at the proposed withdrawal of Britain from the Transvaal was tempered with indignation that it 
appeared he was to be made the 'scapegoat'. Wood's letter had details of a telegram from 
Kimberley which ordered Lanyon to'take the leave applied for last year and return to this 
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country, handing over government to Colonel Bellairs' .115 In obvious distress Lanyon wrote to 
his father: 
The last stage in our siege was arrived at yesterday, when an officer rode in ... [to say] that peace had been 
proclaimed and forwarding the details, of which the enclosed is a precis. If you do not blush for our 
country when you read it I shall be astonished. To me it is positively heartbreaking that ... when large 
reinforcements were close at hand the Govt at home should have caved in after bragging for 4 years that 
the country would never be given back. ... The military operations have [brought] little credit to our arms 
... I should have dearly liked to have had a slap at the Boers. But they have scored where we should and 
accordingly we are in the disgraceful position we are, and the laughing stock of South Africa .... The only 
part of the news which I got in this letter, which affects me personally is that Lord Kimberley says I can 
now take leave and go home. This is, I suppose, a polite way of saying they intend to make me their 
scapegoat, but I won't, and so have telegraphed to say that if they intend enquiring into past action of this 
Govt, I shall remain out so as to protect myself .... I intend to fight, and I have good grounds to fight on. 116 
He was full of bluster, but his 'good grounds to fight on' were perilously thin. Much of this 
bravado was clearly meant to impress his father. Although he was to remain in Natal for a while, 
no one was particularly interested to hear his views on his recall. Admittedly Lanyon was made 
a scapegoat, but he certainly contributed to his own downfall. 
On 29 March 1881 Lanyon published an official statement in Pretoria to the effect that a peace 
agreement had been reached, that hostilities had ceased and that the country, 'until finally handed 
over by the Royal Commission, will remain, ad interim under British rule' .117 The arrival in 
Pretoria of the Boer commandant general, Piet Joubert, and a number of his followers, was 
reported in the local press on 30 March 1881 and many of the Boers began drifting back to their 
neglected farms. 118 The next day Lanyon revoked martial law and declared the high court and 
landdrost courts open for deliberations once more. In the same gazette it was announced that 
postal communication would be re-established throughout the Transvaal. 119 
The British decision to withdraw from the Transvaal and to recall Owen Lanyon will be 
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discussed below, but it is pertinent to note that Colley's vacant position was to be taken over by 
Sir Frederick Sleigh Roberts120 and for the meanwhile Sir Evelyn Wood was to act as Colley's 
successor on the spot. 121 Lanyon went through the motions of saying goodbye and had a notice 
printed in the government gazette to 'convey an expression of his warmest thanks to the 
inhabitants of Pretoria' .122 He was duly presented with two addresses of appreciation for his 
'indefatigable industry, diligence and wide office experience', the first signed by his colleagues 
on the executive council, and another from 45 members of the civil service who similarly 
regretted his 'early departure and relinquishment of the Government of the Transvaal'. 123 The 
press were less laudatory. The News of the Camp predicted that he might well come in for some 
criticism at home, while De Volksstem was heartily pleased to see him leave and hoped fervently 
that he would never return. 124 Lanyon quietly left Pretoria for Natal on the morning of Friday 8 
April 1881, together with Wood who had spent three days in the capital. 125 Lanyon's private 
secretary, Godfrey Lagden, was assigned the task of packing up Lanyon's personal effects to 
send off to Britain and he wrote to Lan yon for instructions on certain of these matters. 126 On the 
day that Lanyon left Pretoria Colonel William Bellairs took over. In his first official despatch to 
the Colonial Office, Bellairs informed Kimberley that he had been sworn in as administrator of 
the Transvaal. 127 
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British withdrawal: finding someone to blame 
Since the horrifying news of the British defeat at Bronkhorstspruit on 20 December 1880, 
Kimberley and his Colonial Office staff had become increasingly troubled by the Transvaal 
situation. Lanyon and Colley had assured them that everything was under control, but niggling 
doubts had begun to creep in when Lanyon's overconfident reports arrived. Referring to 
Lanyon's letter of November 1880 on the 'attitude of the Boers', Kimberley minuted: 'it is an 
unfortunate letter both on ale of the mistaken estimate of the danger and the general tone of the 
remarks .. .' 128 And now their worst fears were realised. Not only had the Boers, contrary to 
Lan yon' s predictions, risen in revolt, but they were handing out a thrashing to imperial troops.129 
Moreover, the Transvaal government was huddled in a military encampment in the capital, 
hemmed in by determined Boers. Kimberley and the War Office made arrangements to send a 
large force to the Transvaal with all speed, but the secretary of state now had grave reservations 
about the mistakes Britain had made in dealing with the Boers. Their alleged lack of courage, 
was proving to be a less than accurate basis for British policy in the Transvaal. Lanyon's 
complacency had meant that the Boer rebellion had taken Britain by surprise. Kimberley had 
clearly lost all confidence in Lanyon's judgement and had instructed Colley to take Lanyon out 
of the equation: 'I leave it to you' to clean up behind Lanyon, 'who should have kept me 
informed' .130 
Justifying Britain's decision to withdraw, Kimberley was even prepared to minimise Lanyon's 
financial successes. It was hardly fair to blame Lanyon for a bankrupt imperial policy in southern 
Africa, to which he was only an accessory, but Kimberley used this excuse anyway. 'As a 
colleague of Gladstone', as De Kiewiet observes, 'Lord Kimberley was himself something of a 
connoisseur of surpluses. He seized upon Lanyon' s vaunted figures and destroyed them.' 131 What 
about imperial loans, money spent on imperial troops, the huge expense of maintaining garrisons 
in Pretoria and Potchefstroom, he asked? Lanyon, he said, was hopelessly out ofhis depth when 
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the broader picture was studied. Almost contemptuously Kimberley turned Lan yon' s brave little 
surplus into what he described as an 'enormous and hopeless deficit' .132 British policy in the 
colonies was about economising; to go on spending money like water in the Transvaal was 
ridiculous. This was the second nail in Lanyon's coffin and ironically it had been pounded into 
what Lanyon himself thought was his most solid defence. British policy in the Transvaal had 
failed and Kimberley, anxious to withdraw as quickly as was decent, was determined to cast the 
blame on Lanyon. 
Then, too, there were other pressures in the southern African situation. The troubles in 
Basutoland and Pondoland were still unresolved, and although Brand had declared himself to be 
neutral and had been hovering about offering help, 133 his volksraad had shown that they were 
inclined to be less conciliatory towards the British. There were even rumours that the Free State 
Boers might swell the ranks of their Transvaal brothers. And at the back of Liberal Party minds 
there were sneaking feelings that their policy was, after all, one of non-interference in the 
colonies, and they had come into power less than a year earlier pronouncing that they advocated 
self-help in the empire. The longer the war continued and the more depressing the news that 
came back to Whitehall became, the more sensible it seemed to admit defeat and yield to Boer 
separatism. 
The British press was less informed about Lanyon's role in the Boer rebellion in the Transvaal, 
and more inclined to blame the British government for trying to hold on to a region that was not 
worth the effort involved. There was trouble enough closer to home in Ireland; if the Boers were 
determined to regain their republic it seemed sensible to comply with their wishes. As the 
influential Illustrated London News put it, 
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England may well ask herself some pertinent questions. What does she want with the Transvaal? It adds 
nothing to her glory. Its annexation to her territories is not demanded by justice. All that she professes, or 
has professed, to be concerned in obtaining by annexation may be obtained otherwise. . .. A slight 
concession now may have a more beneficial effect on all parties than a much larger concession after a long 
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In January 1881, in reply to a telegram from Brand suggesting that the time had come to talk 
about peace, Kimberley agreed on condition that the rebels laid down their arms. When nothing 
came of this initiative Brand tried again in February 1881 and again Kimberley said that ifthe 
rebellion was stopped he would frame a 'scheme' to settle the present 'difficulties' .135 But still 
no brake was put on Colley's frantic military efforts to redeem his tarnished reputation and with 
a conclusive Boer victory and Colley' s death on 27 February 1881, matters came to head. There 
was no longer any question that the time had come to annul the annexation of the Transvaal, and 
Evelyn Wood, with Colonial Office and War Office sanction, eventually negotiated an armistice 
with Joubert on 6 March 1881.136 
Not everyone was satisfied that this was the right way to go. There were certainly those, among 
them Lanyon and Wolseley, two imperial agents who confidently claimed to know more about 
the Boers than most - but neither of whom, in truth, could really make this claim - who felt that 
to 'shuffle out of the Transvaal in defeat' was the ultimate blow to British pride. Queen Victoria 
was suitably shattered by the suggestion that there be a withdrawal. She 'did not feel inclined to 
approve' the eventual peace settlement and thought the whole idea placed Britain in 'a 
humiliating position'. 137 Camarvon, now watching from the sidelines, was another public figure 
who was horrified at the prospect of pulling out of the Transvaal, and he gloomily predicted 
disaster in the region - one of his more perceptive opinions on South African affairs. 138 
Kimberley was particularly annoyed by Camarvon' s criticism published in the Pall Mall Gazette 
at about the time when the idea of withdrawal was being bandied about. He wrote indignantly 
to Gladstone: 
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Did you ever see a more foolish letter than Camarvon's! ... this is not a moment for him to impugn others 
when we are reaping the bitter fruits of his policy in South Africa. 139 
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British public opinion was mixed, but after all, the Transvaal, now that federation was beyond 
reach, had little to recommend it. Kimberley himself had mentioned to Colley that 'there is a 
current of feeling here in favour of the Boers as a people striving for their independence' .140 The 
'wretched conflict' had brought 'neither profit nor honour to the British political and military 
administration in South Africa'. 141 The Times of London probably spoke for many Britons when 
it pointed out in one of its editorials that 'the Empire is big enough without the Transvaal'. 142 
There were also those who felt that the Boers had been wronged and deserved to realise their 
national aspirations, which had clearly meant more to them than most Britons had realised. The 
Illustrated London News, for example, put the Transvaal debacle down to the annexation 
'blunder' and felt that Britain was now 'reaping the harvest of folly which some time since, we 
sowed for ourselves' .143 
The legality of the situation was that parliament did not have to sanction the withdrawal, but 
there would certainly be those who would ask questions, and these would have to be answered. 
Kimberley was probably also aware that the philanthropic lobby in the cabinet was a strong one 
and that its input might conceivably threaten peace negotiations if they were allowed to press for 
a more liberal policy towards Africans. 144 The best way to preempt some of the debate was to 
find someone to blame, someone reasonably dispensable, and then to get the withdrawal over and 
done with as cleanly and quickly as possible. The fewer questions asked, the better for all 
concerned. It was only human nature for the Colonial Office and Kimberley to look for some one 
to blame. Lanyon, with all his blunders, had made himself an obvious target. He had been 
appointed by the Conservatives, so responsibility for choosing him did not present a problem; 
he was young and reasonably inexperienced so his failures could be explained away without too 
much effort. Was he made a scapegoat? Certainly he was, but his personal responsibility for the 
disasters of the war are undeniable. 
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Owen Lanyon departs: his last years, 1881-1887 
After leaving Pretoria on 8 April, Lan yon travelled to Newcastle, arriving on the afternoon of 12 
April 1881. 145 He stayed there in the military camp with Sir Evelyn Wood, who was heavily 
involved in negotiations with the Boers. Lanyon telegraphed Lord Kimberley to find out whether 
the Royal Commission was going to make an enquiry into the administration of the Transvaal. 146 
If so, he was determined to stay in the country long enough to have his say. 
I have no idea of any stones being thrown at me behind my back, and unless I get a clear reply from the 
Colonial Office, I will remain here whether they like it or not. I have no fear of any enquiry, for there is 
nothing that I am ashamed of. ... Ifl stay I will not be home for a couple of months. I cannot tell you how 
rejoiced I am at the prospect of getting out of South Africa and seeing you all again. I trust never to have 
my lot thrown in this part of the world again.147 
When Kimberley contacted Lanyon it was to say that there would be no enquiry into Transvaal 
affairs, but he asked Lan yon to stay on for a while to give his 'assistance and information' to the 
commission.148 It appears that there were two areas where Lanyon gave his advice. At the request 
of the Colonial Office he drew up a detailed memorandum on the boundary line between the 
Transvaal and the Zulu 'so that the interests of the Boers and natives should not clash', 149 and he 
also submitted suggestions to Wood concerning the duties of the British resident who was soon 
to be installed in Pretoria. 150 
Lanyon predicted that the commission would have a difficult task. The Boers were 'rampant', 
he said, and would not be easy to please, and many English-speaking residents were so 
disillusioned that they were streaming out of the Transvaal in the face of Boer rule. He also 
claimed that the Boers were flying their flag in every town and had started a reign of terror, 
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'persecuting the loyal whites and natives in every direction'. 151 As for the future, Lan yon was not 
sanguine about the prospects for harmony in the region, and he felt that 'stormy times' were on 
the way. He admitted to being 'glad to get out of the place' and placed the whole debacle 
squarely at the door of the Liberals and their policy in southern Africa: 
Before long the blundering of the home Govt, will become known in all its ugliness; the Boers spit upon 
the name of an Englishman; the English are thoroughly downhearted, and ashamed ... 
He then went on to make some perceptive and interesting comments about the African reaction 
to the British withdrawal, information which might well have been seized upon by Bright and 
Chamberlain and their humanitarian pressure group in British parliamentary circles: 
The natives are fast losing all respect for us ... the chiefs are asking why they are being deserted and 
thrown back under Boer rule, more especially after they have incurred increased resentment by remaining 
loyal to the Queen during all this trouble. It is a cruel and crying shame that they should receive such 
treatment after the solemn assurances made by the Govt. to them that they would ever receive protection 
so long as they were quiet and obeyed the laws. 152 
Perhaps his sudden concern about the effect of the British withdrawal on Africans was simply 
another way of expressing his unmitigated hatred of the Boers who had brought him down. After 
all, he had been instrumental in engineering the foundations of an African policy based upon 
white supremacy and the relegation of Africans in southern Africa to the status of a rightless 
working class. Be that as it may, he was correct that the aftermath of the war was to be a growing 
hatred between Boer and Briton in southern Africa. The grim truth, as he put it in his letter home, 
is that 'our prestige is forever gone in S Africa.' 153 
Lanyon's letter of 11 May 1881 appears to be the last that he wrote to his father from South 
Africa. On 17 May he left Newcastle and spent the night of22 May in Pietermaritzburg, leaving 
the next morning for Durban. He sailed from Durban on 24 May, stayed for two days in Cape 
Town, and finally steamed out of Table Bay on Tuesday 31 May 1881, bound for 
Southampton. 154 Lan yon' s departure from southern Africa marked the end of his civil career and 
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he never returned, although he was subsequently posted to north Africa on two occasions in a 
military capacity. 
By September 1881 he was back with his father at the Lanyon ancestral home in Whiteabbey just 
outside Belfast. Here he wrote to Robert Herbert about his personal travelling expenses incurred 
on his trip back home. He pointed out that leave had been granted to him some months earlier 
and that his delay in Natal en route was at the behest of Wood and for matters of an official 
nature. He should not therefore have to forfeit any of his pay for the period while in Natal nor, 
indeed, the travelling allowance that would have been due to him had his post not been 
'summarily abolished'. Furthermore, he claimed that because he had been given so little notice 
concerning his departure, his personal effects in Pretoria had of necessity to be sold by public 
auction and this had been a drain on his pocket. The tone of the letter is distinctly injured.155 
Several weeks later, perhaps prompted by Lan yon' s plaintive request for funds and the realisation 
that he was languishing unemployed in Ireland - his period of leave being over - Herbert 
forwarded to Lan yon a copy of a letter that the Colonial Office had sent to the War Office on 12 
October 1881. It amounts to something of a vindication ofLanyon's blunders in South Africa. 
But not quite. Kimberley almost exonerates Lanyon and praises his abilities: he is good at 
bookkeeping and has received military honours which deserve to give him a fresh start As a 
soldier. It is the military that promoted him to the rank of Brevet-Colonel and awarded him the 
CB, so the War Office can have him back. But as far as a civil career as a colonial official was 
concerned, Lanyon had clearly reached the end of the road. Kimberley added that there should 
be no hint of 'apology' which might give the impression of absolution: 'The general words of 
approval will be sufficient', he noted. 156 The War Office was accordingly informed that Lord 
155 
156 
Ibid, vol 5b, Lanyon - Herbert, 29 September 1881. It appears that Lanyon was to be on full pay while in 
Natal and half pay for a period of 4 months (ie until 4 August 1881 )while on leave. Lanyon had applied 
for 6 months but apparently only 4 were granted. There are a number of conflicting opinions reflected in 
the minutes. Kimberley minuted that it was 'a rather awkward question'; PRO, CO 291/10, Lanyon -
Kimberley, 11May1881 and Kimberley-Lanyon, 28 June 1881, minute by Kimberley 19 June 1881. 
PRO, CO 291111, Drafts, Colonial Office - War Office, 12 October 1881 and minute by Kimberley, 3 
October 1881.There is once again (four months later) evidence that the issue was quite contentious. 
Kimberley minuted: 'Write fully, bearing testimony to his zeal and efficiency ... it cannot for a moment 
be supposed that the mere fact that he did not know the Boers would break into open rebellion ... alters the 
opinion of his high administrative talents .... In the meantime ... he is without civil or military pay and has 
received no intimation ... of his ... general conduct'. The attitude is one of wanting to support Lanyon if 
293 
Kimberley 
wished to acquaint you that owing to the changes in regard to Transvaal affairs, this department has not 
any present occasion for Sir Owen's services, and Lord K is glad to take this opportunity of placing on 
record his appreciation of the zeal and efficiency of Sir Owen Lanyon as an administrator, especially in 
the Dept of Finance, and his Lordship hopes that he may now be restored to military pay and regarded as 
eligible for some early employment commensurate with his abilities and services. While Sir Owen has 
been in Colonial Employment he has had the opportunity also of rendering active military service in 
connection with the recent wars in S.A., but as these services have been recognised by the high military 
distinction of a Brevet Colonelcy in the army and a companionship of the Bath, his Lordship feels that 
there is no occasion to refer to them in detail. 
To this Herbert appended a note for Lanyon's information; Kimberley had asked that he be sent 
a copy of the letter, which bore 'testimony to the value of your services under this department' .157 
Kimberley had thus eased his conscience and officially washed his hands of Owen Lanyon. 
Details of Lanyon's life after this official announcement that he was no longer needed for 
colonial service, are hazy. It appears that early in 1882 he married Florence Levy of London, the 
daughter of one of the proprietors of the Daily Telegraph, 158 and that shortly afterwards he was 
appointed to serve as a full colonel in the Egyptian campaign of 1882. 159 His letter of 
appointment came through on 1 August and within a week he had to say goodbye to his new 
bride at Liverpool, which he found a heartbreaking ordeal. On his way to Malta he wrote to tell 
his father that 'the separation has been a terrible blow to us both' .160 By November 1882 Owen 
and Florence were together again, and Lanyon received a congratulatory letter on the 'valuable 
assistance' he had rendered in the campaign from none other than his old associate from 
Transvaal days, Garnet Wolseley, under whom he had served in Egypt.161 On his return to Britain 
Lanyon then took up a position as an assistant adjutant and quarter master general in January 
1883, and was based in Portsmouth. 162 
157 
158 
159 
160 
161 
162 
possible, but there is no mention of reappointing him in a civil post again. 
Ibid, Colonial Office- War Office, 12 October 1881, and undated note by Herbert. See also Ibid, Herbert 
- Lanyon, 13 October 1881. 
The Natal Mercury, 'Death of Sir Owen Lanyon', 8 April 1887. 
TA, A596, vol 3, Hawley- Lanyon, 1August1882. 
Ibid, vol 16, Lanyon- Charles Lanyon, 5 August 1882. 
Ibid, vol 3, Wolseley- Lanyon, 30 November 1882. 
Ibid, Hawley- Lanyon, 18 December 1882. 
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Lanyon' s wedded bliss was short-lived and his beloved Florence died in mid 1883, a blow which 
he felt very keenly. Lagden, who had been Lanyon' s private secretary in the Transvaal, wrote to 
express his condolences on Lady Lanyon's death, and Owen's reply is evidence of his great 
distress: 'It has been such that I cannot write of it, for each day serves but to make it harder to 
bear.' 163 Thereafter he subsequently served in north Africa, where he took part in the Nile 
expedition of 1884-1885. 164 Once home in Britain again his health began to fail. He did not take 
up any further employment and while on a trip to the United States of America he died of cancer 
on 6 April 1887 at only 44 years of age. 165 
Lanyon was clearly a victim of circumstances. He certainly made some serious errors of 
judgement in the Transvaal, but in his defence it is pertinent to ask whether by late 1880 any 
imperial official could have stopped the escalation of Boer resistance and the restoration of their 
independence. Underpinning the Boer success was a rapidly developing sense of self-awareness 
and nationalism and by 1880 this was completely incompatible with continuing British rule. 
Realistically, all Lanyon, or anyone else for that matter, could have done was to ensure that 
Britain was militarily ready to fight - and had he done so the war would merely have been 
prolonged, because the Boers were not to be denied. Even had he realised how critical the 
situation was, it is most unlikely that in such a short time he could have avoided the outbreak of 
war by alerting Kimberley to the fact that Britain should revoke the annexation of the Transvaal. 
163 RH, Godfrey Lagden Papers, Mss Afr s 210, Lanyon - Lagden, 15 July 1883. 
164 Davey, 'Inventory of the Lanyon Collection', p 51. 
165 The Natal Mercury, 'Death of Sir Owen Lanyon', 8 April 1887. 
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CONCLUSION: A PUPPET ON AN IMPERIAL STRING? 
At the beginning of the 21st century, imperial history is at something of a crossroads. The more 
traditional preoccupations of historians of the British empire, those in the Robinson and 
Gallagher mould, are still being actively pursued, notably in Britain, as the new Oxford history 
of the British Empire shows. 1 But imperial scholarship is currently shifting and rearranging itself 
to accommodate the insights of post-colonial theory and to examine the cultural dimensions of 
colonial power which are now coming under the spotlight.2 In some ways this thesis, a study of 
imperial policy as implemented at the colonial periphery, while admittedly researched in the 
early and mid 1990s, straddles the two fields. It interprets Britain's imperial experience in the 
southern African interior in the late 1870s yet it also blurs the once-sharp division between 
metropole and periphery. It studies the role of an imperial agent in terms of what Thompson calls 
'the multiple identities inhabited by rulers and ruled, and the way these identities were 
constructed and contested' .3 The 'ruler' here is the very British, very jingoistic, William Owen 
Lanyon, and the gendered nature of imperialism is depicted well in his masculinity: the ruthless 
militarist, dealing harshly with subject peoples. The 'ruled' in this instance are the non-British 
'other', predominantly Boers, and the Africans, but also include a new British group, the mining 
community. All three groups, in different ways, in Griqualand West and the Transvaal, the two 
regions where Lanyon held sway, put up stubborn resistance against being made to toe the 
imperial line. 
2 
3 
See for example JM Brown & WR Louis (eds), The Oxford history of the British empire, vol IV: The 
twentieth century, (Oxford, 1999). The large majority of contributors are from the UK and the tendency 
is to downplay the newer postmodernist approaches to the writing of imperial history. 
This is evidenced in the series of conferences entitled 'British worlds' being held at regular intervals in 
Britain and the countries which make up the 'old dominions'; for example that held in Cape Town in 
January 2002. While many of the papers offered at Cape Town reflected traditional metropole-centred 
imperial concerns, others offered exciting insights into new imperial interests and reflected the shift in 
interest to social and cultural history and to the investigation of imperial and colonial identities. See also 
Catherine Hall, Civilising subjects, metropole and colony in the English imagination 1830-1867 
(Cambridge, 2002). 
AS Thompson, Review article: 'Is Humpty Dumpty together again? Imperial history and the Oxford 
History of the British empire', Twentieth Century British History, 12( 4), 2001, p 514. 
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But having said that, this particular study is one that is perhaps more comfortable with what 
appears to be the current Oxford History approach, namely one that is less culture-oriented and 
more in line with what might be called political imperial histories. It is a study of high politics 
as well as policy making on the ground, and it takes a biographical approach. It is proudly -
rather than apologetically - empirical and it is based on a very wide range of archival sources. 
In exploring the identity that Owen Lanyon carved out for himself in his more than five years in 
South Africa, and how this came to bear upon, and was itself moulded by the Boers and Africans, 
a central theme has been pursued. Was Owen Lanyon a mere puppet on an imperial string? Was 
he indeed manipulated from Britain? Did the Colonial Office dictate the ways in which he 
influenced his 'audience', the Boers, Africans and settlers over whom he ruled, and was in tum 
influenced by them? Or was he, in his own right, able to wield considerable and innovative 
power over the making of colonial policy in southern Africa? The evidence points to the latter, 
but to substantiate the validity of this claim, it is necessary to dig a little deeper. To do so, the 
metaphor of the puppet on the imperial string must be stretched still further. To what extent, it 
is asked, did the puppeteers, the manipulators of the metropole, personified by the secretary of 
state for the colonies, dictate the actions of the puppet, Owen Lanyon, the imperial agent and 
ruler at the distant periphery? Was he in fact a puppet or an independent actor? And how did the 
audience experience the performance? First of all, how strong, how pliable and how visible was 
that string? 
The string was a tenuous one. In the 1870s and early 1880s the world was still a big place and 
southern Africa was a long way from the metropole. Even after 1879, when there was a 
telegraphic link, albeit frequently unserviceable, between London and Cape Town via Madeira, 
communications were difficult. Despatches, which were in effect the only realistic means of 
handing down policy directives, took a full two months by steamer to reach the Colonial Office, 
to be passed around for those telling comments, be drafted into replies and returned to southern 
Africa. Imperial agents with any gumption, a quality which Lanyon prided himself on, had 
traditionally taken control of the situation in the far-flung colonies. The distance between 
metropole and periphery and the as yet primitive infrastructure in the colonies are thus the most 
obvious reasons why some administrators were more or less obliged to be innovative. And in 
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Lanyon's case this was certainly true. So much so, as will be explored below, that it is surprising 
that his role in providing form and contrast to colonial policy in southern Africa from 1875 to 
1881 has thus far been largely overlooked. 
It is clear that an imperial agent like Lanyon did have to answer to the high commissioner and 
did have to carry out the imperial policy of the day. In Lanyon's early years in Griqualand West, 
Lord Camarvon was a supreme puppeteer and Owen Lanyon was, to some extent, a willing 
puppet. Certainly in the three secretaries of state under whom he worked, Lanyon had three 
superiors with strong personalities to pull the imperial strings, but none more so than Carnarvon. 
Camarvon was driven by a very personal desire to confederate the states and colonies in southern 
Africa and while in Griqualand West, from 187 5 until Carnarvon resigned in early 1878, Lan yon 
certainly danced to Carnarvon's tune. He was indeed appointed to carry out an imperial policy 
and had little freedom in as far as that policy was concerned, but he fully supported the policy 
and from that point of view was a willing puppet. Lan yon was of course relatively inexperienced 
and impressionable when he arrived in Kimberley, being only 33 years of age, but he soon 
became an avid confederationist. His efforts to encourage the political assimilation of Griqualand 
West under the Cape government, his meticulous memoranda on the proposed representation of 
the region in the Cape legislature, his friendly cooperation with Brand - in accordance with the 
changed imperial attitude to the Boer republics - and his important role in providing information 
to Carnarvon in the pre-1877 planning phase of the annexation of the Transvaal in 1877, all attest 
to this. But Lanyon can be described as a puppet in Griqualand West only in so far as he had 
been appointed as an agent to further Carnarvon's confederation scheme. In matters of domestic 
policy the imperial string was so tenuous as to be hardly felt and in this field Lanyon was 
anything but a puppet. As has been seen, he introduced significant measures that had not been 
masterminded by the secretary of state for the colonies. With Camarvon gone in 1878 and his 
successor Sir Michael Hicks Beach exercising a far less stifling presence, Lanyon slowly began 
to gain confidence, shake off the control of the metropole, and carve out his own version of 
colonial policy on the diamond fields. 
In Griqualand West his task as administrator was not an easy one; the region was a political 
anomaly, the settlers a strange money-grabbing lot, and there was resistance to colonialism from 
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indigenous people on whose land the diamonds had been found. The vagaries of the burgeoning 
diamond mining industry, the practical difficulties of getting the diamonds from the ground and 
the alarming fluctuations in the price of the gems made his rule all the more difficult. 
Nevertheless Lanyon met many of these challenges. He paved the way for large-scale mining 
interests and proved that he was certainly capable of independent action that was not dictated 
from above. Rising capitalism and imperialism demanded that Africans be dispossessed and 
transformed into a much-needed reservoir oflabour, and it was Owen Lanyon who devised and 
implemented a location system and the stringent contract labour controls needed to achieve this. 
He also organised and regulated the labour supply on the mines. These were ground-breaking 
measures indeed. Not only was his version of colonial policy in Griqualand West innovative as 
far as meeting the demands of mining and mercantile capitalism were concerned, it also came 
perilously close to defying the metropole' s unwritten humanitarian rule that legislation that was 
devised specifically for indigenous races was unacceptable. Here indeed he was no puppet. 
In contrast, Lanyon' s role as a militarist in Griqualand West, one that he looked back upon with 
great pride and satisfaction, shows signs ofbeing heavily influenced not from the metropole but 
from a powerful peripheral agent: the smoothly impressive Bartle Frere. Lanyon had an undying 
admiration and respect for the statesmanship and political opinions of this high commissioner, 
Camarvon's 'Great Statesman', who had been appointed specifically to implement confederation. 
Lanyon was directly responsible to him from early 1877 - when Frere took over from Sir Henry 
Barkly- until Wolseley's appointment in June 1879, a few months after Lanyon's move to the 
Transvaal. Frere was convinced that stamping British authority on the Africans was the key to 
confederation of the southern African states. There was, he averred, an anti-white conspiracy 
among Africans, and this had to be obliterated for confederation to be achieved. While Frere was 
plotting the overthrow of the Zulu, Lanyon, the very personification of the masculine ruler, 
readily accepted Frere's convictions and undertook a military campaign in Griqualand West in 
1878, snuffing out the Griqua and Tlhaping rebels when they resisted his overt brand of 
colonialism in the region. Lan yon was very proud of his military exploits in 1878, because, he 
maintained, they proved that he was no push-over as a leader. He was also the prime mover in 
the campaign to stop the sale of arms to Africans. He was of the opinion that to continue selling 
arms freely to Africans was to court disaster in southern Africa: it made Africans so much more 
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difficult to subjugate. 
Even when Frere fell from grace in the post-Isandlwana days and was taken out of the South-East 
African arena into which Lanyon had been posted as administrator of the Transvaal, Lanyon 
retained his self-image as a military man. It was an attitude and a style of governance that he 
carried over from Griqualand West into his term of office in the Transvaal. Conciliation was a 
sign of weakness and he refused to be branded as weak. Success as an administrator depended 
upon being aggressively masculine, firm and unbending. He did not see this administrative style 
as autocratic and pig-headed; he saw it instead as efficient and strong. His growing unpopularity 
in Kimberley and later in Pretoria, is clear evidence of how his subjects felt about his rule. They 
abhorred him and all he stood for. This was to impact disastrously on his relations with the 
Boers. 
Once in the Transvaal, in the months before Wolseley's arrival, Lanyon grew in confidence and 
promptly shook off as much Colonial Office control as he could. He had no need to be 
manipulated from above; he was confident that he could cope alone. But before he could exercise 
much influence over the situation in the Transvaal, complicated as far as Britain was concerned 
by the refusal of both the Boers and the Pedi to bow to British overlordship, Gamet Wolseley 
arrived and the imperial string tightened again. Under the irrepressible Wolseley until early 1880, 
Lanyon chafed to be free to administer the Transvaal on his own. He did not admire Wolseley 
the way he had Frere. Wolseley gave Lanyon no latitude at all. The new high commissioner also 
appointed - to Lan yon' s great irritation - as governor of the Transvaal, loved the limelight and 
relegated Lan yon to the background. He stifled Lanyon' s initiative right from the beginning by 
unceremoniously stopping Lanyon's Pedi campaign and then promptly launching his own 
'brilliant thrust' to subjugate Sekhukhune' s polity in late 1879. But he failed to get the measure 
of the Boers; like Lanyonhemisjudged them completely. Until Wolseley was gone, Lanyon was 
hamstrung and could do no more than keep administrative matters running smoothly and balance 
his beloved books. From September 1879 until April 1880 Lanyon was not even a puppet, 
Wolseley pushed him into the shadowy world of an administrative official. This was in stark 
contrast to the innovative role he had played in Griqualand West as the mover and shaker of 
African colonial policy. 
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The moment Sir Garnet rode out of Pretoria en route to Natal and Britain, Lanyon assumed his 
individual role as policy maker, bolstered by his now customary rigid system of control. He 
blossomed. For the remainder of his career in the Transvaal he made sure that he was unfettered 
by the metropole, because, as he admitted to his father, 'I strongly object to pipe for others' 
dancing' .4 Lanyon was relieved when, in 1880, the new Whig government in Britain decided to 
maintain its grip on the Transvaal, despite indications to the contrary in Gladstone's Midlothian 
speeches. Lanyon wasted no time in writing to Kimberley, the new secretary of state for the 
colonies, and managed to persuade him to allow the Transvaal administrator freedom to act more 
or less unilaterally. His request was granted by Kimberley, despite reservations expressed by 
some of the Colonial Office staff, notably the vastly experienced Robert Herbert, who felt that 
Lanyon was too pushy and too non-conciliatory as far as the Boers were concerned. Kimberley 
did not heed the implied warning and was instead comforted by the fact that George Pomeroy 
Colley- who for some inexplicable reason seems to have been the darling of the Colonial Office 
- would be there to keep Lanyon in check should an emergency arise. Furthermore Colley was 
to be responsible for African affairs in the Transvaal. That Colley would be able to exercise 
supervision ofLanyon in the Transvaal proved to be totally unrealistic. Lanyon's days of being 
a puppet were behind him. By this time he was too confident to be manipulated by anyone, and 
certainly not by Colley, whom Lanyon felt was far his junior. In his view, Colley was hardly 
qualified for the governorship of Natal, much less high commissioner for South-East Africa. 
Throwing off all pretence of metropolitan control, Lan yon began his post-Wolseley career in the 
Transvaal by taking decisive, independent action to formalise British rule over the now-defeated 
Pedi. Once again, as he had done in Griqualand West, he devised the ground rules of a racialised 
colonial state. No matter that officially Colley was supposed to supervise matters affecting 
Africans in the Transvaal. Lanyon pushed the measures through on his own and merely informed 
Colley afterwards as a formality. Colley, for his part, was apparently content to be kept out of 
the picture. On his own initiative Lanyon then embarked on an extended tour of the Lydenburg 
region in June 1880. In what amounted to an important new drive to implement his own brand 
ofBritish colonial policy, he addressed the African chiefs, informed them that their authority was 
at an end, and assured them that they were indeed fortunate to be under the strong and effective 
4 TA, A596, vol 15, Lanyon- Charles Lanyon, 4 September 1880. 
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British government. He also saw to the imposition and efficient collection of a hut tax and laid 
the foundations of a survey ofland, preparatory to the establishment of a location system. That 
this latter measure could not be implemented in the time Lanyon had at his disposal was because 
of his bungling in another area of his endeavour: his policy towards the Boers. 
With African resistance quelled and the Pedi placed under Lanyon-style colonial control, the 
administrator continued his aggressive pursuit of colonial dominance over southern African 
independent states. The Boers were the next in line. Again, Lanyon's decisions on how best to 
counteract Boer opposition in the Transvaal were his own. He was by no means a puppet and 
there was little sign of an imperial string, at least not until later, when the string was transformed 
into a hangman's rope. Kimberley and the Colonial Office had passed the buck as far as the 
'disaffected Boers' were concerned. And Colley was satisfied that he was being kept appraised 
of the situation, which he was not. Lanyon simply decided to go it alone. As has been explained 
at length in this thesis, Lanyon misjudged the Boers completely. And ultimately, it was his 
undoing. In the light of this, some discussion ofLanyon's character flaws is perhaps appropriate 
at this juncture. 
The most widely documented criticism ofLanyon as administrator of both Griqualand West and 
the Transvaal is that his style was harsh and autocratic.5 He was extremely unpopular largely 
because he believed that to be conciliatory was a sign of weakness. Wolseley-who admittedly 
exaggerated everything- went so far as to suggest that Lan yon was marginalised because he was 
thoroughly unpleasant and even malevolent. According to Wolseley, Lanyon was not disliked 
only by his subjects, but also by his own staff; apart from a few chosen confidants. He was very 
diligent and hardworking, but this was because he trusted no one but himself to do a job well and 
delegated virtually nothing to the people under him. Unless he initiated a project himself he 
would take little interest in promoting it, and this discouraged any independent ideas on the part 
of his colleagues. He was prepared to do all the work but he also wanted all the credit. This is 
perhaps indicative of his lack of self-confidence and lack of close friends. His father, with whom 
he corresponded so regularly and to whom he confessed his true feelings, was probably his only 
5 See for example Davey, The siege of Pretoria, pp 272-273; De Kiewiet, The imperial factor, p 242-243; 
Van Zyl, Die protesbeweging van die Transvaalse Afrikaners, pp 103-109. 
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real friend and confidant. 
Furthermore, Lanyon had an inability to see the larger picture. He was so caught up in balancing 
his books, for example, that he failed to see the effects of what he was doing and his 
understanding of the wider scope of his actions was clouded. He was a competent administrator 
but lacked the added ability to cope with a crisis. There are great contradictions between the 
Lanyon who was regarded as successful by his imperial superiors and the Lanyon who was 
regarded with contempt and disdain by those he was called upon to administer. It could be argued 
that the frontier population in the 1870s and 1880s were rough and ready, unsophisticated and 
individualistic people, hardly the type of people who took kindly to being ruled by any one. 
Nevertheless Lanyon's unpopularity was a recurring theme in both Griqualand West and the 
Transvaal and this contrasts markedly with the commendation he received from his imperial 
superiors. It was only at the end of his southern African career that Lanyon fell from grace as far 
as the Colonial Office was concerned and even then there was never the same level of negativity 
towards him as there was, for example, to Frere. Frere was of course far more senior and 
experienced; it could well be argued that Frere had further to fall than Lanyon did. 
Lanyon's attitude towards those he governed was not conducive to his success as an 
administrator. He hated the Boers and regarded them with contempt; in fact neither the Boers nor 
the Africans were acceptable in his eyes because neither was British. Neither measured up to 
British standards, and this meant that in his view, both groups were doomed to mediocrity and 
the Africans to servitude. As far as Lanyon was concerned both were utterly incapable of ruling 
themselves. Lan yon translated his position of authority and power into racism, overt masculinity 
and militarism; all these facets ofhis personality were inextricably linked. He was, in a word, the 
typical British chauvinist of his time. 
Lanyon also lacked insight into human nature. Even after living among the Boers for nearly two 
years, he misread them completely. This is indicative ofhow aloof and distant he was from them, 
and how little he really understood about what motivated them to take the action they did. He had 
no inkling of how determined they were to regain their independence, and he completely 
misjudged their innate courage to fight. Late in 1880 he also made some critical military 
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blunders, which for someone ofhis military experience, seems incomprehensible. When virtually 
everyone felt that war was inevitable, he kept his head, ostrich-like, in the sand and refused to 
heed the signs that announced 'war' so starkly. There is no ready explanation of this 
foolhardiness. And, from an imperial point of view, no excuse for it. He simply persuaded 
himself that the Boers would not fight and he was not prepared to alter his uncompromising 
stance for fear they might take this as weakness in the face of resistance. Unwittingly on his part, 
Lanyon's preoccupation with collecting taxes in order to balance his revenue and expenditure 
provided the spark that started the war. As far as he was concerned, solvency was indicative of 
good government. Ifhe could collect Boer taxes it would be an unmistakable sign that he had 
succeeded. 
Lanyon saw himself essentially as a military man rather than an administrator and in Griqualand 
West he sought refuge, successfully, in military action. And yet, ironically, it was in his role as 
a military strategist in 1880 that he ultimately failed. It is certainly true to say that he was very 
much in the mould of so many other imperial soldiers at the end of the l 91h century: triumphant 
when fighting against untrained and poorly armed Africans, but found wanting against organised 
and well-armed white opponents. It was clearly a colossal imperial blunder to entrust a soldier 
with civilian responsibilities, and this was a fairly constant refrain in British imperial policy. 6 
To what extent was Lanyon actually responsible for the disasters of the war? Certainly the Boers 
were determined to regain their independence, but Liberal party policy was far less convinced 
of the advantages of retaining possession of the Transvaal than the Conservatives had been. 
There is some merit in the view that the British government might well have negotiated a 
settlement similar to the one they signed in 1881 if the imperial agent in Pretoria had been more 
conciliatory. But on the other hand, was Lanyon given the opportunity to perform his difficult 
task in the Transvaal? Lack of money, legislative restrictions and delays in handing down 
imperial instructions all conspired to make success less attainable. 
Having said that, Lanyon committed some cardinal blunders. He was indeed made a scapegoat 
in 1881 and perhaps the recall was unduly harsh. But he could hardly have been allowed to stay 
6 Wolseley and Colley are two obvious examples. 
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on in southern Africa in a position of authority after the war. He had lost too much face. 
Furthermore he cannot escape personal blame for the outbreak: of hostilities. His unacceptable 
authoritarianism, his foolish complacency and his errors of judgement and strategy are too 
damning. It might be argued that his youth and comparative inexperience made his blunders less 
glaring, and that some of the blame should be shifted to the door of the secretaries of state who 
appointed him, but this is hardly convincing. He was the imperial official in charge and young 
or not he made glaring mistakes that had dire consequences. 
When he was recalled in disgrace in March 1881 the Colonial Office exercised their real control 
over the once-confident Transvaal administrator, and then it was to deal a deathblow to his 
southern African career. At the end Owen Lanyon was really, after all, a puppet again, and as 
such he was expendable. In the broader picture of British withdrawal from the Transvaal in 1881 
his recall was perhaps relatively insignificant, but undeniably, he was an influential actor, not a 
puppet, in both Kimberley and Pretoria. 
In a very real sense Lanyon's role in southern Africa can be seen on two levels. He arrived at a 
crucial time, the 1870s, when there were vibrant developments and a changing atmosphere. 
Diamonds had just been discovered and the subcontinent was poised for change. At a micro-
level he was caught up in the relationships and struggle between the imperial power, the British 
settlers, Africans and Boers. On another level, in a far larger context, he was part of the struggle 
for white control over the land and labour resources of the Africans and the developing conflict 
between the old, pre-mineral southern Africa and the new, aggressive, capitalist, mining 
economy. 
In his more than five-year career as an imperial agent in Griqualand West and the Transvaal, 
Owen Lanyon played a significant role in the shaping and making of colonial South Africa. He 
had considerable freedom of action and he was not afraid of using his own discretion. Not only 
did he transcribe British colonial policy from the halls of the Colonial Office to the southern 
African veld; he was undoubtedly one of the most important and innovative architects of African 
labour and land policies. His policy making in South Africa was a reactive process - it was 
sparked by resistance to colonialism. Once defeated, subject peoples, under his oppressive rule, 
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had to be suitably controlled and subjugated. That he failed in the case of the Boers does not 
detract from the importance of his role. That he was one of the early architects of African 
colonial policy is undeniable and it is remarkable that his role has been consistently underrated 
- and even ignored, in the historiography of 19th century colonialism in southern Africa. Indeed, 
in many ways he was a forerunner of that particular brand of British imperialism which reached 
its zenith in southern Africa by the close of the century. 
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